/lit/ - Literature

>>23374717
no it isn't

>We might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytical proposition, following (according to the principle of contradiction) from the conception of a sum of seven and five. But if we regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into one, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single number is which embraces both.

They are synthetic a priori

>>23334351
Sensibility only receives sensations, i.e., representations (or a better translation would be 'presentions' since the German is 'die Vorstellungen', or placings before), in the sense that they are just there, i. e., given, not spontaneously produced by will of the subject. Where they come from is beyond the limits of human knowledge, since affirming a supersensible source as their efficient cause would again be a subreptive use of the categories, although again we necessarily THINK that sensation must have a supersensible, non-representational cause, the Ding an sich.

>these representations [...] given in the mind without spontaneity, must, on account of this difference (THE WANT OF SPONTANEITY), be called sensibility.

>>22739323
>it's just a puzzling passage to me
that's because Guyer/Wood translate a paragraph long sentence word for word into an incomprehensible "English" sentence.

refer to the aforementioned amazon review.

Here is the Meikljohn version (who actually breaks the sentence into smaller comprehensible English sentences):

>Now there are objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot be given in experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason thinks them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted, and which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things a priori that which we ourselves place in them.* This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and promises to metaphysics, in its first part—that is, where it is occupied with conceptions a priori, of which the corresponding objects may be given in experience—the certain course of science.

and here is the note:
>*This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural philosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment. Now the propositions of pure reason, especially when they transcend the limits of possible experience, do not admit of our making any experiment with their objects, as in natural science. Hence, with regard to those conceptions and principles which we assume a priori, our only course ill be to view them from two different sides. We must regard one and the same conception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other hand, in relation to reason, isolated and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of mere thought. Now if we find that, when we regard things from this double point of view, the result is in harmony with the principle of pure reason, but that, when we regard them from a single point of view, reason is involved in self-contradiction, then the experiment will establish the correctness of this distinction.

>>22477316
>stopping reading philosophers and philosophizing oneself
by doing both.

>Rational cognitions which are objective, that is, which have their source in reason, can be so termed from a subjective point of view, only when they have been drawn by the individual himself from the sources of reason, that is, from principles...
You learn to reason well through the principles of the authors you read, and think out their inferences for yourself

>>22419414
btfo by Kant (once again)
>The science of Natural Philosophy (Physics) contains in itself synthetical judgments a priori, as principles. I shall adduce two propositions. For instance, the proposition, “in all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged;” or, that, “in all communication of motion, action and re-action must always be equal.” In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propositions.

>>22395041
>>22395125
>The Prolegomena is meant to be read before the critique of pure reason
this is a midwit meme literally refuted in the intro to the prolegomena:

>although a mere sketch PRECEDING the Critique of Pure Reason would be UNINTELLIGIBLE, UNRELIABLE, and USELESS, it is all the more useful as a SEQUEL. For so we are able to grasp the whole, to examine in detail the chief points of importance in the science, and to improve in many respects our exposition, as compared with the first execution of the work.

>>22249845
>>22250863
>having sensations goes much more in the direction of an empirical realism than that of transcendental idealism.

Kant
>If I take away from an empirial intuition all thought (by means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the existence of such or such an affection of sensibility in me, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW that this affection or representation has any relation to an object WITHOUT me.

The first generation of post-Kantian idealists accepts the conclusion of Immanuel Kant's systematic account or science of the a priori conditions of intelligibility, viz., that experience does not conform to the object, but rather depends for its possibility on space and time as forms of sensibility, as transcendental aesthetic shows, and the categories of the understanding, as transcendental logic shows. However, the idealists reject the presupposition of Kant's two-stem science, viz., that space, time, and the categories are brute facts about our subjective constitution, i.e., radically contingent or groundless conditions. Hence K.L. Reinhold describes 1790's Letters on the Kantian Philosophy as his “attempt to present [Kant's] results independently of the Kantian premises”,1 J.G. Fichte tells Heinrich Stephani in a letter, mid-December 1793, that “Kant's philosophy, as such, is correct—but only in its results and not in its reasons”,2 and F.W.J. Schelling tells G.W.F. Hegel in a letter, 6 January 1795, that “[p]hilosophy has not yet reached its end. Kant has given the results: the premises are still lacking. And who can understand results without the premises?”.3 The post-Kantian objection is that the conclusions of Kant's science of intelligibility lack rigour unless they are derived from premises that are not brutely subjective, but are rather absolutely necessary.