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/lit/ - Literature

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File: 164 KB, 900x750, henri-bergson-and-hat.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
11677499 No.11677499 [Reply] [Original]

>But rationalism is the dupe of the same illusion. It starts from the confusion empiricism made, and remains as powerless to reach the personality. Like empiricism, it takes the psychological states to be so many "fragments," detached from an ego which supposedly holds them together. Like empiricism, it tries to bind these fragments to one another in order to reconstitute the unity of the person. Like empiricism, in short, it sees the unity of the person elude its grasp like a phantom each time it tries to lay hold of it. But while empiricism, tired of the struggle, in the end declares that there is nothing else than the multiplicity of psychological states, rationalism persists in affirming the unity of the person. It is true that, seeking this unity in the psychological states themselves, yet being obliged to put to the account of psychological states all the qualities or determinations it finds by analysis (since analysis, by definition, always ends in states), it is true that it has nothing left for the unity of the person but something purely negative, the absence of all determination. The psychological states having necessarily taken and kept for themselves in this analysis all that gives the slightest appearance of materiality, the "unity of the self" can be nothing more than a form without matter. It will be the absolute indeterminate and the absolute void. To detached psychological states, to those shadows of the self the totality of which was, for the empiricists, the equivalent of the person, rationalism, to reconstitute the personality, adds something still more unreal, the vacuum in which these shadows move, one might say, the "locus" of the shadows. How could that "form," which is really formless, characterize a living, acting, concrete personality and distinguish Peter from Paul? Is it surprising that the philosophers who have isolated this "form" of the personality then find it powerless to determine a person, and that they are led by degrees to make of their empty Ego a bottomless receptacle which no more belongs to Paul than to Peter, and in which there will be place, as one sees fit, for the whole of humanity, or for God, or for existence in general? I see here between empiricism and rationalism this sole difference, that the first, seeking the unity of the self in the interstices, so to speak, of psychological states, is led to fill up these crannies with other states, and so on indefinitely, so that the self, confined in an interval which is continually contracting, tends towards Zero the further one pushes analysis; while rationalism, making the self the place where the states are lodged, is in the presence of an empty space that one has no more reason to limit here rather than there, which goes beyond each one of the succeeding limits we undertake to assign to it, which goes on expanding and tends to be lost, not in Zero this time, but in the Infinite.
>The Creative Mind by Henri Bergson p. 146-147

>> No.11677503
File: 56 KB, 640x979, KeatsDeathMask.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
11677503

>>11677499
Keats in a letter to his brother about a conversation from another day past.
>I had not a dispute but a disquisition with Dilke, upon various subjects; several things dove-tailed in my mind, and at once it struck me what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason—Coleridge, for instance, would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetralium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half-knowledge. This pursued through volumes would perhaps take us no further than this, that with a great poet the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration.

>> No.11677630
File: 12 KB, 188x273, pyrrho.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
11677630

>>11677503
>Sextus (Seriously a real person) Empiricus (sp.?)
>The fourth mode
>In order to end up with suspension of judgement even if we rest the argument on any single sense or actually leave the senses aside, we also adopt the fourth mode of suspension. This is the mode which gets its name from circumstances, where by "circumstances" we mean conditions. It is observed, we say, in natural or unnatural states, in waking or sleeping, depending on age, on moving or being at rest, on hating or loving, on being in need or sated, on being drunk or sober, on anterior conditions, on being confident or fearful, on being in distress or in a state of enjoyment.

>> No.11677657

>>11677630
what is being said here? why did you choose this blurb to share?

Suspension of judgement gets its mode from circumstances?

Okk...... and.......? I can suspend judgement right now... and now.... and now......

there are always circumstances....

I maybe cannot always suspend judgement....

>> No.11677721

>>11677630
>>11677657
retard

>> No.11677870
File: 48 KB, 244x400, Roberto.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
11677870

>>11677630
>Roberto Unger appropriated Keats' term in order to explain resistance to rigid social divisions and hierarchies. For Unger, negative capability is the "denial of whatever in our contexts delivers us over to a fixed scheme of division and hierarchy and to an enforced choice between routine and rebellion." It is thus through negative capability that we can further empower ourselves against social and institutional constraints, and loosen the bonds that entrap us in a certain social station.

>This thesis of negative capability addresses the problem of agency in relation to structure. It recognizes the constraints of structure and its molding influence upon the individual, but at the same time finds the individual able to resist, deny, and transcend their context. Unlike other theories of structure and agency, negative capability does not reduce the individual to a simple actor possessing only the dual capacity of compliance or rebellion, but rather sees him as able to partake in a variety of activities of self empowerment.

>> No.11678080

>>11677721
>retard
a non retard would have explained why
a non retard would reply to this with that missing explanation and nothing less

>>11677870
>>11677503
Keats idea of 'negative capability' is the fact that the poet/writer more or less sits down or starts with close to nothing, an idea a character here and there...thats it.. words, visions of the world, memories, ok, yes.... but then from these points... reaches out into pure mystery, pure uncertainty... when starting, unaware of what he may find or come up with, and discovers in real time, information that a moment ago did not exist

>> No.11678506
File: 6 KB, 197x256, Andwhenlovespeaksthevoiceofallthegodsmakeheavendrowsywiththeharmony.jpg [View same] [iqdb] [saucenao] [google]
11678506

>>11678080