/lit/ - Literature

Why do people have a problem with Peirce's infinite semiosis? How is it anti-realist? It seems like Peirce was heavily biased towards realism, with his crusade against nominalism and everything.

Reading the archives rn, and I stumbled upon this:
>I've never really understood why my specific form of autism is so rare. To me, everything is grist for the mill, even if it's in a roundabout way. Every school has at least developed some insight or perspective in some way. And even if you're just listening to a chemist explain how lasers crystallography works, you will go "so this is why X was so interested in crystals.." and be kind of half spacing out and thinking about Schelling in the background. But any time I assume the same of others and try to reciprocate, it doesn't go very well. The one place I've seen people simply say "Where can I read more about this?" is /lit/.
We're kindred spirits. Unfortunately, we missed the opportunity to chat because I was busy IRL that whole week. Thankfully, someone linked my Peirce thread in there, and I hope it gave you plenty of insights to work with. The reason why I enjoy Peirce so much is that I think his line of thinking gets close, if not is already there, to being a self-reflexive carving of reality at all its joints. His phenomenology is also tied to his metaphysics without suffering the problem of "fixing" too many things in place. If this makes sense, given the feat and futility of the task, my goal was never to know everything. Rather, I only asked to for a compass to help understand all that I encounter, sort all that I found into its proper place, and find the next place to travel. Peirce does that by making "the understanding" "move" with the universe, allowing the "micro rules" to change without destroying the "macro rules" (as the macro rules are the fundamental conditions for understanding anything at all and are thus tied into the fabric of the universe).

>Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. This rule is known as the pragmatic maxim.
I don't get it. What's so profound about the pragmatic maxim? Sounds either like common sense or like some weird myopic retardation to me, depending on what he means by effects.

can't believe I got memed into reading this burgertard

Don't worry anon, I've figured this stuff all out. Just take formal logic, then read my works to understand what it really is and how to best use it.

>>22372675
Charles Sanders Peirce painstakingly read through the Critique with his Harvard mathematician father every day for three years. Then he debunked Kant.

Among which categories would these kinds of things occur? Would they be examples of Firstness because they contradict the "universal record"? Would they be examples of Thirdness because they affect the world, despite being untrue?

Peirce & Scholasticism chads... where would entia rationalis fall among Peirce's three categories of reality?

Also, there's not nearly enough talk about ens rationis, degrees of intentionality, and other great hits of Scholastic philosophy. Scholastic philosophy is one of the great continuations of Aristotelian philosophy, the other being certain currents of German idealism (Kant, Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger) and, of course, the great Peirce himself.

>>22142899
>But it is triadicity with only one level of thirds. There must be absolutely infinite thirds to reach true continuity, and therefore to truly join any two moments.
You called my name?

Peirce took a sledgehammer and destroyed Kant's transcendental aesthetic.
>"To imagine is to reproduce in the mind elementary sensible intuitions and to take them up in some order so as to make an image" (CE 1: 353n). The image of space (and time) is not created originally by a transcendental via the productive imagination, but is something that can be created only through the reproduction of sensible intuitions that are given in previous experiences. This is why Peirce points out that the image of space can only come after previous experiences. Insofar as this image results from a synthesis of sensible intuitions acquired from
previous experiences,it is for Peirce a concept or conception. In holding the image of space (and time) to be a conception, Peirce diverges from Kant in a second way.
>Space and time are very special types of conceptions in that they are posited hypothetically to account for phenomenon that cannot be accounted for in any other way. As Peirce put it, "space and time are hypothetical.
>[For example], Space is thus a higher order hypothetical predicate that is posited by reason to give coherence to a sensory manifold that has already been unified by various types of lower order predicates, geometrical and otherwise. "The function of hypothesis is to substitute for a great many series of predicates forming no unity in themselves, a single one (or small number) which involves them all, together (perhaps) with an indefinite number of others. It is, therefore, also a reduction of a manifold to unity"(CE 2, 218). Space (and time) can thus no
longer be thought of as the sensory conditions for cognizing an object because they themselves are 'intellectual hypotheses'15 that are already conceptual. And with this thesis, the sensible conditions of knowledge are overtaken by the logical conditions.
Kant's transcendental aesthetic, including the organization of his judgments and categories, are bound together by positing space and especially time as pure intuitions.
>Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without conceptions blind'.
By reducing space and time to empirical concepts that are synthesized by the imagination after experience, Peirce has essentially destroyed Kant's ability to explain how representations make sense of the world. No more can we "borrow" the succession of arithmetic (i.e. cause-and-effect) or the continuity of geometry (i.e. the "community" of quality in space) to ground common sense. Hume must be laughing from the afterlife.

Here's the million dollar question though. What does Peirce substitute in place of the pure intuitions? What will be the "binding thread" that weaves representations together, makes them intelligible, and gives them any hope of pointing towards knowledge?

>>20965722
everything is a symbol. words are symbols. people are symbols. concepts are symbols. it's all symbols. every time you unite disparate content into something coherent, you've created a symbol. congratulations!

>>20950042
Building on this, I think unlimited/limited of Philebus has to be a terrible translation. As explained here, >>20939836, "limit" has etymologically strange origins. We think of limits as "straight, hard-set" boundaries, yet if you look at its origins, it "bends" like the roaming contours of hills and valleys. To say that unlimited and apeiron are anything like each other is a mistake: "limit" does not carry the terminating aspect of "peras", only perhaps its experiential, spatial aspect. Perhaps a better way of translating the two in a way that captures the "measurement" aspect of it all is:
>indefinite = apeiron
without precise measurement, relative, boundless, etc. I like to think of this as the realm of qualia, something that has "stretch", has continuity, what we see prior to measurement attempts, etc.
>definite = peras
(“set a limit, bound, end”), unit(y) through a chosen measurement.
>mixed/indeterminate dyad = infinite/unlimited
this is what happens when Plato applies his method of exhaustion to progressively define the indefinite. It also seems like a way of increasingly dividing, then unifying, then dividing the world until one can go no further. The possibilities truly are infinite, with infinite effort. Then one must return to the surface with the principle of unity, or at least the hope that it is all unified, and nothing is left to the void (hence it is indeterminate).

if you're familiar with Peirce, then firstness, secondness, and thirdness vs. indefinite, definite, and infinite/unlimited make a lot of sense here. but Peirce has no understanding of the void, what may lie beyond the indeterminate dyad.

>>20930258
>no Peirce
fool

>>20925290
>existence vs. essence
>just another materialism vs. idealism debate
accept nondualism already you fags. Peirce can help you

If you master me, then you will have climbed to the equivalent of K2 of philosophy. When you return to Plato and have overcome me, you will have glimpsed the Form of the Good.

>>20857122
you take that back.

>>20830987
You're looking at the shadows and not the light. The semiotics is derivative of Peirce's phenomenological categories, which themselves are based off of an architectonic, mathematical, and systematic universe. The problem is that everything emanates from that core, once-in-a-millennia Peircian insight, his system which he progressively tweaked over the course of his lifetime. You have French poststructrualists discover this semi-obscure philosopher, find a shining nugget of wisdom (like his semiotics), and then appropriate it to make a career, not realizing how far beneath the surface the mine goes. Once you begin to understand that, everything else starts to fall into place.

For example, why the emphasis on symbols? Because that's what the mind latches onto to process thought, especially in a somehow intelligible world dominated by continuities, infinities, and the absence of solid intuitional foundations (Peirce is a radical Kantian in that he went further than Kant to demolish the crystallized sensible intuitions). And what are symbols? They're contingent laws of meaning, habits which build on other habits, an objective stream of meaning that persists through history yet still require a path of entry to truly understand.

What really amazes me about Peirce is how somebody described him as having "an unstructured way of thinking." But that's the whole point! Reason isn't structured. I'm reminded of Heidegger's etymology of "logos" as "gathering", and clearly the most brilliant thinkers have the capacity to create, interrogate, and weave together all kinds of thinking. Except, in some hilarious why, Peirce's subject-object bridging predates Heidegger's phenomenological insights. And the best part? Peirce proves that his "unstructured phenomenology" has deep logical structure to it, too.

I'm glad you're taking the time to explore Peirce. Brilliant mind, wasted on the philosophical wastelands that is America. It's a winding path though, especially if you don't understand the crux of Peirce's work and his own philosophical inheritance (Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, etc.). I wish he took the time to write his own CPR, Science of Logic, etc., because it's a fucking pain of going through his works, going through secondary sources (most who barely have a clue of what Peirce is up to), going back to his works, comparing what Peirce is saying versus what other philosophers have to offer, etc.

>>20822405
>Das Kantbuch
>It is here Heidegger begins to develop his unique interpretation of Kant which places unprecedented emphasis on the schematism of the categories.
You've piqued my interest.

>>20806770
>>20811515
I solved this problem.

>God is real, but he does not exist.
holy based. love his Peirce-spective.

>>20783519
>last systematic autist
Am I chopped liver to you?!?! And I BTFO'd Hegel like it was nobody's business.

>>20770496
I'm coming back anon, whether you like it or not