/lit/ - Literature

>This leads to a concept known as Quine’s holism; because no observation can reveal which member(s) of a set of theoretical statements should be re-evaluated, the re-evaluation of some statements entails the re-evaluation of all. empirical observations “underdetermine” theories and cannot decide between them. This leads to a concept known as Quine’s holism; because no observation can reveal which member(s) of a set of theoretical statements should be reevaluated, the re-evaluation of some statements entails the re-evaluation of all. Quine combined his two theses as follows. First, he noted that a reduction isessentially an analytic statement to the effect that one theory, e.g. as of
mind, is defined on another theory, e.g. a theory of chemistry. Next, he noted that if there are no analytic statements, then reductions are impossible. From this, he concluded that his two theses were essentially identical. But although the resulting unified thesis resembled Duhem’s, it differed in scope. For whereas Duhem had applied his own thesis only to physical theories, and perhaps only to theoretical hypothesis rather than theories with directly observable consequences, Quine applied his version to the entirety of human knowledge, including mathematics.

Science an math btfo

Is there really no difference between analytic and synthetic sentences? I always thought all tatutologies are true statements.

why is he never discussed here?

>'If p then if ~ p then q'

>(3) If time is money then if time is not money then time is money.

>'If if ~ p then p then p'

>(4) If if time is not money then time is money then time is money.

>...all the results... are true under ordinary usage no matter what the substituted statements may be...

I dun getit

>The Aristotelian notion of essence was the forerunner, no doubt, of the modern notion of intension or meaning. For Aristotle it was essential in men to be rational, accidental to be two-legged. But there is an important difference between this attitude and the doctrine of meaning. From the latter point of view it may indeed be conceded (if only for the sake of argument) that rationality is involved in the meaning of the word 'man' while two-leggedness is not; but two-leggedness may at the same time be viewed as involved in the meaning of 'biped' while rationality is not. Thus from the point of view of the doctrine of meaning it makes no sense to say of the actual individual, who is at once a man and a biped, that his rationality is essential and his two-leggedness accidental or vice versa.

Am I getting this wrong or did Quine brainfarted hard here?
There's no paradox here, since "biped" is not a substance, therefore it has no essence as per Aristotle's metaphysics

The totality of our so called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. The total field is so undetermined by it's boundary conditions - experience - that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.

If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement - especially if it be a statement at all remote from the experimental periphery of the field. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called logical laws. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between such a shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?

For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods ; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a mangeable structure into the flux of experience.

>>18185441
>To be is to be the value of a variable.
>Physics investigates the essential nature of the world, and biology describes a local bump. Psychology, human psychology, describes a bump on the bump.
>Language is conceived in sin and science is its redemption.
Bugman.

>To be is to be the value of a variable.
>Physics investigates the essential nature of the world, and biology describes a local bump. Psychology, human psychology, describes a bump on the bump.
>Language is conceived in sin and science is its redemption.
Wow, why didn't anyone tell me Quine is so soulless?

How did an american BTFO both analytic and continental philosophy?

I'm trying to make sense of Quine's "Two Dogmas". So Quine's arguments only attack the distinction as it meant by positivists and not Kant? He does mention Kant's distinction at the beginning, but then only focuses on the meaning of analytic as true by virtue of meaning linguistic convention. Does this mean his arguments don't concern Kant?

Fuck Quine

Where to start with Quine?

My Dude

>>15346179
Well, start by answering my question. How do you know what a 'batchelor' is in the first place? From whence has this meaning been established? If you're stuck, then hint: pic related.

when did you realize analytic philosophy > continental and it's not even close?

>>14926176
Nobody in this picture is philosopher.
It should be Kripke/Quine/MacIntyre/Carnap/Putnam/Rorty/Wittgenstein

you have read quine, right?

>>11592109
>reality exists outside of models
anon...

>>11250203

Most of analytic philosophy, stop confusing /lit/ for academia.

>Quine was right-wing
>Heidegger was right-wing
>Wittgenstein was right-wing
>Nabokov was right-wing
>Bellow was right-wing

>there are people on this board who deny the existence of worthwhile right-wing authors

Why is /lit/ so afraid of analytic philosophy?

leave being right about everything to me