/lit/ - Literature

His getting from "is" to "ought":
https://twitter.com/samharrisorg/status/951276346529009665?lang=en

some anon had a picture of it but i didn't save it

>>11719750
A lot of people here aren't gonna like my answer, and they might cite Hume, but, yes, Harris is correct.

>>11719750
I'm gonna hold up my hands and say I haven't read his book. But I did read the Twitter thread here >>11719754

And I can definitely understand where he's coming from, I don't know to what extent the conclusions one draws from that could be considered a consistent form of morality. A form of egoism, perhaps.

Because although I agree that most people would avoid experiences that "suck" (as he puts it), I'm not sure how he therefore justifies that we "ought" to do that. I might want to put my hand on a stove (his favourite example). Or, like a normal person, I might not. But I don't see how I "ought" to do one over another.

What's also not clear is how this desire to avoid experiences that "suck" extends to other people. Yes, I would obviously want to avoid putting my own hand on a stove. But I am never going to experience anybody else's pain or suffering, or "sucky" experiences. So it's not clear why I "ought" to endeavour to avoid them.

I suppose that if it was someone I knew and loved, like a friend or a family member, compassion might make it also "suck" for me if they were hurt. But if it was a stranger? It depends how compassionate a person I am. Moreover, if I were somebody like Jeffrey Dahmer who didn't experience empathy and compassion, and therefore it wouldn't "suck" if I killed and ate someone, does that mean that action is morally good, or at best, morally neutral?

His system seems to want to only focus on what "is", rather than reference to God or so on. But as far as I'm concerned, only my pain "is"; I can never experience yours or anybody else's.

I'm not necessarily criticising these conclusions, just wondering aloud if they're the ones that would have to be reached following Harris's system.

He's assuming pain is inherently bad and we should avoid it, which is obvious nonsense and I don't know why he's pretending otherwise

That twitter thread is mortally embarrassing. Every one of his priors is dead wrong.

NOOOO SAM LET GO OF MY HAND I PROMISE I WILL ACCEPT YOUR AXIOMS

>>11719844
kek

>>11719754
for future sambo threads

>>11719831
Care to expound? I personally believe you completely but I'm not well-read enough in philosophy to formulate a response other than some vague inkling in my head that tells me this is not epistemologically sound

>>11719863
You put more faith in an anonymous poster than you do a world-renowned philosopher? And, no, you don't need to work in academia to be a philosopher.

>>11719855
amazing
from the pre-Socratics to this
and people doubt Hesiod's Five Ages

>>11719874
>world-renowned philosopher

>>11719817
So, is is he a crypto-Epicurean?

>>11719884
Yup, his talks sell out quickly and his books are bestsellers. You don't hear people clamoring for more Raymond Geuss books simply because he teaches philosophy at a prestigious university. Sam Harris is the real deal. The people have spoken whether you like it or not.

>>11719889
>Epicurean
I don't even know that he's that smart. If we take Harris at his word we should pump babies full of opiates and keep them in an induced coma state for their entire lives. They would then never have an experience that 'sucked'

@11719906 (You)
thanks for the bump, gonna go pick myself up some Rupi Kaur, who is the absolute pinnacle of poetry as we know it, being the bestseller and all

>>11719925
Oh, I guess I should stop reading Shakespeare since everyone reads him.

>>11719874
>You put more faith in an anonymous poster than you do a world-renowned philosopher?
Yes, I honestly do. At least here, you can say what you truly think and not have to worry about gaining or losing social capital, whereas Sam Harris and JPB have to police their speech, else they will lose those patreon and book deal shekels, not to mention their credibility.

>>11719906

>if we knew everything there is to know about physics chemistry biology etc

>>11720179
well, eventually we're going to?

oh I'm sorry, we can know that we have immortal souls and heaven is paved with gold, but coming to understand the Natural world is beyond your grasp?

religion is a mental disorder lmao

>>11720205

>>11719778
Why? Harris equates values with facts with absolutely no structure. The world is this way, and so it should be this way, because it is what I observed.

>>11719754
It’s easy to make morality make sense when you use extreme examples such as putting your hands on a stove, but what about actions that edge more on the grey zone?

What about giving to charity? *Ought* i give to charity because being poor for others sucks? Being departed from my money suck for me. How far is this pragmatic suckyness able to decide moral actions without ambiguity?

And btw i include being taxed as (in many cases non-voluntary) charity

HOLY SHIT ANON WHATEVER YOU DO DON'T TOUCH THE FUCKIN STOVE
t. the objective morality boogeyman that lives under your bed

Does Harris make an argument a more formal argument and address concerns about his drawing "ought" from "is"?

>>11720397
He doesn't. In The Moral Landscape, he states that one can draw oughts from is'. Specifically:
>So it is with the linkage between morality and well-being: To say that morality is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that the well-being of conscious creatures is good, is exactly like saying that science is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that a rational understanding of the universe is good. We need not enter either of these philosophical cul-de-sacs.

The problem with this, of course, is that the result 'science' reaches is a fact and is observable (whether or not one gives 'rationalism' or 'science' credence or not), whereas the result his 'morality' reaches is simply a subjective judgement that is not observable or self-evident (not to mention completely not 'scientific'), even if it a belief held or believed to be true by many people.

Not to mention he doesn't even understand the is-ought problem. Harris is a fucking hack.

>>11719750
He's wrong.

He swindles subjective experience into his argument and acts as if it's objectively bad. He calls it "suck" and gives you an example of placing your hand on an oven, which he claims objectively sucks.

That's wrong. I only have to remind you, that there are men, who pay good money to get kicked in the balls as hard as possible by a woman wearing a latex suit.

There is no objective good or bad in terms of valuation. (I'm not speaking of good or bad in moral terms)

The axiom of the Austrian School of Economics of Subjective Value Theory is true.

>>11719855
>suck-based morality

Literally has there been a worse "philosophical" moral system? Even Socrates' was more complex and less presumptiously silly

>>11719804
>Sam Harris Utopia is a world of sociopathic schizophrenic serial killers at constant tribal war with one another
radical

>>11719855
>sucks
lmao

>>11720833
I don't like Sam's politics very much, but he's right about objective morality (not that he originated these ideas, they've been a part of utilitarian philosophy for a long time).

You must realize that what you call 'subjective experience' is just a facet of overall objective reality. You are objectively different from another person, and that is why your experience is objectively different... So keeping in mind that everything is fundamentally objective in nature, it is easy to see that: Yes there will be outliers, yes our priorities will vary to the extent that we do, but also that our most basic and important utilities will be shared by the majority. The vast majority of people will not enjoy burning themselves on a stove or living under constant threat of being murdered. We can accomodate the outliers as much as possible, but ultimately morality is about collective utility.

Now, I think Sam is a little optimistic about the potential for some populations to become compatible/capable moral agents, or that average people are even ready to understand objective morality. It may very well be that taking a more libertarian approach would better serve the collective utility of (some) human populations than attempting more complex feats of management, and this can be taken into account when making a utilitarian calculation. Technically though, he's right.

>>11721592
Just because the majority of people do not like burning there hands on stoves it does not mean that the objective morality of the universe should be moving away from, as Sam puts it, "needless suffering". One does not follow the other.

Furthermore, his method for achieving the "ought", even if we give that the "is" is true, is not sound in the slightest. In The Moral Landscape he demonstrates a very obviously flawed understanding of the is-ought problem. He then skirts around the problem and then proceeds on grounds based not in science but as an appeal to a consensus ("saying that my 'good' is subjective is akin to saying that science is subjective" is pretty much his claim, and that's laughable and invites dogmatic interpretation itself, something he seems so vehemently against)

And that's to say nothing of the more complicated moral problems in the face of that goal, or the "wellbeing" goal: there are many, many, many things that are not so black and white, and his morality is not even close to covering the whole gamut with anything close to complete conclusiveness and therefore objectivity.

>>11721616
And I feel like I should mention the complete impracticality of his "morality" which would very "rationally" favor some humans more than others.

>>11719880

Brevity is the soul of wit. Of course, some people will always prefer jerking off.

>>11719855
Am I retarded or does he just sneak value judgements in at #3 and let it play out from there?

>>11721639
one) look up what brevity means
two) examine the context in which that phrase occurs. is polonius a man whose opinion you really wish to emulate?

>>11721663
According to him, they're facts

>>11721592
>The vast majority do not like being burned so it is a fact that it is bad to be burned

After watching Harris and Peterson debate, I must commend Harris for presenting his faulty reasoning clearly, whereas Peterson is obscure with his shit ideas, which is cause for much confusion.

>>11721746
Muh proof -crowd must be woken to the idea of uncertainty. I welcome obscuriantism.

>>11719817
>He's assuming pain is inherently bad and we should avoid it
Much more than that - that pain's being something one should avoid is logically deducible from the non-normative sense of the term 'pain'. He may well be right that pain is inherently bad and something one should avoid. It doesn't matter - his task is the much harder one of providing a logical bridge from the plain, non-normative fact of someone's being in pain to the normative fact of pain being bad, or pain being something one ought to avoid. That is the nature of the is-ought problem as articulated by Hume. Anyone can point to normative facts in the world (assuming one believes in normative facts): That murder IS wrong, that unjustified torture IS bad, etc. The is-ought problem is that of bridging the gap in logical space between normative facts and non-normative facts.

>>11721592
>I don't like Sam's politics very much, but he's right about objective morality
The is-ought problem has nothing to do with whether morality is subjective or objective.

>>11721592

This assumes that what is 'bad' is what is perceived as unpleasant by the senses (burning your hand hurts), which is an assumption you don't necessarily have to agree with.
You could easily argue the good is something seperate from the senses and that certain ways of living/behaving are good in themselves, even though they're not especially pleasant.

It's all about what fundamental assumption you choose and Harris acts like his is objective and all the others are arbitrary.

>His axiom seems to not cover nearly enough ground to create such an all-encompassing morality "grounded in fact"
I think another way of phrasing that is that his moral system is just obviously wrong - we use normative notions everyday that seemingly have nothing essentially to do with happiness or pleasantness: Justice, fairness, duty, flourishing, perseverance, etc. No doubt Harris thinks all of these notions can be derived from a calculus of pleasantness. Maybe they can, maybe they can't, that would be up to him to prove. Still it wouldn't show that they are actually the same in kind, as normative qualities, as the normative quality of pleasantness, just that something functionally equivalent to them can be derived from pleasantness.

>>11719754
Is this phenomenology?

>>11721616
You haven't understood. Objective morality does not equal universal morality. If morality is a strategy for fufilling collective utility, then it must be specific to the collective in question (with the potential for overlap with other beings/collectives).

I have yet to see a convincing argument for the reality of the is-ought distinction. You're welcome to present one, but all you've done here is assumed that said distinction exists. At least Sam's assumption that there is only 'is' has the backing of all scientific inquiry to date. I recommend looking into Quine's criticism of the is-ought distinction.

This whole 'subjectivity' nonsense is another one of these spurious distinctions as well; it's useful shortand to say 'objectively different experience', but has been twisted to aggrandize our sense of self.

As to the complexity of calculating 'wellbeing' or optimal utility, it is indeed very complex and I do not (nor does Sam) contend that all is black and white. It is usually religious and ideological models of morality that deal in black and white. Objective reality is highly complex, of that there is no doubt. So, I must point out that your expectation of 'complete conclusiveness' is rather strange... Especially as we must assume that utilitarian moral calculations would be constantly evolving as knowledge increased and variables changed.

>>11721626
I don't really know what you expect here. Equality is a myth, and if morality is about collective utility then not everyone will get to do whatever they want. What's the problem? Also again, divergent collectivies will have divergent optimal utilities. There is no magic unversial bullet (ought) for that.

>>11721697
The vast majority do not like being burned so it is a fact that it is bad for that vast majority to be burned.

Your expectation of universality is unreasonable. Morality is about collective utility, not catering to every weirdo in existence. Also, it is a fact that it is bad to be burned from the stance of bodily harm (unless it's a medical procedure preventing greater harm)... So it could be argued from a biological fitness standpoint that someone who likes burning themselves is a maladaptive specimen.

>>11721783
There is no is-ought problem you fucking pseud. There is only is. You show me where ought exists dumbass.

>>11721793
Thanks for saying absolutely nothing. Ground control to Major Tom.

Harris is working from what science has told us about the universe thus far. So yes, his assumptions are absolutely less arbitrary than purely conceptual ones. How can you not see that?

>>11722095
'you ought to kill yourself'

>>11722092
The vast majority of Americans don't like to exercise so it is a fact that it is bad for that vast majority to exercise.

>>11721822
All of those notions are paradigms which attempt to minimize collective and long-term suffering in some manner, even if they entail lesser or great short-term suffering to do so.

>>11722114

I'm talking about one specific assumption on which he bases all his ideas about morality.
This one assumption is what supposedly makes his thinking 'objective', while it isn't even though he pretends it is. If it isn't objective, there isn't any reason why people would logically have to accept it. Stating that morally good=less pain, is giving a certain definition of morality which isn't grounded in any fact.

This assumption isn't any less arbitrary than any other, he basically just states: pain is morally bad. This is an axiom. If it seems less arbitrary than others, than only by a certain standard. And this standard would imply other assumptions, and so on.
This is the infinite regression problem in ethics, which he doesn't seem to understand but claims to have solved by simply acting his own assumption is objective. Just like every other moral system does.

>>11722147
Pain being morally bad is self evidently true tho

>>11722122
Oh yeah you sure showed me. Saying there is no 'ought' doesn't mean I don't believe in morality as real collective utility. Try your best to comprehend.

>>11722162
Nice thumbnail

>>11719855
This guy is a philosopher?
But he doesn't even understand his own scenerio.
In his (exceedingly childish and reductionist) example it isn't Pain as such that is being avoided but Pain in the context of that instance. Not the principle itself.
Holy shit what is going on in academia these days

>>11722167
He's technically a neuroscientist. But the situation around his phd is pretty shady.

>>11722134
Preference does not equal utility. Obviously people can like things in the short term that are terrible for them in the long term. No one is claiming that everyone is equally adept at even determining their own optimal utility. Most of the people who don't like to exercise aren't going to enjoy dying of diabetes or cardiovascular disease either, and their poor choices place a burden on others.

>>11722147
Did he actually state that though? I see him using pain in an example, but there could easily be other examples where short term pain results in less long term suffering... Or even examples of sacrificing your life for your family to serve collective utility.

I think you're strawmanning a bit here.

>>11722175
Exactly. You can't just assume pain doesn't have utility.
You need a whole theory of utility in the first place to determine whether or not it's really good or bad, which in turn requires a moral foundation. And that puts you back at square one.

>>11719906
Does that mean you should become a Catholic just because Fulton Sheen was a "world-renowned philosopher?"

>>11722150

No, it isn't. This is an axiom and you can take it or leave it.
Even in our secular culture pain isn't necessarily wholly bad. If you suffer while pursuing a cause which is deemed good, the pain or discomfort adds to your achievement.

>>11722186

In the Peterson debate and in the picture with his Twitter post, he always comes back to this one argument. I haven't heard him give any other.
I don't even mind his ethical system, I just really dislike that he acts his is objective while all other ones are arbitrary. This is ironic because it's what all fundamentalists do.

>>11722167
You didn't read up to point 6 did you...

>>11722205
yes
and you either need to slowly reread my post again or you are legitimately too stupid to understand what's going on

>>11722187
No, the theory of utility is the moral foundation. As your ability to consider more variables improves, so does the precision and sophisitication of your moral calculations.

>>11722214
He explicitly accounted for contexts in which pain wouldn't be the primary consideration.

>>11722226
Yeah, it's not a good criticism. Whether the universe is random or deterministic, you still have to try at things because the specific outcomes are unknown to you. What you can do is narrow your field of effort and risk by accounting for outcomes you can be more certain of, such as: You will burn yourself if you touch the hot element and you will not accomplish anything if you do not make any effort at all.

>>11722243
>you still have to try at things because the specific outcomes are unknown to you.
You don't have to try at things in a deterministic world because there is no attempt. There is no specific action to be taken - all will merely happen. In a random universe action is gambling, and as such much more nuanced and potent.

>>11722061
>If morality is a strategy for fufilling collective utility
Pretty big if you got there senpai

>>11722195
Fine, but I reckon that objective reality is pretty fundamental. Although our knowledge of the universe can never be perfect, if anyone can justifying flirting with fundamentalism it's scientists. They're the only ones with a prove track record and a methodology which requires them to be open to new information.

>>11722260
Even if that is a way to describe it, it is also itself. Music is not reducible to the notes, the notes are a way to understand music.

>>11722218
>No, the theory of utility is the moral foundation.
If you take utility to be equivalent to "good" as a foundational axiom.

>>11722253
Sure, but for you in the present it is an attempt because you don't know if you will succeed or fail. Attempt, gamble, same thing. The point is that the future is unknown to you... Even if you know the universe is deterministic, you still have to work off of probabilities for most things. The notion that action in a random universe would be more nuanced and potent presupposes that randomness would manifest significantly at the macro-scales most relevant to us; a supposition there is no evidence for.

>>11722268

That's correct, but they can't say anything about what is morally true. Science examines reality as it is, but that doesn't have anything to do with right/wrong or bad/good because it's value-free.
Anthropologists, evolutionary biologists and historians can examine the history of morality and ethics but this is merely descriptive.
No serious scientist would ever claim to be able to say: this or that is objectively good/bad, because that's not his field.

Only a handfull of people, including Harris, claim to have a sort of objective basis for morality and to have solved the is/ought problem.
No serious philospher would be as militantly anti-religous as these guys or would claim to have found 'the' solution to ethics.

>>11722293
I would, especially since collective utility is the primary concern. If you were alone in the universe, morality wouldn't really be a thing. What other demonstrably extant foundations are there (I would argue that fully abstract concepts of morality were actually born out of collective utility concerns)?

>>11722332
Tons, if not most, people prefer deontology over collective utility though.

If you want to convert them you need justifications.

>>11722325
Well what is the basis for values if not observations of real world consequences?

Well, I don't know if Quine was especially militant, but he cast considerable doubt on the very existence of the is/ought and analytic/synthetic truth distinctions. So many philosphers just take for granted that these distinctions actually exist, yet I have never seen convincing arguments to that effect.

>>11722351
I said demonstrably extant. If it works for them, that's great -- but we're talking about what's actually going on 'under the hood'.

>>11722332
>especially since collective utility is the primary concern.
You haven't shown that though, you just keep asserting it, despite being called on it multiple times in this very thread

>>11722370
Utility is not demonstrably extant without your pre-existing moral assumptions.

>>11722377
Well what other options are there? You want to contribute or just shit on me?

Please, tell me what are the other possible goals of morality other than the satisfaction of collective utility. No, individual utility isn't one because there would be no such thing as morality in a universe with a single being.

>>11722379
Whaa? Utility is basic to our existence. If you generally try to avoid death you are satisfying a utility, if you avoid murdering people you are satisfying a collective utility. Morality is the abstraction of that extant utility dynamic, not the foundation.

>>11722404
"Utility" is not a goal you moron.
Utility is a measure of progress towards a goal.

In order to talk about a concept of "collective utility" you need to define what the goal of the collective is.

>>11722404
>no such thing as morality in a universe with a single being
Again with the assertions. You need to do a little better. You are just begging the question here
>Please, tell me what are the other possible goals of morality other than the satisfaction of collective utility.
Interesting you think morality has goals.

It seems to me that both "what is" and "what ought to be" are mysterious, but the latter is more so. Consider

> X ought to be

We can ask why.

> Because X is an instance of X_1, and we ought to do X_1

We can ask why we ought to do X_1.

> Because X_1 is an instance of X_2, and we ought to do X_2.

We can continue asking the why question, but eventually we reach a point where he says

> You're just supposed to do X_n! Isn't it obvious!

All deductive branches of knowledge must start somewhere, from axioms. But consider

> For every two distinct points there is a line that goes through both.

The nihilist (which, I suppose, I am) points to this and says

> Do you see how obvious this is? Do you see how it is incapable of being honestly doubted? Well, when it comes to ethical "axioms", none of them are as obvious as this! They just aren't that obvious, and so the whole of ethics is built upon, well, nothing! It's built on nothing! It's built on a shady, unstable foundation.

Anyways, I'd love if someone could criticize this so that I can strength my ideas.

>>11722422
No, the goal stems from the utility. How the hell can you set goals if there are no worse or better conditions (utilities) from where you are now? Moron.

>>11722457
How can you say what is better or worse if you have no goal?

>>11722431
No, you need to do much better. Please explain how morality would be a consideration for a being whose actions could have no impact on other beings.

I think morality only exists because sentient beings have utilities and a capacity for abstraction. They have utilities to satisfy, and morality is a formula to help with that... So yes, there is a point (goal) to morality.

>>11722486
>Please explain how morality would be a consideration for a being whose actions could have no impact on other beings.
>what is deontology

>>11722468
Utilities. Why would most people consider it 'better' that their heart continues beating? Riddle me that.

The goal is a consequence of the utility.

>>11722503
>Why would most people consider it 'better' that their heart continues beating?
Because they have a moral system built around the goal of survival, as do most people. Hence why things that contribute to their survival have utility to them.

>>11722501
Ok, and why would moral rules exist if there was but a singular being who couldn't affect others? How and why would such rules be formulated in the first place? Where would they come from? If you say God, then we're just detouring into fairytale land.

>>11722517
Ok, so you think that a newborn who cries for feeding or because they've been scared is operating on a moral system? Surely you can see that you have the causality backwards?

>>11722523
>if there was but a singular being who couldn't affect others?
>If you say God, then we're just detouring into fairytale land.
Do you listen to your own bullshit? Your own hypothetical is a detour into fairytale land you dumb fuck

>>11722532
>Ok, so you think that a newborn who cries for feeding or because they've been scared is operating on a moral system
No, but neither are they operating with a theory of utility.
The motive force behind their crying is entirely biological.

>>11722362

You always have to decide if some real world consequence is good or bad and for this you need an a priori definition of good and bad to see if your event fits the criteria.

X happens. X is bad. Why? because X causes Y.
But then why is Y bad? Because Y necessarily means Z.
But then why is Z bad? Because X necessarily implies ...

and so on until you reach an axiom you just accept without further justification. The observation is always neutral on its own, you need the additional moral assumptions to qualify it.

I don't want to go into it any further. The only point I wanted to make is that the so-called objectivity of his moral system isn't at all proven, he just acts like it is.
Peterson pointed this out a couple of times too and he couldn't give any satisfying answer.

>>11722536
It's a reasonable thought experiment, whereas resorting to God is a both a factual claim and desperate hand waving.

Shhhh, the adults are talking.

>>11722549
Utility isn't a theory, it is that biological reality. Morality is the abstract, theoretical layer which attempts to make calculations based on the best available knowledge.

>>11722559
>you can't beg the question, only I'm allowed to do that
If we assume utility doesn't exist, how can you show utility is a basis for decisions?

>>11722565
If I give you a potential action, how do you determine how much utility you get out of it?

Does the answer just magically pop into your mind?

>>11722565
>Morality is the abstract, theoretical layer which attempts to make calculations based on the best available knowledge.
You have things completely backwards.

>>11722565
>Utility isn't a theory
You think utility exists? Like atoms or light or your mom's ass? It's an abstract concept and is purely theoretical

>>11722552
No, you hit a level of basic utility and there's nothing beyond that. The observations could only be neutral for a being with no utility, that is to say with no 'skin in the game'. Even if you can imagine a sentient being like that, it wouldn't invalidate utilitarian morality for us since I'm not making claims to universal 'oughts'. I've already noted that even divergent human collectives will have divergent collective utilities. You're hung up on the notion of 'oughts' being valid, and perhaps conflating objectivity with a flawed expectation of universal uniformity.

Look, it's pretty apparent that even Peterson's moral framework exists because human cooperation was evolutionarily important. We developed language and civilization and our cooperative formulas became codified as moral knowledge. If you believe that's actually the word of God, great -- but there's no evidence for that. So you tell me what is the more arbitrary explanation and which has a better claim to objectivity.

>>11722580
How and why would you assume utility doesn't exist? You're just flailing around now. What is your proposed alternative basis for decisions?

>>11722639
It is directly related to biological reality. It is only abstract in the sense that we use it as a comprehensive term to address the manifold real conditions which motivate us. Morality is more abstract (although still rooted in reality via utilitiy) as it is the attempt to weigh the importance of those many conditions in an effort to benefit the collective. 'Birds' is technically a taxonomic abstraction used to describe many varying species, but it isn't purely theoretical and neither is utility.

>>11722722
>How and why would you assume utility doesn't exist?
How and why would you assume God doesn't exist. I can assert His existence with as much certainty as you can assert the existence of 'utility'. Can you show me some utility?

>>11722722
>It is directly related to biological reality.
Only insomuch as your brain has constructed a correspondence system between your senses and your behaviour.

>>11722730
Yes I can. Do you brush your teeth? If yes, why?

>>11722737
Not necessarily. We contradict our optimal utility all the time because we don't know any better or we're maladaptive or whatever. The potential for better or worse utility optimization exists whether you're conscious of it or not. It's quite possible that another person could calculate better utility conditions for you than you could for yourself.

>>11722779
>Yes I can. Do you brush your teeth? If yes, why?
So you can't? I must confess I am greatly puzzled anon. You claim utlity exists, in the same way birds exist, that it's a biological reality. And yet I am now closer to discovering what it is or even if it exists at all. Can you help out a poor ignorant anon like me?

>>11722797
Answer the question and I will help you out, ignorant anon.

Being facetious doesn't automatically make you clever, btw.

>>11720205
>believes true knowledge as an attainable state of awareness is possible through scientistic methods

>>11722809
Why do you need to know if I brushed my teeth? Can't you show me some utility? According to you it exists in the physical world as a biological reality. You aren't going to backtrack on that are you?

>>11722846
No, I'm not. Answer the question scaredy-kot.

And not -if- you brushed your teeth, but why you brush your teeth if you do.

>>11722647

You're conflating an explanation for the existence of morality (as a general phenomenon) with a moral system itself.
I'm not saying the existence of morality as a whole can't be explained by saying it's just useful in different contexts, I'm saying Harris himself is positing a specific system of ethics which he claims is objective but fails to prove it is.

He says burning your hand on a stove is 'objectively' bad, I say it isn't because first you need a definition for what bad is which leads us into the infinite regression problem. If this is objectively bad, it's universally true.
Universal validity is a claim which every moral system makes and even Harris does it: how else could he argue that religious people should drop their dogmatic beliefs and instead accept his hot-stove-dogma?
Because he declares 'utility' to be the basis of morality but this is an arbitrary choice.

>>11719750
This faggot is a closet utilitarian but presents his position as something very unique and revolutionary. Fucking retard of highest order.

>>11722647
You can't "prove" any moral system, possibly not anything at all, since there can always be an extreme skeptical position to take.

>>11722881
>but why you brush your teeth if you do
I don't know why

What if someone doesn't want kids or to get married? How does Sam's "objective" morality account for greatly varying human desires?

>>11722941
>extreme skeptical position to take
Not possible with utility apparantly, because utility objectively exists in a physical way like birds

>>11722882
There is no infinite regression. Eventually you reach the point of the worst possible outcome for the individual and then the collective. An expectation of universal morality is not objective since we are all objectively different. An objective moral system must account for biological divergence and allow us to make compromises. Fortunately the most basic needs are shared by the vast majority, which eases the difficulty somewhat. It is not dogmatic to accept that the vast majority of people would compromise their well-being by burning themselves on a stove, and if you read all his points he did specifically allow for situations in which the pain/damage would be worth it in service to a greater utility.

He isn't declaring, he's pointing out a chain of cause and effect which is not arbitrary.

>>11722941
Sure, you can be a hardcore epistemological skeptic but the sun is still going to rise tomorrow. An expectation of perfect knowledge is just silly really.

>>11722950
Really, you can't even think of a couple of reasons? Well, you're lying...

>>11722974
...And you're stupid. 'Birds' is technically an abstraction too, it is a taxonomic concept that describes a very large and divergent spectrum of species. In the same way 'utility' is comprehensive way of referring to all needs (which are all ultimately physical and real like everything else in the universe) instead of exhaustively listing them. Even abstract concepts are real in the sense that they are physical patterns of information in your physical brain and physical electrons in this physical computer.

>>11723011
>'utility' is comprehensive way of referring to all needs
Finally anon, I thought we we'd be all day. Why should we fulfill our needs?

>>11723011
>referring to all needs (which are all ultimately physical and real like everything else in the universe)
Needs are memetic beings, like all experiences. We can't really map out location or potency of experiences through a physical model. Chemistry gets closer, but even then we seem to lack a whole field of study.

>>11723011
How would you account for this?
>>11722962

>>11722227
then he is literally sneaking value judgements there

>>11722304
In a hard deterministic world there isnt really a "you". It's not just that the outcome of an event is predetermined, but also your level of effort.

>>11723011
>Even abstract concepts are real in the sense that they are physical patterns of information in your physical brain
>when God and my gf are both now as real as anything else

>>11723011
My qualia is experienced, but not translatable to physical matter

>>11723023
There is no should, because there is no ought. The only 'should' is in the consequence. If you don't want to die, you 'should' probably fufill your needs. If your preference contradicts your basic survival utility, I would say you're maladaptive but it doesn't matter because you've removed yourself from the mutual survival game (that game being the reason moral formuals exist in the first place).

>>11723056
As I've pointed out repeatedly, an actually objective moral system would account for divergence between both individuals and collectives, since we're all objectively different. Morality can't be universal and uniform because we are not, and morality is related to our needs. Compromise is inevitable and will be skewed towards collective utility as that is the function of morality.

>>11723065
He is accounting for variation in experience and values. Literally allowing room for values outside the norm, which is consistent with divergent utility due to objective differences (see above).

>>11722979

>Eventually you reach the point of the worst possible outcome for the individual
You can't use the word 'worst' here without the assumption that certain things are bad and others good. The implicit assumption in Harris' system is utility is the good and that's why there's a hierarchy of better and worse outcomes. This is were the regression problem is. Biological 'needs' and physical sensations aren't moral in character, that's the problem. Harris just assumes they are.


>He isn't declaring, he's pointing out a chain of cause and effect which is not arbitrary
The chain of cause and effect which he points out isn't arbitrary but this is a possible explanation of why moral systems exist.
Besides explaining why moral systems exist, he obviously posits his own version of a utilitarian moral system and he claims this is superior to religious moral systems.

That he thinks a utilitarian moral system logically follows from the chain of cause and effect he describes is exactly where he's wrong. He thinks he can derive an ought from an is because he claims pain is objectively bad, which it isn't. Unless you start to give justifications and then we're at the infinite regression problem.

Pain is bad = the axiom/dogma/fundamental assumption

>>11723141
>There is no should, because there is no ought. The only 'should' is in the consequence. If you don't want to die, you 'should' probably fufill your needs. If your preference contradicts your basic survival utility, I would say you're maladaptive but it doesn't matter because you've removed yourself from the mutual survival game (that game being the reason moral formuals exist in the first place).
Ok, so you are finally admitting your moral system is Darwinian absolutism.

>>11723141
>If you don't want to die, you 'should' probably fufill your needs. If your preference contradicts your basic survival utility, I would say you're maladaptive but it doesn't matter because you've removed yourself from the mutual survival game (that game being the reason moral formuals exist in the first place).
But should we want to survive? What is the utility of survival? What needs does it fulfill? Should we play this game? It's really not as straightforward a question as you seem to think, even if you assume all needs are based around survival (not true) and the world is physical (not proven) etc etc.
You seem to assume biological physicalism is the only game in town, and thus xyz follows, but you're begging the question

>>11723141
So morality is objective, but not universal? How is that not subjective morality, and therefore non binding to any person? Murder if it benefits; lie if it helps you; steal if you gain something. Are these and much more not wrong?

>>11723104
True, but you (the biological locality that is you) is blissfully unaware of predetermination. Determinism, randomness... It's all effectively irrelevant in your quotidian life since -- as you imply -- free will doesn't exist.

>>11723118
Yes, your concepts of God and your imaginary gf are real as electrons and chemicals in your brain. The degree to which these concepts don't describe something external to that physical information is the degree of abstraction.

>>11723136
What in this universe isn't physical? Or even outside of it? What is this metaphysical layer you speak of?

>>11723187
>What in this universe isn't physical
Do we experience the universe as it is or as we experience it? It then follows that we can only know our experiences and we can't make any ontological claims as we can't experience the world in itself and therefor we can't rule out the possibility of nonphysical objects.

>>11723187
It's what I experience and know through intuition. Matter doesn't account for my thoughts, feelings and consciousness as I experience it, and my intuition tells me God is real, my faith affirms that.

>>11719750
are we experiencing a mid-wit revival in literature and philosophy rn?

>>11722092
aww what a cutie

>>11723142
Again, there is a 'worst' that most people can agree on. You're assuming 'ought' exists and that morality can precede needs, which it cannot. Morality is an abstraction upon needs and our resulting calculations cannot be perfect, universal or uniform.

There is no ought. If you have a convincing argument for the existence of an is/ought distinction, do share.

>>11723162
Well yes, death seems pretty absolute. 'Admitting' as if it's something dirty I've been concealing. Oh please. How can coherent moral system not be based on real consequences?

>>11723170
There is no 'should' in the sense of 'ought'. The only 'should' is in the sense of consequences. Survival is the basest utility because without it, none of the abstractions exist. Yes, I've accounted for situations in which collective utility calls for the compromise of individual utility (or potentially even that of other collectives). It is fairly straightfoward, but yes the calculations do become complex as one would expect from our complex and multivariant reality.

>>11723175
What is subjectivity? It's objective differences. If we're all objectively different, objective morality can't be fully universal/uniform. The only thing that really binds us is consequences. There are situations in which you could morally argue for killing, lying or stealing... Is all killing really murder? Morality is a complex spectrum and you're intentionally oversimplyfing it to benefit your argument.

>>11723206
We are beings of limited perception obviously, but we experience some of what the universe is and use technology to experience even more of it than is possible with our unaugmented senses. If you're taking an extreme epistemological skeptic position, we can't rule out anything, but that's not an honest position as we all operate on likely probabilities every day. Why invent another layer of existence when there has never been the slightest whiff of one?

>>11723210
Your thoughts, feelings and consciousness are literally matter and energy. Yes, energy is also phsycial. Good for you though, I hope your faith serves you well.

>>11723258
>Survival is the basest utility because without it, none of the abstractions exist
I'm just going to repeat myself Lynn
>But should we want to survive? What is the utility of survival? What needs does it fulfill? Should we play this game?

>>11723303
>Your thoughts, feelings and consciousness are literally matter and energy
Citation badly needed. Everybody gather round, anon has solved the hard problem of consiousness

>>11723258
I'm not sure if lying or stealing can ever be considered moral, maybe killing an assailant or something, but even at the risk of death should I lie? Since I believe in Heaven and Hell, maybe I shouldn't lie.

>>11723317
I got here as quick as I could. What did I miss?

>>11723308
There is no regression once you're dead. There is no one left to make abstractions and disingenuously argue on a pygmy clay painting forum.

>>11723317
If you want to hide in your metaphysical redoubt that's fine, but there's really no point in arguing if you won't join me in the world of best available empirical knowledge. Everything so far points to everything being physical. Fite me.

>>11723258

>There is no ought
If there is no ought, than why should you even accept this so-called moral system? The ought is the most central aspect of ethics: something is good, therefore you ought to do it. You can't have real ethics without an ought. If you drop this, you're left with a set of pragmatic agreements which aren't moral rules but more like laws or contracts.

If you're proposing a set of rules which we can just take or leave, without any reason why we 'ought' to follow them and without any justification why they're good, than you're simply not talking about ethics/morality.
And Harris is, because he repeatedly uses the words ought (see twitter posts above) and should (when he claims religious people should drop their dogmatism and follow his system instead).

There's always an ought implied because we supposedly 'should' us utility as the basis for deciding good and bad and this choice lacks justification. Survival in itself doesn't have a moral quality unless you give definitions of good and bad.

I also don't believe there are objective oughts so I don't go around telling religious people to drop their rules and follow something arbitrary I made up.

The only way to prove something is eternally true is to test it eternally and see the results. Ill wait. You cant predict the future nor can you fully determine what the past is. There is no inherent meaning to anything in the universe. Even at the most basic level of change, quantum suggests we cant predict what will happen, rather we predict what may happen.

So ironically nothing is true, provably. It may be temporarily mostly true as far back as we can see, maybe even thousands of years.

In the meantime we recognize that there is utility in using combinations of reason, logic, intuition, and sense to project our own beliefs about the world. Even atheists “believe” there is no god. They have “proof” which is only temporarily true. Sam Harris + co genuinely believe there is no god. This is why they hate biblethumpers and cheer when hero Samwise drops a one liner atom bomb on Christianity for the 72nd time that night.

Objectivity means well yet its critical blind spot is the radical faith like mentality its adherents champion.
How do we know something is true?
Whose to say what is true? God? Science?

I claim additionally believing something to be true completely ignores the relevance of whether it “actually” is true or not, and also, we face the problem of language, namely we cant really know what we mean by our words. Late Wittgenstein

So because we cant know the definitions of our claims entirely, we cannot know what we are proving scientifically, with 100% proof.

Im also not saying there is no objectivity in the world, there can be, its just not inherent. Its arbitrary. Made up rules, beliefs etc.

>>11723358
>Everything so far points to everything being physical. Fite me.
Everything points to the world being purely mental. We have no direct evidence the physical exists

>>11723303
Im not saying that there is some weird immaterial realm, but that we cannot rule it out. And I don't see how it's dishonest, it's a pretty old and established position in philosophy.
Also, when we have physical 3D eyes, then it's no wonder, then that we only see physical 3D things.
Also, I don't have to resort to weird esoteric dimensions to show that there exist planes of existence we can't comprehend/see, for example in string theory, it's speculated that there exists 11 dimensions.

>>11723187
>What in this universe isn't physical? Or even outside of it? What is this metaphysical layer you speak of?
Thoughts, concepts, data, interpretations, morality, etc etc.
>>11723358
>Everything so far points to everything being physical.
[citation needed]

>>11723258
So what if there is a 'worst' that people agree upon? What if that very 'is' is somehow maladaptive or reduces utility?

For example: parents that sacrifice themselves for their children. I hope you would agree that most would do so, even if their children were helpless and defenseless without the parents. Certainly this is not a religious act either, but it very obviously reduces the utility of both individuals as well as the group.

The system that Harris puts forth is not a morality, and that he acts as if it can be a substitute for morality is ridiculous: his system is completely irreconcilable with human nature.

>anon's entire argument depends on 'utility' being something objective and physical

>>11723370
Any obligation is ultimately born of consequence. 'Ought' can be a useful abstraction, a proxy for exhaustively explaining consequences every time, but technically no is/ought distinction is evident. Again, I would refer those interested to Quine's criticism of such distinctions.

I don't go around telling people to drop their religious moral frameworks either, especially if it's working for them (consequences). But that's because I see the utility in people having a moral framework they can relate to and not because I think mine is arbritrary. I do agree that Sam short-sighted on this.

>>11723380
Again, that is extreme epistemological skepticism. Is that how you live your life, or do you accept some things as true based on your best available knowledge? If you want to say we can't technically prove anything 100% that's fine, but we didn't need to do that to invent and build the technology you're using to make that post.

>>11723381
And what is 'mental' ?

>>11723449
>Any obligation is ultimately born of consequence. 'Ought' can be a useful abstraction, a proxy for exhaustively explaining consequences every time, but technically no is/ought distinction is evident. Again, I would refer those interested to Quine's criticism of such distinctions.
Any obligation is ultimately born of consequence. 'Ought' can be a useful abstraction, a proxy for exhaustively explaining consequences every time, but technically no is/ought distinction is evident. Again, I would refer those interested to Quine's criticism of such distinctions.
So, as such, "morals" would depend on the social system in which they are instituted? ie) a band of savages with no punishment for slavery and murder would be right to murder and enslave, just because there are no consequences for it?

>>11723382
Additional dimensions and quantum phenomena are not evidence of a metaphysical layer, they are also physical.

>>11723442
>Better than no argument whatsoever

>>11723409
Those are all physical. Please explain how any of those exist independent of physical reality.

The worst would be death of the collective, as no abstractions survive that and it fails the fundamental function of life. I could imagine a collective sacrificing themselves for the sake of another collective's utility (like an entire planet's ecology), but that's a genuine moral question and I don't think it invalidates utilitarian morality.

People screw up utility calculations all the time. In your specific example there are more variables to consider, such as whether the group would take on the children, how many children there are, etc. But yeah, humans aren't going to be perfect calculators of utility (collective or individual) and I have never claimed that they could be.

>>11723468
No, they could be gravely miscalculating their optimal collective utility and be completely oblivious to that. There are always consequences, to everything.

>>11723491
Existence of planes we can't see doesn't equal metaphysics. The point is that there is a possibility of planes that we can't precieve my dude and also that any ontological claim is basically useless becuase we can only experience our subjective experience and not "objective" reality.

>>11723506
Again, that's the extreme epistemological position. Do you live your daily life based on the premise that all your knowledge is useless? Do you interact with people under the assumption that they aren't real? It's not a helpful or serious argument.

>>11719750
how big does your ego have to be to think you have to "create" morality. fucking fart-sniffer

>>11723506
>>11723534

*epistemological skeptic

>>11723491
>Those are all physical. Please explain how any of those exist independent of physical reality.
Yikes. Show me that that is true; certainly I cannot go somewhere and bear witness to one of them. I cannot use my sensory perception to perceive any of them.

But if humans aren't a perfect calculator of utility, how can a 'moral' system based upon their calculation of utility be perfect?

And you did not satisfactorily reply to this anon's post
>>11723370
Your reply seems to completely disregard any notion of morality in exchange for simply what 'is'. Then whatever it 'is', it is not a moral system.

>>11723449
>And what is 'mental' ?
Well you're the guy who claims to have solved the hard problem of consciousness, so fill me in senpai. I don't think we know

>>11723534
>It's not a helpful or serious argument
>stop asking difficult questions I can't answer, it points of the flaws in my ideology

>>11723534
Epistomologicaly I'm a pragmatist, knowledge is useful if it helps me manipulate/explain my expericence of reality becuase if that isn't the definition of truth, then truth is rather pointless. I'm not saying that knowledge is useless, but that we can't make ontological claims such as physicalism/materialism and rule out the existence of nonphysical things.

>>11723549
Perfection is an unreasonable standard. Is anyone here making claims of perfection? Morality stems from what is, it cannot possibliy precede what is.

>>11723549
>>11723552
Well you can have a brain surgeon crack open your skull and probe your brain in a manner that alters your perception. Or you can take external psychoactive chemicals and use them to do the same. Does that not suggest anything to you about the nature of your consciousness? Now you can make the inception argument if you want, but nobody actually lives their lives that way. The 'le nothing is real' argument is itself an objective truth claim and so is logically self-defeating.

>>11723617
oh okay so you don't have proof, thanks
I hope you see the irony of criticizing religious morality and dogma while claiming that utility and morality and ideas and thoughts are physical while having absolutely no proof for it

>>11723617
Answer the question: if there is no 'ought', how can you call the system Harris posits as a 'moral' system? It seems more of a rationalist system; indeed there is absolutely nothing moral about it as you're arguing.

"ought" presupposes the ability to make our choices, which Harris insists we don't have

>>11723564
>Claims flaws without explicating them.
>Doesn't answer my 'difficult' questions.
Yes keep throwing your feces little monkey, it's very effective.

>>11723570
Ok, let's take another approach. What would nonphysicality be like? What distinguishes it from the physical and what are the boundaries? Does it interface with the physical -- if so, how?

If you accept that knowledge is useful, then you are de facto accepting that ontological claims have merit even if only to 99.9% certainty. Why do you give that 0.1% uncertainty such weight?

>>11723617
>Does that not suggest anything to you about the nature of your consciousness
It suggests that consciousness has some relation to the physical, not what that relation is. there are valid interpretations of those facts that don't reduce the mental to the physical.

>>11723449
>Any obligation is ultimately born of consequence
Not necessarily. Moral systems can function by telling people to don't do stuff because it's inherently bad, not because they might not get away with it. Many today would call the actions of bank managers immoral even though they won't be punished and they're perfectly within the law. Many ethical systems say actions have a certain inherent moral quality. Only certain schools of philosophy choose to take consequence as the ultimate basis of morality.
This is where the axioms differ and the axioms themselves can't be justified.

If you're telling people: don't do X because the consequence is Y, this isn't ethics, it's merely pointing out cause and relation and people will do X regardless if they think Y is ok.

>>11723549
>Your reply seems to completely disregard any notion of morality in exchange for simply what 'is'
Please expand on this, I'm not getting what you're saying.

>>11723675
>Asking a physical being that thinks in physical ways and only percieves physical things what nonphysicality is like
Idk, can you describe the 11th dimension for me anon?
Im not accepting ontological claims my dude, most ontological claims have the same amount of predictive power and are literaly unfalsifiable. Also, the certainity is at X my dude.

>>11723675
>Yes keep throwing your feces little monkey, it's very effective.
Insults are not helpful or serious anon. You need to show that physicalism is true, and from there that utility somehow exists (even though those two positions surely contradict each other), and from there that we should value utility. Please keep trying, it's causing much merriment to the board.

>>11723652
Your standard for proof is literally insane. Would you take a bet that the sun won't rise tomorrow? Thanks for playing.

>>11723663
I'm working with a definition of 'morality' as an abstract formula we use to satisfy collective needs (utility). If you define 'morality' as something else (likely something that presuppose the 'ought' distinction), then your confusion is understandable.

>>11723673
Yeah, there's no free will. We can learn from our experience and be changed by it, but whether it's determinism or randomness (or both) in action, we aren't in control of how things play out. You don't consciously choose your thoughts -- they are already arising before you're even aware of them.

>>11722061
>Objective morality does not equal universal morality.

>>11723751
>I'm working with a definition of 'morality' as an abstract formula we use to satisfy collective needs (utility)
Why not use the the 'distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour' instead of begging the question? Is utility right or wrong?

>>11723696
>Please expand on this, I'm not getting what you're saying.
You claim 'ought' is simply a taking-into-account (for lack of a better term) of the consequences of an action. This reduces morality from "you should do this because it is good" to "you should do this because it results in the best consequences", which is a critical distinction: the latter says nothing of morality, whereas the former is fundamentally moral.

The way I see it, Sam Harris' fundamental axioms in relation to morality are as such (I'll use his "well-being" rather than the "utility" that is common in this thread; I assume they are at least relatively interchangeable in the sense that maximizing well-being maximizes utility and vice-versa):
>Well-being is the only thing in the individual that is worth maximizing
>The well-being of the collective should be maximized

These are his answers to two fundamental problems in ethics, and he presents them not as axioms (which is exactly how they function), but as scientific facts.

This is my problem with his morality. He cannot use science to say why those things are facts, and indeed he does not say why they are facts at all, except using some philosophically-cheap appeal to "well-being".

They are axioms: would you agree with this or not?

>>11723751
how do we go about employing this formula to satisfy collective needs if we nevertheless lack the capacity to actually do so?

>>11723696
Consequences aren't just getting caught and being punished, they are the entirety of the results of your actions. Consequences happen and change conditions regardless of what people think is ok. I am saying that ethics can only be a formula for manipulating what is, it cannot be an 'ought' (a distinction no one has made an argument for in this whole thread) or otherwise something that precedes what 'is'. What can precede that which 'is'?

Now morality can be presented as the word of God or whatever, and I don't necessarily have a problem with that if it's healthy for people. But fundamentally, all morality is an effort to manipulate what is.

>>11723737
Do 'birds' not exist because 'birds' is an abstraction describing a spectrum of species? Then why doesn't 'utility' exist as a category of varied physical needs?

Why would you make a distinction between physicalism and some other layer in the first place? What is the impetus, how does it fit in?

>>11723751
but that is fundamentally not what morality is

>>11723781
they aren't axioms, they're presuppositions
harris takes them as axiomatic, i.e. as self-evident or at least discoverable 'facts'

>>11723751
>Your standard for proof is literally insane. Would you take a bet that the sun won't rise tomorrow? Thanks for playing.
That's false equivalence. There is nothing that science holds as true without having demonstrable proof of (except axioms that the method is useful): I am using the same standard for proof that science employs

>>11723751
Determinism doesn't mean we don't make our own choices; we are that which determines our choices.

>>11723793
>Then why doesn't 'utility' exist as a category of varied physical needs?
Because its a value judgement. What has utility? And why?

>>11723776
Because distinctions are based on things that actually exist, they don't precede what 'is'.

>>11723781
>the former is fundamentally wholly abstract and arbitrary (or at least pretends to be) with no provenance in what 'is'
ftfy

>>11723787
Capacities vary. The masses have always inherited great windfalls from a vanishingly small percentage of unusually capable outliers. Intellectuals do influence culture and have even reshaped religions. It's not a static thing, it will evolve over time. Where I don't agree with Sam is that it's wise to just pull the rug out from under people or treat them with contempt if they decent people.

>>11719855
okay, this is epic

>>11723830
capacity for free will does not vary if free will is not real
the capacity to change the behavior of self and others by choice being impossible, given that 'fact', being my point

>>11723830
>Because distinctions are based on things that actually exist, they don't precede what 'is'.
But right and wrong or good and bad behaviour exist, so why not makes distinctions between them instead of begging the question

>>11723781

I think you replied to me by accident because I agree 100% with your entire post and I'm trying to argue the exact same thing.

>>11723793
>I am saying that ethics can only be a formula for manipulating what is, it cannot be an 'ought'
Strictly speaking I agree with what you're saying. But Harris doesn't. He does say dogmatism should be dropped and that we ought to do what's of most utility.

What you're giving is a description of how morality actually functions. But Harris goes further than you do here because he goes on to use the words ought and should implying that there's a reason why X is better than Y.

You're looking at morality empirically, from the outside so to speak. On the inside it works differently, the moral person doesn't think his actions are moral because of their utility per se, but because they're good. If he thinks goodness is derived from utility, that's fine, but that's an axiom.

>>11723802
And that's where he goes wrong. Yes, it "is" so that it hurts when I place my hand on a stove, which is what he finds self-evident. That does not mean that I "ought" to avoid it.

Science is fundamentally descriptive. Ethics is prescriptive. He (wrongly) jumps that gap with his axioms, deems them prescriptively self-evident, and then goes on from there.

His moral system lives in the fairy-tale land where answers to fundamental ethical questions are as simple to answer as "it hurts, therefore it is bad"

>>11723815
Are we? Why can MRI scans detect decisions a couple of seconds before we consciously make them?

>>11723822
Where do you get value judgments if not from what 'is'?

>>11723807
Except that you can't prove with perfect 100% certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow, yet we accept it as de facto truth because as near to certain as is possible. There is no evidence that points to everything being a function of a being's experience, nor any evidence for some realm parallel and distinct to the physical. Yet you expect me to treat those possibilities as being in the same ballpark of probability as the sun rising tomorrow.

>>11723878
>Where do you get value judgments if not from what 'is'?
From God nigga baka

>>11723878
>Where do you get value judgments if not from what 'is'?
How can you get them from what 'is'?

>>11723830
>ftfy
Sorry man but that's what ethics is: if you want to attempt to dictate proper human behavior in a way that isn't ethics, don't call it ethics. This is why his argument is so funny to me: it's like saying "I have solved metaphysics with science". Ethics is virtually unsolvable by definition, to say that the answer was right in front of us all along as science is comical

>>11723878
>Except that you can't prove with perfect 100% certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow, yet we accept it as de facto truth because as near to certain as is possible. There is no evidence that points to everything being a function of a being's experience, nor any evidence for some realm parallel and distinct to the physical. Yet you expect me to treat those possibilities as being in the same ballpark of probability as the sun rising tomorrow.
Except I'm not. I'm asking you to show me how I can comprehend these notions as physical the same way I would ask someone how I can see cells or molecules or atoms. The fact that you think it so impossible just goes to show that you yourself don't but them on the same level of physicality.

Someone skipped the critique of pure reason

>>11723878
>Why can MRI scans detect decisions a couple of seconds before we consciously make them?
You are referring to Libet, yeah?
Bothered to look into the literature since he published his finidings?

>>11723878
>Why can MRI scans detect decisions a couple of seconds before we consciously make them?
At most those experiments prove that a certain type of decision–the completely random and utterly trivial kind–is made without consious involvement, not that all of our choices are made that way.
Also, if your concept of your self includes your subconscious, then a choice being unconscious doesn't make it not-yours.

>>11723830
So people don't influence eachother? Nowhere is free will required to have an influence on others or to develop a capacity for more precise moral judgements.

>>11723861
I do make distinctions between them, but my basis for making those distinctions is utility. What's yours?

>>11723863
Well yeah, I think my consideration of utility is more fleshed out than his. You have to account for all variables, which includes the possibility of 'technical truth' being harmful or effectively useless to many.

>>11723968
>but my basis for making those distinctions is utility
>what's good is good because it has utility which is good

>>11723968
My basis for making those distinctions is how horny it makes me

>>11723901
Entirely absurd. There must be some basis on which any ethical system is formulated... And you're suggesting that basis can be anything other than observation of cause and effect?

>>11723927
No I didn't, and Kant's subjectivism is a load of crap.

>>11723933
If trivial decisions are made without conscious involvement, it is evidence of a pathway. Many seemingly trivial pre-conscious thoughts could form into what seems like a consciously willed non-trivial thought. I won't pretend that the science is settled, but it is evidence of a kind free will doesn't even begin to approach. Pre- or subconscious choices doesn't make them not yours, but it doesn't make them free will either. Also, the implication that complex 'choices' can be entirely yours is an odd one. You are not born with much knowledge and pick up most of it along the way, from other people.

>>11722205
Why would you even need to? He contradicts his assumptions on the third point--so the whole thing is garbage from there.

>>11723989
No, utility precedes value judgements and it cannot be the other way around. How can value judgement be made without a living being (who has utility) to make it? It isn't circular so stop pretending it is.

>>11723993
That is rare honesty, thank you anon. Sexual gratification is a utility.

>>11719855
Checked.
Also, I'm going to go ahead and label the "things suck" bit as argumentum a fellatione.

>>11724022
>It isn't circular so stop pretending it is.
It is circular so stop pretending it isn't. How can utility exist without a value judgement about what has utility?

>>11724022
But what is the goal of utility, why should it be the single metric by which we look at everything, and what makes it so special as to not be artibrary and precede value judgement (which it does not)? The axioms of utilitarianism come with the same dogma as religion (in moving from is to ought) with the added cherry on top of adherents ironically believing in absolute superiority over religion

Utility anon here, I have been marathoning this in hopes of satisfying a collective utility of discovery but now my individual utility of needing sleep is intense enough to take precedence.

Thanks for the thread all anons.

>>11724006
HAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHHHAHAHHHAHAHAHAHAHAHA HAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHHHAHAHHHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
I'll give you the same intricacy and delicacy you gave to Kant's ideas
Your ideas are a load of crap

>>11724050
>the self righteousness in this post
As dogmatic as religion
goodnight anon

>>11724006
>Pre- or subconscious choices doesn't make them not yours, but it doesn't make them free will either.
I never said it did.
In fact, you'll note that I haven't once used the phrase "free will" in this thread. "Free will" has too many unhelpful connotations and ambiguities that I prefer to avoid altogether y referring to specific freedoms of the will; in this case, the freedom to make choices yourself rather than having them made for you by other fators such as "the laws of physics" or "chemical reactions in tehe brain".
>Also, the implication that complex 'choices' can be entirely yours is an odd one. You are not born with much knowledge and pick up most of it along the way, from other people.
I never said that your choices are entirely yours either. Obviously your choices are affected byother things and people, so you don't have ultimate responsibility for them, but it's still you who made them in the sense that every element of the decision-making mechanism (physical or mental, doesn't matter) which arrived at that decision is a part of you.

>>11719754
>1/ Let's assume that there are no ought's or should's
>3/ [assumes an ought]

wow hume btfo

>>11722253
there is attemp, but it was preordained that you would attempt, and wether it would succeed or fail was also preordained

Harris is a genius

>>11723249
>speaks of mid-wit endeavours
>engages in zizek posting

Never got your type

>>11724165
That's an axiom

>>11719754
>5/ If we *should* to do anything in this life, we should avoid what really and truly sucks. (If you consider this question-begging, consult your stove, as above.)
Kinda making a leap here isn't he? On what basis are bad experiences to be avoided? It's just a matter of preference.

>>11722092
>So it could be argued from a biological fitness standpoint that someone who likes burning themselves is a maladaptive specimen.
Does he ever address the fact that atheists have extremely low birth rates? Isn't that a maladaptive specimen?

>>11722114
>what science has told us
I know you're joking but there are people who would say this without a hint of irony or self-awareness.

>>11722137
You're reaching pretty damn hard dude

>>11723765
objective value systems can be contingent on particulars

>>11723765
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/objective-or-absolute-moral-values/

>>11724184
what?

>>11722404
>what are the other possible goals of morality other than the satisfaction of collective utility
virtue, for one

Bumping this gay thread

>>11724123
>assumes oughts/is distinction exists, doesn't think the burden of proof lies with people making that claim

>>11724662
Preferences are a real thing; they're not a complete basis for moral judgement, but if we acknowledge them as one of many various utilities (needs) to weighed, they are part of the basis.

>>11724698
I don't know if he does. I would say that's maladaptive, yes. Doesn't mean atheism itself is wrong, just means that atheism isn't the healthiest thing for everyone and/or that the correlated traits of most atheists (neoliberal politics, non-traditionist, urbanites, etc.) push them into the low birthrate crowd.

>>11725118
Is virtue not a type of morality? An established formula that benefits the collective utility?

>>11725838
>>assumes oughts/is distinction exists, doesn't think the burden of proof lies with people making that claim
Why do you keep saying this? In the general case, how do you justify it? Do you even understand the problem, or what you are doing when you go from 'is' to 'ought'? Please do some at least cursory research on this subject

>>11725838
ethics of virtue only incidentally benefits 'the collective'. it is primarily the pursuit of individual excellence.

>>11723910
Still waiting for an answer

>>11725956
What is 'ought'? What are you actually talking about? You can't even define 'ought' without appealing to what 'is', but please do try.

>>11723910
Sorry, missed that. Why would you make a distinction away from the physical in the first place? What evidence leads you in that direction? If you don't think that your thoughts/feelings exist as physical matter/energy in your physical brain, what is your alternative hypothesis?

>>11725990
Can you have a standard without a collective to compare to?

>>11726129
>Can you have a standard without a collective to compare to?
Yes.

>>11726129
>>11726166
but even so, that's beside the point. you've been very slippery this entire thread. you construed virtue ethics as an 'established formula that benefits the collective utility'. it isn't. even if the existence of a 'collective' was a precondition for establishing some metric by which you could measure your own worth, 'collective utility' still wouldn't be the object of practicing virtuous behavior.

>>11726166
So what are ethics, what is virtue? What informs these concepts if not real world consequences?

It is very much the point, because no concept of virtue or morality would exist if your actions didn't have an impact on others and there was no collective to cooperate with. How can a standard of virtue exist without comparison?

>>11719750
What Sam Harris is doing is taking a problem Ayn Rand solved, getting butthurt over it's capitalist implications, and attempting to reframe it under his socialist politics and determinist epistemology.
It's striking and even a bit hilarious to me when reading it how "Fuck. Ayn. Rand." colors every inch of it. Knowledge of Rand's life-reference axiom and stressing that the contextuality of concepts matter make this reading a tired rehashing of old problems mucked up by a man out of his depth

>>11726311
Anon your argument is "if not this, then what?" for more than just this I've recognized (like the thoughts thing above). What makes you think that it is physical when all perception points to notion that it is not (it is not something that is observable). You arbitrarily place the burden of proof wherever you want it.
That is equivalent to me saying "if not derive morals from virtue, then what?" And when you reply "well derive it from utility" or "derive it from collective utility", I can just ask why and say that it's arbitrary. You think of utility as some sort of universal truth and provide no evidence for this to be the case other than "it hurts to put your hand on a stove", and don't even acknowledge it as an axiom and instead as something that's physical when that isn't even demonstrable (so why do you think it? see above).
And on utility, just because it creates a reaction and a negative consequence, it does not impart value on that negative consequence, or the reaction, or the act. And that's to say nothing about the epistemology which you seem completely content in discarding completely.

Utility and collective good are your God.

>>11726359
No, I am asking what are your grounds for a physical/nonphysical destinction in the first place. What is 'mental' and how is it different from physical?

Utility is not arbitrary, we all have utility since we all have needs. Claiming that values, morals, virtue etc. can possibly precede what is -- that they do not require observation of cause and effect -- is highly arbitrary and fallacious.

These are all the same objections now that I've responded to in the rest of the thread, with no added specificity or progression. So I'm off now, I encourage interested anons to read the rest of the thread.

Thanks again to all.

>>11725838
If you want to autistically define any system of morality as "muh collective utility" feel free

>>11719750
Sam Harris is a literally a guy on drugs by his own admission. Judge all he says accordingly

>>11726311
nigger, i am not saying anything about the necessity of an a priori ground for any 'legitimate' ethics. obviously virtue ethics has its object in the future--toward CONSEQUENCES AHH--as it is a system of practice in the pursuit of excellence. what i am objecting to is your illegitimately linking this to this very fuzzy notion you have of 'collective utility', from which it is independent. the concept is irrelevant. the standard of virtue can be autochthonic, or it can be determined (and is, more usually) by the norms and expectations of a community. but AGAIN the OBJECT *IS NOT* 'collective utility'. the object is EXCELLENCE.
that is the only point i am trying to make re: this stupid fucking thread.
you dingus.

>>11726421
>Utility is not arbitrary, we all have utility since we all have needs
Yikes. Then where does utility stop? Where needs stop? Define utility. Does it stop at the most basic needs (food, water, shelter) or does it go deeper? Why does it go deeper?

>>11722779
>did you brush your teeth if yes why?
To please God :^)

>>11723680
And those interpretations just assume more things are involved than we have evidence for. Should be given less preference by Occam's Razor alone since they add more assumptions. But no one cares what interpretation you can contrive around the facts until it makes useful predictions.

>>11723187
>muh chemicals in the brain
Yes, yes, now describe to me how action potential, the flow of iones, transforms into something non-physical. After you answer that, explain how neurons know when to transfer the action potential as something we hear/see/taste etc, because they are cells that aren't aware of their current location in the brain, and there are no unique ion channels for neurons in the occipital zone, the temporal zone etc.

>>11726421
>Utility is not arbitrary
Yes it is. You make an arbitrary decision about what has utility and what doesn't.

>>11719935
>being this dense

>>11727096
>decision
Free will doesn't exist.

>>11727052
Sure, just as soon as you can explain how atoms have feel pain.

>>11727138
What are you babbling about, you retard?

>>11727133
His point was the definition of utility was arbitrary, because utility means it has a use for something. Well, what does it have a use for? Depends on what you choose to do, and there lies the key. Something is only useful (it only has utility) if it helps you with what you want to do. What you want can be arbitrary and varies dramatically from person to person. Something that's useful for you can be useless to me because we want different things, which makes utility a poor measure of anything because it doesn't get to the root.

>>11727142
How do atoms feel pain?

>>11727133
>Free will doesn't exist.
Ah, the eternal battle between those who are destined to believe in free will, and those who choose to argue against it.
Are you the same dude who says he's solved the hard problem of consciousness, but won't tell us how he's done it?

>>11727149
He knows if he just said 'desires' he'd sound dumb, so he calls it 'utility' to avoid this

>>11727133
It's does from the perspective of a thinking machine.

>>11719855
>let's assume
Stopped there.

>>11727249
>Are you the same dude who says he's solved the hard problem of consciousness, but won't tell us how he's done it?
No one has. Also has little to do with free will.

>>11727866
It kinda does. Until we more fully understand how consciousness emerges and what it is, and how it relates to physical matter, we can't really make sweeping claims about the existence or lack of free will based on observations of the said physical matter.

>>11722172
https://rhizzone.net/articles/sam-harris-fraud/

>>11721592
>everything is fundamentally objective in nature
But that's bullshit.

>>11727912
>we can't make any sweeping generalizations about gravity until we have a complete theory of gravitons
That's you right now.

>>11729154
>implying we know even 5% as much about the mind as we know and can observe about gravity
Holy false equivalence Batman!

>>11719750
Go to bed Ben Stiller

>>11729202
Up until the last 10 years we knew way more about the mind than about gravity.

the idea that everything is just a part of a larger whole is in principle sound, but this objective reality, whatever it amounts to, is unknowable because a part by definition cannot comprehend the whole. a moral perspective is subjective in virtue of it being a moral perspective. sam is correct in saying that if we did away with perspective we would arrive at an objective morality, but it would just be an ethical map the size of the world. in essence, it would explode morality because morality is how to live in light of the fact we don't already know it all. the scientific endeavor to understand everything possible would, at its terminus explode morality, accordingly then. but it is also trivial to argue that science is a pathway to a better morality. you can cut sam harris and his arguments out of the process entirely and no difference would be made. he's more or less in the same camp of people who essentially say "we ought to put all our human effort into science, because its in science we will find the ultimate answers, and no longer beholden to morality, which is nothing but a half solution, a kind of God in the gaps" inasmuch as this is a call to action itself it takes on a moral tone because it elevates a certain course of action, rooted in a certain perspective, above others. that they could be wrong never seems to occur to them, and thus it is nothing but a statement of faith. in this way faith in science is nothing but a new religion, so when peterson says what it is about religion is not exclusive to classical religions and is capable of infecting any endeavor, he is correct. Sam's argument is "its different this time" and in some sense it is, because everything is different on some level, and in another sense its exactly the same as every other collective effort rooted in a common moral cause. in the end the debate actually changes nothing because there will always be adherents and dissenters. the idea that its somehow different this time in that sense is totally illusory. what's different is the names have changed but its the same psycho drama that has played out all throughout recorded history. in this sense peterson is correct to point out that the narratives of the past still have something to say about this endeavor. you can up the technological sophistication on the tower of babel, but in the final analysis its still about man's aspiration toward godlike knowledge and ability. this confers a kind of self assurance that is dangerous, and I think peterson is correct about that. I don't think peterson is saying science is somehow not good at what it does or should be "fought"--rather it should be a little more humble and self aware. genuine scientists usually are. sam is more like a science apostle in the vein of bill nye and black science man, at a slightly higher reading level. they're not wrong its a useful endeavor, they just overstate their case with respect to ultimate truth

>>11731441
That's all well and good, but it's also damning enough that his use of neuroscience is flawed (probably arising from the fact that he bought his degree and research), and his moral axioms are also easy to call into question

It'd be a shame if this thread died before the bump limit

>>11731464
redpill me on Harris' research and degree anon, I had always heard that of the Fedoras he was the underachiever in the field he wields like a club for credentialist faggotry (Dawkins a renowned biologist, Dennett a serviceable philosopher, Krause an actual physicist and rapist)

>>11731865
https://rhizzone.net/articles/sam-harris-fraud/

>>11731865
I don't claim to be a neuroscientist (but as a STEMfag I have taken relatively rigorous logic courses).

Aside from the whole strange situation regarding Harris' PhD (which he himself has never clarified: you should look into it yourself, using that [admittedly inflammatory and pretty unsourced thought the sources exist if you do your own research] link the anon above me linked)...

From what I understand reading real neuroscientists (ie peers) comments on his work, Harris did not do his own research, paid for his experiments, and then turned his dissertation into what became The Moral Landscape.

Looking further into the contents of his dissertation, Harris makes a fundamental (yet very common) error in neuroscience dubbed "reverse-inference", or the "reverse-inference fallacy" (his use is fallacious but not all uses are: more on that below). Logically speaking, reverse-inference as I understand it uses basic abduction to make inferences about what has been observed.

In logical abduction, however, there is no guarantee that the resulting inference is true, even if the ORIGINAL inference is.

Harris uses this, however, to make the point that values are not separable from facts, which is the primary crux of his argument in The Moral Landscape. Specifically, he argues that because moral statements fire neurons in the same area of the brain (so to speak) as do observational propositional statements (ie the grass is green), there is no difference between value judgments and facts neurologically.

This is where the reverse-inference fallacy is, and why it's a fallacy (which from what I understand is apparently a common fallacy in neuroscience): Harris equates their firing the same area in the brain as meaning that they are fundamentally handled the same in the brain.

But that inference cannot possibly stand on its own two feet unless you are of one particular opinion (of which there are at least a few mutually-contradictory in neuroscience) about how the brain processes information, and not one of these opinions is conclusive over another at this stage. (If it sounds like I get mystical here it's because this is where my lack of understanding of neuroscience and the different and competing philosophies and theories about the brain come in). It's sort of like saying that by looking at this particular brain state given by an MRI.

Reverse-inference is often used in neuroscience when looking at new areas of inquiry into a subject, or as potential hypotheses about brain function. But the work does not stop there: the reverse-inference is never guaranteed to be correct in itself. But this is where Harris stops. He uses the information in order to make an interpretation of the data, rather than draw new hypotheses and areas of inquiry into further study. This is why it is fallacious.

disclaimer: I am neither a neuroscientist nor a very articulate writer, this is just what my looking into has garnered for me.

>>11732021
>It's sort of like saying that by looking at this particular brain state given by an MRI.
Whoops, let me finish that thought:

It's sort of like saying that by looking at a particular brain state given by an fMRI, I can deduce with certainty that a person is thinking X [This is not possible]. This is the reverse case.

The forward-facing case is knowing what a person is thinking (because they tell you) and then making inferences about the brain state given by an fMRI, which is what is done.

>>11726631
What is the purpose of excellence? What is gained by achieving it? How are the norms and expectations of a community determined? You're not making an excellent effort here anon.

>>11726798
Yes, it stops where our needs stop (I would include desire as a subtype of needs, as no one really ignores their desires they just prioritize some over others). It goes deeper than the individual's basic needs because 1) fufilling those basic needs requires cooperation with others, so collective utility becomes an important consideration (we are social by nature) 2) once we've fufilled those basic needs, we need something to do. Even if it's just meditating in silence.

>>11727249
>destined or randomly compelled to believe in free will / argue against it.
ftfy

>>11727149
Utility (usefulness) cannot be arbitrary because to be useful, a course of action must be demonstrably effective. 'What you want' is not arbitrary, because it derives from your biological state at any given time. Yes 'wants' can vary greatly between individuals, since individuals are varied. Fortunately, our most basic and urgent needs/wants significantly overlap and so we can employ formulas which have demonstrable utility in helping eachother to satisfy those ends (collective utility).

>>11727052
Nothing transforms into something non-physical.
No one knows all of the intracacies of brain function, is that a logical reason to assume the metaphysical? Why jump the tracks on empirical investigation when it has revealed what we do know about the brain and will continue to reveal more?

>>11732579
>Nothing transforms into something non-physical.
Except it does. The action potential turns into sound we hear, a thing we see etc.
Unless you claim that action potentials aren't linked to our thoughts and senses? But then you'd be going against the very basis of physiology, neurology and medicine in general, and also against your own materialism.
>when it has revealed what we do know about the brain and will continue to reveal more?
Yet you use the non-physical to grasp this. Are you so retarded that you can't understand the simple fact that what you see/hear/think/etc is not in the material realm? Where is the thing you see in front of you? It's not the image itself, as we use our eyes as a mediator, yet it's not an image in our brain either, as we just have the visual cortex, where somehow the flow of ions turn into an image that we "see", one that doesn't isn't material.
Get out, you're embarrassing yourself.

>>11732595
No, I am saying that your brain does something analagous to the way your computer translates simple binary pattern voltage potentials into more complex patterns via physical materials/electrons, until it reproduces (to some degree of fidelity) visual and audio patterns received from cameras and microphones (like eyes and ears) which in turn gathered those patterns from the environment.

You're assuming that experience itself is non-physical. Without invoking a soul or similar unfounded entity, you must ask what is it then that is experiencing sensory data from our brain? This leads to the homunculus argument/Cartesian theatre problem of infinite regress.There is no logical reason to assume that 'your experience' is something discrete from the physical you as opposed to produced by the physical you.

You condescend, yet show no shame in merely asserting that this is all non-material without providing a cogent argument or even partial evidence to that effect. There's no need for such hostility anon, it's unbecoming.

>>11732840
Consider the variation of your own experience relative to the condition of your body. When in deep sleep you don't experience anything, exogenous substances can alter your experience in dramatic ways, so can endogenous substances (like oxytocin when you're in love), senility due to aging, etc. Does this not strongly indicate that our experience/consciousness arises from our biological state and is not discrete from it?

>>11732579
>Utility (usefulness) cannot be arbitrary because to be useful, a course of action must be demonstrably effective
And 'effectiveness' is arbitrary, as is 'demonstrably'

>>11728760
>rhizzone
The state of some people

>>11732485
>Yes, it stops where our needs stop
And where do they stop, and where do they begin? Does Hitler 'need' to burn jews? Do jews 'need' to stay alive? (Maybe replace this with 'Inquisition' and 'Protestants' to avoid the inevitable)

>>11732450
my intention here is not to give an apology for virtue ethics, only to show that you don't understand the premises nor the purpose, and further that anything you say about it is either suspect or plainly wrong.

>>11719750
>there is pain
>we should avoid pain
nice non-sequitur leap

>>11733706
I THINK PAIN SUCKS!

Ayyyyyyy

>>11732960
No they are not. It is obvious that stabbing yourself in the heart would be effective in ending your life while eating a baconator would be less so. If something is demonstrable, you can observe a cause and effect.

>>11733466
Is not any action you take in response to some type of need? Making judgments about prioritizing those needs in the context of cooperating with others is the pursuit of morality, and yes it is complex and evolving.

>>11733633
You are simply hung up on the 'ought' distinction anon. You assume without question that there can be universal, abstract concepts which precede what is. Your intention appears to be the avoidance of answering my fair questions.

>>11734147

>>11734233
Effective in what, you fucking mong? Can't you get it through your head? Just because it hurts to put your dick in the oven it doesn't necessitate that doing so is objectively bad.

Even if it was true, it still doesn’t imply ethical objectivism as he often says it does. He believes certain things are ‘wrong’ or ‘right’, but he doesn’t realise if his moral landscape is reality it means that morality is just fabricated to create a pleasant society. Not necessarily making it subjective, but meaning they don’t actually exist.

>>11734233
>Making judgments
But oughts and shoulds don't exist anon...

>>11734233
>No they are not
Yes they are. Whether something is 'effectively' or 'demonstrably' useful is completely arbitrary

>>11734233

>>11734237
This. And in fact Harris uses "neuroscience" incorrectly to make that statement that it is physically objectively bad, if you'll believe
>>11732021

>>11734274
To add, by what measure do you measure demonstrably or effective? Those only have meaning in relation to other things and don't exist by themselves.

>>11719855
Is this a parody account or is he actually being serious?

>>11734233
>You are simply hung up on the 'ought' distinction anon. You assume without question that there can be universal, abstract concepts which precede what is.
where do i say this?

>>11734233
>You are simply hung up on the 'ought' distinction anon. You assume without question that there can be universal, abstract concepts which precede what is. Your intention appears to be the avoidance of answering my fair questions
So do you when you attribute morals to utility, even if human utility is something that you believe if physical and "is". you base a system on your "utility", and your interpretation that we "ought" to do this or that precedes what "is".

>>11734245
The example was clear, effectiveness is not arbitrary. Do you even know what I was responding to there?

>>11734267
Correct. Judgements therefore stem from what -is-.

>>11734274
Would you please refute within the context of my example? Simply asserting without engaging with the example or providing a counter-example establishes nothing.

>>11734300
If you wanted to get to the end of a hall as quickly as possible, would you walk or run? If you ran, why? Furthermore, how did you know that running would get you there faster?

>>11734473
No, it is all we can do... It is not that there is an 'ought', it is that there is no other source than what 'is' (our needs) that compels us to thought and action. If you ignore a need/desire, it is only in deference to some other one.

Utilitarianism is based. We all know the needs of white Europeans have more utility than those of brown people, so let's get that shit organised and work out how to maximise utility by giving white Europeans what they want

>>11734656
>Judgements therefore stem from what -is-.
Yes, as pointed out here:
>>11734663
White superiority is fact, it 'is'

>>11719855
I get what he's saying. That wasn't really Hume's point though

>When anons argument for deriving ought is that nothing else exists except his interpretation of utility and maintains that this is somehow different from religion

>>11734663
Indeed, since collectives diverge (just as individuals diverge), differing collectives will have objectively different optimal utility conditions. The needs of Europeans (white is implied) certainly have more utility to them, no doubt. I know you're being a sarcastic sack of shit, but you've helped me to illustrate the link between morality and the particular agents applying it.

>>11734673
White superiority at what? Average IQ? Quite possibly. Blanket white superiority was not stated or actually implied, you're being very disingenuous now.

>>11734694
You really think our 'interpretations' of utility are that different when it comes to basic needs? My argument is actually that there is no 'ought', you are only manipulating what is to achieve another is.

>>11734727
>White superiority at what?
In every way. The needs of non-whites have no utility, that is a fact, it 'is', so that's what we should base our judgements on, across the world. Colonialism and slavery are therefore justified because they increase utility, which only whites have.

>>11734743
>when it comes to basic needs
Yes exactly. Whites have a 'basic need' to rule the lesser races, and they in turn have a 'basic need' to be ruled by whites. It's great to meet a likeminded person on the 'Chan

>>11734756
How have you arrivied at the fact that only whites have utility? That is not implied in anything I've said. I clearly stated that divergent collectives will have divergent optimal utility conditions, which is a logical assumption. That does not preclude collectives from considering the needs of other collectives. Why are you being so petulant?

>>11734767
Pretty weak anon. Goodbye.

>>11734782
>Why are you being so petulant?
I'm just pointing out what 'is'. I though you were on my side, and you agreed we should base judgements based on what 'is' not oughts or shoulds. And surely it obvious that only whites have utility, and that's a basic fact we can agree on. It's common sense

>>11719750
Ought is the starting point and the ending point, is is the problem in-between.

>>11734782
he's a leftypol thinking his extremely stale satire is somehow very clever and funny

>>11734663
This but unironically

>>11734743
And how does that possibly describe morality?

>>11734440
>>11734656
Excuse me, please, but you made a claim about me and I would like you to prove that claim with evidence. You know, like a good scientist. So where is your evidence that I am 'simply hung up on the 'ought' distinction' [sic] and that I 'assume without question that there can be universal, abstract concepts that precede what is'. Where did I state any of this? Or where on the CAT scan of my brain do you locate the activity that indicates that I hold these ['beliefs']?

>>11734656
The hallway example just proves my point. Running is only seen as more effective when compared to walking, but there isn't a measure of effectives, no number that represents effectiveness.

>>11732840
>your computer translates simple binary pattern voltage potentials into more complex patterns via physical materials/electrons, until it reproduces (to some degree of fidelity) visual and audio patterns received from cameras and microphones
Except the visual and audio patterns are still material, don't compare a computer to a human.
>You're assuming that experience itself is non-physical
That's pretty much a given. How can experience be material?
>There is no logical reason to assume that 'your experience' is something discrete from the physical you as opposed to produced by the physical you.
Except we can't pinpoint the location of the image I am seeing currently/happiness/etc anywhere in the material realm.
>>11732873
>exogenous substances can alter your experience in dramatic ways, so can endogenous substances (like oxytocin when you're in love)
I agree with you on this, but the problem of "experience" not being material is still present.
>There's no need for such hostility anon, it's unbecoming.
Yes, yes, act like the wise, calm one. In any case, it baffles me that anyone can think that literally everything is particles. The most ironic thing is that you are thinking of these concepts, yet they aren't physical, so you're contradicting yourself even as you're thinking of the arguments for materialism.

>>11735239
>Yes, yes, act like the wise, calm one. In any case, it baffles me that anyone can think that literally everything is particles. The most ironic thing is that you are thinking of these concepts, yet they aren't physical, so you're contradicting yourself even as you're thinking of the arguments for materialism.
It's even worse. It's an emotional belief.

>>11735371
It makes the irony even stronger and funnier. I mean, you don't need to be very smart to come to a simple conclusion that thoughts aren't material. That's all you need for materialism to completely fall apart. Sure, I can't claim anything about the realm in which thoughts (and other abstract things) exist, but that doesn't mean materialism is correct.

Rest in piss

>>11719855
How does Sam not fall down the anti-natalist David Benetaar style
>We can experience sucking
>Therefore we should all kill ourselves

>>11736269
He actually had Benatar on the podcast. Sam didn't really have any points and got BTFO.