/lit/ - Literature

if the absolute is pure difference then difference cannot be properly mediated by this identity

>>11482290
hegel never really wore that jacket irl so your shitty drawing of him is inaccurate

>>11482306
>For dialectics, the Absolute is only the whole movement through various relative stages of understanding, but the progress of knowledge never comes to an end, so the absolute is relative. However, even a relative truth may nevertheless contain some grain of the whole absolute truth, so there is an absolute within the relative. Perception is relative to the observer, but the existence of an objective world is absolute.
>Hegel used the various ‘definitions of the Absolute’ to characterise the successive philosophical standpoints shown to be in fact relative in the development of the Absolute Idea.
tfw you get btfod by marxists.org

>>11482382
if the absolute is this pure difference with itself then there's no reason to assume this process is always subsumed to some holistic identity with itself as this pure difference, etc. more like there's only the production of difference and nothing else

this is a pretty standard deleuzian point

Stirner already did

Cant refute an argument if it was never intelligibly written.

The individual knows whats better for himself after having learned from the collective spirit.

Hegel was a fraud charlatan who obscured his works to make it seem deep. No one that makes up words should be treated seriously.

>>11482782
Hegel didn't make up many words, he redefined old ones

>>11482782
>mongo no like big wordie words
>mongo read simple sentences, they make mongo's tummy feel gud
>1 2 3 mongo count big numbers up

>>11482306
Absolute is not pure difference. Absolute is the identity between difference and identity. You have to read The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy and then

>>11482789
>>11482808
Here comes the Hegelian Defence force again here to defend the hacks sketchy practices of trying to write as obscurely as possible.

>>11482814
no one expected that from Kant or Fichte why is Hegel always bullied?

>>11482839
meant for>>11482824

>>11482839
Kant is easier to read plus he actually knows what he is talking about

>>11482814
you're right, but this identity is only ever constituted by difference, just like in sense-certainty where the universality of the Now is established by my taking up a Now to say "Now.", if you're following. difference is constitutive of identity, but of course identity is also constitutive of difference, and round the hegelian circle we go

i think deleuze just says there's only difference, but i also think hegel anticipates this by saying the absolute is not just the identity between difference and identity, but the identity OF identity and non-identity (so even saying the absolute is just a difference-engine is still subsuming it to some totalizing concept). but i could be wrong


>>11482857
apply yourself

>>11482306
>he doesn't even realize the owl of Minerva only takes flight at dusk

>>11482775
THAT'S THE IDEA MATE

>>11482979
YEAH but there's a reason the phenomenology doesn't stop at sense-certainty. actually the master/slave dialectic opens the threshold of self-consciousness precisely because the onesidedness of Verstand hangs on to everything said in the chapter on consciousness—absolution of sense-certainty occurs when the universality of the Now is communicated in any particular now—when, that is to say, the difference that language lifts out of the empirical Now into the universality of its truth returns to itself in the world before us and finds ACTUALITY there.

>>11483118
sorry--and that only occurs *socially,* in a culture united as Spirit, which is why the rigidities of Verstand start to collapse after the death-struggle gives way to social obligation

>>11483118
the circle is too clean for deleuze, this ourobouric appropriation of contingency to ideality seems like it's having its cake (difference) and eating it too (difference as the self-mediation of the whole). for deleuze it's all an open totality.

nevertheless I don't see how deleuze escapes the hegelian schema: as soon as he describes difference in this way he's implicitly participating in the dialectic by developing hegel's thought, albeit towards a sundering of the identity that makes the dialectic possible.

Reading the Phenomenology myself right now. adrift in the seemingly endless flatlands of Observing Reason. Understanding, the Laws, Force, Form and Content—all these bogus hypostases keep returning. Consciousness is such a frustrating amnesiac.

>>11483138
I'm with you, and I follow Badiou here—Deleuze is mostly the pyrotechnical flickering over the surface of the indifferent One. everything gets boiled back down, most evidently in Mille Plateaux. "Smooth and Striated" is a masterclass in crypto-Hegelianism. shame most of the Anglophone thinkers following him never see it this way—Jane Bennett gets herself into all sorts of metaphorical glue traps trying to articulate a Deleuzian vibrant materiality of becoming that some how sustains difference despite its overwhelming and heavy indifference to any temporary eddy of matter to bubble out of it and become an object.

>>11483118
>>11482979
That´s right. But still, if you want to understand why the Absolute is the identity of identity and non-identity, you have to go all the way through Vernunft. Vernunft is the only faculty of the spirit that can establish the identity between subject-object objective (which corresponds to Bewusstseins section) and subject-object subjective (Self-Bewusstseins section). In fact, that is strictly speaking the end of "Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins" and the biginning of "Phänomenologie des Geistes".

>>11483138
>>11483151
tangentially related by even Derrida sounds Hegelian in his more strictly Husserl-type phenomenological moments. early in the great reading of Rousseau in the Grammatology, he recaps Voice and Phenomena to gloss his theory of auto-affection and I swear he's describing Hegelian self-consciousness. what I do find interesting in Derrida is his engagements with "dialectic" as such. The Pit and the Pyramid, which is basically a prospectus for the Hegel column of Glas, spells it out very neatly at the end that deconstruction can only confront the Hegelian dialectic by tracking those moments that seem to "turn away" from what is (wrongly, I think) read in France as its linear teleological self-deployment. so for instance he homes in on Hegel's scathing criticisms of Leibniz, who is scorned as "infantile" for restricting his thinking to the merely numerical. same language is reserved for Chinese writing, which for Hegel (so says Derrida) keeps to an abstract calculus of signs without achieving the self-relating infinity of proper to language that you can with the infinite combinatoire possible with an alphabet. for Hegel they're "infantile" because they keep to a certain "stage," they refuse to "move on" past the contradiction between thought and signification. same thing basically happens in his reading of Hegel and Bataille—sovereignty is basically the fate of the master after he "drops out" of the narrative of the Phenomenology. and if you read Hegel here the disappearance of the master from the scene is actually quite conspicuous.

but the extent to which any of these "turns away" from the closed circle really constitute *difference* in a non-self-relating sense—I'm not sure.

>>11483172
>subject-object objective (which corresponds to Bewusstseins section) and subject-object subjective (Self-Bewusstseins section).
what a brilliant and concise way of putting all of this. thank you, that was illuminating. i'm >>11483142

>>11483151
shreked and keked

>>11483151
i think deleuze's fascination with the groundlessness of thought and his aversion to any and all ontological closure as a result is starting to solidify into a determinate form, into his Notion, as it were. he hits on some great intuitive insights into reality as the machinic production of difference for the sake of difference, but i struggle to understand just how this difference can actually be radical, and not ontic, difference. im reminded of zizek's distinction between ontic surprise and radical/ontological surprise: ontic surprise is a surprise birthday party, radical surprise is finding a singularity in your closet, it just doesn't happen. same with Badiou's Event. i understand they're saying reality always has an infinite potential to re-articulate itself as this-or-that but i don't know how that really pulls the rug out from under hegel's feet


idk im sure this has been answered somewhere. seems like you know more about it than i do. i will defer to your expertise

>>11483142
The Phenomenolgy of spirit is a POS full of mysticism. Hegel literally made it all up as he went along and when he found himself in a corner he just invents words that he doesn't define and just bullshit his way even more.

>>11483190
mmm yes that seems to be the problem with anything in the shadow of Heidegger—Heidegger's ontological plane is resolutely identical in Being and Time, almost imperialistically so what with the inevitable horizon of involvement.

>>11482360
how do you know?

>>11483192
why are you so upset about Hegel? did it make you feel bad that you couldn't understand it? Findlay in /Hegel: a Re-Examination/ has an excellent commentary on the Phenomenology that makes it easy to follow along

>>11483190
well i know that Zizek isn't trying to pull the rug out per se. like his American comrade-in-arms Fred Jameson he is convinced Hegel is sorely misread by the institution of philosophy as the supreme thinker of teleology and identity, and he's using Lacan to show that this just isn't cogent, that there's a big rift haunting consciousness at all times. in a way you can read the owl of Minerva metaphor alongside the Phenomenology to see that this is so: by the time we get to Absolute Knowing its "Now" is already past and we are basically left back in sense-certainty. dialectic has to be re-elaborated on each and every occasion—that particularity is what makes it universal.

>>11483175
is zizek right to call absolute knowing the recognition of the closure of being that is, simultaneously, its opening? basically the consummation of his overcoming of kant, ie the positing of limit must always-already be accomplished on the side of consciousness, and as such the absolute is nothing but the positing and appropriation of limits made possible by that very recognition. because to recognize a limit one must necessarily stand outside it

>>11483212
yes the dialectic is always contingently constituted in realtime. there's a line of poetry from somewhere that goes something like "the path is there because you walk it, there is no other path besides" and I consider that the supreme summation of the dialectic that doesn't get bogged down in school of life-tier teleological historicism

>>11482290
His philosophy of history was really fucking stupid.

>>11483214
i'm not terribly up on my Zizek qua philosopher, i mostly know is cultural critique. although Adrian Johnston suggests that's the whole gambit. I know his Hegel via /Sublime Object/ and a smattering of lectures.

but to answer your question from my own understanding of Hegel, I think that any reading that wants to close out the totality of the Absolute just doesn't get what the Absolute is—a fleeting, backward glance at a totality that has already passed away. recognizing it is what opens it, its closure is in that sense its opening. I think really read the Phenomenology as a big loop, the Encyclopedia has this structure too in a sense.

>>11483225
>school of life-tier teleological historicism
exactly, this is just a dumb reading of Hegel put forward by lazy anglophones. the REAL target of these "critiques" is, of course, Marx. but the Leninist synthesis of Marxism shows that the communist hypothesis is hardly teleological. capitalism will be destroyed—everything will be—but it doesn't necessarily end well. you have to fight for that, you have to actualize yourself, you have to make the particular struggle of the proletariat into a universal struggle of freedom—emphasis on MAKE!

>>11483232
>recognizing it is what opens it, its closure is in that sense its opening.

yes exactly this, its closure just is the continual opening provided by our recognition of this closure, in other words that as subjectivity we can't help but make the recognition, and as such "doomed" to always open and summarily upset the current order. I think it's exactly what zizek is trying to say. I'll see if I can find the passage in Absolute Recoil on this, hold up

>>11483214
>>11483212
>>11483225
I will alway say that the problem with Lacan, Zizek and maybe Deleuze regarding Hegel is that they don´t seem to understand the Aufhebung from Selbstbewusstsein to Vernunft. (Lacan is the best example of that).

>>11483273
Can you articulate?

I can't find the passage on absolute knowing but this is pretty good:

>It is because of this temporal complication that, in Hegel, everything becomes evental: a thing is the result of the process (event) of its own becoming, and this processuality de-substantializes it. Spirit itself is thus radically de-substantialized: it is not a positive counter-force to nature, a different substance which gradually breaks and shines through the inert natural stuff, it is nothing but this process of freeing-it

>>11483273
why so? one could certainly argue that when the Unhappy Consciousness surrenders its enjoyment to the Unchanging, Hegel precisely figures castration—surrender the omnipotence of enjoying the fruits of labor (surrender Lordship), discover Reason as your own freedom within the social (symbolic) order. although I suppose the critical difference is that with Lacan, we never really get over thinking ourself through Verstand

>>11483273
>>11483295
have you read Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen's monograph on Lacan? very illuminating on the Zizekian (and the French) Hegel. All comes from Kojeve's undue privileging of the master/slave episode

>>11482290
*refutes you*

>>11483277
>>11483295
At least with Lacan, he thinks that Selbstbewusstsein (Maître-esclave dialectique) is unsolvable (L´Angoisse 11/21/1962) because (unlike Hegel) he thinks that desire prevent Selbstbewusstsein to be transparent. Regarding Hegel, the "transparency" of Selbstbewusstsein is essential in order to overcome the figure and reach Vernunft. For Lacan, there is not an actual Aufhebung of Selbstbewusstsein.

>>11483382
based poster

Fuck I wish I was smart enough to understand this thread.

>>11482789
>he redefined old ones

Which is exactly the problem. I frequently have no idea to what extent I actually understand what he's saying because it's often not clear how I'm supposed to come to terms with the specific sense in which he means each word in a given context and in what way it might be generalizing some other sense.

Then when I do make a breakthrough and clearly understand some section it'll turn out that he's spent most of the time going on and on about the same thing in different ways in ways that seem obvious after the fact, but only if you've battered his whole conceptual framework of assumptions into your head and force yourself to accept them.

>>11483722
the Phenomenology is utterly transparent once you grasp that 1. he's describing what happens to a consciousness as it tries to know the world, and 2. he utilizes a level-distinction between these events as they unfold for consciousness, and the truth of those events as they are revealed for us watching what happens to consciousness. consciousness is kind of like a character in a novel, and Hegel is writing both the narrative of its growth, and a commentary upon it, at the same time.

this is only a way in, though, because the whole problem is to break the particularity of consciousness that notions like "character" imply, to help us grasp the universality of Spirit itself in our own self-consciousness

>>11483722
>>11483722
>battered his whole conceptual framework of assumptions into your head and force yourself to accept them.
you're completely misreading. he's not convincing you any of these propositions are "correct," but that the mode of truth that occurs at certain points seem airtight before dissolving under its own contradiction

>>11483722
From the experience of my schoolmates in college, I can tell you that regularly the problem with Hegel is where you start reading him. Everybody wants to understand Phä and WdL as fast as possible, disregarding texts like "The Difference..." (IMHO the best place to start with Hegel) or Jugendschriften. In general, Hegel is pretty clear with the concepts but he´s always quoting himself from older jobs. (Also translations makes everything harder)

>>11483200
Findlay commentary is terrible, he turns it into an analytic reading.

>>11483683

>>11483781
>>11483200
I would say: Hyppolite for Phä, di Giovanni for WdL. That´s all you need.

Why do Hegelcunts always talk about the same thing? It's always "the absolute" and "hypostasis" and nothing else. It's the same discussion every single time Hegel comes up. Either:
>no, no, you're misreading, the absolute is (abstract word salad)
>ah, yes, but may i add (word rotisserie)
And it all finally ends with:
>you're just not trying hard enough to understand him
Why is it the same shit every time, no applicability to anything except the odd "capitalism" or "dialectic".

I never see you faggots do any actual philosophy or say anything profound that relates to anything. Every other great philosopher writes in a clear way and isn't afraid to discuss the everyday in plain terms. But then you enter into a discussion about Hegel and all you see is a bunch of idiots coated in thick grease sliding around and piling on top of each other.

>>11483759
>but that the mode of truth that occurs at certain points seem airtight before dissolving under its own contradiction

I understand that, the problem I have is that Hegel's decision to mark out the particular features of consciousness to sublate he does is more arbitrary than he seems to claim. If apparent sense certainty is always mediated, when there never really was a point where this was a 'stage' of any aspect of consciousness but a recognition of a limited aspect of itself. And, in this case, it seems to only makes sense to speak of an individual consciousness constituted in space and time realizing this intellectually, given the basically artificial assumptions of sense certainty, as it isn't clear how or why an actual person would necessarily go through this in the specific stages he posits unless they also necessarily experience these things in the same way and make the same conceptual distinctions.

>>11483806
this

>>11483806
Hey to be fair Turkish oil wrestling can be fun

>>11484010
Undoubtedly, my friend. And I love to lube myself up in a fine coat of abstraction so that I don't have to rub up against that troublesome thing we call reality. I slide around in a thick sheen, unhindered by anyone calling me a charlatan or overly obscure; and nothing I say has any effect on anyone else because it is pure grease and glides effortlessly over anything pertaining to actual experience, which is rough and painful to interact with. Here my brain, thus insulated by unceasing, painless motion flies free in its own sphere, inventing words and building towering structures from concepts of varying colors and sizes, in any manner I so choose. I may build vast conceptual cities in this way, making sure to hide the fact that all the material for these concepts comes from the real world, that is, from real experience, which I have fled and abstain from indefinitely. Yes, here I am a dove in free flight, and over time I forget entirely what friction is, and finally become numb to the fact that I am traveling at all; the fact that my wings long ago stopped moving and I am gliding through space as over a frozen lake passed my notice and now I am dreaming, dreaming, dreaming.

>>11484084
>not understanding the radical potentiate-being-becoming of the Vehrfudungdingdongwubbalubbadubdubthing-in-itself
Psssh kid how about you try agreeing with me next time

>>11483806
hot

>>11483806
hegels lectures on aesthetics are actually lucid, but the average hegel pseud only read the memes which are just garbage he wrote for the prussian state

>>11484113
why do you raise a valid point and immediately invalidate it by calling early hegel garbage? And this while implying he ever did anything not for the prussian state -- hegel, the biggest choir boy in philosophy next to kierkegaard

Reading Hegel gives me nausea.

>>11484084
nice pasta bro

>>11484436
>it's just your imagination bro
>women are a meme
>durr how porcupines hug?
deep. And they'd hug with their tummy, schopie dopie, you little brainlet, if you're reading him then you're reading from the bargain bin of germany philosophy

>dude, things are the way they are for a reason, best not to meddle with the world order kiddo: the """"philosopher""""

>>11483806
could it be the same shit every time because you are making the same mistake every time

>>11482290
>TFW nobody in /lit/ still not present this figure

>>11483834
on the one hand i don't think this is Hegel's claim. i don't think he's saying that in a prior state consciousness is stuck at sense-certainty. in fact if the resurgent crises of Verstand in the chapter on Vernunft are to have any meaning at all, one has to jettison this teleological reading of stages. rather the naivete of consciousness keeps reoccurring—Verstand is a constant error waiting on the margins to slip into our Reasoning about the world and obscure the dialectical, procedural fluidity of life and universality behind a smokescreen of static identities held in abstraction apart from each other. it's not that "at one time" we have sense-certainty then suddenly and for all time realize it's foolish—rather, we are always forgetting that sense-certainty just doesn't cohere, and so try to apply it again and again every time we are confronted with a new object or region of reality. the same goes for perceptive consciousness and force theory. Observing Reason repeatedly recapitulates the dissolution of these theories.

on the other hand, even if the sequence is arbitrary (i've heard arguments in favor of both views), its contents certainly arent; Hegel didn't just invent, say perceptive consciousness—it's the Humean theory of empiricism. he literally describes bundle theory albeit in his own dialectical metalanguage

>>11482808
Popper was hardly a mongo, and he said the same thing

Platonic realism /thread

>>11485551
>>11483834
Also, it´s important to remember that Hegel describes the evolution of consciousness in hand with history of philosophy. If you follow both you´ll see that they have the same order. This is more evident in WdL than Phä. In WdL the section that corresponds to the begenning of Phä is "Lehre vom Wesen" (Doctrine of Essence). So no, the sequence is not arbitrary, he´s following the history of philosophy itself as has happened and reading it in retrospect.

>>11482290
Don´t let this thread die, it´s getting interesting.

>>11485952
i didn't realize the Phenomenology was homologous with History of Philosophy, thanks!

>>11485578
>Popper
>Contrary to major Plato scholars of his day, Popper divorced Plato's ideas from those of Socrates, claiming that the former in his later years expressed none of the humanitarian and democratic tendencies of his teacher. In particular, Popper accuses Plato of betraying Socrates in the Republic, wherein Plato portrays Socrates sympathizing with totalitarianism

Is reading the Phenomenology with the help of Sadler a decent way to get into him?

>>11487095
The WdL more than the Phä. For example, Phä doesn´t explain or unfolds directly the dialectic of Sein - Nichts - Werden (Being - Nothing - Becoming/Heraclitus and Parmenides) because there is no "Erfahrung des Bewusstseins" (Experience of Consciousness) in that part. The Being has to become Essence in order to appears and result in some experience).

>A Refutation of Hegel

1. Despite all the scholarly dick-slapping about how "serious" Hegel was in (a) being a dialectical logician who purports to demonstrate abstractly the apodeictically true and therefore rationally necessary unfolding of transcendental (i.e., as opposed to "transcendent") consciousness, and in (b) being therefore a subjective idealist whose logic qualifies as rationalist metaphysics, both of these characterisations of Hegel are perfectly correct. They are also correct of Fichte, who is much more honest and less muddled about presenting them as his philosophical project. If 200 years of quibbling hasn't resolved the issue, the simplest answer is probably the correct one: what Hegel took from his own teachers and what he seems to state plainly in his own words likely represent what Hegel actually thought.

2. Whereas Kant's fundamental isolation of the subject and the world for-it has yet to be "refuted," and therefore subjective idealism's denial of (or at least radical scepticism with regard to) the thing-in-itself can't be answered, the same question that everyone asked of Kant, namely, "What guarantees the rational necessity of your deduction?," can be asked of the subjective idealists, i.e., Hegel and Fichte.

3. Fichte transparently states that his dialectic is rationally necessary, even more strongly than does Kant; he also appraises Beck's phenomenological modification of Kant's "expository" method as basically correct, and thinks that Reinhold's attempt to find an irrefutable lynchpin for the critical system is correct; that is to say, Fichte thinks that a transcendental deduction must be "constructed" with immediate, (literally) intuitive certainty, for oneself, in order to see its truth, which then becomes apodeictic. Hegel is exactly the same, and goes balls deep in his commitment to this in the Logic, but because he's also a fucking self-indulgent lunatic and makes it as byzantine as possible, Hegel scholars have quibbled over what his basic intent even was (for which see 1).

4. No one in their right mind today would subscribe to the grandfathered-in early modern rationalist metaphysics which Fichte and Hegel (and Kant) adopt and manipulate to prove (rather, to be the fundamental constituents of) their philosophical systems; even beyond this, no one in their right minds today cares about apodeictic reasoning in general, ironically because modern scientists and philosophers are reflexively Kantian. But even beyond that, philosophers who have properly taken a linguistic turn, for the same foundationalist reasons that drove Hegel and Fichte in the first place, have correctly seen that the subjectivist and rationalist foundations Hegel and Fichte sought themselves required foundations, and so taking them as foundations was in fact the same mistake that both Hegel and Fichte criticised in their predecessors.

>>11484457
But Hegel wouldn't want you to just skip Schopenhauer.

>>11483806
Since you obviously know better how about contributing to the thread?

>>11487224
Tfw too much of a brainlet to understand this post
J-just tell me what to think, o-ok?

>>11487224
>a subjective idealist whose logic qualifies as rationalist metaphysics
utterly incorrect

>>11487224
This post is complete sophistry. Let's examine why.

In point 1., rather than explain why Hegel conforms to the representations of his system given in points (a) and (b), our author simply suggests that the meaning of Hegel ("what he seems to state plainly in his own words") can be taken at some kind of face value, and thus that all "quibbling" of professional philosophers in German, French, and Anglophone traditions (to say nothing of whatever other languages have philosophical circles devoted to the study of Hegel) is not relevant to the understanding of Hegel. The author seems to omit a premise here, namely that academic philosophy is self-perpetuating and devoid of value, and if so, he ought to state that that is the case.

Nonetheless, this premise is tacitly contradicted in point 2., which declares the relevance of interrogating philosophical systems, something both academic philosophy and the work of Hegel occupy themselves with—though the latter is incidental.

Point 3. is supposed to establish the major premise undergirding the syllogistic denial of Hegelianism to follow in point 4. apropos of apodeictic reasoning, which, we are here told, Hegel exemplifies in his necessary deduction of dialectical logic from "immediate, (literally) intuitive certainty, for oneself." This, however, is not at all clear in Hegel's case. reading even the Phenomenology would expose the fruitlessness and error Hegel sees in all forms of intuition and immediate truth, which for him always turn out to be false and contradictory, repressing an underlying *mediate* commerce between subject and object, culture and nature, and so on. This brings him closer to Heidegger, or at least the reading of him given by Dreyfus, which grounds theoretical consciousness in practical background practices which are given in as historically transcendent a priori. This seems to be optimal in the phrase of Hegel which may stand as the motto for his whole philosophy: the owl of Minerva flies at dusk: apodeictic truth can only be derived retrospectively, in the temporal mediation between the present of consciousness and the reflexivity of its looking back on the past of its experience, ie, in self-consciousness.

I mention the appeal of Dreyfus's Heidegger for anglophone analytics because it already refutes the idea that "modern scientists and philosophers are reflexively Kantian." But above and beyond this, point 4. seems to suggest that the normalcy of an opinion is the guarantee of its truth—that the disregard of contemporary (again, anglophone analytic) philosophers for apodeictic reasoning means we, too, should discard Hegel. that is already sophistry, but it is also, as I suggest in point 3., not relevant to the reading of Hegel. the internal necessity of Hegel's idea of truth is an effect of its *retrospective* structure: if it appears necessary, that's because history in fact followed this course, so a philosophy that reflects on history necessarily follows it.

>>11488136
>This, however, is not at all clear in Hegel's case. ... error Hegel sees in all forms of intuition and immediate truth, which for him always turn out to be false and contradictory, repressing an underlying *mediate* commerce between subject and object, culture and nature, and so on.

Conceptual, that is determinate, cognition is mediate, but Aufhebung is an attempt to "designate" a fundamental ground which dialectically reconciles the mediateness and general broken-upness of determinate cognition. So is Fichte's "thetic," non-determinate cognition of the subject, with all its careful warnings (very similar to your post) about how a determinate description of the indeterminate ground of the possibility of determinacy is not a proper "grasping" of that indeterminacy. So is Schelling's attempt at the same, Hegel's other teacher, who also cribbed from Fichte (visibly and obviously while he was still Hegel's roommate and friend, i.e., until his middle period). Interestingly, Heidegger does the same thing as well, which is why Derrida criticised him (he "transcendentally signifies" Being itself).

>I mention the appeal of Dreyfus's Heidegger for anglophone analytics because it already refutes the idea that "modern scientists and philosophers are reflexively Kantian."
Dreyfus, the arch-Heideggerian, endorses Blattner's reading of Heidegger as Kantian. Blattner was Dreyfus' PhD student.

The half-reading of Hegel and half-reading of Heidegger in your post is exactly why I say recent rehashing of Hegel has been a bunch of horseshit. You are right: They are all Heideggerians who are trying to make Hegel speak Heideggerian, by jettisoning everything that made Hegel Hegelian (and Fichtean). It's fine, I guess, but the question is why can't just do neo-pragmatist philosophy without butchering Hegel (of all things) and making him a puppet for Sellars. Likeliest reason: Hegel was neglected, Hegel was in vogue, there was a buzz about Hegel in the late '70s and the '80s, I'm studying Hegel at the surface level of my daily dissertation work but I'm also a pragmatist because of the zeitgeist, oops, I guess now I'm a pragmatist "Hegelian" who needs to twist and invert Hegel to speak Heideggerian to a post-linguistic turn America.

Modern scientists and philosophers are reflexively Kantian in that they don't presume to speak for the thing-in-itself, but are happy to describe reality phenomenally, as flexible naturalists. This is actually a huge part of the turn toward Hegel. Logical positivism gave way to pragmatic, continually self-revising Kantianism. The other big point is communicative rationality in neoliberal ethics and politics. The post-positivist, post-certainty '70s were when all these sorta-Hegelians made their bones, after the lunkers of the '60s had landed and blazed all the trails.

>>11487423
It's not hard at all, it's just jargon, and most people who study these things professionally are emperor's-new-clothes'ing it by spewing jargon without ever actually thinking.

Just read Wittgenstein and Heidegger as correctives against one another, and especially to isolate yourself from their respective cult-like "traditions," and then read the history of philosophy through their methods. Heidegger's epigones are also OK, Gadamer Ricoeur Derrida.

99.9% of philosophers are faking it.

>>11488405
Are Hegelians just overcompensating p-zombies?

>>11488414
Hegel is a big tent with lots of mostly ephemeral lightshows that are pale and shameless imitations of shows at other venues, a lot of disused cruft and junk everywhere, an elaborate initiation ceremony involving a series of handshakes that you have to perform flawlessly in the correct order, and then, off in a corner where no one looks, one big rickety sputtering generator powering the whole place, called A Shitty Watered-Down Version of Heidegger.

Blame analytics who think they're geniuses for reinventing the wheel their neighbour invented 30-40 years earlier, and not even copying him well enough to make it perfectly round.

>>11488425
Who should I read, what does Heidegger have to do with all this, and can you recommend any advanced works on this stuff

Writing more isn't writing better.

>>11485532
Trash like your English. His writing is repetitive and dull, yet people excuse it because of the ''''''deep'''''' dialects. Either/Or in particular is a striking example. At the very least, when Thomas Mann wrote his novels, they actually worked as novels, too, not just philosophical arguments. Also in contrast to Mann, Kierkegaard was always 'navlepillende' and a total protestant slave, the model subservient citizen. The thought that people still think Kierkegaard still has something to offer in the 21th century sickens me. I imagine JBP would like him, Kierkegaard being the original gatekeeper of philistine individualism.

>>11488425
>drivel

Honest question, why didn't he present his ideas in a symbolic/graphical way and give some concrete examples?

>>11489904
good post

>>11489920
Because of Lessing's Laocoon.

>refuting the poster-boy of conservative pseuds
Heh, y'all get back to refuting ME when you're done with your primary school assignment

>>11490354
>implying subject-objection distinction
>implying determination of physical reality as rex extensa
>implying kant said anything descartes didnt
brb gonna smash this fat jewish puss, join the nazi party, and have everyone study me anyway because I'm that fresh. Meanwhile 'the story [Geschichte] of Kant's life is hard to describe because he had neither a story nor did he a life', wow... see you 'round, kid.

>>11490332
seriously reevaluate your life if you think kierkegaard was a good writer

>>11483199
It's Schop

>>11489080
>>11488425
Nothing. The idea of Hegel as a "shitty watered-down version of Heidegger" is utterly ignorant and incorrect.