/lit/ - Literature

C, did I win?

>>15308985
Can’t be determined yet. This is a poll. Winners will be the ones who selected the answer of the plurality and will have decided this question once and for all.

Bump

>>15308977
It's just a rule of intelligibility.

>>15309194
So, b?

>>15308977
All the ones that aren't C are reducible to each other and are false.

>>15309215
No, that's a bit grandiose. Logical truths are true by definition.

>>15308977
The rule of non-contradiction isn't valid. The universe is Dialetheistic.
>>15308985
False, superposition violates non-contradiction.
>>15309240
C is wrong, the universe is dialetheistic.

>>15309243
So, a?

>>15309251
>False, superposition violates non-contradiction
>>>/x/

>>15309251
>The rule of non-contradiction isn’t valid.
So, a?

>>15309251
>isn't valid
>he still believes in negations
OH NO NO NO

>>15309267
You have low IQ
>>15309272
Yea I guess so, it was assumed true based on classical understanding but the universe is not classical, so we must rid ourselves of it.
Much like how excluded middle was considered true until the constructivists showed it was not valid so we rid ourselves of it.

>>15309309
>Yea I guess so, it was assumed true based on classical understanding but the universe is not classical, so we must rid ourselves of it.
No, we don't get rid of it. We basically rephrase supposed exceptions like "the spin is both up and down" to "the spin is up in world1 and down in world2". That's why it is true by definition: we always rephrase things so as to preserve its truth.

>>15309350
There is no world one or world two.
The spin is both up and down is what is actually happening.

>>15309254
No, it's not an empirical truth.

>>15309309
>You have low IQ
popsci nigger cope

>>15309362
>The spin is both up and down is what is actually happening.
>>>/x/

>>15309370
>>15309378

>>15309362
The experiment only has a single outcome, though. When it is in a pure state of superposition before measurement, it is neither up nor down nor both.

>>15309384
This is still paraconsistent and implies dialetheism.

>>15309362
This kind of presumptuousness is what keeps you from participating in actual scientific inquiry, anon.

>>15309394
No, only mixed states can be described as "both", and we only experience one outcome.

>>15309396
I'm a graduate student researching quantum information theory
>>15309413
While in superposition its in a mixed state, when we observe it in one state does not mean it was "secretly in one state and then we found out about it". The state vector contains all states, that is what is actually happening.

>>15308977
It's c. In every field from every culture in living non living beings the nature of one things being not existing as it's own things being is considered logically foul

>>15309441
>its c
the universe is paraconsistent.

>>15309251
Stfu u god damned retard.

>>15309447
How do u figure?

>>15309448 (you)

>>15309430
>I'm a graduate student researching quantum information theory
( X )

>>15309459 (you)

>>15309430
>While in superposition its in a mixed state
While in superposition, the state is neither up nor down. So it is not both.

>when we observe it in one state does not mean it was "secretly in one state and then we found out about it"
Exactly. Before measurement it was neither up nor down nor both. It was in superposition.

>>15309447
>uses a logic with weaker claims
Nobody is surprised you think everything is fake and paraconsistent logic is weak in many fields. It's not just weak on objective claims it can't do everything modal or some other logics can do

I'm so glad paraconsistent logic has never done anything worth a damned and it never will. They have to steal from real ideas and do a slipshod attempt at putting it back under its umbrella while never actually doing so

>>15309383
>>15309458
>>15309470
I appreciate these rare wojaks. post mor

>>15309509
Stop being a cunt a go study your fake logic

>>15309474
The formal quantum logic is paraconsistent. Superposition is a form of paraconsistent logic. Every time we write out a state vector and begin to compute results, we are using paraconsistent logic.
>>15309480
I dont think everything is fake, I accept that there are things that are paraconsistent. There are also things that aren't paraconsistent. It's quite nuanced.
>>15309504
Quantum logic is paraconsistent.

>>15309528
>Every time we write out a state vector and begin to compute results, we are using paraconsistent logic.
>>>/x/

>>15309516 (you)

>>15309528
It's not nuanced you fucking retard. Your logic allows for nothing. It just let's you say maybe. There's nothing in the world that allows paraconsistent logic

>>15309542
>>15309544

>>15309528
Quantum logic is not paraconsistent you retard. It's closer to fuzzy not paraconsistent

>>15309516
plez stop bullying. im new to thread. just wanna see more rare wojaks
>>15309543
seen it
>>15309552
thanks!

>>15309564
>quantum logic
>>>/x/

>>15309552
That's why you steal ppls ideas, you're an evil cunt. We found out who the wojack poster is and was already mentioned it is a freudian fake cunt

>>15309572
Quantum logic is just a logic trying to map quantum things. They haven't decided on one yet, but tbf we don't have an overarching logic yet so

>>15309564
MVL is a form of paraconsistent logic.
Also:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1306.3121.pdf

>>15309589
No that's backwards. And ur idiocy is why I know no matter how many ideas you steal u will understand none of them and do nothing w them

>>15309572
>>15309582

>>15309587
maybe my response was too harsh but quantum logic is just a cute mathematical exercise. You don’t need to invent new logic to deal with QM

>>15309528
>The formal quantum logic is paraconsistent.
No it isn't, pseud.

>>15309596

>>15309589
That's like saying a fruit is a type of orange. You're an absolute moron

>>15309603
>>15309608

>>15309598
I don't disagree I haven't delved into it yet, I'm still working on numbers first. I'd say the fields I used but I'd rather not have this rat steal any more of my ideas and then post Womack's when he's afraid of confrontation

>>15308977
(a) abstracted from consistent relations in our experience, probably also (c) but we don't know precisely to what extent.

The most fundamental logic is apodictic though, certainly demonstrated by the brute fact of experience itself (e.g. you're not omniscient so you deduce that existence contains more than your experience).

>>15309681
how do you think we make deductions anon?

>>15308977
For me it's b. C just can't be.

>>15310031
Depends on the deduction. In this particular example, via the logic of apodicticity (it is self-evidently true and admits of no other possibilities, regardless of your skepticism towards logic in general).

>>15308977
(e) We made it up because philosophy doesn't work without it

>>15310072
For me it’s c. B just can’t see.

>>15309681
>abstracted from consistent relations in our experience, probably also (c) but we don't know precisely to what extent.
That's like saying the rules of chess are abstracted from experience. Logic has nothing to do with the empirical world. Its laws are determined when the definitions of its terms are stipulated. When the operation of negation is defined, the possibility of (p & ~p) is excluded.

>>15310348
how can it be a feature of nature if you can't know nature

>>15310359
Then you don't define negation except by the non proposition. Using (p & !p) just adds another layer that keeping negation allows it to be more fundamental

>>15310387
It doesn't need to be transcendental and idealist in order to allow an individual to learn from the nature of the universe.

>>15310391
You can't define p from (p & !p) that's four or five levels of derivative. Again it's like defining a fruit to be a type of orange. You need to define p within (p & !p) before you can begin to make that statement. It's a logical fallacy, an actual one not that internet shit

>>15310359
And how do you approach the task of definition? Are you temporarily transported to some realm void of experience? It is impossible for any abstract system to be entirely self-referential. Really think about it, instead of just regurgitating your programming.

>>15310439
>And how do you approach the task of definition?
Same as you would when you stipulate the rules of a new game.

>Are you temporarily transported to some realm void of experience?
No.

>It is impossible for any abstract system to be entirely self-referential.
Not sure what that is supposed to mean.

>Really think about it
I have.

>>15310454
Formalism necessitates an objective reality. It relevantly creates clauses for it but the system only works insofar as it adapts correctly to reality. Formalism isn't a good argument

>>15310460
No idea what you're trying to say here.

>>15310464
Because you're uneducated

>>15310454
Everything about the act of definition is grounded in experience. Consistency, identification, the notion of truth and falsehood... These are features of experience.

You have a naive view of logic as some kind of discrete element of reality... You say logic has nothing to do with the empirical world, but how can anything we speak about have nothing to do with the empirical world?

>Not sure what that is supposed to mean.
If you can't figure that out, then I don't think you're ready for this conversation.

>>15310468
I have a PHD in philosophy from a top 5 department, and specialized in the philosophy of mathematics and logic.

>>15309430
Isn't this just the Copenhagen interpretation?

>>15310472
No offense, but you don't sound like you have much exposure to this topic. You are conflating a number of distinct ideas that have nothing to do with each other. The fact that the laws of logic are not empirical generalizations does not entail the existence of some non-empirical realm.

>>15310474
Formalism is an argument where you believe that the system defines reality which I pull evident from this statement 'Same as you would when you stipulate the rules of a new game.'

So I'm arguing that's not a good foundation for definition because it inherently relies on reality itself.

Is there any way we could conversational debate on logic or something more?

>>15310491
No. Copenhagen doesn’t interpret the particle as actually “being in” all possible states at once. The superposition is an epistemological statement; talking about the state the particle is “in” when it’s not being measured is an abuse of language

>>15310498
All abstractions are grounded in the empirical. You are a dishonest brainlet. Good day.

>>15310491
that's the leading one, right?

>>15310516
It’s the correct one

>>15310504
>Formalism is an argument where you believe that the system defines reality
No, that's not accurate. Formalism attempts to reduce verification in a given domain to a mechanical activity. Formalism in mathematics was put to rest by Godel, at least in its Hilbert formulation. Formalism in logic is much less controversial. The logical connectives can simply be defined by their introduction and elimination rules. I don't know what 'relying on reality' is supposed to mean.

>>15310562
Yeah no that's correct, it doesn't contradict me tho. I think it's a misnomer then in logic, bare with me, because logic is supposed to be defined by an ontology. I get we haven't mechanized a system in ontology well enough to give logic as good of a foundation as logic does to math, insofar as it does but definitely does. I know there is some work on mereology but I mean logic inherents from ontology while a formalism would just assume a closed system that doesn't need to. I ontologize Goedel in the same way I'd put it on any subject, that you can't have any closed system that formalism, the ontology of all formalisms, implies

These days it's pretty normal to say that the "principle" of non-contradiction is linguistic and intersubjective only. That's not to say that it wouldn't empirically "hold good" in all or effectively all particular cases, to the point that it might as well be a universal/abstract/formal axiom. Wittgenstein has lots of nods at things like this in his little mini-dialogues with imaginary logicians, where they will go
>But surely the principle of non-contradiction is basic!! How can you say it isn't?!
and Wittgenstein will reply in a way that shows yes, it MIGHT AS WELL be abstractly, universally true most cases, but we have no meta-logical basis for saying it is, and that is an important distinction.

My tendency is to think that there are hard rules of consciousness, but that they aren't synonymous with the linguistically stabilized "laws of logic" as laid out by some random guy. For the same reason that Kant's categorial deduction was the first thing to be disregarded, even by Kantians. Nobody cared about this unjustified set of supposedly axiomatic categories, or at least they only cared about them provisionally and heuristically instead of taking them as self-evidently "the laws of thought" like Kant did. So yeah, we might eventually find the real transcendental framework of thought, maybe through mysticism, but it's not going to look anything like discursive logic. Logic is a subset of language, which is a subset or aspect of "thought" in the widest sense of the term, which presumably is grounded in some transcendental or transcendent reality. If logic can't even accurately model and reflect language, let alone thought, how can it reflect the unknown metaphysical grounds of thought? How do we know God or nature "thinks in" discursive formulae like "A=A?"

But the only reason I say all this is to get at the more interesting thing I mentioned above, namely the fact that the Greeks had to figure this shit out on their own. And they didn't have centuries on centuries of Kants and Freges to orient themselves by (if only through opposition), they just had a bunch of dudes sitting around talking about philosophy, and some pre-philosophical myths and fables. The Greeks didn't even have formal grammar at this point. Most histories of logic devote lengthy consideration to the fact that the Greeks didn't intuitively differentiate things like synonyms and homonyms, they were an "oral" culture in Walter Ong's sense. They had to cleverly construct, over several generations, ways of indirectly teasing out "homonyms are not synonymous in meaning."

>>15310534
It's neither correct nor even a coherent interpretation.

>>15310562
DEFINITION OF EVEN THE MOST ABSTRACT TERMS INVOLVES REFERENCING FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF YOUR EXPERIENCE NO NETWORK OF ABSTRACTIONS IS TRULY SELF-REFERENTIAL THEREFORE THERE IS NO HARD BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE EMPIRICAL AND LOGICAL YOU ABSOLUTE FUCKING RETARD

>>15310596
continuing from this post/
That's why Plato's earliest dialogues seem so strange to us, because he's refuting adult sophists who are saying things that are so childish and stupid that we can't imagine they need to be refuted. But Plato was probably expressing a century worth of slowly gaining ground against such sophistry, and finally being able to pin it down and stop it from doing destructive wordplay that bamboozles everyone and ruins any discussion. Plato's ability to pin down basic grammar allowed him to gesture at stable meanings/definitions "really underlying" terms, which was a revolution in thought so significant that we can't imagine what it was like to NOT think in Plato's way reflexively. We're almost born doing what Plato did only by being a supergenius inheriting a century of other geniuses arguing with each other. It's so embedded in our language and culture that we just do it.

That's the same milieu the principle of non-contradiction comes out of. Just like they couldn't intuitively distinguish at first between something as stupid as "son" and "sun" being obviously different words (because different "meanings," even if they sound the same; the idea of "meaning as distinct from thing-said" had to be conceptually generated, prior to knowing it was needed), they also had to think about the distinction between THINKING and BEING, that is between our statements/thoughts about reality and reality itself. There is good reason to think that the whole Eleatic tradition following Parmenides is defined by its radical adherence to the assumption that thinking=being. The inability to SAY things sensibly about the world, to account for becoming, reflects the objectively real impossibility of becoming. Likewise for the dudes who said that becoming was the only real reality, and permanent being had no real status.

The opposite and equally radical tradition would be the sceptics' deconstruction of any possibility of saying anything whatsoever. Rather than pronouncing on the nature of being/becoming, they say that thought and language are permanently dumb. That's closer to modern transcendental and linguistic philosophy. When people cleave to the principle of non-contradiction in response to this, as the last firm ground we can still stand on even after all the deconstructions and so on, they're basically being eleatics. They are intuitively seeing language as statements about the world, made from within the world. If there's anything that can be said, it's that A=A and doesn't equal not-A. For this one second we can grasp how frustrating and confusing it was to be a Greek trying to argue about this shit in Athens in 440BC, before Plato even came along and formalized things, as radical "u can't know nuthin" sophists try to strangle "we can know everything, it's just that knowing everything = knowing that nothing 'is' at all" eleatics and vice versa. Cf. this thread.

>>15310602
Were you dropped on your head?

>>15310614
He's right tho

>>15310621
I have no idea what he is ranting about. He sounds deranged.

>>15310602
You're right but you are letting him just say "haha no" so you have to do all the work of trying to bridge the gap every time and he can just reply with mockery, that's a recipe for a blown gasket my friend.

>>15310614
>>15310625
This is in bad faith.

>>15310635
>This is in bad faith.
His gobbledygook like "NO NETWORK OF ABSTRACTIONS IS TRULY SELF-REFERENTIAL" means absolutely nothing to me. He's just talking gibberish.

>>15308977
A combination of A and E. I think it emerged from a lot of trial and error at the beginning of the species, and the most common results of that trial and error formed the empirical framework for non-contradiction.

I argue, though, that non-contradiction is just that -- another framework, like any other, which can be overcome and subverted. There is fundamentally no reason why it couldn't be, and I'd make that claim because the realm of human experience and empirical observation is confined to one part of what we know, or at least believe, to be a very, very large system. To think that the way we construct, manipulate, and view our world is the end-all-be-all seems incredibly short-sighted and almost childish to me.

>>15310645
Strange, it means something to me and at least one other guy. I immediately plugged it into the long discourse in 20th century philosophy of logic vs. metalogic, antifoundationalism, etc., and knew what he meant.

>>15310635
He's just going to feign ignorance (unless he's really that stupid) no matter how reasonable or not I am, so might as well indulge my contempt a little. No worries, I'm not actually worked up.

>>15310673
Perhaps you can explain it, then. I never even mentioned the concepts of abstraction or reference, so I'm completely baffled by his unglued /x/-tier tirade.

>>15310678
Link to a single post of mine where I make any claims about a "network of abstractions" being "self-referential"? You're not making any sense.

>>15310704
>Formalism attempts to reduce verification in a given domain to a mechanical activity.
You've argued for this. The abstraction being the definition or being or nature of the thing. You can't reduce the verification into the same system or reduce it at all. It inherits the definition from something prior

>>15310771
I'm not him btw

>>15310771
Sorry, I'm not following you. Proof in FOL is provably a mechanical procedure.

>>15310704
In fact the concept of definition can't be *defined* by logic.

>>And how do you approach the task of definition?
>Same as you would when you stipulate the rules of a new game.

>>15310791
What does being "defined by logic" even mean? And where did I make any claims about such a notion?

>>15310704

>>15310359
>Logic has nothing to do with the empirical world.
Logical definitions are abstractions. If you meant what you said here, then you think that abstract systems can be entirely self-referential (i.e. it is not necessary to reference anything outside of the system to define its terms).

>>15310785
That's proof into it not onto it, which it should be. I think we need to look at the definition of formalism because the concept of mechanization I think you mean to imply it automechanizes as everything by nature has a mechanism.

>>15310807
Logical terms don't refer to anything at all. Logic is compatible with any ontology or none at all. And no, logical definitions are not abstract.

Don't waste your time lads (unless you want to explicate for other anons), he's just trolling us.
>>15310474
Makes it pretty clear.

>>15310806
It means definition is ontologically prior to logic like truth is. So logic can't create truth. Logic must adhere to truth or it doesn't work much like a cat is an animal but an animal isn't a cat. If I make up any logical system it needs to 'borrow' truth from reality (the whole of the universe instead of just logic) in order for the logic to be consistent at all

>>15310842
Someone having a degree is mind-blowing to you, isn't it?

>>15310854
Your arguments are absurd is just it

>>15310852
The introduction and elimination rules of FOL can be proved to preserve truth. Truth in logic is much like energy in physics: what it "is" is less important than the fact that it is conserved.

>>15310871
Which argument of mine is "absurd"? So far, all the replies to me have been broken-English gibberish with no relevance to anything I have actually said.

>>15310880
Sure but to assume it goes completely from fol doesn't follow. Logic itself would have to answer everything if it wasn't subservient to anything. It preserves a fol logical truth seems more appropriate as the fol truth can't explain truth overall.

>>15310899
Fair enough they're not absurd but you have claimed logic can produce truth within fol itself which is nonsense because there are more truths than fol can answer, for instance ontology, existential truths etc.

>>15310904
What does "fol truth" mean? The whole point of truth is that there aren't different kinds.

>>15310915
>you have claimed logic can produce truth within fol itself
What does "producing truth" mean? If I invent a new variation of Chess called Chess2, where pawns can move 2 steps, have I "produced a truth" (namely, that a pawn moving 2 spaces is a legit move in Chess2)? Whenever you define a new term or formulate a new rule, you trivially create a new truth by stipulation.

>>15310965
Yeah I agree there is only one type of truth, so I don't think fol can produce truth, it can produce a derivative of truth, let's call it a fol truth.

>Whenever you define a new term or formulate a new rule, you trivially create a new truth by stipulation.
I 100% agree w this but it's more an 'image' of truth. So we can define Stalin by 'a man w a funny moustache' but mereologically we can give a rough quantification of how true that definition is. To say Stalin was a communist dictator of Russia, aside from some squabbles about the terms, is more definitionally correct than the prior definition. So we can say there's a truth within every system that aligns to the truth the system produces. This all being said the system itself can't work unless it takes from a more fundamental truth. An example would be I can't say 1+1=3, disregarding any semiotic arguments, and expect any system of it to actually work. An example of this fundamental truth with quantification is that two hydrogen atoms mix into one helium atom. This is fundamental apart from any system and yet and system we use in math must match this logic and quantifying in some way.

>>15310785
Proof in first-order logic is provably NOT a mechanical procedure:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entscheidungsproblem

>>15311013
Proper names are not really 'defined' via definite description, they are bestowed at birth through a causal process. See Kripke's Naming and Necessity. This is a matter for modal semantics in any case, outside the scope of first order logic.

>>15311040
>Proof in first-order logic is provably NOT a mechanical procedure
Yes, it is: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_completeness_theorem

>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entscheidungsproblem
No, the Entscheidungsproblem is about systems that go beyond FOL to include the equivalent of arithmetic (lambda calculus).

>>15311102
Lambda calculus was how Church addressed the decision problem, because, to stipulate that first-order logic can be mechanically solved, you have to devise a mechanical process by which proof is to be carried out. That's what lambda calculus is here. The halting problem relates to the decidability of lambda calculus (and is therefore more expansive), while the decision problem relates to the decidability of first-order logic.

>>15311054
Yeah I know that point, then to not rut in the weeds of it or pettyfog, I could say a dog is defined as having four legs in general this is true but you would call a dog that lost a leg a dog still. You could apply the same treatments to barking, eating x, runs across the street and get a continually diminishing definition of dog. Granted they aren't untrue if I said a dog barks, eats kibble, likes to run etc to explain a dog because I'm trying to capture the essence of dog. But one things that is inherently true of a dog is it is an animal, no matter what they are. So to argue that a dog barks is partial to the truth of dog but less than a dog is an animal. So I'd analogize it to the common term dog unless you say dogness must be a proper name, I'd argue either not or everything has a proper name

hold my Ineffable
>Neither "the one" nor "all things" accords with the One. These are a pair of binary oppositions that divide our consciousness of the One. If we focus on the One as simple, we lose sight of the complete perfection of that principle. But if we conceive it as all things simultaneously, we destroy its unity and simplicity. The cause of this is that we ourselves are divided and we distractedly consider its characteristics as if they were separate.

>>15311102
Regarding the Gödel reference, yes, a proof in first-order logic is verifiable by mechanical process, but it cannot (in general) be constructed by mechanical process.

>>15308977
Retard here, I don't think humans can answer this question. It's like answering what consciousness is, we lack the tools to look at these things since they are what we use to look at and evaluate stuff themselves.

>>15311130
Yes, FOL with at least binary relations (other than equality) is undecideable. But logical consequence within FOL itself is semidecidable, which is all that is needed. More importantly, Godel's completeness result conceptually reduces logical consequence to provability.

>>15308985
(b) -->(c)

>>15308977
B
The basis of logic is part of an architecture that is outside the realm of phenomena

>>15310834
>Logical terms don't refer to anything at all.
>Logic is compatible with any ontology or none at all.
>logical definitions are not abstract.

Can you show examples that demonstrate any of these extremely dubious claims? If logical definitions (or any definitions) aren't abstractions, then what are they?

>>15311402
>these extremely dubious claims
The first two are trivially true. The last is just formalism about logic (as opposed to formalism about mathematics, which is more controversial).

For the first one, take any logic class. Logical connectives like 'and', 'or' and 'not' are defined via introduction and elimination rules. E.g.,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_deduction#Introduction_and_elimination

These terms are grammatically just not the kind of word that refers. They are not nouns. For instance, what concrete empirical object would you have the term "and" refer to? I'm not familiar with anyone in the history of philosophy or logic who tried to construe logical connectives as referring terms. The idea is bizarre.

The second point is provable correct. FOL does not presuppose the existence of any object in the domain of discourse. It is completely neutral regarding ontology.

It's purely linguistic. Contradictions do not exist, except in language. It's a conjunction of words that doesn't make sense.

>>15311509
enjoy drawing squiggles and exchanging noises

>>15308977
The first 1000 years of the church solved this question so what's the point of this thread?

>>15308977
Some poll on 4chan created it retroactively.

But in all seriousness, "avoiding explosion" is probably the answer. Hand the mic to anyone who doesn't go for non-contradiction, and their first move will always be to address explosion. You could also throw A on top of that, I guess, or maybe a softcore version of B.

>>15311947
It take avoiding explosion means something specific in this context?

>>15311970
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion

Basically if you allow for something like the contradiction "X and not-X," you can then fill X in with anything you like, and then via subtraction get just the X or just not-X. The immediate task of paraconsistent logic is to get around this.

>>15311871
damn son u got btfo hard as fuck

>>15310597
Wrong.

>>15311509
>For instance, what concrete empirical object would you have the term "and" refer to?
It refers to the apparent multiplicity of objects/events in our experience. It's an abstraction upon that experienced relation.

>It is completely neutral regarding ontology.
This is back-pedalling. You said that "logic has nothing to do with the empirical world", and that is a broader statement than saying FOL is neutral regarding ontologies. The fact remains that no logic would exist if some thinking agent didn't abstract it from their experienced relations (meaning it has a great deal to do with the empirical world).

>The last is just formalism about logic
I don't see how that follows, unless you're claiming that logic is not an expression of thought and so somehow independent from our mental processes.

>>15310472
>>15310515
this.
everything comes from perceptual experience, wherein the law of non-contradiction absolutely applies, so the question of whether it’s part of external objective reality is moot
Also, please no one listen to the delusional pseud polluting the thread with quantum shit
The concept of dialetheism is insanely retarded and self-contradictory. if you’re going to reject the fundamental building blocks of thought and reason, then you might as well forgo the claim to any positive understanding at all, and interpret the rest of your conscious experience as meaningless random noise

>blah blah blah empiricism
Who gives a fuck? Suppose you roll the dice and woohoo: there are zero contradictions in the universe, observable or otherwise. Why should this necessitate I subscribed to non-contradiction? Just the same there are zero unicorns in the universe I'll guess, but that doesn't mean I ban the word "unicorn" from my language. Even if this doesn't exist within actuality it can still be a useful subject for hypotheticals, which themselves have real, actual relevance. If you can't deal with an issue like >>15311947/>>15312009 then that's a real problem, but "uhh, I don't see any" is not.

>blah blah blah empiricism
Who gives a fuck? Suppose you roll the dice and woohoo: there are zero contradictions in the universe, observable or otherwise. Why should this necessitate I subscribe to non-contradiction? Just the same there are zero unicorns in the universe I'll guess, but that doesn't mean I ban the word "unicorn" from my language or suppose that unicorns are some impossible thing. Even if this doesn't exist within actuality it can still be a useful subject for hypotheticals, which themselves have real, actual relevance. If you can't deal with an issue like >>15311947/>>15312009 then that's a real problem, but "uhh, I don't see any" is not.

>>15312857
>which themselves have real, actual relevance
To what? The empirical world? Saying something is 'useful' is describing a relation to the world of your experience. So you've answered your own question — you give a fuck.

>>15312857
Cringe

>>15309350
>we always rephrase things so as to preserve its truth.
COPEW!

>>15313046
Not him, but hypotheticals are relevant to the non-empirical domain of the mind, which includes pretty much everything we care about.

>>15308977
Does nature contradict itself? No, therefore C. Also A is just a dismissive way of phrasing C, in order to formulate it we had to observe it.

>>15313921
>the mind — experience itself
>non-empirical domain

Wew lad.