/lit/ - Literature

>>15890253
Damn that nigga smart

>>15890253
it influenced them by retroactively BTFO'ing them

He assassinated Enlightenment, incinerated it, and ate its ashes for breakfast.

>>15890253
Fichte, who was a disciple of Kant, created the German Idealism, you know, Hegel (Romanticism)

>>15890253
It moved the exterior world's center into the mind. It's essentially a logical proof of Hindu doctrines about self and the universe.

>>15890349
How did Fichte and Hegel create romanticism? It seems they're just a small part of it

>>15890362
>It moved the exterior world's center into the mind.
Plato did this few millennia before

Fichte did not accept the Kantian argument about the existence of the noumenon or "things in themselves", super-sensitive realities beyond the categories of human reason. He saw the rigorous and systematic separation between "things themselves" and things "as they are represented to us" (phenomena) as an invitation to skepticism.

Rather than accept such skepticism, Fichte radically suggested that the notion of the noumenal world (and the "thing itself") should be abandoned and instead accepted the fact that consciousness is not grounded in the so-called "real world" imaginary represented as "outside" of cognitive consciousness.

>>15890363
they did not create it

>>15890373
No one took his shit srs

>>15890375
Fichte is a joke in philosophy departments across the planet. Why didd you post this?

>>15890395
>How did this influece romanticism

>>15890375
Kant only accepted noumenon because there was no way to demonstrate it doesn't exist; he didn't himself believe that it must exist.
> Fichte radically suggested that the notion of the noumenal world (and the "thing itself")
But these are very different... you can do away with noumena and still have things-in-themselves by simply not having "intelligible" parts in an appearance.
>should be abandoned and instead accepted the fact that consciousness is not grounded in the so-called "real world" imaginary represented as "outside" of cognitive consciousness.
That's quite similar to Berkeley, no?

>>15890395
>No one took his shit srs
So you mean Kant's merit is "proving" or rather being more autistic about systematising the limits of rationality? What was the bridge from him saying this in academic circles to romantic poets and and artists sperging out?

>>15890395
>in philosophy departments across the planet.

>>15890404
noumena simply *are* intelligible objects.

>>15890658
No, noumena are thoughts... Have you ever read Kant?

>>15890714
yes.
'thoughts' are judgments, the connection of a predicate to a subject. noumena are possible objects of thought, but not the thoughts themselves. at least not for kant.
kant compares the concept of noumena directly with plato's ideas, the distinction between noumena and phenomena to that of the ancients. the simple meaning of the terms makes this evident. phenomenon: a thing that appears; noumena: a thing as it is thought.

>>15890793
>a thing as it is thought.
So it's a thought not an object
>objects of thought
Are you being purposefully obtuse? Objects are the content of thoughts that have objective validity. Thoughts are created via understanding. Noumea are thoughts that relate to objects without having bee sensed. They're not the objects-in-themselves; they're how the understanding cogizes them without them being passed via sensibility.

>>15890253
In various ways.

>>15890837
a THING *as it is* thought, as opposed to how it appears
kant *identifies* noumena with the things('das Dingen')-in-themselves. this is a change in the sense of the term from the ancient use, but the term still refers to intelligible (again, as opposed to intuited) objects. they are simply the ground of our sensation, without determinate content.

>>15890881
>a THING *as it is* thought,
Yes, so not as it exists. As it is thought via understading. The thing-in-itself is the thing as it is.

>>15890891
>The thing-in-itself is the thing as it is.
>not as it exists
ah.

>>15890909
?

>>15890919
just stay with it for awhile.
consider the meaning of the verb 'esse' 'essen' 'to be'

>>15890929
I don't speak German nor pseudism. If you have an argument I'll read it tomorrow morning. Noumena, if it exists, results from the faculty of understading, and the content of it would be the object-in-itself but without a mediate sensation/intuition by sensibility. And yes, it's like Plato's forms.

>>15890362
This. It gave the ultimate justification for navel-gazing retard.
>muh noumena
>muh intuition

>>15890404
>That's quite similar to Berkeley, no?
Except Berkeley didn't ground it in the self-positing I.

>>15890375
and yet. and yet.

Fichte introduced not one but two "things-in-themselves" in his own system.
Firstly, he introduced the "absolute I", the I in which there is only infinite positivity prior to its first negation or self-determination. This absolute ground of subject and object is a noumena which he inferred because of the self-positing activity of the empirical I; in other words, he abstracts from experience and then applies it transendently, a basic Kantian err.

Secondly he has to overcome the problem of why the I should first negate itself to begin with (a problem resolved later by Hegel), e.g why is there something rather than nothing. To do this he introduces the "check", which is a "feeling" the I has, which causes it to first attempt to determine itself. In where this "check" comes from he falls back into Kantian skepticism- we cannot know. Nevermind that such a check is already a determination and explains nothing.

>>15891285
>in other words, he abstracts from experience and then applies it transendently, a basic Kantian err.
I dunno seems pretty based to me, formal wrongness is sometimes necessary for intuitive truth.

>>15890253
>romanticism
via his 2nd and 3rd critiques (particularly the third) which postulated an underlying ground - practical Reason - as a substrate which manifests nature purposively in reason but mechanically in appearance. His ideas of beauty here as our recognition of this purposiveness, and the other side of the coin in art, influenced the holistic nature of romanticism. What were essentially euphemisms in Kant became explicit in Fichte, inspiring Holderlin, Schiller, Novalis, etc.

>marxism, critical theory
This is via Hegel and Schelling. Hegel's philosophy was made possible by Kant and his inverted world but Hegel was not a Kantian. Late Schelling has Kantian sympathies, and his critiques of Hegel lead, by way of Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, etc, to Marx

>>15891304
you may like this quote from him.

but none the less, he is claiming about the I something necessary and scientific, not something he feels "intuitively"(?) assuming you mean that word colloquially

>>15890253
Well he influenced "virtually every subsequent wester philosopher" so if you extrapolate from that every product of w. phil since then was influenced by kant.

>>15890793
>>15890881
this is 100% wrong. If this were so, Kant would be a dogmatic idealist. I refuse to believe you read CoPR, you are pulling this out of your ass

>>15891466
there's nothing controversial in what i wrote. it's not even an interpretation, only the meaning of the text as it was intended.
but yes, kant is, when you remove the inconsistencies and sleights of hand in his argument, an idealist.

>>15891484
sorry but you got filtered

>>15891487
whatever, dude.

>>15891416
>assuming you mean that word colloquially
No, I apologise for not being more exact. Thank you anon, very nice quote. And I think goes well with Carlyle's "great man theory" and the illumination of truth.

>>15890881
Kant refers to the "noumena" of traditional metaphysics disparagingly as "thought-things"

>>15891791
and then employs the concept in a similar and yet totally incoherent way. strange.

After reading this, Heinrich Von Kleist wanted to kill himself. Which he did a few years later with his dying mistress

>>15890349
Eh. Fichte was hugely inspired by Kant, but his philosophy was a direct attack aimed at Kantian trascendental criticism. I really think you can't call yourself a Kantian if you reject the noumenon-phenomenon distinction, and all the German idealists did exactly that.
>>15890395
>Fichte is a joke in philosophy departments across the planet. Why didd you post this?
He's not though. Search his name on jstor: you'll discover that relevant and serious scholarship concerning his philosophy is still being produced all over the world.
>inb4 you're just parroting thr Schopenhauer quotes youve read on 4chan
>>15890714
Have you read Kant's second critiques?
>>15890793
No no, Noumena for Kant aren't possible objects of thought! Only phenomena are! That's why in the second critique our noumenic freedom can only be proven through a fact, rather than a determinative judgement!

>>15891370
So it was Fichte that inspired romanticism? And that was only German Romanticism while in other parts in Europe stuff like e.g. French Revolution may have had a bigger impact than some distant musings of Kant

>>15891484
>kant is, when you remove the inconsistencies and sleights of hand in his argument, an idealist.

>>15891484
Which "sleights of hands"?

>>15891466
>>15891484
>>15893407
Kant is a transcendental idealist

>>15893614
>meaningless post

>>15893016
>That's why in the second critique our noumenic freedom can only be proven through a fact, rather than a determinative judgement!
Why do you need the 2nd critique for this? He justified free will in the first critique by means of intelligible causes

>>15893621
How is it meaningless when you’re arguing over basic misunderstandings of noumena

>>15893638
The discussion is whether he's a *dogmatic* idealist like the ones he criticizes (e.g. Berekely).
>basic misunderstandings of noumena
Ok, clarify them then?

>>15890253
by making them misunderstand what he said

>>15893657
He’s not, and he makes that clear as such in the Prolegomena. Noumena give the object form, not its matter.

>>15893666
Devil trips of truth

>>15893675
>t. only read Prolegomena

>>15893683
Explain to me where I’m going wrong.

>>15893687
People are arguing that Kant is inconsistent in the use of his terminology and the first two critiques can lead to different interpretations of noumena and thus his idealism. How would you expect to contribute to the conversation if you only read Prolegomena?

>>15893732
Because it’s the most accurate summation of his thoughts on noumena and their relation to Berkleyan idealism, where most of the contention in this thread seems to be coming from.

Why did Ayn Rand hate him?
I thought deontology was the basis of libertarian ethics.

>>15893790
who

>>15893630
In the first critique he only establish that a free cause can be thought without incurring into any contradiction with the natural law. That's it, apart from this he is adamant that theoretical reason cannot identify any determinate free cause.

To prove the existence of such a cause you need the second critique, which proves our freedom through an analysis of our practical reason. Read the the first chapter of the second critique if you want to know more about it, it's just 30-40 pages long.

>>15893756
>>15893732
>>15893687
>>15893683
>>15893675
>>15893666
Can you guys summarize your positions? I'd like to take part into this discussion, but I genuinely cannot understand who's arguing for what

>>15893790
Dunno, she didn't even read him.

>>15893945
>To prove the existence of such a cause you need the second critique, which proves our freedom through an analysis of our practical reason.
But practical reason can't prove existence?

From the first critique

>>15893973
It does not prove the existence of our will, rather it proves that it is free. In this sense it proves that at least one free cause exist (my will).

>>15894004
Kant changed his mind on this one btw, he points it out in both the Groundworks and the second critique. In these works the highest good is a product of moral law, rather than its principle.

>>15890404
>Kant only accepted noumenon because there was no way to demonstrate it doesn't exist; he didn't himself believe that it must exist
He literally gives an explicit argument for their existence in the Refutation of Idealism in the first critique. At best what you can say is that noumena cannot be positively determined: still, he thinks we can know they exist because our experience cannot be accounted for by our intellectual faculties.

In the trascendental deduction he also gives a, imho, stronger argument for it. Here's a very concise summary, according to what I have understood. Our intellect is a purely synthetic faculty. It can produce by itself an experience only through the faculty of reproductive imagination. To work, this faculty requires intuitive representations, so that it can recombine them: so every act of imagination requires, and this can be said a priori, a previously cognized intuition. This means that it cannot be the case that our entire experience has been the product of our sole imagination and intellect. This means that our receptivity, which is a passive faculty, has to be had activated by something other than my intellectual faculties and their products (the representations obtained from said faculties). That "something other" is, at this point, by definition a noumenon, since we've just excluded every possible phenomenon.
As you see, and as I've said at the beginning of the post, this does not let us determine those noumena in any concievable way. Even their concept is purely negative (a noumenon is an indeterminate non-phenomenon). All we can say is that something other than phenomena and our intellectual faculties must necessarily exist for our experience to have be taken place.

>>15894154
>He literally gives an explicit argument for their existence in the Refutation of Idealism in the first critique.
Post it? As I recall, he argues about objects-in-themselves there, not about noumena. Also that entire section was only added in the 2nd edition after people kept criticizing him for being an idealist. Schopenhauer also criticizes the 2nd edition (pic related)

>>15894154
>This means that it cannot be the case that our entire experience has been the product of our sole imagination and intellect. This means that our receptivity, which is a passive faculty, has to be had activated by something other than my intellectual faculties and their products (the representations obtained from said faculties).
Nowhere it follows that the object for our intuitions must exist anywhere else than in our mind. Maybe the confusion lies in you using 'intellect', which I don't remember it being a central concept in the transcendental doctrine of the elements at least in the Cambridge translation. What do you mean by intellect?

>>15894227
I haven't argued for the correspondence of noumena and phenomena, only for the existence of the former. I don't think that the argument he gives (based on the substantiality of phenomena) is enough to prove said correspondence: as far as I know every representation in my experience apart from the first ones could have been fully produced by my reproductive imagination. Still, even in this case the existence of noumena would be necessary.
>>15894204
From what i've read Schopenhauer had a really bad grasp on Kant's notion of negative determination (and kantian logic in general, which, to be fair, was not published at the time) and noumena. For example he thinks that Kant contradicts himself when he says that our experience has been caused by noumena, since the concept of causality, according to his misreading, cannot be applied to noumena. This happens because he doesn't know that noumena are defined negatively (in opposition to phenomena), and negative concepts (under the category of limitation) are entirely indeterminate (he says this in the 10th section of the Analytics). Kant does not contradict himself by saying that experience is not self-caused, and by doing so he doesn't have to determine any specific noumenon. That said, I don't know enough about Schopenhauer's philosophy to know why he was so invested in this misreading.

Also I'll point out that the argument I've summarized can be derived from the TD section of the first edition.

>>15894314
>as far as I know every representation in my experience apart from the first ones could have been fully produced by my reproductive imagination. Still, even in this case the existence of noumena would be necessary.
How? They're all traced back to your first determinated intuitions

>>15894314
>the concept of causality, according to his misreading, cannot be applied to noumena.
What's the meaning of applying the concept of causality to something that was not intuited in time? How do you define noumena and how do you think causality can be applied to them?

>>15894370
Those first determined intuitions would not be the product of my intellectual faculties, that's what I'm saying.

>>15894390
>What's the meaning of applying the concept of causality to something that was not intuited in time?
It's not a positive determination (as in the judgement "this noumenon A caused this intuition A1": rather it is a negative determination, as in "my experience was not caused by the representations it contains, nor my intellectual faculties".
>How do you define noumena
Negatively, in opposition to phenomena (a noumenon is a not-phenomenon), as Kant states in the section dedicated to the noumena-phenomena distinction. Saying that noumena caused my experience is analitically identical to saying that my experience was not caused by phenomena.
When it comes to theoretical reason this is the only possible definition of noumena.

>>15894204
things-in-themselves. are. noumena.
see section 29 of the prolegomena, where the terms are presented as synonyms.

>>15890253
He influenced Schopenhauer which in turn influenced Nietzsche which in turn influenced (one way or another) all major artists of the 20th century.

>>15894439
yet he also calls noumena the 'true correlate of sensibility' (cpr a 3o/b 45) and that this *must* be so lest we arrove at the 'absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears' (cpr b xxvi)
far beyond a mere limitation of the intellect. we can somehow know the source, and yet not know the source, of our sensations.

>>15894480
Do you mean here? This is only saying that pure concepts of understanding with no relation to experience would be things-in-themselves (or noumena.) That doesn't mean all things-in-themselves are noumena or that the two are synonymous. It just means that noumena are things-in-themselves, but things-in-themselves don't have to be noumena (e.g. a transcedental object that doesn't affect any subjects)

>>15894439
>Those first determined intuitions would not be the product of my intellectual faculties, that's what I'm saying.
Intuitions are noumena because they're not a product of intellectual faculties? You lost me. Noumena doesn't have corresponding intuitions.

>>15894531
your brain is mud. fimd a new hobby.

>>15894508
Yes, I agree. I don't know wether there is still a point of contentiom here.
>>15894540
No, rather they are caused by noumena, because receptivity is not a spontaneous faculty, and because we could have not produced said first intuitions through reproductive imagination.

>>15894439
>my experience was not caused by phenomena.
Experience is just empirical cognition. Phenomena are appereances. Appearences are objects of empirical intuition. Experience is not caused by not-phenomena

>>15894556
Feel free to provide an argument instead of being bad-mannered for no reason.

>>15894566
i'm not arguing with you, just expanding. keep up the good fight.

>>15894578
synonyms are not necessarily coextensive but they can be used interchageably in the proper contexts. kant identifies things-in-themselves as noumena many times. no, not all noumena are things-in-themselves. yes, all transcendental objects are noumena. yes, a thing-in-itself is a transcendental object.

>>15894608
So if a thing exists independently of any mind and is not or cannot be perceived by any subject, would you call this noumena?

>>15894540
Could you also answer this question so I understand better what you think by noumena? >>15894635

>>15894649
Sorry meant to reply to >>15894566 if you could answer >>15894635

>>15894635
no, that would be an unknown object, like an undiscovered planet.

>>15894664
And that, in your opinion, is not a thing-in-itself? If not, why?

>>15894672
it's not in kant's sense of the term, as it is at least theoretically an object of possible experience in that it could be perceived with the proper instruments or some other means like long distance space travel.
but you wrote 'cannot be perceived by any subject' in which case you might call it a transcendental object i.e. a noumenon in that it is a purely intellectual invention. but as it serves no real function in the system of metaphysical concepts i doubt kant would elevate the notion with such a title.

>>15894714
>it is a purely intellectual invention
What if the object cannot be thought (along with not being perceivable)?

>>15894568
I'm not sure you've understood what I've said.
>>15894649
I've responded here >>15894566
I'm not saying that those first intuitions are noumena, rather I am saying that they have not been produced by our reproductuve imagination (by recombining previously cognized intuitions). This means that what has activated our receptivity, for us to cognize those first intuitions, is not a phenomenon nor our imagination.
Since we have an experience, Kant think that this should lead us to believe that noumena exists.
>>15894635
Yes, this fits Kant's notion of noumenon

>>15894740
then it is not an object. it is nothing.
at least, nothing for you.

>>15894792
I see, so you're saying an object must be capable of being thought in order to be an object and both things-in-themselves and noumena are objects. I didn't get that from Kant--that an object cannot be unthinkable.

So then you also don't subscribe to the negative definition of noumena: althouggh that unthinkable thing is not a phenomenon, you also think it's not a noumena. Someone above uses the negative definition of noumena; can I ask how do you define noumena?

>>15894785
It sounds like we're using different definitions of noumena then. I never found any reference where Kant explicitly considered noumena to be possible without the capacity of understanding or without it being a thought or a concept.

>>15894849
I think this is a contention about a fine detail more than anything. It is in a sense true that we cannot talk about noumena insofar are they are not a correlate of phenomena, but only because we would have no reason to assume their existence.
So when you asked
>So if a thing exists independently of any mind and is not or cannot be perceived by any subject, would you call this noumena?
I conceded the existence for such a noumenon only for the sake of speculation. If there were to be such an object, it would be a noumenon. Still, when we leave speculative reason and get into theoretical reason, I could simply not grant the existence of such an object. If God were to exist, he would be such a noumenon, but theoretical reason won't ever let us grant said existence.

>>15894903
>I think this is a contention about a fine detail more than anything.
I don't know why you think that. Your argument that the first intuitions are caused by noumena only works for the noumena in the negative sense.

>>15894946
And? I'm not sure I'm following you. I'm not claiming that that argument proves the existence of noumena as they are intended by your previous question ("things that exists independently of any mind and are not or cannot be perceived by any subject"). That was a completely different argument, and in it (you can check) I've specified multiple times that I was only talking about noumena in the negative sense. I've also pointed it out in my previois post, when I said
>If there were to be such an object, it would be a noumenon. Still, when we leave speculative reason and get into theoretical reason, I could simply not grant the existence of such an object. If God were to exist, he would be such a noumenon, but theoretical reason won't ever let us grant said existence.

>>15894976
Yes, I just meant that the disagreement was due to using different definitions of noumena, and I thought you meant that the distinction was just a small detail. I agree with you re: the negative use of noumena

>>15893675
how can someone be so wrong about Kant? Noumena give objects their form?? lmao. What part of "formal idealism" was confusing to you. How did you miss the entire content of the Critique and walk away with the opposite take-away when he is repetitive about it to the point of absurdity. This board is unbelievable sometimes

>>15894835
>so you're saying an object must be capable of being thought in order to be an object
no, sorry, i was actually mocking your use of the term object in that instance.
some 'thing' that can neither be perceived, thought, or otherwise represented can be no 'thing'. but an (external) object (Gegenstand, as opposed to Ding or Objekt) does not need to be conceptually determined ('thought') in order to be an (external) object (Gegenstand); it need merely be situated in space and time i.e. formally apprehended by the intuition.
i do believe kant fails in his attempt to demonstrate the structural necessity of the thing in itself, negatively or otherwise, without falling into some contradiction with the terms of his own system e.g. the limitation that he has placed on the legitimate use of the pure concepts of the understanding. i am tired of this argument, though, so i won't be continuing.

>>15894314
>For example he thinks that Kant contradicts himself when he says that our experience has been caused by noumena, since the concept of causality, according to his misreading, cannot be applied to noumena.
It's not a misreading. Schopenhauer refers to Kant's philosophy as in the first edition of CoPR.

>>15895324
So now you say objects must be "formally apprehended by intuition" so noumena are not objects by this definition. Or maybe you are just mocking my use of terms again; it's hard to tell with geniuses like yourself.

>>15895361
I'm not sure what he thinks is the relevant difference between the two editions. I'm asking becsuse this is a heavily debated topic, and lots of people have their own answer to this question.

>>15895466
In the first edition, noumena are defined as concepts that lack a sensual origin.

>>15895428
again, noumena are intelligible objects that are nevertheless not possible objects of experience. in a sense this is only a manner of speaking and, as you seem hung up on some restrictive and personal definition of object, maybe we should drop the use of it in this case for something else. what about idea? noumena are ideas of reason. the thing in itself? merely an idea that serves a structural or architechtonic function in the kantian system, namely as the absolutelt unknowable yet still inferrable correlate of our sensations.

>>15895484 here
I've grown tired of this conversation but if you want to read more about the true and uncontroversial reading of Kant's objects (Gegenstand) I have written about it in my book "The synthesis of the objective and the subjective", which will answer any further questions and explain how Noumena give the object (as opposed to Objekt) form

>>15895476
>>15895484
god? noumenon
free will? noumenon
the soul? noumenon

>>15895484
>the thing in itself? merely an idea that serves a structural or architechtonic function in the kantian system, namely as the absolutelt unknowable yet still inferrable correlate of our sensations.
That, to me, sounds a lot closer to the transcendental object than to the thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself exists independently of our intuition if it exists at all.

>>15895582
or how about you s u c c my d i c c you pansy ass r e t a r d

>>15895598
the thing in itself is a transcendental object. any 'necessary' concept that cannot be given determinate content in an a priori judgment is a transcendental object.

>>15895476
?
Sorry, I'm lost. Keep in mind that I know almost nothing about Schopenhauer's philosophy, so I'm not really sure how to connect the dots. Also noumena weren't characterized as mere concepts, otherwise the whole Dialectic part would make no sense whatsoever.

Also, and I should have pointed it out earlier, I'm not sure what's the point in taking the first edition over the second. It is sure helpful to read it to deepen our understanding of Kant's philosophy, but when it comes to what he actually thought, the second edition is the one we should refer to (he stood by it up to the day of his death, and he had planned to write a massive commentary of it, in which every sentence would have been more thoroughly justified). Giving priority to the first edition, as far as I know, is in line with Schopenhauer's personal preferences, since I've read that he also dismisses the last two critiques. If I had to guess, that happened because Schoppy wants to presents himself as Kantian while also denying almost everything Kant said. If that's the case, he shouldn't be trusted when it comes to these purely philological question (basically, when it comes to ascertain what Kant actually said).

>>15895612
I don't agree with your equivalences that the things-in-themselves are noumena, the thing-in-itself is a transcendental object, etc. I find them to be different things similar to how they're described here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/#ThinThemNoumTranObje

>>15890253

>>15895644
>Also noumena weren't characterized as mere concepts
Concepts as in objects of the understanding. Why do you think the Dialectic doesn't make sense this way?

>>15895646
i will defer to the entry in the blackwell dictionary for transcendental object
pic related
i think the implications are obvious. let me know if there is further confusion.

>>15895671
you are such a piece of shit

>>15895671
>Concepts as in objects of the understanding.
Only in the positive sense. The negative sense was not introduced in the second edition.
>Why do you think the Dialectic doesn't make sense this way?
Because the Dialectic section doesn't deal with noumena in the negative sense. If Kant only meant noumena in the positive sense, he would have added a section dedicated to noumena as correlates of our intuition. It is clear that Kant upheld this distinction (positive/negative sense) in the first edition too. The second edition only confirms this philological interpretation
Btw I'm not this guy>>15895691, dunno why he's so mad at you

>>15895678
Yes, the implication is that they are different things but Kant uses them interchangeably where appropriate: e.g. the transcendental object is defined in relation to a sensible apperances but a thing-in-itself is not dependent on intuition, but it can be situationally related.

>>15895761
it is quite the reverse, kant is inconsistent im his usage and the distinction is besides that an unnecessary subtlety.

>>15895761
>>15895782
if the transcendental object is the correlate of sensation, and the thing in itself is also the correlate of sensation, why should we not identify these two supposedly distinct concepts?
x=y
x=z
therefore z=y

Who cares? None of this does anything for anyone. Get a life loser.

>>15895750
Not sure I'm following. Do you mean that there are sections in the dialectic that can only be understood if noumena are considered only in the negative or only in the positive sense? If so, which sections?

>>15895820
>and the thing in itself is also the correlate of sensation
It is not necessarilly because the thing-in-itself is not dependent on intuition or sensation.

>>15895838
>Do you mean that there are sections in the dialectic that can only be understood if noumena are considered only in the negative or only in the positive sense?
Yes. If noumena as correlates of intuitions were to be noumena in the positive sense, they would be dealt with in the trascendental dialectic sections, among the other ideas of pure reason (which are all, to use your definition, "concepts that lack a sensual origin"). I really think that Kant didn't think that noumena as correlates of intuitions were to be intended in the positive sense.
>If so, which sections?
Basically the whole second book, since we're talking about a section that, under this notion (namely that in the first edition Kant talked about noumena only in the positive sense), should have been included in it, with its own section.

>>15895846
nor am i saying any such thing. however kant does make sensation dependent on the thing-in-itself as 'the true correlate of sensibility'. his words. 30 a/ 45b. the same is said of the transcendental object (a 494/ b 522), though the term is then 'correspondent' rather than 'correlate'. the meaning is essentially the same.

>>15895879
you are confusing sensation with intuition and the transcendental object with noumena generally. please get the fuck our of here.

>>15895900
So far I've been very kind and patient to you. Please, reciprocate. Give some substance to your critique and avoid hurdling insults.

>>15895879
>Yes. If noumena as correlates of intuitions were to be noumena in the positive sense, they would be dealt with in the trascendental dialectic sections, among the other ideas of pure reason
But why would a concept of the understanding be dealt with along with ideas of pure reason? The dialectic talks about reason, and the analytic talks about understanding: the noumena in the positive sense are objects of the understanding thus fit in the analytic.

>>15895976
there's nothing to substantiate, it's a basic fucking confusion on your part. fuck off.

>>15895896
I don't see how they're the same: the thing-in-itself is independent of our senses and possible experience, and the transcendental object is a an object that makes experience possible. Sure they're related and they can both be considered to be the correspondents or correlates of sensibility depending on the context, but that doesn't make them synonymous.

>>15895979
Because noumena as correlates of intuition, in the positive sense, would become purely regulative concepts: basically, concepts I need to presuppose for a need of reason (I hope this is the right translation) in order to think. As such they would deserve their own section, to dispel the inevitable doubt about their possible existence. But Kant clearly means those correlates in the negative sense (and he thinks they exist).
>>15895980
Oh, I thought you were that other guy.

>>15896074
>they can both be considered to be the correspondents or correlates of sensibility depending on the context, but that doesn't make them synonymous.
yes, it *l i t e r a l l y* does.

>>15896084
>Because noumena as correlates of intuition,
Just to make sure: when you say correlates of intuition, you do keep in consideration that it is not sensible intuition i.e. "noumenas as correlates of non-sensible intuition" rather than of intuition in general, right?
>concepts I need to presuppose for a need of reason (I hope this is the right translation) in order to think. As such they would deserve their own section, to dispel the inevitable doubt about their possible existence.
Not sure why noumena should be presupposed or why the doubt regarding their possible existence should be dispelled. Kant doesn't claim they do or do not exist in the first edition and he appeared to be of the opinion that we can't know if they exist.