/lit/ - Literature

>>21670221
>>21671313
>That the world has a mere physical but no moral significance is the greatest, most ruinous and fundamental error, the real perversity of the mind and in a basic sense it is certainly that which faith has personified as the antichrist.
t. schopenhauer

animals are sincere
only man can be honest and insincere

>Consider, for example, the writings of the school of Schelling, and observe the constructions that are built up out of abstractions like finite and infinite—being, non-being, other being—activity, hindrance, product—determining, being determined, determinateness—limit, limiting, being limited—unity, plurality, multiplicity—identity, diversity, indifference—thinking, being, essence, &c. Not only does all that has been said above hold good of constructions out of such materials, but because an infinite amount can be thought through such wide abstractions, only very little indeed can be thought in them; they are empty husks. But thus the matter of the whole philosophising becomes astonishingly trifling and paltry, and hence arises that unutterable and excruciating tediousness which is characteristic of all such writings. If indeed I now chose to call to mind the way in which Hegel and his companions have abused such wide and empty abstractions, I should have to fear that both the reader and I myself would be ill; for the most nauseous tediousness hangs over the empty word-juggling of this loathsome philophaster.

>A tendency of the mind to work with such abstract and too widely comprehended conceptions has shown itself almost at all times. It may ultimately rest upon a certain indolence of the intellect, which finds it too difficult a task to be constantly controlling thought by perception. By degrees such unduly wide conceptions come to be used almost like algebraical symbols, and tossed about like them, and thus philosophy is reduced to a mere process of combination, a kind of reckoning which (like all calculations) employs and demands only the lower faculties. Indeed there finally results from this a mere juggling with words, of which the most shocking example is afforded us by the mind-destroying Hegelism, in which it is carried to the extent of pure nonsense.

got me

>Occasionally, when I consider the impressive erudition of these know-it-alls I say to myself: oh how little they have had to think about, in order to have been able to read so much! Even when it is reported of the elder Pliny that he was constantly reading, or having things read to him at the table, on trips, in the bath and so on, the question arises for me whether the man was so terribly lacking in thoughts of his own that those of others had to be incessantly transfused to him, just as a consommé is given to a consumptive to keep him alive. And neither his undiscriminating gullibility nor his unspeakably repulsive, incomprehensible, and paper-saving collectanea stylea does anything to give me a high opinion of his capacity to think for himself.
t. schopenhauer

>in my main work (vol. 2, ch. 47) I described how the state is essentially a mere institution of protection against external attacks on the whole and internal attacks on individuals against one another. From this it follows that the necessity of the state, in the final analysis, is based on the well-known injustice of the human race; without this there would be no thought of the state, since no one would have to fear infringement of his rights and a mere union against the attacks of wild animals or the elements would have only a remote similarity to a state. From this standpoint one clearly sees the narrow-mindedness and shallowness of the philosophasters who in pompous phrases depict the state as the highest purpose and the blossom of human existence, thereby delivering an apotheosis of philistinism.

t. §123 of essay on jurisprudence and politics

no thaumazein, he had no takes. so he shuffled around hollow concepts in loose associative chains in the hope that something original would happen. some call it "daring to think radically".
>when strangers visited hegel they asked him when professor hegel would return home

why would you be impressed with tate after reading schopenhauer though?
>In practical life the intuitive knowledge of the understanding is able to guide our action and behaviour directly, while the abstract knowledge of the reason can only do so by means of the memory. Hence arises the superiority of intuitive knowledge in all cases which admit of no time for reflection; thus for daily intercourse, in which, just on this account, women excel. Only those who intuitively know the nature of men as they are as a rule, and thus comprehend the individuality of the person before them, will understand how to manage him with certainty and rightly. Another may know by heart all the three hundred maxims of Gracian, but this will not save him from stupid mistakes and misconceptions if he lacks that intuitive knowledge. For all abstract knowledge affords us primarily mere general principles and rules; but the particular case is almost never to be carried out exactly according to the rule; then the rule itself has to be presented to us at the right time by the memory, which seldom punctually happens; then the propositio minor has to be formed out of the present case, and finally the conclusion drawn. Before all this is done the opportunity has generally turned its back upon us, and then those excellent principles and rules serve at the most to enable us to measure the magnitude of the error we have committed. Certainly with time we gain in this way experience and practice, which slowly grows to knowledge of the world, and thus, in connection with this, the abstract rules may certainly become fruitful. On the other hand, the intuitive knowledge, which always apprehends only the particular, stands in immediate relation to the present case. Rule, case, and application are for it one, and action follows immediately upon it. This explains why in real [pg 251] life the scholar, whose pre-eminence lies in the province of abstract knowledge, is so far surpassed by the man of the world, whose pre-eminence consists in perfect intuitive knowledge, which original disposition conferred on him, and a rich experience has developed. The two kinds of knowledge always stand to each other in the relation of paper money and hard cash; and as there are many cases and circumstances in which the former is to be preferred to the latter, so there are also things and situations for which abstract knowledge is more useful than intuitive.

don't even try

>the philosopher always becomes such as the result of a perplexity from which he tries to disengage himself. this is plato's thaumazein, astonishment - a very philosophical emotion (theatetus, 155D). but what distinguishes ungenuine from genuine philosophers is that this perplexity comes to the latter from looking at the world itself, to the former merely from a book, a philosophical system which lies in front of them. this was also the case with Fichte, for he became a philosopher merely over Kant's thing-in-itself, and had it not been for this would most probably have concerned himself with quite different things with much greater success, for he possessed considerable rhetorical talent.
t. schopenhauer

Yes.

>the eternal jew Ahasverus is none other than the personification of the entire jewish people.
Schopenhauer hated philo-semites because he knew their beliefs are fueled out of pure ignorance. I've noticed an uptick of philo-semitism on this board and it's probably coming mostly from /pol/ people who are NEETs with no propsects in life and are bitter. I don't mind far left views but it's annoying when the quality of discourse is awful because /pol/tards can't think outside the terms of insane conspiracy theories.

>he would like to put his roots down and gain a homeland, without which the people is like a ball in the air. - but until then he lives parasitically off other peoples and their lands, but nevertheless remains animated by the liveliest patriotism for his own people, which manifests itself in strong cohesion according to which "all stand for one and one for all", so that this patriotism without homeland is more zealous than any other. the homeland of a jew are the other jews: thus he fights for them like "for God and country" and no community sticks together as much as theirs.
>therefore it is absurd to want to concede to them a share in the government or administration of any country. Originally amalgamated and one with their state, their religion is by no means the main issue here, but rather merely the bond that holds them together, the point de ralliement [rallying-point], and the banner whereby they recognize one another. This is also seen in the fact that even the converted Jew who has been baptized does not by any means bring upon himself the hatred and loathing of all the rest [of the Jews], as do all other apostates. On the contrary, he continues as a rule to be their friend and companion and to regard them as his true countrymen, naturally with a few orthodox exceptions. … Accordingly, it is an extremely superficial and false view to regard the Jews merely as a religious sect. But if, in order to countenance this error, Judaism is described by an expression borrowed from the Christian Church as “Jewish Confession,” then this is a fundamentally false expression which is deliberately calculated to mislead and should not be allowed at all. On the contrary, “Jewish Nation” is the correct expression. The Jews have absolutely no confession; monotheism is part of their nationality and political constitution and is with them a matter of course. (schopenhauer, parerga and paralipomena vol 2, on jurisprudence and politics)

>the philosopher always becomes such as the result of a perplexity from which he tries to disengage himself. this is plato's thaumazein, astonishment - a very philosophical emotion (theatetus, 155D). but what distinguishes ungenuine from genuine philosophers is that this perplexity comes to the latter from looking at the world itself, to the former merely from a book, a philosophical system which lies in front of them. this was also the case with Fichte, for he became a philosopher merely over Kant's thing-in-itself, and had it not been for this would most probably have concerned himself with quite different things with much greater success, for he possessed considerable rhetorical talent.
t. schopenhauer

this was also the case with mainländer, for he became a philosopher merely over schopenhauer's will

start with world as will and end with parerga. and thats it.
>>19667338
>parerga vol 2 chapter 24
>the art of not reading is highly important. This consists in not taking a book into one's hand merely because it is interesting the great public at the time—such as political or religious pamphlets, novels, poetry, and the like, which make a noise and reach perhaps several editions in their first and last years of existence. Remember rather that the man who writes for fools always finds a large public: and only read for a limited and definite time exclusively the works of great minds, those who surpass other men of all times and countries, and whom the voice of fame points to as such. These alone really educate and instruct.
>One can never read too little of bad, or too much of good books: bad books are intellectual poison; they destroy the mind.
>In order to read what is good one must make it a condition never to read what is bad; for life is short, and both time and strength limited.

>World vol 2, chapter 12 footnote
>a principal advantage of the study of the ancients is that it guards us from verbosity, since they always take the trouble to write concisely and pregnantly, and the mistake of almost all the moderns is verbosity. the most recent of all try to make amends for this by suppressing syllables and letters. we should therefore continue to study the ancients all through our life, though limiting the time spent on this study. the ancients knew that we ought not to write as we speak. the moderns, on the other hand, even have the effrontery to print the lectures they have given.

>World vol 2, chapter 38 ... "herodotus is all the history you need"
>the true philosophy of history thus consists in the insight that, in spite of all these endless changes and their chaos and confusion, we yet always have before us only the same, identical, unchangeable essence, acting in the same way today as it did yesterday and always. the true philosophy of history should therefore recognize the identical in all events, of ancient as of modern times, of the east as of the west, and should see everywhere the same humanity, in spite of all difference in the special circumstances, in costume and customs. this identical element, persisiting under every change, consists in the fundamental qualities of the human heart and head, many bad, few good. the motto of history in general should run: "Eadem, sed aliter - the same, but otherwise." If we have read Herodotus, we have already studied enough history from a philosophical point of view. for everything which constitutes the ubsequent history of the world is already there, namely the efforts, actions, sufferings, and fate of the human race, as it results from the aforesaid qualities and from its physical eartly lot.

>a bottle long retains the smell of that which filled it. his contempt for animals, who, as mere things for our use, are declared by him to be without rights, is thoroughly jewish, and, in conjunction with pantheism, is at the same time absurd and abominable.
t. schopenhauer

remember, no disrespect for animools

>instead of an exhaustive knowledge of these space-relations, we therefore obtain only a few arbitrarily communicated results from them, and are in the same position as the man to whom the different effects of an ingenious machine are shown, while its inner connexion and mechanism are withheld from him. we are forced by the principle of contradiction to admit that everything demonstrated by euclid is so, but we do not get to know WHY it is so. we therefore have almost the uncomfortable feeling that we get after a conjuring trick, and in fact most of euclid's proofs are remarkably like such a trick. the truth almost always comes in by the back door, since it follows per accidens from some minor circumstance. frequently, an apagogic proof shuts all doors one after the other, and leaves open only one, through which merely for that reason we must now pass. often, as in the theorem of pythagoras, lines are drawn without our knowing why. it afterwards appears that they were traps, which shut unexpectedly and take prisoner the assent of the learner, who in astonishment has then to admit what remains wholly unintelligible to him in its inner connextion. this happens to such an extent that he can study the whole of euclid throughout without gaining real insight into the laws of spatial relations, but instead of these, he learns by heart only a few of their results... in our view, however, this method of euclid in mathematics can appear only as a very brilliant piece of perversity.

>only after we have learnt from this great mind (kant) that the intuitions or perceptions of space and time are quite different from empirical perception, entirely independent of any impression on the senses, conditioning this and not conditioned by it, i.e., are a priori, and hence not in any way exposed to sense-deception - only then can we see that euclid's logical method of treating mathematics is a useless precaution, a crutch for sound legs. we see that such a method is like a wanderer who, mistaking at night a bright firm road for water, refrains from walking on it, and goes over the rough ground beside it, content to keep from point to point along the edge of the supposed water.
t. schopenhauer

if physicists are so smart, why haven't their methods of proof not changed since euclid?

conclusions are easy, judgments are hard.
like most of the NPCs who attempt this kind of posting, you pretend to have arrived at a controversial conclusion and don't even reveal your premises.
you are GAY.

fragments and vague associations are lying dormant somewhere in the crevices of our mind, never completely gone but also hard to retrieve.
>...an occasion is required. how much the occasion achieves in the case of memory can be shown by the fact that anyone who has read fifty anecdotes in a book of anecdotes, and then laid the book aside, is sometimes unable to recall even a single one immediately afterwards. but if the occasion comes, or an idea occurs to him which has any analogy with one of those anecdotes, it comes back to him at once; and so do all the fifty as opportunity offers.

>most of what the intellect has dropped it never takes up again, especially as the taking up again is bound to the principle of sufficient reason, and thus requires an occasion which the association of ideas and motivation have first to provide. ... the knowledge even of the scholarly head exist only VIRTUALITER as an acquired practice in producing certain representations. ACTUALITER, on the other hand, it is restricted to one particular representation, and for the moment is conscious of this one alone. hence there results a strange contrast between what a man knows potentia and what he knows actu, in other words, between his knowledge and his thinking at any moment. the former is an immense and always somewhat chaotic mass, the latter a single, distinct thought. the relation is like that between the unnumerable stars of the heavens and the telescope's narrow field of vision;
t. chapters 14 and 15 of schopenhauer "world as will..." vol 2

/lit/ often functions like a crowd-sourced human association machine.

science is just another layer. expecting final answers there is like trying to reach the edge of the world.
t. schopenhauer

>there's something unimaginably evil out there mang

literally the weakest subtype of tragedy as schopenhauer defined them, from lowest to highest: flaw/malice, blind fate, ordinary circumstance.

Schopenhauer

Let us not forget.

>If I were to say that the so-called philosophy of this fellow Hegel is a colossal piece of mystification which will yet provide posterity with an inexhaustible theme for laughter at our times, that it is a pseudo-philosophy paralyzing all mental powers, stifling all real thinking, and, by the most outrageous misuse of language, putting in its place the hollowest, most senseless, thoughtless, and, as is confirmed by its success, most stupefying verbiage, I should be quite right.

>Further, if I were to say that this summus philosophus [...] scribbled nonsense quite unlike any mortal before him, so that whoever could read his most eulogized work, the so-called Phenomenology of the Mind, without feeling as if he were in a madhouse, would qualify as an inmate for Bedlam, I should be no less right.

>The description of a great misfortune is the only indispensable element in tragedy. The many different ways in which the poet introduces this description can be reduced to three types. First of all, it can come through the exceptional malice, bordering on the limits of the possible, of some character who will be the architect of the misfortune;

>It can also come about by means of blind fate, that is, by chance and error

>Finally, misfortune can be brought about by the simple situation of the characters with respect to each other, by their circumstances; there is no need either for a monstrous error, or for an extraordinary fate, or for a character at the limits of human wickedness; on the contrary, characters familiar to us from the moral point of view, and placed in ordinary circumstances, find themselves in situations which force them to prepare for each other, in full knowledge and in full awareness, the most horrendous misfortunes, without the fault being clearly attributable to any one of the parties.

>not reading The Art of Being Right instead