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I have been unable to reconcile the hard problem of consciousness and the measurement problem in quantum mechanics with materialism.

First, if we assume an atom isn’t conscious and a human brain is conscious, it should be theoretically possible to add unconscious atoms in the right order until we reach a point whereby a certain configuration of atoms (let’s call this configuration “X) gives rise to the appearance of phenomenality. But that also means there’s a configuration of atoms almost identical to X (let’s call this configuration “Y”) that has no consciousness whatsoever. Imagine moving one of Y’s atoms so that it becomes X; how could a such an infinitesimally small change in the arrangement of unconscious matter switch on the lights and traverse that explanatory chasm from nothing to something it’s like to be that particular being?

Second, von Neumann showed that interacting systems should become entangled. Starting with a superposition (S), the interaction of S with a measurement apparatus M would result in a superposition. But we could think of another apparatus M0 that measures M and S, and we’d still have a superposition. We could keep adding more measurement apparatuses, including our eyes as a photodetector that measures this chain of measurement apparatuses, and we’d have no reason to assume, according to von Neumann, that we would not have a superposition. We can keep on going, including not only our eyes, but our optical nerves, up until we get to the brain, and we are left with a brain/measurement apparatus/system that is still in a superposition. Since we never observe a superposition, this chain needs to stop somewhere.

The materialist cannot explain why collapse happens. Von Neumann proposed that the interaction between mind and matter causes matter to evolve probabilistically, according to Born’s rule, and non-linearly. In other words, the mind causes the collapse of the wave function. But this would imply substance dualism, which cannot explain how mind could arise from matter.

But what if we’re creating these problems for ourselves by positing the existence of an entirely separate ontological class from mind, called matter. What if, akin to alters (personalities) becoming disassociated from the larger psyche in people with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), we’re just dissociated alters within a universal mind-at-large?

On this view, wave function collapse occurs as a result of an interaction between an organism’s thoughts and the thoughts underlying the inanimate universe that surrounds it, rather than "matter".

This ontology – idealism – is internally consistent, solves the hard problem of consciousness and the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, and is more parsimonious than materialism in that it only posits a single ontological class: mind.

Counter arguments?