/lit/ - Literature

>>11079535
What the fuck is a prime accident? Do you mean prime matter?

Prime accidentals would mean substances to me...

>>11079568
Yeah it's the same thing for me too. In this definition you can replace 'prime accidental' with 'prime matter'. Matter, of course, can be an accidental.

In creating a human, therefore, Aristotle and many other metaphysicians of his time would view humans as Earthen fire. The 'earthen' being the accidental of fire, or in fiery Earth the 'fiery' being the accidental of Earth.

Like 'white man' or something of that nature. The man just happens to be white, but it doesn't change his overall composure. This is what I mean by prime accidentals. In a formal definition of the subject, if they can be left out, they are accidentals.

So, what do you think of the statement? Right/wrong?

>>11079578
Prime matter is pure potentiality, it's not fire or earth or anything of that sort. You couldn't use pure potentiality for the definition of anything...

Maybe I don't understand what you're trying to say

>>11079621
>Prime matter is pure potentiality, it's not fire or earth or anything of that sort.
In order for something to have potential, it has to exist anon. This is the first requirement. You can't say a 'form' is potentially a chair, but you could say wood is potentially a chair.

>>11079670
Not that anon, but I would even consider forms to be actual.

>>11079670
this is wrong and aristotle is a pseud

potentials are abstractions

>>11080039
>>11080079
Forms do not exist yet, however.

It is much more useful to say that wood is potentially a chair than to say that the idea of a chair is potentially a chair. The idea is implicit in the active power that moves the passive power (wood), formally. The active power would be a lumberjack.

Do you see how much different Aristotle is than your stupid watery bullshit ''''philosophy'''' hurr so deep. You guys just don't get what philosophy is supposed to be: it should be a reflection of objective reality.

>>11080089
I'm not implying that the efficient cause is not necessary, but, as you admit, the formal cause is also required. The cause should be actual previous to that which it actualizes, hence if a chair is made, the formal cause must be actual also. What I mean, at any rate, is that both the wood and the form of a chair, that is to say the material and formal cause, must be in actuality.
Also, I'm not trying to disprove Aristotle.

>>11080089
>You guys just don't get what philosophy is supposed to be: it should be a reflection of objective reality.
No, that's science.

>>11080116
The formal cause does not exist in actuality, only exists as a manifestation through the material world.

It's why 'circles' do not exist in real life, only formally, through the material reality.

That's why forms cannot be potentials, only the material reality can potentially be something else, and only if it actually physically can, i.e. someone or something with that thing being something else is the end in mind. I suppose along the lines of chemical/physical reactions/residue, that means it could become something potentially even if it wasn't the intended end, like an Aristotleian accidental.

>>11080129
Good point, anon. Aristotle's Metaphysics is really a precursor to the scientific method.

>>11079535
>οι βει the earth must surely be at centre of the universe

>>11080138
In the sense that metaphysics is the ground of science into which this latter cannot penetrate, yes. But this is precisely why metaphysics, as an area of philosophy, is not concerned with objective reality itself, but the conditions which make objective reality possible.

>>11080133
something can’t be a cause without being actual, that’s psychotic
>circles don’t exist
yes they do, as abstractions, which you are side-stepping. calling something a cause which is manifested by its effect is lunacy. just say there are only effective causes and forfeit abstractions as some type of provisional effective cause. literally, neural activity that evokes something that humans vocalize as “circle” which is moving into wittgensteinian autism and you can have fun with that sperg
>>11080138
yes, which is why its poor philosophizing

>>11080150
Metaphysics, the work itself by Aristotle, examines the components of primary beings themselves, as they are composed of things, like units for numbers, and also the elements they are composed of, much like Biology today.

Just saying. It is also concerned with notions of 'being', like you say, but it doesn't posit that science cannot penetrate into that realm, it just wants to make distinctions as to what it means to be a primary being, and what it means to have done something, because action is directly related to being.

This is why it's still applicable: because it is scientific and practical.

>>11080160
IZZZ PUR PHILOSOPHIZIN IF ITS SICENCE LULZ

>>11080138
fuck no Aristotle was a rationalist

>>11080163
Right, but my point is that he confuses science with philosophy, and vice-a-versa, by doing this.

>>11080138
No, it's not.

>>11080177
He examines rationality and irrationality. Irrationality, as defined by Euclid, has contraries of its own of course.

I assume you mean non-numerically, but you can't not expect me to go there, because he does discuss rationality as a mathematical concept because the HIGHEST, most primary level of being is numerical.

>>11080179
No issues with that anon.

>yu only know sometin if u can perceive it

Fuckin relativists.

>>11080160
Aristotle wasn't a nominalist; he thought that forms exist as more than mere abstractions in the mind.

>>11080205
But not materially, only through the combination of processing and including the formal notions in the end of any motions, is the form reflected in material reality.

As long as have that distinction out of the way, of course forms '''exist''' but how could they ever potentially be anything?

>>11080173
making a fool of yourself and showing you aren’t capable of rebutting what i said
>>11080205
then what OP has been saying is nonsense and has no truth value. abstractions, which is what forms are, must be actual to be causes and their actuality provides structure for effective causes to be manifested. that this is intangible physically and is separate from material does not make it less actual. So, either Aristotle is not a clear thinker and is trying desperately to get away from the problem of dualism or OP is lying or confused. Something is amiss in this conception of forms, which absolutely must exist or otherwise be merely another kind of physical object, described by physical objects ad infinitum which brings up new problems for him as now we can’t find an abstract first cause any longer

>>11080197
Many eminent scientists make dismal philosophers on this account. They don't have a head for the almost complete abstraction that is required by philosophy.

>>11080217
They are not potentially. I never claimed that; if I understand what you said in this post, we are not in disagreement.

>>11080189
rationalist as opposed to empiricist

>>11080226
Aristotle is a clear thinker, I believe, he did affirm that forms exist absolutely. What I'm saying, I don't know whether it be against OP or someone else, is that forms are more than abstractions in the mind, and are actual in the fullest sense.

>>11080235
>complete abstraction that is required by philosophy.
t. Nietzsche

>>11080238
The issue is, of course, Aristotle deals with things that 'are', not things that technically 'exist'. 'To be' means to have motion. There are no formal definitions without a prior physical existence thinking, and then subsequently, creating them. Without action, there is no existence.

>>11080226
Read above.

>>11080266
>'To be' means to have motion.
This seems odd; since that which is actual is in a greater way than that which is potential, and motion is the actualization of a potential.

>>11080297
No, motion does not create actualization. Aristotle distinguishes from 'processing' and 'actualizing'. Something actual, has the end in itself already. Aristotle makes this distinction. Something living is 'actual'. Therefore, this thing has achieved the previous primary being's end of putting this primary being into motion, i.e. life. This is to be actual.

To be in the process of learning something, or thinking about something, or walking with intention (not just walking, for that too would be actual), then this is a process, because the end has not been achieved yet.

All of these things require motion, though, which forms do not have. There is no way a form has being, then, only something material can have being.

>>11080266
t. Kant, actually

>>11080079
Holy brainlet

does the nature of metaphysics mean that they can never be disproven by physical events?

>>11080735
I mean, there are definitely aspects of the Metaphysics that can be disproven. But by disproving those aspects, you disprove just the empirical examples, not the overall concepts.

So yes and no.