/lit/ - Literature

>>13758005
>Who theorizes this basic idea
Burtt might be your best bet. The last century since Burtt is pretty much people reinventing the wheel. People articulated it even before him too, obviously, but he sets it out really nicely and it's a fun read. Pic related is the first page, for reference.

>Isn't this an impossible thing to do?
>The only thing happens, is strictly speaking, is either persuation or ignoring.
I definitely agree with the pragmatic outlook, like in On Certainty:
>§206. If someone asked us "but is that true?" we might say "yes" to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the same."
>§495. One might simply say "O, rubbish!" to someone who wanted to make objections to the propositions that are beyond doubt. That is, not reply to him but admonish him.
>§609. ... If we call this "wrong" aren't we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs?
>§611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.
>§612. ... At the end of reasons comes "persuasion." (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.)

But I think the possible outcomes aren't persuasion/ignoring, but agreement/persuasion/ignoring, where agreement means "one party seeing what the other means," and persuasion meaning something undesirable in this case (since we're talking about real metaphysical truth, so coercion or pragmatic agreement for accomplishing some end are irrelevant).

I don't think Kant would necessarily be incapable of coming to agreement with you, and not even because (like Wittgenstein is saying in OC) all knowledge presupposes an openness to adjusting one's preconceptions anyway. I mean it in the sense that I think Kant was just a decent philosopher and a logician who only discounted intellectual intuition because he thought he had good reasons for doing so. He even seems to regret it a fair bit in the CPR, to me anyway.