/lit/ - Literature

also, random thought, but what would be interesting would be if people wrote works of philosophy that were basically vacuum-sealed and only intended to be read in about twenty years. the present changes too much, and everybody's in a kind of a race to get the right handle on a thing that absolutely cannot be handled in that way. cyberpunk fucking rules. it's the only way of actually taking the correct view on this new intersection of money/tech/knowledge that is basically the only thing that matters in philosophy.
>he said
>like a fucking asshole
life on the other side of Woke Revolution - in *any* form, just the process itself observed dispassionately, without trying to box everything into one side of the political spectrum or the other - really is legit fascinating. money/mind/tech. find a flaw.
>found one, you're stupid
>i mean other than that

>As Tomomi Asakura has acutely pointed out, one can understand the difference between Mou and the Kyoto School by considering that Mou departs from a moral standpoint whereas the Kyoto School begins with a religious standpoint— in the philosophy of Tanabe, ‘the attitude that sees the reality qua absolute contradiction and absolute self-disruption’. Mou sought an ‘internal transcendence within his 'non-attachment ontology whereas Nishitani sought an overcoming which took its most radical form by achieving emptiness through war. What is at stake in both enterprises, however, is the problem of time, and of a history that has been totally conquered by an axis of time largely defined by European ontotheology and its completion in the realisation of modern technology. If the failure of both of these projects— though for different reasons, since the Kyoto school’s decline owed largely to Japan’s defeat at the end of the Second World War— has anything to tell us, it is that, in order to overcome modernity, it is necessary to go back to the question of time and to open up a pluralism which allows a new world history to emerge, but one which is subordinated neither to global capitalism and nationalism, nor to an absolute metaphysical ground. This new world history is only possible by undertaking a metaphysical and historical project, rather than simply claiming the end of modernity, the end of metaphysics, the return to ‘nature’— or, even less credibly, the arrival of the multitude.

>Nishitani believes that the concept of history is intrinsic to Christianity. In Christianity, the original sin and eschatology mark a beginning and an end, as well as the limit of waiting for a beginning of a new epoch, with the Second Coming of Christ. For Nishitani, this historical consciousness genuinely arose during the Renaissance, and culminated during the Reformation. In the Renaissance, it was indicated by the consciousness that the world order is not entirely dependent on providence, and that the personal relation between God and man is cut across by the natural sciences; and in the Reformation in the realisation that history is but a human product. In contrast, Nishitani observes that, in Buddhism, there is a negativity in time which must be transcended, meaning that finitude in both its linear and cyclical form must be transcended in order to attain absolute emptiness. Therefore Buddhism is not able to open up the question of historical consciousness, and does not see the possibility of ‘emergence’ in every ‘now.’

>Everyone, every culture, needs a ‘home’, but it doesn’t need to be an exclusive and substantial place. It is the aim of this book to show that it is not only necessary to seek alternatives, but that it is possible to do so by opening the question of technics not as a universal technology, but as a question of different cosmotechnics.