/lit/ - Literature

>>10955169
Yes

>>10955169
Hegel was a fag

>>10955342
but it seems like wittgenstein would only take issue with those specific words as universals, and not get upset with the overall thrust of the sense-certainty stuff, and then why would findlay think to include it?

>>10955394
Wittgenstein was a fag

>>10955394
Then no.

>>10955169
Someone please put this in Layman's Brainlet terms. Because I seriously doubt that anyone here understands this.

>>10955169
Hegel, iirc, considers the natural consciousness to be ultimately relative and illusory its conceptual activity.
that is, one of the flaws of the natural consciousness and Understanding is attempting to 'freeze' things in the process of understanding and forms
an abyss populated by names and marks of names.

i may be miscomprehending the question, but i think the issue is a confusion between the unique experiences of individual subjects which would be the set of heres and nows and the mode of consciousness that is characterized by awareness of being in time and space and also the naive identity of thought and thing (which is to say, this "chair" is the same as my thought of chair).
the latter is universal in the sense that it is implicit in the development of consciousness and the development of communal thought.

does this help at all?

the analytic term you're looking for is "indexical", ie a word that has no meaning in and of itself and only gains sense through reference to a specific context. (eg "here" has no meaning other than the specific "here" which it refers to. similarly "I" only refers to the person who is speaking it--there is no essence of "I"ness that each person shares.) with an indexical, sense is identical to context.

Wittgenstein (and most analytics) would fault Hegel for analyzing indexicals in the same way as normal referential words. so when Hegel sees "I" as a universal, he is claiming that there is a referred sense pointed to by the referent "I", which must be a universal because it persists past the changing, contingent "here" and "now". however, analytics would say that he is simply looking for the referred where none exists--indexicals such as "I" and "this" do not engage in a referent-referred relationship in order to gain sense, so to look for a referred "I" or "this" is to search for a function of language that does not exist.

>>10955169
Sense-certainty doesn't become universal in the sense that somehow the individual consciousness comprehends Spirit. This comes much later in the Phenomenology. It sounds like Wittgenstein's critique is running along the same lines as criticisms of platonic forms and some metaphysical relationships found in people like Carnap and Lewis.

I think that Wittgenstein's point doesn't really prove problematic for Hegel in any way. Hegel isn't focused on the relationship between words and universal & particular instantiations. His point is just to begin to explain how Spirit, consciousness, and objects are related.

>>10955595
>the analytic term you're looking for is "indexical", ie a word that has no meaning in and of itself and only gains sense through reference to a specific context.

This seems like a bad definition. No word has meaning in and of itself, because in order to explain the meaning of a word, you must use other words that themselves don't have inherent meaning.

>the billionth useless conversation about the same three or four philosophers just started
I'm getting some popcorn

>>10955662
The only 3 or 4 that matters.

I haven't read either but it sounds like Wittgenstein is hung up on language while Hegel just considers all experience to be the universal since there can't be anything more than what you experience.

Honestly fuck wittgenstein and fuck Hegel. They are both charlatan snake shoe sailsmen.

>>10955654
i might have explained it badly. no one claims anymore that a word has a meaning "in itself", but words that gain sense through referent-referred relationships can be delimited by analytic truths that are essential to the concept being utilized. for instance, if you are correctly using the term "banana" you have to be talking about a fruit, because it is an analytic truth that the concept of banana is inherently a subset of the concept of "fruit". though there is no sense "in itself" to "banana", there are analytic truths about its concept that limit it to certain usages.

with indexicals, there is no analytic truth between referent and referred (which means that this relationship does not exist). there is no way from the outset to say what the sense of "here" is, because its sense is fully dependent on its context. with a word like "car", you can say outside the context of a specific usage, that it will always refer to a "vehicle" or "object with wheels" or the like, but an indexical has none of these delimiting concepts. an indexical is fully dependent on NON-linguistic concepts (such as geographical location when using "here"), whereas a referent gains its linguistic sense through networks of reference with other words.

I may be wrong on this but Findlay was writing in the 50s-60s, is an analytic philosopher of that extremely confused period of turnover in linguistic philosophy, AND has a weird relationship to the late Wittgenstein, which is what most people think when they see "Wittgenstein"

Again I might be wrong but I think what is happening here is that Hegel is doing his sense-certainty argument thing, which is about the impossibility of grasping the raw immediacy of the particular by somehow not conceptually determining it; this should be read through a thick historical understanding of ca. 1800 German philosophy; Findlay is however reading it through a linguistic philosophy lens ca. 1950-1960; and Findlay is then applying what he takes to be Wittgenstein's argument about the semantic-functional "uniqueness" of certain linguistic acts/phenomena, i.e., demonstratives, to Hegel's argument.

As someone who is decently familiar with Hegel, decently familiar with the late Wittgenstein, and decently familiar with analytics inasmuch as I hate them and see them do shit like this all the time (which also makes me biased in this assessment): I think Findlay is importing a bunch of shit that is neither here nor there. From what I can tell, he has a bad misreading of late Wittgenstein, which is somewhat understandable because its holism was incomprehensible to contemporary analytics for a generation or two (hell, still is sometimes). He seems like one of the ones who can't get his goddamn head out of the classificatory fetish of analytic-linguistic philosophers, where no matter how hard you try to explain to them that the "function" of language is accessible to us only in post hoc and intersubjective assessment, and we can't really sit down and do things like "Hmm, I wonder what a 'Demonstrative' essentially [read: transcendentally] is!"

If I'm right and he's importing that here, it's a big ball of confusions. Hegel is confused enough about the relationship between mind and language - mind and the words we used to describe what we think (or witness) it is that mind "does" - without exponentially increasing that confusion by importing Ryle/Austin-era hyper-confusion about the nameableness of names and naming, AND a bad misunderstanding of Wittgenstein as speaking to this problem (when, in fact, he was showing it was a dumb as fuck badly posed question to begin with).

Wittgenstein would call into question the possibility of talking about "universals" in any essential sense. I don't know what he says about demonstratives in particular in his later philosophy but I am sure it's holistic and provisional and not metaphysically definitional and classificatory. It wouldn't be about whether they are "traditional" nouns (nouns, "naming," is the "traditional" or normal function of language? What's a "function?" Who says what's "normal?") It would be about how attempting to reduce language to its ground functions like a computer begs the very question of the ground.

>>10955726
Good response and post.

>>10955800
excellent post. i believe you are correct in all points

>>10955800
I just finished up the phenomenology; Findlay's analysis is just useless. He even admits in the introduction that he doesn't understand what Hegel is saying during Force and the Understanding, but he's sure it's smart.

>>10955800
>Hegel is confused enough about the relationship between mind and language
There really is no such thing as a philosophy of language at all in Hegel's philosophical project. People need to learn to let Hegel do the Hegel thing, and leave it to Peirce and later philosophers and scientists to help us sort this shit out.

>>10955169
The main theme of the works of Hegel is not, in fact, the universal, but predeappropriation. Thus, the subject is contextualised into absurdity that includes truth as a paradox. Derrida’s model of existentialism holds that consciousness is capable of significance, but only if structural neotextual theory is invalid; if that is not the case, we can assume that truth is used to disempower the "i".

Therefore, if Hegelian semantics hold, we have to choose between structural neotextual theory and Theaetetian narrative. Many deconstructions concerning Wittgenstein's "Certainty" and I say that with the utmost pericombobulation (he was a fag after all) may be found.

But the example of the posttextual paradigm of expression prevalent in Hegel’s demonstratives is also evident in linguistics. J. Green states that we have to choose between conceptual materialism and Lacanist obscurity.

It could be said that Hegel denies the ability of language to express particulars, although, he deconstructs structural neotextual theory. The primary theme of Wittgenstein's essays on the "i" is a dialectic totality.

>>10956243
Dumb comment

>>10956254
care to extrapolate?

What would Wittgenstein say about the Hermeneutic Circle?

>>10956887
Wittgenstein cannot connect past and present language games, and track changing rules. He had no formal education in philosophy, he read Weininger and Spengler instead of the hermeneutics guys, on top of that the poor bastard was tutored by Russell. Ultimately we needed Ramsey, a Peirce reader and Sraffa, an economist who came all the way from Italy, to get the man to stop being a faggot. If exposed to enough hermeneutics, a Late Late Wittgenstein could have been in order.

>>10956963
>Wittgenstein cannot connect past and present language games, and track changing rules.

Of course he can, the idea of change is inherent in the idea of the Wittgensteinian view of language/meaning/understanding. Because there is no transcendental signified or ultimate referent of truth or view from nowhere or whatever you want to call it, meaning is necessarily intersubjective, necessarily only "meta"stable between interpreters and never stable.

Wittgenstein also read Heidegger the year B&T was published and liked it, and Spengler and Weininger, and gestalt psychology, so he would have been familiar (probably directly, but if not, at least indirectly) with Dilthey and the whole hermeneutic tradition, as well as Nietzsche and Goethean proto-phenomenology.

>>10955169
>subject (I): object (this)
>demon(stratives)
>neither name nor describe
>beyond a particular instantiation of use

>>10955726 This


>>10955949
>There really is no such thing as a philosophy of language at all in Hegel's philosophical project.
If his use deviates from his intentions, it exists there:
^
>>10956243
>we have to choose between conceptual materialism and Lacanist obscurity.

>>10956963
>>10957039
>If exposed to enough hermeneutics, a Late Late Wittgenstein could have been in order.
Hot takes, spicy

>>10955169
reported for using reddit images, kys faggot nigger

>>10957982

SADDLER!

Where's Ashley!?

If Findlay is shit what are some of the good analyzers? Should I just take off the safety wheels and read him straight?

>>10957039
No, he can't. His language games are stuck in the present, in an ordinary, immanent current year that shows itself when the language game is played. He doesn't concern himself with the evolution of grammar or the archaeology of knowledge at all. You need to read historicity INTO Wittgenstein, because Wittgenstein's philosophical project is one that bullies the shit out of history and historicity, if he knew the first thing about Dilthey or understood Heidegger, it wouldn't have, and he wouldn't have been so traumatized by his encounter with Sraffa.

>>10959065
>ordinary, immanent

As opposed to what? You seem to associate "immanence" with "the present," which you then also associate with changelessness..? I don't understand the association. Why would an ever-renewing, ever-unfolding present, where Being is always Being for us and not in itself, and the world and its beings are only accessible to us as a horizon of futurity and a past of remembrance, be ANTI-historicist? Why would radical immanence and intersubjectivity be unable to countenance change? Immanence of meaning is immanence in human judgment. Human judgment is individual, intersubjective, and therefore historical. Therefore meaning is historical.

Wittgenstein's late philosophy of language is entirely aimed at demolishing the idea of an ultimate, atemporal, Platonic referent, and/or an atemporal, unhistorical transcendental vantage from which those referents could be determined. Same as Heidegger's, which is also an "immanent" philosophy, which is why Heidegger scholars routinely note that Wittgenstein's project is very similar to fundamental ontology. Hell, it's why the fashion in Germany since the '60s, pioneered by a generation of Heidegger's students and their students, has been all about blending IMMANENT pragmatism with Wittgenstein and Heidegger/Gadamer.

Again, the whole point of the immanence is to make the Being of beings, or the meanings of speech, into something historical. The transcendental is, historically, the atemporal, specie aeternitatis. Being has a history. The whole idea of a language "game" is to draw attention to how games are played - hint: it's not by reference to atemporal transcendental rules.

>He doesn't concern himself with the evolution of grammar or the archaeology of knowledge at all.

I don't understand what you mean by this either. If you mean the evolution of the faculty of language, of the conditions of the possibility of language at all, presumably at the level of biology, then no he doesn't talk about that but that's not his purview.

I don't know what you are referring to when you say archaeology of knowledge, unless you mean Foucault's early philosophy in Order of Things and Archaeology of Knowledge, bot that is the same sort of philosophy of immanence that Wittgenstein and Heidegger have, and has nothing to do with the biological/transcendental conditions of grammar-at-all either. If that is indeed what you are talking about.

>Wittgenstein's philosophical project is one that bullies the shit out of history and historicity

Lots of very good historians are Wittgensteinians. Ian Hacking for one. Shitloads of historians of science, since he was so influential on post-postivism for - surprise - radically historicising the possibility of "objectivity" and "rationality."

>>10959065
>>10959105
I don't know anything about Sraffa though so maybe I'm missing some skeleton key to the whole argument?

>>10959105
>As opposed to what?
As opposed to stop attaching time to Wittgenstein's opus with no textual basis. You are seeing things that aren't there.
>Why would radical immanence and intersubjectivity be unable to countenance change?
Skepsis over the bullshit of platonizing transcendence, and thinking there might be problems in seeking an inter-subjective truth or reality by working with the meditations of only one subject instead of more, is just the pars destruens. Acknowledging the existence of language games is an observation that, no matter how correct, does not turn you into a process philosopher, let alone a historicist, until you have a pars construens positively featuring some manner of historicism, you clinical retard.
>Foucault's early philosophy in Order of Things and Archaeology of Knowledge, bot that is the same sort of philosophy of immanence that Wittgenstein and Heidegger have
Wittgeinstein, Heidegger and Foucault have the same epistemology, philosophy of language and philosophy of history now? Fuck off, you sophomore.
>Lots of very good historians are Wittgensteinians
But is any of those named Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein? They don't get their historiography and sources from him, why did you even bring it up?

>>10959266
So you've restated what you said before, still just as wrongly but now sounding like a pretentious wizard guy from a D&D video game wrote it (presumably because you're panicking and feel like you're on the defensive?), and you're still for some bizarre reason equating an immanent philosophy of language/meaning with an inability to account for how language changes.

You've also namedropped process philosophy, apparently positively, but I don't know why. And you say, "process philosophy, let alone historicism." So.. process philosophy is a more remedial form of historicism..? Do you mean that the other way around?

You don't answer my questions about how (or whether) you are using Foucault's definition of "archaeology of knowledge" either. But yes:
>Wittgeinstein, Heidegger and Foucault have the same ...
1) Foucault was very similar to Heidegger in many ways, as was the whole post-war French milieu - of whom Deleuze, a close friend of Foucault's, was a Husserl scholar; Derrida was of course a Heidegger and Husserl scholar; and Foucault repetitively defined his philosophical project as an attack on phenomenology - Foucault also said toward the end of his life that Heidegger was the greatest influence on his thought, and in general his writings. In general, people have noted the similarities of French post-structuralism with hermeneutic ontology since the former began, and especially of Foucault's anti-transcendental, structural-historicist attack on the "empirico-transcendental doublet" with Heidegger's attack on the transcendental philosophy in his pre-Kehre writings.
2) Wittgenstein, again, read Heidegger, liked him, and defended his landmark work of fundamental ontology - the historicising of Being, which is so often compared to the later Wittgenstein's project that he began elaborating in the years DIRECTLY FOLLOWING HIS READING OF THIS WORK - to the logical positivists.
3) In general, if you study "historical epistemology" or "historical ontology" - Hacking's pointedly Wittgensteinian term in his heavily Wittgensteinian book - or anything like it, you will encounter this fancy historical method called "historicising epistemic formations" - sometimes called discourses, or epistemes, a la Foucault. The process of taking an epistemic formation as discursive, or since you seem to like Foucault's archaeology (???), conducting an "archaeology" of an episteme, involves privileging the discourse and not its participants as the object of inquiry, and excavating the conditions of the possibility of saying what was said. It is not a coincidence that Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the French post-structuralists had similar philosophies of language (as noted by virtually all historians of contemporary philosophy), and it's even less a coincidence that Wittgenstein and Foucault both read and understood Heidegger deeply.

>>10959347
Actually, if anything, Foucault is the least "historicist" in his "archaeology of knowledge" (which, again, I still don't know if you're citing or you just like the phrase). He has famously been criticised for..... not accounting for CHANGES in epistemes, only archaeologically investigating the static constitution of each episteme and then presuming it morphed into another one. The cliche about Foucault is that he moved to address this problem by turning to the genealogical method - i.e., by moving AWAY from the "early" Foucault, i.e., the archaeology of knowledge.

So, from what I can tell, you like the sound of certain philosophies or the idea you think is latent in them, and you have an idea in mind yourself about some kind of meta-linguistic philosophy or some shit, but you haven't read the things to be able to situate your own ideas amongst them, and you can't articulate your idea when asked.

Can I suggest just clarifying your fucking meaning, when asked? Another tip: My lack of access to your meaning - my inability to participate in the language game - is currently taking place IN history. If you were actually to clarify it, my understanding of not only the words you're using, but of the whole world, would change, historically, in history. And by talking to you, I would be creating new meanings based on my own understanding, and asking you, with every attempt at communication, to draw upon your whole life-history and past (i.e., historical) understanding of being, to undertand me. Wittgenstein's historicist philosophy is amazing in how easily it lets us talk about historical changes in meaning and understanding!

Anyone want to go over the Phenomenology of Spirit?

Here is the first bullet point

". In the case of a philosophical work it seems not only superfluous, but, in view of the nature of philosophy, even inappropriate and misleading to begin, as writers usually do in a preface, by explaining the end the author had in mind, the circumstances which gave rise to the work, and the relation in which the writer takes it to stand to other treatises on the same subject, written by his predecessors or his contemporaries. For whatever it might be suitable to state about philosophy in a preface – say, an historical sketch of the main drift and point of view, the general content and results, a string of desultory assertions and assurances about the truth – this cannot be accepted as the form and manner in which to expound philosophical truth."

>>10959347
>So you've restated what you said before
You think that way only because you treat a disbelief in the idiocies of Plato and the positivists automatically turns you into Martin Heidegger or a French post-structuralist, when you could simply be a skeptic. They all read Hegel, he didn't.
>Wittgenstein, again, read Heidegger, liked him
Yes
>defended his landmark work of fundamental ontology - the historicising of Being
No
>Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the French post-structuralists had similar philosophies of language (as noted by virtually all historians of contemporary philosophy)
And by "all" you mean Rorty. I shudder to think what manner of historians of philosophy are in analytic-dominated Angloland.
>Foucault is the least "historicist" in his "archaeology of knowledge"
And so you just found out on your own it is not the same philosophy of language and meaning of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, as you were claiming.
>archaeologically investigating the static constitution of each episteme and then presuming it morphed into another one
Wittgenstein simply doesn't do even the social constructivist grid-to-grid discrete history of Foucault's discurses, nor does he take Heidegger's circular approach. My point is that Wittgenstein doesn't even bother to do any of these things or talk about etymology or anything of the sort because Wittgenstein doesn't care for history, hermeneutics, or anything, because his philosophical project is another. You want him so bad on team hermeneutics next to Gadamer, Vattimo and Derrida, but all he's doing is shitting all over the Wiener Kreis and Oxbridge idiots, and his prescription is language therapy, not hermeneutics. Since you struggle so much with this notion, I will try one last time: you don't get an account on how language changes, out of Wittgenstein's philosophy, because he didn't write one.
>So, from what I can tell, you like the sound of certain philosophies or the idea you think is latent in them, and you have an idea in mind yourself about some kind of meta-linguistic philosophy or some shit, but you haven't read the things to be able to situate your own ideas amongst them, and you can't articulate your idea when asked.
This is you m8
>Wittgenstein's historicist philosophy is amazing in how easily it lets us talk about historical changes in meaning and understanding!
Except it's just not Wittgenstein's. You put words into the mouth of what is now mostly a Schopenhauerian, who just grew out of his picture theory adolescence because of a Peircian and an economist. If you want a textual source for Wittgenstein's historicism, all there is is proposition 7 of the TLP, read it as many times as you need.
If you still think this is not the case, instead of bringing unrelated people like historiographers or historians of philosophy into the conversation, write down the historicist evolution of meaning that Wittgenstein himself wrote, or take your sophomoric stupidities elsewhere.

>>10955726
What analytic authors write about this?

>>10958032
Os voy a romper a pedazos!

>>>10959347
>If you still think this is not the case, instead of bringing unrelated people like historiographers or historians of philosophy into the conversation, write down the historicist evolution of meaning that Wittgenstein himself wrote, or take your sophomoric stupidities elsewhere.

/thread

>>10959495
In fact Heidegger and Foucault both had extremely bad and ahistorical readings of Hegel. They also hated what they perceived to be Hegel, as did Wittgenstein coming out of the positivist milieu that hated the British Idealists so much. You'd know this if you knew anything about the history of philosophy.

I "want him on team hermeneutics" inasmuch as every fucking post-positivist German philosopher since the 1960s does, and every post-analytic philosopher who studies both him and the hermeneutic phenomenological tradition does. All I said was that (A) his philosophy is of anti-transcendental meaning-immanence is similar, and (B) every single fucking mainstream academic expert says this, frequently and cavalierly. Again, if you want more examples: Ricoeur, Bourdieu, Dreyfus. All notably Wittgensteinian, one a direct student of Gadamer/Heidegger, another an eminent Heideggerian and fan of Bourdieu, and the other an ur-structuralist. Gasp!!

That doesn't mean he's an "historicist," necessarily, a term which you still haven't defined - if by it you mean he studied with Droysen???? But when he has a philosophy of meaning that is often considered conceptually identical at its foundation by half a fucking century worth of experts, and comparisons between his work and phenomenology, between grammar and fundamental ontology, fuel a MASSIVE industry of scholars on both sides of the analytic and continental divide, there may be something to it when someone says to you "Heidegger and Wittgenstein are basically similar in how they treat the history of Being/meaning."

You don't know what historicism is and you don't define it - or rather, you did define it as somehow opposed to an immanent philosophy of meaning, and when questioned about that you started namedropping completely unrelated shit like process philosophy, in the hope that the person you're arguing with won't know what it is. (Did you think process philosophy was esoteric or something?) You conflate the TLP with the late Wittgenstein in a discussion of the late Wittgenstein. Are you that insufferable fucking pseudo-Hegelian blogger who posts on Reddit constantly?

No one is reading this garbage back-and-forth anyway, so it's just you and me. Whether you like me or not, consider taking my advice: When you get too big for your britches, because you've gotten used to throwing around your lumpy grab bag of unsystematic half-knowledge, and someone actually calls you out on it, don't retreat into desperate attempts to prove to this random dude that you aren't a retard. I already know you're a retard, so you have nothing to gain there. Instead, consider going and doing the actual work to become a smart guy who can't be called out so easily. Everyone wins that way.