/lit/ - Literature

>>20194743
It's not a grift dude. In ordinary language, language Dennett accepts, we have to use propostional attitudes like "perceive that" and then (with the addition of a subject "I") bind those to sentences consisting in subjects, supposedly extrasensory like "the apple," and connect these to sensory quality predicates like "is red." Nobody will deny that "I perceive that the apple is red" makes perfect sense. And everybody in the literature, even Dennett, accepts that as intelligible and proper. Of course they understand "red" as a physical property like reflecting a certain wavelength of light. But PERCEIVING THAT is an attitude like loving, hating, etc, and is supposed to be consistent with error. Meaning: "I perceive that the apple is red" is consistent with the apple being green, but i perceive (i.e. see) it to be red, which is illusion. Likewise there might not even be an apple, which is hallucination. And again, these are granted in the literature Dennett engages by most people even materialists. The issue then is making sense of cases of error. If I perceive that an apple is red when it's actually green, what's going on? The old philosophers thought this showed that there was a separation between a more direct object of perception than the apple, the "sense datum" or "impression," which was qualitatively red, or green, or whatever, and about which you couldn't make a mistake. The alternative to this is to say the quality is baked into the perception itself, which is adverbialism: we "red-see" or "green-see," etc. But there's still somewhat of an asymmetry there, if we "red-see" something that doesn't exist, like a non-existent apple. This bothers many materialists. In any case many materialists propose disjunctivism about perception. This is the claim that when you hallucinate, when there's no wavelength of light and no apple, and experience e.g. color perceptions which you think are indistinguishable from non-hallucinations, you're just wrong. But this is one place where using an immanent qualitative sameness makes more philosophical sense: it's less cumbersome, explains why we insist the two experience are indistinguishable. Materialist rejection of qualia quickly starts looking ridiculous. It's much better to just accept qualia and pretend there's some materialist way to reduce it, than claim it doesn't exist as Dennett does. Which is in fact what most materialists in philosophy do. Dennett's view is seen as fringe by other materialists who don't deny qualia.

>>17969555
it's insane there are so many seethers in this board talking about how women aren't interested in philosophy when most of /lit/ doesn't seem genuinely interested in philosophy either

hello /wg/, I jokingly told my friend that writing a light novel/web novel in japanese would be an easy way to make some cash a few days ago, but now when I come to think of it writing a story sounds really fun even though I've never written one before. so, what would you recommend to a complete beginner like me? should I just say fuck it and start writing? read the recommended books in the op? outline a story and then start writing? or a mix of everything?
thanks in advance