/lit/ - Literature

>>16569008
>ATHENIAN: So what’s the definition of the thing we call the soul? Surely
>we can do nothing but use our formula of a moment ago: ‘motion capable
>of moving itself’.
>CLINIAS: Do you mean that the entity which we all call ‘soul’ is precisely
>that which is defined by the expression ‘self-generating motion’?
>ATHENIAN: I do. And if this is true, are we still dissatisfied? Haven’t we
>got ourselves a satisfactory proof that soul is identical with the original
>source of the generation and motion of all past, present and future things
>and their contraries? After all, it has been shown to be the cause of all
>change and motion in everything.

>>16328998
>>16329075
>48. To Sabazios
incense—aromatic herbs
Hear me, father Sabazios,
son of Kronos, illustrious god,
you sewed into your thigh
Bacchic Dionysos,
the roaring Eiraphiotes, 3
that he might come whole
to noble Tmolos
by the side of fair-cheeked Hipta.
O blessed ruler of Phrygia,
supreme king of all,
come kindheartedly to the aid 6
of the initiates.

>56. To Adonis
incense—aromatic herbs
Hear my prayer, O best,
O many-named god.
Fine-haired, solitary,
ever bursting with lovely song,
Eubouleus, many-shaped, 3
noble nurturer of all,
male and female in one …
unwithering bloom, O Adonis,
you vanish and then shine again
in the fair season’s turn.
Two-horned spirit of growth, 6
much loved and wept for,
fair one, joyful hunter,
god of the luxuriant mane,
desire is in you, O sweet blossom,
O son of Aphrodite and Eros,
born on the bed 9
of lovely-tressed Persephone.
You dwell deep
in murky Tartaros,
then again toward Olympos
you carry your blossoming body.
Come, O blessed one, bring 12
earth’s fruits to the initiates.

5. nature three-fold: It is not entirely clear what is meant by this. At OH
30.2, Dionysos is called “two-natured, thrice-born” (and see note). The
three natures indicated here might refer to those births in that he has
three different “mothers”: Semele, Persephone, and the thigh of Zeus.
On the other hand, since Dionysos was devoured by the Titans and
thereby had contact with them, it is possible that his nature is threefold:
human through Semele, Titanic through the Titans, and Olympian
through Zeus (cf. the composite nature of human beings in Orphic
anthropogonies, summarized and discussed in Graf/Johnston 2007, pp.
85–90). Another possibility is that Dionysos’ nature can be seen to
embody the bestial, the human, and the divine. As with the contradictory
references to Dionysos’ birth throughout the collection, the ambiguity
might be intentional.

6: “Primeval” is the translation of “prōtogone,” which naturally recalls the
Orphic entity known as Protogonos, who also shares with Dionysos the
sobriquets Erikepaios, Eubouleus, and Bromios; see OH 6.4n+i.
Through this identity, Dionysos can rightly be called both the “father and
son of the gods.”

Natural and Unnatural is a false dichotomy that doesn't exist.
What people mean is Telos and Misuse against something's purpose. To speak of natural as good necessarily demands a belief in the Good and the Telos of every true being. Unnatural only exist if there's a real Good, that something can be a privation of, exists. Which requires extra-human intent in reality, which implies at least "semi-non-random" evolution, that the whole universe works towards a certain harmony. Aka pseudo-"Hegelianism" (actually Platonism). Doesn't imply determinism rather that there's a paradigm that the laws of physics try to comply by, nudging at the world, a blueprint so to say, a Telos.

>unaware that Being is nothing but Internal Act
>unaware that the consequence of every Internal Act is an External Act
>likewise the first external act of the first internal act, of every higher being, is the second internal act of the first external act; this then produces its own second-external act with its own third-internal act: this continues to the final Limit of Body.
>this is emanation that all Being does
he'd know this if the brainlet had actually read Plotinus

>>14405964
>>14406102
And thus we shall postulate three monads and three numbers, not simply two as before, namely, the substantial, the unitary, and the Ineffable. And so we shall posit this thesis, which we previously rejected, namely, that there are one and many in the Ineffable, as well as a series consisting in first, middle, and final terms, and, additionally, [the triad] of remaining, procession, and return; and in general, we shall incorporate a great deal of that which can be spoken of into the Ineffable.39 But if, as we maintained, one must not apply [the expressions] “that” or “those” to the Ineffable, because we wish it to be beyond the one and the many, therefore neither must we posit one [Ineffable] that exists prior to the many [ineffables] and another that, by virtue of its participation in the many is divided in the same way as they. It will not then be something that can be participated in, nor does it give something of itself to that which comes after it, nor is each god ineffable before it is one, in the way that [each] is one before having an essential nature. (I 26)
But even here the argument, by its self-reversal, demonstrates that that entity is, after all, ineffable, since it conceives the Ineffable in ways that are fundamentally opposed and in terms of the natures that are inferior to it. But how could this come as a surprise, given the kinds of difficulties we shall come up against concerning the One, not to mention those concerning the Unified and concerning Being? But these must await us.

>The Attempt to Define the One Obscures Knowledge of the One
But for the present we are speaking about the One that has such a nature, attempting to put the official seal on our discourse, to the effect that it is not what we say it is, nor do we know it as One and as all things together, but rather, that which our labor pain delivers from these the One and the many, it is just that, and I am speaking of cognitive labor pain. Knowledge of One advances until the onset of labor, but struggling to emerge as a product and as endowed with an explanation, it falls short of the One, and emerges among its offspring. Proclus the philosopher refers to this in his Monobiblos as the ineffable axiom, namely the axiom that accords with the knowledge in labor with the One, just as he calls the axiom in accord with knowledge that has already been articulated, the expressible axiom. This is the cause of the constantly ambivalent examination of and decision about the One, wherein it is sometimes judged to be knowable, sometimes to be unknowable. In one way it is the former; in another it is the latter. This is why Plato in the Letters prohibits the question, “What kind of thing is it?” concerning it, and blames this for all evils, that is, the division of what belongs to the One into quality and essence. Actually, we experience this division as a titanic rending, though it is this experience of division that we attempt to lead back up to what is most exalted, and to the whole that is least subject to division.

ITnowremainstoshowwhatconceptionsweoughttohaveofthe GodsmentionedbyPlatointhepassagebeforecitedfromtheTimaeus. Foroftheancients,somereferredwhatissaidaboutthemtofables, otherstothefathersofcities,otherstoguardianpowers,otherstoethical explanations,andotherstosouls.These,however,aresufficiently confutedbythedivineJamblichus,whodemonstratesthattheywander fromthemeaningofPlato,andfromthetruthofthings.Afterthis manner,therefore,wemustsay,thatTimaeusbeingaPythagorean, followsthePythagoreanprinciples.ButthesearetheOrphictraditions. ForwhatOrpheusdeliveredmysticallythrougharcanenarrations,these
Pythagoraslearned,beinginitiatedbyAglaophemusinthemystic wisdomwhichOrpheusderivedfromhismotherCalliope.Forthese thingsPythagorassaysintheSacredDiscourse.Whatthenarethe Orphictraditions,sinceweareofopinionthatthedoctrineofTimaeus abouttheGodsshouldbereferredtothese?Theyareasfollow: OrpheusdeliveredthekingdomsoftheGodswhopresideoverwholes, [191]accordingtoaperfectnumber,viz.Phanes,Night,Heaven,Saturn, Jupiter,Bacchus.ForPhanesisthefirstthatbearsasceptre,andthe firstkingisthecelebratedEricapaeus.ButthesecondisNight,who receivesthesceptrefromherfather[Phanes.]ThethirdisHeaven,who receivesitfromNight.ThefourthisSaturn,who,astheysay,offered violencetohisfather.ThefifthisJupiter,whosubduedhisfather. Andafterhim,thesixthisBacchus.Allthesekings,therefore,beginning supernallyfromtheintelligibleandintellectualGods,proceedthrough themiddleorders,andintotheworld,thattheymayadornmundane affairs.ForPhanesisnotonlyinintelligibles,butalsoinintellectuals, inthedemiurgic,andinthesupermundaneorder;andinasimilar manner,HeavenandNight.Forthepeculiaritiesofthemproceed throughallthemiddleorders.AndwithrespecttothemightySaturn, ishenotarrangedpriortoJupiter,anddoeshenotaftertheJovian kingdom,dividetheBacchicfabricationinconjunctionwiththeother Titans?Andthisindeed,heeffectsinonewayintheheavens,andin anotherinthesublunaryregion;inonewayintheinerraticsphere, andinanotheramongtheplanets.AndinasimilarmannerJupiterand Bacchus.Thesethings,therefore,areclearlyassertedbytheancients.

>>13904437
>Stranger
>We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colors and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, [251b] and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.
Theaetetus
True.
>Stranger
>And it is in this way, I fancy, that we have provided a fine feast for youngsters and for old men whose learning has come to them late in life; for example, it is easy enough for anyone to grasp the notion that the many cannot possibly be one, nor the one many, and so, apparently, they take pleasure in saying that we must not call a man good, [251c] but must call the good good, and a man man. I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.1
Theaetetus
Certainly.
>Stranger
>Then, to include in our discussion all those who have ever engaged in any talk whatsoever about being, [251d] let us address our present arguments to these men as well as to all those with whom we were conversing before, and let us employ the form of questions.
Theaetetus
What are the arguments?
>Stranger
>Shall we attribute neither being to rest and motion, nor any attribute to anything, but shall we in our discussions assume that they do not mingle and cannot participate in one another? Or shall we gather all things together, believing that they are capable of combining with one another? Or are some capable of it and others not? Which of these alternatives, [251e] Theaetetus, should we say is their choice?
Theaetetus
I cannot answer these questions for them.
>Stranger
>Then why did you not answer each separately and see what the result was in each case?
Theaetetus
A good suggestion.
>Stranger
>And let us, if you please, assume that they say first that nothing has any power to combine with anything else. Then motion and rest will have no share in being, will they?

>gnosticism
die heretic

Of the First-born king, the neverending one; and upon him all the immortals grew, blessed gods and goddesses and rivers and lovely springs and everything else that had then been born; and he himself became the sole one.