/lit/ - Literature

>wrote a tractate that supposedly proves that metaphysics cannot be answered due to language restrictions
>retired because he "solved all philosophical problems"

Okay, I am kinda confused here, bros. I can get the idea that some philosophical ideas cannot be put into words.

But what exactly does this have to do with logical positivism? The idea that the truth can only be arrived at via logical statements.

Just because language isn't perfect doesn't mean that logic = truth.

I guess I'm just stupid.

Correct me if I'm wrong, as I'm only reading through TLP and have not yet read the primary on his later work.

Wittgenstein's framework on propositions in language is fundamentally changed between TLP and later Wittgenstein. In TLP Wittgenstein atomizes language (and propositions) into elementary components that are joined together into propositions that either reflect reality (and are true) or do not (and are false) (1.2, 3.144, 4.023, 4.032). These atomic components are mutually independent (1.21). Language obscured the essentially elementary and composite nature of propositions but the nuts and bolts of thought represented (shown? 4.022) by language were as such.

Language-games, then, are Wittgenstein's more cloudy and obscure way that language is interpreted into (or "resolves into") thought. The language game can be interpreted in the general case (as it is strictly particular and context-dependent?) as a black box, into which language goes along with rules (ostensibly including context?), which then produce a meaning: meaning is a function of language and rules. Am I correct in understanding language-games this way? Would it then also be correct to state that rules (and context) act more as a lookup function in a dictionary of potential meanings rather than acting to create meaning?

Why are these important? Is this a way of life?
> reality is linguistically ludicrous
I feel like rap and hip-hop are linguistically ludicrous. How relevant are they?

>>17567777
>I just finished 200 paragraphs of The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Does it get harder to understand later on? It feels like it's too simple. I don't find myself disagreeing or having meaningful comments on a lot of it. It's almost like the book is just articulating things I already agree with. Is there something more? Also now that I've gotten this far, reading it seems more like a chore, rather than a treat which is what it started as. Would it be acceptable for me to either skip the rest of the book or move onto a different book for the time being?

>A man going to the moon does not fit my pre-rational structure of thought therefore I do not need to believe it
How can one cope?
Memes aside, how does one draw the line between hinge propositions such as "there is an external world" which you have no grounds to doubt and something like "no man has ever went to the moon"? The fact he uses it as an example demonstrates a kind of dogmatic way of thinking, yet it is still appealing to apply it to philosophical problems such as external world skepticism and such. Is there a non-arbitrary distinction?

It's shameful that he was refuted by BOTH Heidegger and Jung.

>>15721701
>mfw people define things

>As soon as I read the first sentence I became persuaded that he was a man of genius
what did he write?

Start and end with wittgenstein

Does anyone else get the vibe that analytical philosophy--or maybe philosophy in general--is a bunch of gobbledygook?

Let me give you some examples. I'm going to throw a dart at some subcategory on Philpapers and paste the summary here. Then I’ll do the same for some paper and its abstract.

Summary:


Two-dimensional semantic theories postulate two "dimensions" of meaning or content, each understood in terms of possible worlds. The second dimension is typically depends on the external referents of expressions involved, while the first dimension captures the way that reference depends on the world. There are many different two-dimensional frameworks. David Kaplan develops a framework involving "character" and "content" to understand the meaning of indexicals and demonstratives. Robert Stalnaker develops a framework involving "diagonal propositions" and "propositions expressed" to understand assertion and its relation to context. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson develop frameworks involving "primary intensions" and "secondary intensions" (or "A-" and "C-intensions") to understand the relation between apriority and necessity and also to understand an internal Fregean dimension of content.

Abstract:

One well known problem regarding quantifiers, in particular the 1storder quantifiers, is connected with their syntactic categories and denotations. The unsatisfactory efforts to establish the syntactic and ontological categories of quantifiers in formalized first-order languages can be solved by means of the so called principle of categorial compatibility formulated by Roman Suszko, referring to some innovative ideas of Gottlob Frege and visible in syntactic and semantic compatibility of language expressions. In the paper the principle is introduced for categorial languages generated by the Ajdukiewicz’s classical categorial grammar. The 1st-order quantifiers are typically ambiguous. Every 1st-order quantifier of the type k > 0 is treated as a two-argument functorfunction defined on the variable standing at this quantifier and its scope (the sentential function with exactly k free variables, including the variable bound by this quantifier); a binary function defined on denotations of its two arguments is its denotation. Denotations of sentential functions, and hence also quantifiers, are defined separately in Fregean and in situational semantics. They belong to the ontological categories that correspond to the syntactic categories of these sentential functions and the considered quantifiers. The main result of the paper is a solution of the problem of categories of the 1st-order quantifiers based on the principle of categorial compatibility.


Can you believe this shit? It’s literal nonsense. Do I have permission to abandon philosophy and go back to reading Shelley in a tree? My brain hurts.