/lit/ - Literature

Do large language models being able to convincingly talk about IRL things they've never experienced prove that Wittgenstein was right and it's all just language games, with no "beetle in the box" being necessary to engage in them?

>born into extremely wealthy family
>retarded and can barely get through school
>still gets into elite university to be an engineer because he is rich
>reads Schopenhauer
>”Dad I wanna be a philosopher!”
>Ok son, you are lucky enough to be part of the richest families in the world, go spend your whole life to think about and solve philosophy!

>fast forward
>”Erm…language…is confusing…”
>”Like…words represent stuff…and yeah…if you can’t say something clearly then don’t say anything!”
>”Philosophy is just made up problems”
>Wealthy and able to do anything, mfw there are no problems
>Randomly freaks out at Cambridge and storms out over and over like a girl
>Bertrand Russell applauds and worships him as a genius
>Goes on to trash on Schopenhauer and call him retarded but secretly copies everything he ever said and pretends he came up with it

Huh? The greatest philosopher of the 20th century?

>>22270781
Yes

What’s the point in doing metaphysics after Wittgenstein debunked it all?

>>22034685
>>22034689
Jews and gays, two of the high achieving demographics. When they are combined they are unstoppable (Marcel Proust, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Allan Bloom, Roy Cohn, Sam Altman, etc.)

>>21847671
>blocks your path

>I think Aristotelian categories are a good way to classify things
>"Well, what about a game? There's many games but they don't all share one thing in common"
>Well, what's your alternative
>"Imagine they're all like a family and they share traits and shit"
Wtf did he mean by this?

Would he still engage in Philosophy and Mathematics if he were alive today, or would he go and do something else?

Anyone want to talk about Wittgenstein's private language argument as it applies to sensation and pain? Am I correct in thinking that most confusion about this arises from not understanding that Wittgenstein is exclusively talking about the grammar (tacit logic) of words like "pain," "know," and statements like "I know he's in pain," within a language game? Such that what he's really doing is making a distinction between this ordinary usage and uses like "Your mind cannot directly experience my subjective states," which would involve other grammars (of "minds," "subjective states" etc).

>Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental [seelisch] process' at all.— For THAT is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?—In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process.
>(A pain's growing more and less; the hearing of a tune or a sentence: these are mental processes.)

>244. How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?—of the word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.

>248. The proposition "Sensations are private" is comparable to: "One plays solitaire by oneself"

>253. "Another person can't have my pains."—Which are my pains? What counts as a criterion of identity here? Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of "two exactly the same", for example, to say "This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it". In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain. (And it would also be imaginable for two people to feel pain in the same—not just the corresponding—place. That might be the case with Siamese twins, for instance.)
>I have seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself on the breast and say: "But surely another person can't have THIS pain!"—The answer to this is that one does not define a criterion of identity by emphatic stressing of the word "this". Rather, what the emphasis does is to suggest the case in which we are conversant with such a criterion of identity, but have to be reminded of it.

>Solves then ends philosophy

Blame this guy.

Blue and brown books, or philosophical investigations? Where should I start?

>>16614119
Yes.

I get a sense that his whole tractatus was him sperging out trying to defend his atomism in a world that is not atomic, is he like reeeing because he cannot accept that there is a clear distinction between phenomena and noumena? I do get it that he seems to gravitate towards some strange sollipsism at times but at the same time his whole point is that the world is composed of these almost atomical "facts", it's like he is saying that instead of the world being composed of Observer and Observed it is composed of some sort of "inner phenomena" and there is no subject at all

>>15713387
There's not a single uncool photograph of Wittgenstein, it's quite strange.

How would you rank philosophers based on IQ?

>The general method that Wittgenstein does suggest is that of 'shewing that a man has supplied no meaning [or perhaps: "no reference"] for certain signs in his sentences'. I can illustrate the method from Wittgenstein's later way of discussing problems.

>He once greeted me with the question: 'Why do people say that it was natural to think that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth turned on its axis?' I replied: 'I suppose, because it looked as if the sun went round the earth.' 'Well,' he asked, 'what would it have looked like if it had looked as if the earth turned on its axis?'

Well?

>slapped an 11 year old so hard they bleed from the ears and collapse
CRAAAAWWWWWLING IIIIIN MY SKIIIIIIIN

Is it still possible today that someone who doesn't have a strict philosophical background publishes a philosophical paper? I once read a short anecdote of Wittgenstein coming to some philosophy professor's office and having a long talk with him wherein the professor debunked most of his ideas (or something of the sorts; I apologize if I've got something wrong) but at the end, when Wittgenstein was pretty down, the professor told him to come again. Is this a plausible scenario today? Would a philosophy professor embrace a talk with a STEMfag such as myself?

Also, to stress out that this does indeed belong on /lit/, my main concern is about publishing and writing philosophical papers.

>shut the fuck up

Is there anything that I need to read before going for his books, /lit/?

>>10951602
All philosophical "questions" become trivial when they are well posed
Prove me wrong

>I am the yeast of thoughts and mind
What did he mean by this?

What do i need to read before tackling this guy? What are the main works of his i should read? And is he hard to understand?