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15648339 No.15648339 [Reply] [Original]

>destroys any possibility of materialistic accounts of mental experiences in 8 pages
Can a man be more based?

https://www.newdualism.org/papers/J.Levine/Levine-PPQ1983.pdf

>> No.15648343

>>15648339
im not reading 8 pages, explain it in greentext nigger

>> No.15648349

>>15648343
Read it faggot

>> No.15648359
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15648359

>>15648349
no
fuck u

>> No.15648390

Kek I just finished reading this. captured a lot of intuitions I had about the subject, especially the standard of similarity/dissimilarity stuff. surprised to see Locke's indirect realism is still relevant and quite on the money as I always suspected it was. the only thing I still don't quite get is why the argument applies for pain but not for heat. anyways I like guys like him they're just really sharp and get down to it. Based OP, based paper, all around a based experience.

>> No.15648408
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15648408

>>15648390
explain it in greentext

>> No.15648464

>>15648390
If you are interested in knowing more, I was skimming through this page:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Irreducible

>> No.15648477

>>15648408
>pain being some functional state x doesn't explain why pain should feel the way it does
>if that is the case, we can imagine that the quale of pain is realized disjunctively, ie by both the firing of c-fibers and some other state we can imagine that results in the same phenomenal property known as "pain"
>this is what locke meant by the arbitrary connection between corpuscular processes and the ideas we experience of them
>in the case of other organisms with different physical constitutions, the materialistic account can't furnish us with a standard of comparison between our sensation of pain and theirs, because the physical process can no longer explain the quality they're intended to explain

>> No.15648492
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15648492

>>15648477
ehm ... in english, doc?

>> No.15648516

>>15648492
oh I thought I was getting quizzed.

he's saying pain can't just be nerves brooo because that doesn't explain why pain feels the way that it does to begin with. if pain is something arbitrarily connected to its physical cause, then maybe more than one kind of physical cause can produce it. if you had aliens with hydraulic nerve systems their materialists would say pain was just my valves opening brooo, or whatever. so it seems like pain has a quality that is "universal" in a way that materialists can't explain

>> No.15648544
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15648544

>>15648516
im going back to /fa/

>> No.15648554

>>15648516
Could the same idea be applied to thought in general? A thought in itself is different than some molecules moving around.

>> No.15648559

>>15648516
(and the same is true for any other qualia, such as sensory perceptions, ecc. ecc.)

>> No.15648567

>>15648544
lol bro you got it. he's just saying there's a quality to pain that materialists can't explain. there's something more to it than just chemicals.

>> No.15648569

>>15648477
But isn't that just the god in the gaps? People used to say this about visions and dreams, but recently a few papers were published explaining the fractal visions observed by LSD users. A distributed network of neurons hooked up to pixels will give rise to fractals at certain critical levels of excitement. This really the entire vision has been characterized at all length scales, from the atom to the "mind screen". Why wouldn't we be able to figure out in 50 years why pain feels "sharp"?

>> No.15648573

>>15648554
I think it does, that is the point. If you read the SEP page on qualia, where I found the paper, almost all of your inner experience can be included in the category discussed in the paper:

>QUALIA: (1) Perceptual experiences, for example, experiences of the sort involved in seeing green, hearing loud trumpets, tasting liquorice, smelling the sea air, handling a piece of fur. (2) Bodily sensations, for example, feeling a twinge of pain, feeling an itch, feeling hungry, having a stomach ache, feeling hot, feeling dizzy. Think here also of experiences such as those present during orgasm or while running flat-out. (3) Felt reactions or passions or emotions, for example, feeling delight, lust, fear, love, feeling grief, jealousy, regret. (4) Felt moods, for example, feeling elated, depressed, calm, bored, tense, miserable. (For more here, see Haugeland 1985, pp. 230–235).

>> No.15648581

>>15648554
yeah I suppose so he's just saying "it's all chemicals man" just never hitches the gap between the physical thing and what it feels like, its intrinsic phenomenal quality.

>> No.15648584

>>15648569
Can you post the titles? I'd be super interested in reading anything on the subject

>> No.15648591

>>15648569

because it'd be like trying to provide a formula for why red feels "red". Berkeley already anticipated this. you're trying to explain an idea with what isn't one, it's like trying to explain what a sound is using color. it's just two different things. and besides, reproducing the qualia with artificial neurons doesn't explain how it is produced in the first place, THAT it is (in this way)

>> No.15648599

>pain can't be material beacause hypotheticals
These are the dumbfucks who complain about leftists being "feels over reals" lmao

>> No.15648620
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15648620

>>15648339
Yes, certain experiences are subjective, when they shouldn't be in the first place. The answer is consciousness.

>> No.15648650

>>15648584
Elementary visual hallucinations and their relationships to neural pattern-forming mechanisms.

Could only find this one quickly, but if you're competent it should be enough to find more. In general dynamical phase space models applied to brain activity are making wild progress imo. There's I believe a PRL showing that the determinant characterizing the stability of a dynamic attractor switches sign when you fall a sleep. It seemed universal, they tested a worm and a monkey.

>> No.15648677

>>15648544
Imagine a pink elephant. That image you see in your minds eye, what space in the world does it occupy? I mean nobody else can touch it, smell it, hear it, see it. So what is it made of? If it's not just made of atoms, there must be more to life than just material stuff.

>> No.15648731

>>15648591
But in the end all experience is structure. Color is a dimension, wether it gets labeled by an arrow or a shade in the brain would matter little for our interpretation of the world. If you put shades on a child flipping the colors of the world, he believes those to be the true qualia. You haven't changed anything meta physical but changed qualia. You can probably go much further, adding heat sensation to hearing and hearing to sight by simply rewiring. Ocular implants don't need to be wired to the correct nerve bundles, in a few days the brain organizes the structured noise to images. I believe.many qualia in our lifetime will be shown to be structured neural patterns seeded by the outside world, and characterizing the patter formation will allows us to manipulate qualia by purely physical means. Maybe not everything, but the gap will become smaller and smaller.

If you want to save meta physics I believe you have to delve in to the structure, not the mind, as this is just matter.

>> No.15648777

>>15648477
And this is why "animal rights" is a joke. Animal pain is not human pain.

>> No.15648798
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15648798

>imagine the aliens
>i want to believe

>> No.15648812
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15648812

>>15648339
>dualism

>> No.15648825

>>15648777
pain is pain. their screams will always be more convincing than weasel word games

>> No.15648829

>>15648349
Kys