/lit/ - Literature

>>11810299
>lol i am weary of my wisdom

>i will watch the watcher

>>11810299
>Sam Harris
>Claims his science proves something, fallaciously
>Claims his axioms are scientific facts, dogmatically
>Purchased his PhD in the market, mysteriously
>Jumps the is-ought gap, knowingly
Pick five (5) and no less.

>>11810308
fpbp

>>11810329
Thanks for gifting me a proper laugh, hadn't had one of those on lit for a long time

Why does /lit/ hate Harris so much when popular (pseudo)intellectuals are a dime a dozen?

>>11810394
It must be the antisemitism this site is rife with!

>>11810394
Harris calls himself a neuroscientist. Look up how he got his doctorate

>you will never have the reasoning abilities of Sam harris

>>11810573
thank God

>>11810454
>I believe unfounded meme reports over actual academic records because they discredit the big bad atheist man that I cannot compete with
tiring

>>11810299
Would love to see you on his podcast and confront him about your concerns.

>>11810898
Okay then, I'll just look at his science experiments (that he didn't conduct and only payrolled) that he uses to make his 'ethical' conclusions and attack that, because that area is ripe as well.

>>11811012
He wouldn't take me. Then again, face-to-face debate is hardly a good platform to critique ideas and methods

>>11811028
Why do you think he won't take you?

>>11811044
Cause I don't have enough money to buy my PhD in neuroscience yet

>>11811064
too bad you're too stupid to just get the PhD through legitimate means and are reduced to slandering those who actually accomplished this just so you can cope with your own mental inadequacy

>"I have discovered happiness"--says Sam Harris, and blinketh thereby

>>11811064
you seem jealous because that didn't even make sense.

Try emailing him with your claims about his arguments and tell him it will be a very entertaining episode. Be respectful and maybe he will listen to your rants.

>>11811090
I'd be interested to know when you think Sam Harris did this. Cite specific examples (i.e. in his podcast, books, or at talks).

>>11811074
you're one heck of a naive person. He's not respected in his own field by his 'peers'.
>>11811078
how many random ass bozo's off the street does he interview? I would at least like to send him a message asking him to discuss his education.

>>11811102

>>11811131
Sam does me banging your daughter suck? It may suck for me, but its amazing for me (and Ill think of you in my mind)

>>11811131
>assume there are no aughts
>we ought to avoid doing this thing because it hurts
nice

>>11811012
Have you seen his 'debate' with /ourguy/?

>>11811210
Is William Lane Craig the final boss of Western thought?

Check 'em

>>11811210
Based

>>11811218
Yes

>>11811210
What a man.

>>11811131
>muh stove hurts so much it must objectively be bad

FACTS DON’T CARE ABOUT YOUR FEELINGS!!!

>>11811210
>Lane vs Hitchens
>Lane vs Krauss
So pissed Dawkins chickened out

>>11810308

>one picture of Harris's words is enough to make his supporters run for the hills
like pottery

>>11811210

this guys a fuckin joke

>>11811366
Babby hurt his hand on the stove?

>>11811379
no, because i ought to not do that.

>>11811131
Man when Sam actually tries to be philosophically rigorous it's embarrassing.

"Suck," as one of the commenters on that post already points out, is not something that can be applied to "facts" in the world. It is a value judgment, and it's here in premise 3 that he therefore smuggles in his conclusion and begs the question.

>>11811210
i listened to it for a bit and it just seemed to be about „how do you have morals without god“ so i stopped
give me a quick rundown if there were more arguments

>>11811210
>Lane Craig
>Atheists cannot prove God doesn't exist though, and I declare the burden to be on them!
>Atheists claim there is a multi-verse or "world ensemble"
>They cannot prove a multi-verse exists, therefore it does not.

The hypocrisy this guy emits is laughable.

>>11811012
he got btfo by chomsky

>>11811568
lol no he didn't. He basically called out Chomsky on his bullshit and Chomsky wouldn't answer.

>>11810329
based

>>11811165
good catch. you’re the first person who has found this incongruence afaik. you could own sam with it

>>11811562
actually he even won a debate against krauss even on topics of cosmology. lol he is a good debater

>>11811783
thanks can u get me his number ill callhim iup right now

>>11811131
It's amazing that he actually posted this.

>>11811162
>>11811165
>>11811235
>>11811412
>>11811803
wow no arguments to be seen, just over-dramatic meme spouting. amazing.

and no
>"Suck," as one of the commenters on that post already points out, is not something that can be applied to "facts" in the world. It is a value judgment
is not an argument. it barely a coherent sentence that is fundamentally flawed and completely misses the point that Harris is making.

>>11811131
doesnt this logic lead to anti natalism? no humans = 100% perfect avoidance of sucky expierences lol

>>11810394
Tallest blades of grass get cut first.

>>11811803
he posted his e-mail exchange with chomsky where he gets clowned on too, he's not very wise.

>>11811874
its a perfectly reasonable objection. all harris did with his insistence on the hot stove is say
>painful experiences are painful
the proposition "conscious beings should avoid painful experiences" remains unsubstantiated

do conscious beings *want* to avoid painful experiences, as a factual matter? sure, but dont mistake want for should

>>11810329
>Purchased his PhD in the market, mysteriously
story?

>>11811874
Go away Harris

>that time he started a fight with chomsky and got BTFO by the second email

what is it with brainlet right wing intellectuals? is sam harris and jordan peterson really the best capitalism can buy?

>>11812407
>right wing intellectuals
>a neocon atheist jew and a jungian centrist liberal
Alright then m8

>>11812083
>do conscious beings *want* to avoid painful experiences, as a factual matter? sure
Well, there's BDSM...

sam harris is a fucking hack

>>11811210
doesn't this guy believe entirely on faith, but then tries to argue based on empirical merits? lol he really is /lit/'s guy

>>11811131
>let's assume
dropped

>>11811224
Damn. Naruto aged like shit.

>>11813092
He believes based on religious experience, but thinks there are good rational reasons to believe in God. I don’t see anything immediately wrong with that.

>science and rationality can govern all things, even ethics
>and that's a scientific fact.

Pure science and reason can only go so far. Sam attempts to jump the gap but it is not possible, and it shows in the invalidity of his arguments.

There must exist a belief or axiom that is completely independent of reason and science to bridge this gap. This belief is arbitrary by definition. Merits and consequences and effectiveness of this belief can be argued and examined, but the fact is that this belief is necessary.

>>11813092
The point is not that Craig isn't a clown. It's that anyone who gets exposed by Craig is not a serious thinker, like Hitchens or Harris.

>>11811131

This is true bugman """""thinking""""""

>>11812407
>>11812037
>>11811668
The Chomsky emails are embarrassing for both. Harris is like the undergraduate who thinks he can earn brownie ppints with the prof by making some dumb point. Chomsky always comes across as a cantankerous old coot who hates whoever he's emailing. There's a very similar exchange with George Monbiot. He has no tolerance for idiots

>>11813367
Why is Craig a clown?

>>11811668
Nope.

If you read the full exchange, he attempted to call Chomsky out, resorted to fallacious nonsense, and after he completely embarrassed himself, posted the exchange. It’s bizarre. I never had any knowledge of Harris before that, but after reading that I never could have any respect for him.

>>11810299
why quote Nietzsche with a picture of Ben Stiller? the neetch despised utilitarianism

>>11810329
He didn't purchase his PhD, but it doesn't look very rigorous from reading the abstract.

>>11811218
Considering he got beaten by Sean Carroll, no. His version of the Kalam Cosmological was shown to be flawed.

>>11813423
>wahhh chomsky hurt my feelings

>>11812418
>social darwinist
>enforced monogamist
>not right wing

>>11811210
I don't think he ever debated Zizek

>>11813423
He is a cantankerous old coot, you would be too if you had brainlets like ben stiller trying to argue with you for cool kid points all of the time

>>11811787
he's a good speaker, but in his debate with Hitchens at least he keeps passing the burden of proof instead of actually proving his claim. I found that disappointing.

>>11813440
I did not find Harris to be the embarrassed one in the exchange. Harris had a reasonable point/criticism of Chomsky in that he doesn't care about intentions when gauging morality. That's a totally reasonable stance, but Chomsky got all butt hurt and wasn't really willing to address it.

>>11813884
He's literally none of those.

>>11814074
the road to hell is paved with good intentions, snowflake
sorry if that hurts your feelings

>>11814166
you clearly don't understand Harris' argument about intentions. Hitler had "good" intentions in his mind, but objectively, killing innocent civilians is not "good"

The argument with Chomsky is in the context of US foreign policy and specifically counter terrorism efforts.

>>11814240
con't from above

Also context is Palestine(hamas) vs Israel conflict.

>>11813909
>He is a cantankerous old coot
Well yeah, but he could have graciously said he was too busy or something instead of being a grouch

>>11814240
Isn't Chomsky claiming that the US did not have any good intentions when they bombed the plant? It was just revenge and later they pretended it was about chemical weapons

>>11814256
Not sure about the plant, but I remember Harris giving Chomsky shit for saying the US is the world's biggest terrorist or something along those lines because the US has killed people, even civilians, in their bombing of the middle-east.

Harris pumps the brakes on that argument and says, "wait a minute, but we aren't specifically targeting civilians like real terrorists (i.e. hamas, hezbollah, etc). We could kill everyone if we wanted to, but we don't. While islamic terrorists target civilians and use human shields.

>>11814074
>I did not find Harris to be the embarrassed one in the exchange

That's because you're a moron.

>>11814350

how to not win an argument 101

>>11814274
>islamic terrorists target civilians
Chomsky is saying that everyone considers themselves the good guys.
All qaeda believed they were targeting zionists and infidels not innocent civilians. Bin Laden was quite explicit about how all americans are culpable and aren't innocent. The Nazis believed they were targeting only 'judeo-bolsheviks' not innocent civilians. We say we're targeting 'terrorists' not civilians. It's all cant and hypocrisy, and even before the war on terror America had killed 100 times more civilians in the middle east than died on 9/11. We basically defined terrorist as 'anyone who disagrees with our foreign policy and wants American troops out of their country' and pompously declared that we only targeted terrorists

>>11814363
yeah this is Chomsky's argument that Harris takes issue with. This argument only takes into account body count. It does not consider that we take huge precautions in limiting collateral damage and do not specifically target civilian population centers. If we (USA) or Isreal wanted to pull a Hitler in the middle-east, we could. We took out Iraq's military and government in like 2 weeks. We could have completely flattened the entire country, but we didn't. We exercised restraint to save innocent lives. Real terrorists (islamic terrorists in this context) do not exercise constraint. In fact, they kill their own people willingly and sacrifice innocents to kill their "targets."

There is a huge gap between what the US military does and what islamic terrorists do on a daily basis. Seeing no difference between the two is ignorant and dangerous.

>>11811210
>blocks your path

>>11810394
I don't know but even his own subreddit hates him now

>>11814377
>It does not consider that we take huge precautions in limiting collateral damage and do not specifically target civilian population centers
We specifically didn't do that, as Chomsky keeps mentioning. His example is he pharmaceutical plant which we indiscriminately blew up,even though we knew it would cause massive civilian casualties down the line, because we don't care about the people it killed. We pay only lip service to caring about civilians, there is no constraint in practice

>>11811090
>>11811165
>>11811393

Still have yet to see one of you oughtfags demonstrate how universal oughts exist, or how is/ought is a real distinction. Harris is just explaining how we obtain our value judgements form the 'is' of our biological state and the 'is' of external facts, which are objective things. I don't see a claim to universality there, in fact he explicitly acknowledges that in another situation someone may prioritize the pain differently.

If you want to hate on Sam for being a libtarded jew that's fine, I get that. I'm not a fan of his politics either. If you're going to uphold the pretense of a philosophical objection though, please get into the arguments.

>>11814427
That is obviously not true. We could flatten Damascus, Baghdad, kabul, or any country which we are in conflict with. But we obviously haven't because we care about innocent lives. If terrorists are hiding themselves or supplies among general population, and we choose to bomb those targets, obviously innocent people may die. But we did not use people as a shield, the terrorists did.

>>11814680
>universal oughts
What are you talking about? I don't think you understand the is/ought distinction yourself

>>11814685
>>11814377
>>11814274
I really can't follow your argument here. So we bomb cities, deliberately targetting areas with civilians, obvious civilians die, and say 'lol its the terrorists fault for being there among the civilians'. And we call a terrorist anyone who disobeys us when we invade their country. And apparently this gives us moral authority because we could have been even more ruthless. If we care about innocent lives why did we invade countries in the first place?

>>11814712
Do you think we are NOT at war with radical Islam? They are routinely trying to kill innocent people because of their delusions. We have taken the fight to them as opposed to just playing defense.
The US and Israel exhibit more constraint than their enemies on a routine basis. Which side stones, burns, beheads adulterers and apostates? It's not hard to see which side is the side of good intentions.

>>11814680
What are you referring to by 'universal oughts', and why do you believe that I think they exist? The is-ought distinction makes no claim that 'universal oughts' exist.

>>11814686
I understand it just fine. Are you going to demonstrate what 'oughts' are or how he is wrong? Or just cast vague aspersions?

>>11814780
Fine, then if oughts aren't universal in nature, what is the actual distinction between 'ought' and 'is'? If I synthesize a value judgement from facts and my own biologically rooted biases, that appears to be all 'is'.

>>11814801
To put it another way, the is/ought problem assumes that 'ought' is a distinct set, when it is actually a part of the 'is' superset. Where else then could our oughts be obtained from, other than from what is?

>>11814833
In this example, 'is' is distinctly different from 'ought', and pretty much by definition.
'is' describes that which we can observe or reason or know.
'ought' describes how we interpret what 'is' to make judgments. In evaluable 'ought' propositions there is a (usually implicit) conditional, and this is the crucial distinction that does not exist in an 'is' proposition. Take for example:

The sum of the squares of two legs of a triangle is equal to the square of the hypotenuse.
I ought to compare the sum of the squares of the two legs of a triangle to the square of its hypotenuse [if I wish to determine the length of its hypotenuse, etc]

Person A is in category B.
Person A ought to take action C [if A wishes to fulfill the purpose or role of category B]

It is painful to place my hand on a stove.
I ought nought to place my hand on a stove [if I wish to avoid pain].

Note that the ought statements only evaluate propositionally under the constraint of the conditional. There are no set of 'is' statements that will allow me to evaluate the proposition 'Person A ought to take action C'. If you disagree, feel free to give a counterexample that you can claim with the same certainty that I can that, in a right triangle, a^2 + b^2 = c^2.

The conditional constraint represents the gap that 'is' propositions cannot cross. There must exist a framework above 'is' propositions that allows me to evaluate these propositions. This framework provides an implicit conditional to evaluate propositions that otherwise would be impossible to answer, ie moral propositions.

The selection of this framework is inherently subjective from a strict standpoint of pure reason. The framework may be supported by 'is' propositions, but that does not mean that it was not selected subjectively. Claiming it does is a sure way to lead back into infinite regression.

Furthermore, the claim that they can be "obtained from" 'is' propositions is unhelpful for the same reason: ANY framework like this can be "obtained from" 'is' propositions, but that obtaining is similarly arbitrary.

Are you a proponent of moral relativism? Harris isn't.

>>11815015
bump, wanna see a response to this from 'muh is superset' anon

>>11815015
Abstract definitions do not necessarily describe concrete distinctions, which is what I was asking for. You dance around how we could obtain judgements from anything other than 'is', which is important. For instance, in what way would we evaluate beentween 'arbitrary' frameworks that is also not reliant upon what 'is'. Would you value logical consistency without having observed consistency in the concrete world? Is there any 'ought' which does not lead back to the 'is' thereby becoming no less arbitrary? The truth is that we all rely on the predictive power of 'is' observations, and the extent to which our judgements employ this predictability is the extent to which they are non-arbitrary.

Subjective selection is not an adequate refutation of objective nature. When many people agree that murder is immoral, is that completely arbitrary or are there objective similarities between these people and their observations of cause and effect that allow this to happen? Also, consider that there could be moral paths that would lead us to objectively greater states of well-being that we aren't even aware of; our subjective perspective does not change the consequences of the paths we take nor the potential of those we didn't.

I am a moral relativist, in the technical. I can see that on a fine scale, individuals are different enough that they might achieve optimal well-being via different means. Also -- on a larger scale -- that same principle applies to divergent collectives. It is apparent, however, that the similarities between large swathes of people who agree on the most consequential moral questions are concrete and objective ones. I think that is all Harris is pointing out... He might not agree with me on how consequentially divergent some human collectives are, but I don't think he'd disagree that the answers to certain moral questions (don't do drugs) might have different answers for different people. So he may claim to be an anti-relativist, but that is probably for effect and not strictly true. While I am a relativist, I see that there is an objective basis for normative morality. I don't see how subjective perception/misperception changes objective consequences, nor how selecting a framework based upon osbservations with predictive power is arbitrary.

>>11811562
Atheists pretend to be agnostic so they don't have to justify their beliefs.

>>11815468
Or don't have the courage to admit the obvious

>>11814777
That war is largely our fault though... The U.S. and allies have made things much worse with geopolitical meddling (proxy wars and CIA arming/training factions), and by removing 'lesser evil' tyrants who were presiding over the most secular and non-radical nations in the region (doing much infrastructure damage and causing much death & suffering with sanctions in the process).

I'm not equating individual military personnel to rabid daesh insurgents, but on the grand scale the west doesn't come out very rosy here.

>US foreign interventions have good intentions

what the fuck, how many times were you dropped as a baby? i'm american and even i know we're full of shit

>>11815433
>You dance around how we could obtain judgements from anything other than 'is', which is important.
There are many different ways we could do this, as evidenced by philosophers' views on ethics, not to mention religions and the like. Effectively, they are all the same: drawing an arbitrary line in the sand (though the resulting system is hardly ever this simple). This is not an answer that seems tenable to you or Harris (even though that is exactly what Harris does), and it is not one that is optimal, but it is the only one. It is dishonest to deny this and then claim that your arbitrary line in the sand is a scientific fact, as Harris does.

Here's where you do it:
>consider that there could be moral paths that would lead us to objectively greater states of well-being that we aren't even aware of

Why are greater states of well-being what is desirable, from an ethical point of view? The well-being of the individual or the collective? The entire collective or only a small collective insofar as the individual can thrive? Why did you choose this, and how did you arrive at that conclusion? Why is it not arbitrary? When you answer these (if you plan to instead of "dancing around" them like you did the entirety of my last post), please be concrete.

Logic and reason and what 'is' simply cannot take you to what is "good" without you either drawing a line in the sand or redefining what is 'good' (ie what we 'ought' to do) from its timeless and abstract definition to something in terms of human well-being. This is dishonest.

>Would you value logical consistency without having observed consistency in the concrete world?
If the logic is sound, sure.
>Is there any 'ought' which does not lead back to the 'is' thereby becoming no less arbitrary?
The one that does not come from 'is'.
>The truth is that we all rely on the predictive power of 'is' observations, and the extent to which our judgements employ this predictability is the extent to which they are non-arbitrary.
Our 'ought' judgments do not employ this predictability in a way that is non-arbitrary, ethically speaking. Self-service is not ethics. Please feel free to give a counterexample.
>Subjective selection is not an adequate refutation of objective nature.
No, the proposition that human well-being (or prevention of suffering) is 'good' is subjective, and so all propositions that follow it rely on it being so. Prove it to me if it is a fact, otherwise it is an axiom.
>When many people agree that murder is immoral, is that completely arbitrary or are there objective similarities between these people and their observations of cause and effect that allow this to happen?
I'm not even sure what you're asking. Be more clear.
>our subjective perspective does not change the consequences of the paths we take nor the potential of those we didn't.
You're right. But science cannot tell us which path is better without someone telling science what is good.

Feel free to address my previous post.

If it's a fact that well-being of mankid is the one and only quality of the universe worth striving for, prove it

>>11813909
>brainlets like ben stiller

kek

>>11812367
See:
https://shadowtolight.wordpress.com/2015/01/07/neuroscientist-sam-harris/

http://wmbriggs.com/post/4923/

>During the course of my investigation of scientism and bad science, I have read a great many bad, poorly reasoned papers. This one might not be the worst, but it deserves a prize for mangling the largest number of things simultaneously. What is fascinating, and what I do not here explore, is why this paper was not only published but why it is believed by others. It is sure evidence, I think, that scientists are no different than anybody else in wanting their cherished beliefs upheld such that they are willing to grasp at any confirmatory evidence, no matter how slight, blemished, or suspect that evidence might be.

>I do not claim, and I do not believe, that Harris and his team cheated, lied, or willfully misled. I have given sufficient argument to show the authors wore such opaque blinders that they could not see what they were doing and so choose to write down that which they imagined they saw, which was a preconceived, incoherent concoction about how “Christians” would differ from “rational” thinkers.

>>11815792
Harris and I advocate for incorporating scientific findings as much as possible when drawing that line in the sand. For my part, I understand that some degree of bias is unavoidable; but leaning heavily on science will makes for less arbitrary judgement. Much like knowledge, you don't just go from 0% arbitrary to 100%, there are degrees. Is it arbitrary to have a bias towards surival when none of us would exist if such a bias hadn't been the norm?

The well-being of the collective is primary of course, as long term well-being of individuals depends on this (and morality is inherently about collective utility -- formulas of morality wouldn't exist if we were only individuals with no impact on eachother). We can consider the well-being of various levels of 'collective-ness', such considerations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but sometimes they are. Since we're not omniscient beings, we simply have to do our best, but applying what we learn through science (our biological differences and similarities most notably) will make things less arbitary.

>Logic and reason and what 'is' simply cannot take you to what is "good" without you either drawing a line in the sand or redefining what is 'good' (ie what we 'ought' to do) from its timeless and abstract definition to something in terms of human well-being. This is dishonest.

This is where you tip your hand and reveal that you do on some level view 'oughts' as universal or at least somehow preceding our bias as valuing agents. What definition of good (even an abstracted one) does not rely upon human biases and observed facts? Does the term 'good' even mean anything when not applied to something else? To attempt to define 'good' or 'ought' without referring to the concrete, you would have to other abstract concepts in circular fashion.

-You wouldn't value logic if predictable consistency had not first demonstrated its utility to you in the concrete. Mathematical abstractions would never have been developed if we did not first observe the properties of distinctness and consistency in world.

-Where does that 'ought' come from, if not from what is? Poor answer.

-Self-service with consideration to the impact upon others is indeed ethics. What do you think ethics is?

-We only act to improve our well-being in some way, even if poorly calculated. The person who wants to die seeks to end their suffering. The person who self-harms is self-medicating. The psychopath who murders is achieving some form of satisfaction. We only serve some aspect of well-being, even if we claim not to. Furthermore, I have not claimed that 'good' or 'ought' are universally identical to everyone, only that the divergence is caused by the actual objective differences between people (the similarities which cause morality to overlap are likewise objective and concrete). There is nothing in your subjective perspective that does not rely upon observation of the objective.

>>11815792
(cont.)

-If many people agree that murder is immoral, is this because all of those people have made a completely arbitrary judgement, or do they all recognize the consequences of murder in their society (and are they all intelligent and/or empathetic enough to share a similar bias).

-Yes, some degree of bias will always be a part of determining what is good. But even those biases are objective. Understand that the term 'subjectivity' is just shorthand for the objective differences between observers. If observers were identical in all respects (including position in spacetime), there would be no subjective perspective. So we can tell science what is good, and there is no proscription on science aiding us with that judgement (and in the long term even our biases can be informed by fact). Morality is objective, just not universal (nor does it have to be).

>>11816872
are you the anon that's been saying shit like everything (like utility) is physical?
>The well-being of the collective is primary of course,
prove it
>and morality is inherently about collective utility -- formulas of morality wouldn't exist if we were only individuals with no impact on eachother
wrong, check your definition of morality; "hurr what else then" is not an answer
also neither of those imply the other
PLEASE prove to me that "well-being" is the end all be all of morality

>>11816923
>>11816872
it's really as if your goal is to replace conventional religion with the religion of science

>>11815792
To just to come back around to the specific topic though, unless you can demonstrate a source for our 'ought' judgements that isn't an 'is', then oughts deserve no special distinction as if they occupy some new category of knowledge (indeed, oughts are just another kind of is). We're all just manipulating what 'is' to acheive another 'is'. End of story.

>>11816872
>Harris and I advocate for incorporating scientific findings as much as possible when drawing that line in the sand.
Okay, so you agree that you have an axiom that is arbitrary. Your justification for drawing the line does not change the fact that it is arbitrary.

>Is it arbitrary to have a bias towards surival when none of us would exist if such a bias hadn't been the norm?
Yes, it absolutely is. Harris likes to use the example of the WPME (Worst possible misery for everyone) for his starting point sometimes. I find this sort of funny because he leaves himself very open to anti-natalism: isn't the easiest way to avoid suffering to avoid bringing something that can suffer (and will, immensely) into existence? And that just goes to show why his ethics aren't really even ethics. The line in the sand that the anti-natalist draws is no less arbitrary than the one that Harris draws, and yet the anti-natalist one proposes a much more elegant solution to Harris's WPME. So why not take that one instead?

>This is where you tip your hand and reveal that you do on some level view 'oughts' as universal or at least somehow preceding our bias as valuing agents.
And you do as well, as you've just stated above. Either that or you acknowledge that your 'ought' is fundamentally arbitrary (however backed up by 'is' propositions), and therefore carries no authority or superiority over any system or the other.

>>11817041
I'll leave you here for sake of brevity and point back to my first post where I clearly define the difference between an 'is' and an 'ought' that you still manage to "dance around". That post seemed pretty clear to me and I'd like you to refute it in order to show me that there is no distinction between an 'is' and an 'ought'.

The answer to your question about a source is a metaphysical one, so it appears to me to be one that you've already discounted in your mind, for what reasons I don't know.

>>11816967
The individual wouldn't exist without the collective. Pretty simple.

What sense would the concept of morality make in a universe with only one being, whose actions would have no impact on others? 'What else' is a valid logical strategy. If we can eliminate alternative explanations and you are unable to provide another, then at the very least I have a much higher probability of being correct than you do (and what can you be correct about, if you can't even explain your hypothesis?).

All of our actions serve some aspect of well-being. Can you think of any action anyone takes that is not improving well-being in some fashion (see above)?

>>11816984
Nah, I don't care if normies are religious. A lot of them are better off that way. But here, we are ostensibly debating the nature of reality as temporary philosophers, and so I endeavour to be intellectualy honest.

>>11817105
Wouldn't there be situations in which the most beneficial thing to do for the collective would be immoral? Like exterminating a population that is dogmatic and violent or exterminating populations for the good of the gene pool? Aren't many disabled persons unable to contribute to anything and are only burdens? Then it's moral to kill them?

>>11810394
Who are the real intellectuals? I offer Brian Eno and refuse John Green.

>>11817104
No, I'm not relying on any axiom. I admit to the presence of bias and accept that our judgements can't be universal or perfect.

The anti-natalist is still seeking well-being... Either they value the well-being of the greater ecology over us (and achieve psychological satisfaction in doing so), or they find that their suffering is worse than the prospect of non-existence (again, trying to improve well-being by not being). Neither position is entirely arbitrary, as we rely on the world's ecology and have the capacity of empathy for other life. It is entirely conceivable that some people would've rather not been born in hindsight, but this position is pretty rare and certainly not generalizable to most collectives. I can also imagine extreme WPME scenarios where anti-natalism may be the sensible course, what is strange or laughable about that? It is not arbitrary to have a bias towards survival, it is a normative biological reality which makes life possible. Again, I do not expect that oughts precede us or are universal, so I don't see how a bias that facilitates our existence is arbitrary (in the abscence of extreme personal or collective suffering, but then our bias would become informed by factual circumstances, and still not arbitrary).

You're also still arguing like 'arbitrary' is a binary 0 or 1. Is that what you think? There's no possible in-between?

Your argument with respect to 'fundamentally arbitrary' is the same as a the fallacious argument against knowledge for being incomplete/imperfect. How is judgement completely or fundamentally arbitrary? Can you make any judgement that does not rely upon observation of the concrete in some respect? Is all knowledge erroneous because our knowledge is incomplete?

You haven't defined the concrete difference between 'is' and 'ought, you've only defined 'ought' by referring to other concepts, which is circular argumentation. You haven't 'clearly' defined anything.

Ah yes, the metaphysical cop-out. Knew that was coming. You don't even attempt to answer... Why and how do you argue for something you can't begin to explain?

>>11817168
Those are complex questions, and I would propose that morality is a spectrum, not a simple yes/no. Would it be immoral to exterminate a population that would always threaten your collective as long as it existed? Not especially, but there would be degrees... Do they all have to die to elminate credible threat? Could a minimal threat be tolerated if it meant that this population could continue existing in some capacity?

Similarly I don't think eugenics are inherently immoral or moral, the crux is how they are applied. Can we limit eugenics to sterilization/capital punishment of violent offenders and pre-birth measures and still achieve a great effect? Are all disabled persons so consistently unhappy that it would be better for them to die? Do all disabled persons cause such a magnitude of suffering among others that their death is necessitated?

Details are important, which is why accurate observation of consequences (science) is important. There are certainly situations in which the beneficial conditions for individuals or collectives clash and compete, and morality is about finding and working with the overlap. Sometimes those situations can be intractable (like facing an individual/collective with limited or non-existent capacity for empathy), and it would not be immoral to prioritize yourself and your collective in those circumstances (and nor do I claim that morality is universal -- biological divergence will result in moral divergence).

>>11814240
>objectively, killing innocent civilians is not "good"
Wish someone had mentioned that to the British before they got ahold of Dresden.

>>11814777
Best goyim in this thread, visit your local synagogue for a complimentary brisket.

>>11815792
>it is not one that is optimal, but it is the only one
Doesn't that mean it is both most optimal and least optimal?

>>11816872
>Harris and I advocate for incorporating scientific findings as much as possible when drawing that line in the sand.
imagine I posted a .jpg of Karl Marx wearing a fedora and holding a katana.

>>11817246
>Ah yes, the metaphysical cop-out. Knew that was coming. You don't even attempt to answer... Why and how do you argue for something you can't begin to explain?
I hope so, it was obvious from the start. But the problem with your entire line of thinking is that you've redefined ethics in terms of well-being, and this is fundamentally not what ethics is.

>It is not arbitrary to have a bias towards survival, it is a normative biological reality which makes life possible.
So what? You are assuming life is desirable here, which is not something an anti-natalist would posit. It very much is arbitrary to have a bias towards survival speaking ethically. If you wish to use that particular "normative biological reality" as a foundation for ethics, it is fine, but realize that your position here is arbitrary. I've asked you to prove this and you haven't, because you aren't able to. It is an axiom.

>You're also still arguing like 'arbitrary' is a binary 0 or 1. Is that what you think? There's no possible in-between?
There may be a justification that you find better than another, but no. Something is arbitrary or it is not arbitrary.

>How is judgement completely or fundamentally arbitrary?
Judgment is arbitrary if the method with which you base the judgment on is arbitrary. And in your case it is, because as I've said for the umpteenth time, 'is' cannot tell what is desirable or morally justifiable.

As to your notion of my believing "all knowledge is erroneous because knowledge is incomplete", no I do not believe that. Some knowledge is provable and complete, like many fields of science. But this does not extend to ethics.

Regardless of whether you find my post satisfactory or not, I should hope that to you it is not obvious nor common sense that an 'is' statement is not discernible from an 'ought' statement, which is the cause of all your confusion. Please illuminate me on why they are the same. And be concrete and clear: give examples. Draw an 'ought' from a set of 'is' for me. Do it without qualifying it arbitrarily as you claim you do, or as you claim is even possible. This is clearly not self-evident and so the onus of proof must lie with you.

If you want to define ethics as that which results in the maximizing of the well-being of the collective of humanity (which is arbitrary), then fine, but you have to own up to the fact that you are basing this on a judgment that is not scientifically provable or reasonable in the same way things such as math and physics are. Please stop with the wordplay and address the concerns directly.

As for other starting points (axioms), which is not any less arbitrary than yours: Why not view humanity as a means to create a consciousness greater than ourselves as some posit is imminent in the future, and embrace that instead? What is humanity in the face of a greater consciousness? In the face of this, what is human well-being?

>>11816923
>But even those biases are objective

>>11817295
what is the point of an ethics system if you can't answer ethical questions

>>11814680
>external facts are objective things
How does one make such monumental assumptions?

>>11817349
>Some knowledge is provable and complete, like many fields of science
Science has never proven anything. Proof is for mathematicians and alcoholics.

>>11817349
We need to look at morality in a different light.

Imagine we start from consciousness, as that is no bad place to start. The entirety of humanity is conscious and demonstrates emotions such as pain and joy and love. But mankind's consciousness is but a drop in the pond when compared to what we can create. We can create a being that may be able to experience consciousness on a magnitude heretofore unknown to the universe.

The collective magnitude of consciousness in the universe at any one time is sort of like a landscape. It has its ups and downs as people die and feel terrible and feel great. Imagine all consciousness on the planet feels the worst possible misery. I call this my Lowest Possible Consciousness For All (LPCA).

It is a self-evident and scientifically provable that anything is better than LPCA. Therefore it is up to us to ensure that whatever happens, it is not this. But this is much easier than we think: because we are beings of such a low consciousness, and because the LPCA is not at all practical to imagine would exist, if we proliferate beings of higher consciousness, each one of which has a consciousness the magnitude of the entirety of mankind, then as long as at least one of these beings of higher consciousness is not unhappy, we have succeeded.

Thus, it is our moral obligation to proliferate beings of higher consciousness

>>11817348
Oh yeah, totally. Marx was so rigorously scientific.

Just being an atheist doesn't mean you're consistent about applying logic and evidence to all areas of knowledge. Sam is a great example... I agree with him on morality and atheism, but his politics are complete rubbish. As seen above, he doesn't even apply his own moral notions comprehensively... He is right to say that terrorists would probably kill us all if they could and we wouldn't do the same, but he ignores the fact that U.S. geopolitical meddling and wars are what caused the proliferation of radicals and that U.S. actions have led to more suffering and death than the terrorists alone would've ever caused.

Yeah, everyone is wrong sometimes. Does that mean everyone is wrong about everything?

>>11817446
>Marx was so rigorously scientific.
That's what he was claiming, yes.

>>11810573
Good otherwise I'd still be in kindergarten

>>11817349
Ok, well you still haven't shown an example of any action which isn't in pursuit of well-being, so how can ethics be about anything else? What fundamentally is ethics, if you don't mind me asking?

So if I'm the moral authority of a society and I decide to outlaw murder as an immoral act because of the predictable effects that rampant murder would have upon my society, that is fundamentally arbitrary? If it is fundamentally arbitrary, is it completely arbitrary? It doesn't appear that way and you haven't argued for the binary nature of an arbitrary quality, only asserted it.

The method isn't arbitrary. Relying upon knowledge which has predictive power to inform your judgement is the opposite of arbitrary. If you consider everything short of abstract mathematical proofs abitrary, fair enough. Keep in mind though, that even abstract mathematics and logic wouldn't exist if not for basic observations about the concrete world. So let's say that all morality is arbitrary to some degree, so what? Any bias is still an objective, biological reality. I do not have an expectation of morality to be universal or perfect, so how are my 'oughts' concretely distinct from any other inductive knowledge (knowledge you accept can be valid, even if incomplete)?

In short, mathematics have an advantage in your line of thinking because they do not necessarily have to describe anything concrete, they can be self-referential statements (if we ignore the concrete properties mathematics is based upon). But 'oughts' are judgements which must refer to the concrete world; so there is nothing untenable about them being inductive knowledge, which all of science is by the way. To be like mathematics, ought judgements would have to abstain from making claims about the concrete world, is that what oughts are to you?

What is our consciousness? What is a greater consciousness and what makes it greater? Define those concepts and I'll consider your hypothesis. On the face of it though, I don't see how well-being would fall out of the equation or how that posits an alternate source of morality.

>>11817368
I did answer them, did I not? Oh, you need your binary thinking satisfied... And they call me an NPC.

>>11817375
Says the guy with no counter-argument.

>>11817493
And? So? Don't idiots say the same thing when they claim race is a 'social construct'?

>>11817366
Where do you suppose biases originate from if not your objective biological state?

>>11817534
>Ok, well you still haven't shown an example of any action which isn't in pursuit of well-being
Returning a purse or wallet without taking the money inside
Offering your home to a homeless man
Charity and philanthropy
Holding a door open for a person
Helping an elderly woman across the street
Tipping generously
Removing living creatures from the shower before showering
Picking up after yourself
Lighting yourself on fire in protest
Standing in front of a tank in a parade
Rewarding a person for returning your wallet
Forgoing profit to preserve the environment
Taking precautions to humanely kill animals
Avoiding stepping on small creatures when at all possible
Etc
Etc
Etc

Can't wait for the
>hurr durr it was a tautology all actions are by definition contributing to your well being

>>11810299
>I solved ethics guys, see it turns out if u just avoid pain then ethics is objectively the pursuit of collective well-being
Truly the Socrates of our generation

>>11817576
You're not serious right?

All of those satisfy some aspect of psychological well-being (adhering to your beliefs, indulging in your capacity for empathy). Most of them involve considering the well-being of another (which is why morality exists -- it is a strategy which evolved with us as social animals).

>>11817592
Utilitarians have had a different view on ethics for a long time, Harris didn't invent it... He just pushes the objective nature of it, and he's right.

I challenge you to define ethics in a more coherent and concrete way than the pursuit of collective well-being.

>>11817613
You have an interpretation of the way the world is that is ludicrous. any action taken then in your world is by definition one that contributes to your wellbeing even if it is literally the end of you
It is detrimental to your wellbeing for you to die, is this true or false?
To believe that you can discern what is morally good and morally bad given all observable facts about the universe is... Do you really think this lol

>>11817647
You would only knowlingly take an action that would cause your death if 1) it would relieve your suffering 2) it would preserve or enhance the well-being of other(s) 3) it was a miscalculated risk in the attainment of a dopamine hit.

So yeah, it's all in pursuit of some kind of well-being.

You can't even concretely define morality, you assume that it is universal or somehow precedes us, and you can't demonstrate the existence of anything literally metaphysical... Yet you lol at me. Yeah, ok.

>>11810299
Sam "I May Seem Mediocre, But That Actually Makes Me Superior" Harris

>>11817701
Yeah, I do lol at you. Utilitarianism cannot call itself moral. Morality cannot exist without metaphysics. You just co-opt the term morality to be the result of a comparison between the reduction of consequences to a single numerical value that you posit corresponds to some ethereal value of wellbeing. Even barring the fact that this single numerical value is in all important cases impossible to truly determine, just the audacity to believe that you can reduce events like this is really something else. The existence of the Christian God seems about as plausible

>>11817742
Welp, the problem of induction applies to all of your inductive knoweldge, and I bet that doesn't dissuade you from applying it every single day of your life. I'm certain that you routinely employ knowledge that has demonstrated its predictive validity to you in the concrete, a standard you conveniently dismiss when asserting the plausibility of your god. I have no idea what you are on about with that 'single numerical value' nonsense.

You can't even concretely define your terms and concepts (like 'metaphysical'), all you can do is refer them to other concepts in a nice little circle.

>>11817822
hahahahaha
oh man the irony

>>11817701
>well-being.
What the fuck is wellbeing and why is it 'good'? You have no argument other than hurr durr we like it. Naturalistic fallacy baka

>>11817613
do tell me how exactly lighting yourself on fire enhances your well-being.
you are pretty much proving >>11817576
point.

>>11814680
harris is a brainlet who thinks scientific utilitarianism and the is/ought distinction is incompatible

>>11816853
https://shadowtolight.wordpress.com/2015/01/06/some-new-atheists-cant-get-enough-of-their-hate-mail-2/

>Ergo: No hate mail is real.

https://shadowtolight.wordpress.com/2015/01/06/more-genius-insights-from-neil-degrasse-tyson/

>don't know anything about one-page systems nor keeping things offline

https://shadowtolight.wordpress.com/2015/04/04/new-atheism-in-the-dock/

>pretends that C.S. Lewis' "God in the dock" actually put God in the dock

>>11815557
>That war is largely our fault though...
Nice tayyiqa!

>>11811218
>Western thought
You can keep it!

>"If The Vedas says in a hundreds of instances that fire is something cold and dark, then it's false."

t. Shankara

>>11817547
>And? So? Don't idiots say the same thing when they claim race is a 'social construct'?
Yes they do. And so do you.

>>11818566
>damn Iraqians trying to take our freedom

Will the Sam Harris dick sucker in here just give a final definition of "well-being"? Bonus points if you can do it without using the word "sucks".

>>11818705
>the Sam Harris dick sucker
I'm leaning towards it actually being Sam Harris. Who else would spend as much time defending these positions? We know his ego is fragile enough