/lit/ - Literature

>We have arrived at a decisive point of the narrative: death, time, their originary absence and their arrival qua the fall itself, the appearance of man as his disappearance, the realization of his possibility qua his derealization—it is here, then, in the double of the technical and the human, or rather in the double question of technics and the human, that the relation between anthropology and technics appears as a thanatology.

>Since original man has neither imagination nor future, nor for all that a memory or a past, he is almost without love, almost without desire. Concentrating (on an object), not being lost (with the want), desire is the memory of desire. Everything will thus have come with the feeling of death: death itself, labor, education, language, society, love. Homo oeconomicus, faber, laborans, sapiens: the logical, reasonable, or speaking animal, the politico-social animal, the desiring animal, all that traditional philosophy has always used to qualify the human race, from Plato to Aristotle to Marx and Freud—this all comes only after this accident by which man enters into the disastrous feeling of death, into melancholy.

>What Heidegger calls the already there, constitutive of the temporality of Dasein, is this past that I never lived but that is nevertheless my past, without which I never would have had any past of my own. Such a structure of inheritance and transmission, which is the very ground of facticity itself since tradition can always conceal from me the sense of the origin that it alone can transmit to me, presupposes that the phenomenon of life qua Dasein becomes singular in the history of the living to the extent that, for Dasein, the epigenetic layer of life, far from being lost with the living when it dies, conserves and sediments itself, passes itself down in "the order of survival" and to posterity as a gift as well as a debt, that is, as a destiny. This is not a "program" in the quasi-determinist biological sense, but a cipher in which the whole of Daseins existence is caught; this epigenetic sedimentation, a memorization of what has come to pass, is what is called the past, what we shall name the epiphylogenesis of man, meaning the conservation, accumulation, and sedimentation of successive epigeneses, mutually articulated.

>The ambiguity of the invention of the human, that which holds together the who and the what, binding them while keeping them apart, is différance undermining the authentic/inauthentic divide. We shall look into this at the very moment of its passage, from phusis in différance (life in general) to the différance of this différance. Différance is neither the who nor the what, but their co-possibility, the movement of their mutual coming-to-be, of their coming into convention.

from the podcast w/Uncle Nick: "We have to get time right." Also NL saying he doesn't want to distance himself from Heidegger either ('transcendentally rigorous'). Kind of interesting to think about...

>We have arrived at a decisive point of the narrative: death, time, their originary absence and their arrival qua the fall itself, the appearance of man as his disappearance, the realization of his possibility qua his derealization—it is here, then, in the double of the technical and the human, or rather in the double question of technics and the human, that the relation between anthropology and technics appears as a thanatology.

>Since original man has neither imagination nor future, nor for all that a memory or a past, he is almost without love, almost without desire. Concentrating (on an object), not being lost (with the want), desire is the memory of desire. Everything will thus have come with the feeling of death: death itself, labor, education, language, society, love. Homo oeconomicus, faber, laborans, sapiens: the logical, reasonable, or speaking animal, the politico-social animal, the desiring animal, all that traditional philosophy has always used to qualify the human race, from Plato to Aristotle to Marx and Freud—this all comes only after this accident by which man enters into the disastrous feeling of death, into melancholy.

>What Heidegger calls the already there, constitutive of the temporality of Dasein, is this past that I never lived but that is nevertheless my past, without which I never would have had any past of my own. Such a structure of inheritance and transmission, which is the very ground of facticity itself since tradition can always conceal from me the sense of the origin that it alone can transmit to me, presupposes that the phenomenon of life qua Dasein becomes singular in the history of the living to the extent that, for Dasein, the epigenetic layer of life, far from being lost with the living when it dies, conserves and sediments itself, passes itself down in "the order of survival" and to posterity as a gift as well as a debt, that is, as a destiny. This is not a "program" in the quasi-determinist biological sense, but a cipher in which the whole of Daseins existence is caught; this epigenetic sedimentation, a memorization of what has come to pass, is what is called the past, what we shall name the epiphylogenesis of man, meaning the conservation, accumulation, and sedimentation of successive epigeneses, mutually articulated.

>The ambiguity of the invention of the human, that which holds together the who and the what, binding them while keeping them apart, is différance undermining the authentic/inauthentic divide. We shall look into this at the very moment of its passage, from phusis in différance (life in general) to the différance of this différance. Différance is neither the
who nor the what, but their co-possibility, the movement of their mutual coming-to-be, of their coming into convention.

from the podcast w/Uncle Nick: "We have to get time right." Also NL saying he doesn't want to distance himself from Heidegger either ('transcendentally rigorous'). Kind of interesting to think about...