/lit/ - Literature

>>20057894
Thought that was Willard Van Orman Quine, even my mind played tricks when I read "Lee Quan" as "Willard Quine."

>>18842150
>They didn't all abandon it, Carnap stuck with the program his whole life
Carnap absolutely abandoned verification for confirmation by the mid-1930s.
>Quine's analytic/synthetic critique from Two Dogmas of Empiricism misses the point.
Quine's point is two-fold. First, that analytic statements aren't a separate class of sentences. By that we need to understand that if analytic truths are truths by definitions, those definitions are equivalences between two things, definiens and definiendum, and the mere equivalence doesn't generate the truth of the equivalence unless the two parts flanking the equivalence symbol are themselves meaningful, in "Truth by Convention" he discusses it more. If I say P means Q this is not telling you that either P or Q have meaning proper, or truth, you don't conjure the truth of P or Q from saying P means Q like that. His second point is that experiences can't verify single statements within a theory because those statements within a theory depend on coherence with other statements. The experiences could just as well confirm some other statement if some auxiliary hypothesis is true to explain how. This might not be obvious to see at first if you stick to a sense datum language til you realize even sense datum language is theory-loaded, but it becomes especially obvious when you shift from verification to confirmation, where projectibility (for the sake of confirming universal laws of nature) is required. But Carnap would admit that even saying things about particular objects, defined as classes of particular experiences, also requires projectibility and thus we can't really escape the problem if we stick to a sense-data language (this is precisely why he moves to confirmation in "Testability and Meaning").
>You misunderstand Godel's theorem
You can go to meta languages to make incomplete theories complete, but that ascent generates incompleteness one level up.
>The way to fix this is with Bayesian inference + Solomonoff induction
No matter how much you rigorize induction it's still going to be based on projectibility based on some hope that the predicate you're making inferences about is one and not another, for cases of membership you can't yourself check. This is grue/bleen, plus/quus, gavagai, and so forth. Underdetermination is unavoidable unless you accept Lewisian naturalness and that immediately brings you back to metaphysics, which is a welcome decision for Lewis and other supporters of naturalness anyway.
>Solomonoff's contribution was to say that the simplest theory is the one that has the lowest Kolmogorov complexity when encoded.
Why should a theoretical virtue like simplicity (Occam's razor and what not) determine verisimilitude? This has been criticized. There's no reason to believe some lawlike correlation exists between simplicity and truth of a theory, and many philosophers of science find the reliance on theoretical virtues worrisome since it's not empirical or analytic, but pragmatic.

>>17485783
Pre-critical rationalism "proves" the existence of entire entities entirely a priori, from premises which don't even contain those entities conceptually within them or otherwise (any claims to the contrary notwithstanding). They're not performing analysis, they're performing dialectic: proceeding from premises to conclusions beyond what those premises' meaningful content permits them to do. Demonstration alone wouldn't let them do that. Descartes' proof of God is an example, much as Anselm's proof of God is.
>>17485831
Because Quine and Davidson don't believe our conceptual schemes are 'pictures' of the structure of some out-there metaphysical reality. They differ from Kant in that they think the true theory of the world is partly based in pragmatic virtues and partly in observation (so they accept something like a synthetic ground, analogous to noumena, but they reject structure is to be found in it and pictured by our theories).

>A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in three AngloSaxon monosyllables: "What is there?‟ It can be answered, moreover, in a word—
"Everything‟—and everyone will accept this answer as true. However, this is merely to say
that there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over cases; and so the issue
has stayed alive down the centuries.

Post paragraphs that make you coom.

>>15908952
Patrician analytic metametaphysics. That being said:
>McDaniel's ontological pluralism
>Schaffer's permissivism
>Hirsch's quantifier variance
>Chalmers' neo-Carnapianism
You don't really believe these right, anon?

>To RUDOLF CARNAP Teacher and Friend
What did Quine mean by this? He had a wife and children but he dedicates Word and Object to his sparring partner.

>>15319332

>Dude, just say Logic trumps all and be done with it, lmao.

sexy
sexy
sexy
Why did he do it?
∆
∆∆

Aren't you forgetting someone

Party rockers in the house tonight

Let's go
People always say that my music's loud
Sorry for party rocking
Neighbors complain saying turn it down!
Sorry for party rocking
Haters don't like we got the spotlight
Sorry for party rocking
When they talk shit, we just be like
Sorry for party rocking