/lit/ - Literature

>>20312311
>If you actually believe this you are an unironic NPC. Namaste out of my way
The opposite is true, because NPCs have no inner experience/awareness of phenomena, while the Advaitin model does explain that we have an inner experience of phenomena. On the other hand certain Buddhist models deny this and propose NPC theories

Mark Siderits has an essay in the "self, no-self" compilation talking about this where he basically says certain Buddhist theory-of-mind says that we are P-Zombies

>>19695800
>>Those researchers in that article conflate consciousness and sensory-perceptions, which is a surprisingly common mistake
>Given that sense-percepts are the majority of what constitutes our vigilant natural life, why would that be a mistake?
Because sense-perceptions are only one aspect of our lived experience, we also have knowledge of things like thoughts and emotions, however these latter things are not made known to us through any of the senses unlike sense-perceptions. What unites them with sense-perceptions in our experience? The answer is that they and sense-perceptions are all known alike by awareness.

All of these thoughts, sense-perceptions and emotions are not self-knowing, they do not have individual centers of awareness that allows thought #187 of the day to observe itself, all these things are instead known by awareness. Sensory-perceptions, thoughts and emotions present themselves to this awareness like images flashing before the movie-goer on a movie screen. That this is so shows up in the way that people naturally speak about knowing thing, people always speak of themselves as distinct from those thoughts and sensations, they say "I saw the horse run by" and "I've just suddenly had an idea", if awareness wasn't distinct from those things then people wouldn't instinctively speak of themselves as having a separate an abiding identity which knows that particular transient thing, as well as the things before and after it.

Moreover, a self-aware sight of something would not be able to combine or integrate itself with other self-aware thoughts and sense-perceptions to form the united experience that we have. At the moment that the sight of a tree is both displaying the visual content of "tree" and also having self-awareness of itself as such (according to your model where it has both), it cannot also smell odors or hear sounds or know the contents of one's thoughts; there remains no way for these to all be integrated in the smooth continuum of experience that we actually experience where we have knowledge of our own thoughts while also having simultaneous and immediate access to our sight and sense of touch. A separate witnessing awareness standing outside all of these is required—the light of pure consciousness.

>> Consciousness is what has immediate awareness of sensory perception while being non-identical with those mental objects
>Wrong, our consciousness coincides entirely with its acts as long as we remain in the psycho-phenomenal strata of analysis.
How could consciousness coinciding with (taking place at the same time) as mental acts ever possibly prove that consciousness was the same thing as those mental acts like visual perceptions? All objects coincide with the space that contains them, but to say that objects are the same as space is wrong since objects are comprised of a material that occupies a position in space. The mere fact of coincidence does absolutely nothing to prove identity.