/lit/ - Literature

How is it?
https://pastebin.com/pdrPBMZU

>>10723713

>>10709285
Oh SORRY sar, I didnt realize you wanted the VIP section tonight. Here you go sar, enjoy.

Intellectual fraud funded by Big Kino to revitalize failing crustacean consumption in kinoplexes

Got any metaphysics to back up those claims smart guy?
(N.B. epistemology presupposes metaphysics!)

Depends. If you want to start with Hegel, you would do well to start with the Phenomenology.

Along the way of religion, despite calling himself a Lutheran, Hegel denies major Christian doctrines -
he does not believe in heaven and denied salvation, thinks that viewing ourselves as pilgrims upon this world (qua Augustine) is unethical, denies the transcendence and personality of God, denies the reality of miracles and also Christian love ethics. He also thought theology was generally wrong-headed, as it presupposed God in its subject matter (though, he of course believed in God).

Hegel was more interested in Christianity, as it was immanent, real and actual expression of feeling with the Absolute. He initially flirted with Paganism, but found worship to be dead
and stagnant waters. Luther, he thought, provided the greatest expression of this feeling through his conception of Mass - though Hegel ultimately countered nearly everything aside from
this form of Divine expression.

Hegel saw truth in human institutions insofar as they were the development of the Divine Idea.

Hegel thought he could eventually replace faith with rationality, and treated Christianity in accordance to how he conceived of this design. A rather controversial point Hegel made was this,
while religion and philosophy treated essentially the same subject matter, but do so in different manners - the feeling and intuition of religion (representations), but in the end, he thought they
must be replaced by the categories and thoughts of philosophy (concepts). He subscribed to the hotly-debated thesis that feeling could eventually be made discursive.
The representations of religion, as Hegel considered them, were inchoate and unorganized thoughts, in the same sense that nature is from the point of organization less developed than
spirit. In the end, there is only one sort of thinking, with varying degrees of organization and explicitness.

To illustrate, for Hegel there is the object of (1) sensation (concrete, particular object and unsystematic), of (2) representation (particular object, universal in formal qualities, though not fully related as in a system) and
of (3) thinking (universal and related in a system). More or less, while religion is consideration in a certain sense, it is by and large implicit.

Generally speaking, most rejected Hegel's metaphysics though appropriated other thoughts such as the dialectic. Such is true of Marxists (of certain stripes) and even Kierkegaard.

>german """""idealists"""""
>believe the mind-independence is a necessary condition for consciousness

yikes...

>>10189907

My attempt.

I took the liberty of including the preceding passage. Also, as a preliminary note which help frame this is, Hegel was very concerned with ordinary perception and wanted to make a consistent
explanation for our ordinary perception.

>The terms in Essence are always mere pairs of correlatives, and yet not absolutely reflected in themselves: hence in essence the actual unity of the notion is not yet realised, but only postulated by reflection.

This is a part of the Aristotelian (check out his history of philosophy to see how hard Hegel jerked off to Aristotle) notion of how substances, i.e. individual things like you, me, dogs, plants, artifacts and so on, exist,
and is an ontological claim by Hegel who believes there ARE separate and distinct things which exist in certain ways within an Absolute whole.
That is, there is a thing which is unorganized and has potential to be many ways, with these potentials working as opposites. For example, something can become larger or smaller,
this colour or that colour, here or there, etc. At the same time however, something being in one way does not remove its capacity to be in other ways - hence neither correlative can be absolute or total,
especially in the case of finite things.

>Essence – which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself – is self-relatedness, only in so far as it is relation to an Other – this Other, however, coming to view at first not as something which is, but as postulated and hypothesised.

Being is something which exists without qualities (but capable of them), and Essence is what makes this thing BE a certain way, and realizes this certain way. What Hegel is describing here is that Essence actualizes a certain capacity within Being.
Within the concept of the being is its own intrinsic way of existing which must be taken on its own terms (contra Kant, in the sense that a priori standards/terms is considered to presuppose too much), and the Other
mentioned here is another way this thing could have been, and that we are aware of this other way of being by relating our wider knowledge, a greater Whole, to this particular instance. Accordingly, difference is understood in relation to speculation based on evidence available to us.

>Being has not vanished: but, firstly, Essence, as simple self-relation, is Being, and secondly as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy, Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected light – Essence accordingly is Being thus reflecting light into itself.

Essence and Being are here made into a compound - a simplistic way to put this is that the FORM of a chair, which is to say all the qualities a CHAIR is said to possess, are put to WOOD. It is now immanently a chair -
the wood exists as a chair, but it still has the capacity to change, to be other things. Being is not consumed in being actualized, and is a necessary condition for something and not secondary.