/lit/ - Literature

"Logic is about the true meaning of the principle of identity (and of contradiction; the many controversies about which of them takes precedence over the other, and what is the most correct form of their expression, are not very relevant here). *The proposition A = A is immediately certain and self-evident.* At the same time it is the original standard for the truth of all other propositions. If any proposition ever contradicted it—that is, if at any time a specific judgment contained a predicate that made a statement about a subject which contradicted the concept of that subject—we would regard it as false; and on refection, the proposition A = A would finally emerge as the maxim of our judgment. It is the principle of true and false, and whoever, as happens so often, regards it as a tautology, which says nothing and which does not advance our thinking, is entirely right, but has misunderstood the nature of the proposition. This applies to Hegel and almost all *empiricists* who came later—nor is it the only point of contact between these apparently irreconcilable opposites. A = A, the *principle of all* truth, cannot itself be a *specific* truth. Whoever finds the principle of identity, or the principle of contradiction, devoid of meaning has himself to blame. He expected to find specific ideas in them, and he hoped to add to his fund of positive knowledge. But those principles in themselves are no insights, no specific acts of thought, but the *standard applied to all acts of thought. This cannot itself be an act of thought which could be compared in any way to the others. The norm of thought cannot be situated in thought itself.* The principle of identity adds nothing to our knowledge. Rather than increasing a fortune, it provides the complete foundation for that fortune in the first place. *The principle of identity is either nothing, or it is everything.*"
- Weininger

Is he correct? Is the principle of identity (A=A) *everything*? Why or why not?

Logic is about the true meaning of the principle of identity (and of contradiction; the many controversies about which of them takes precedence over the other, and what is the most correct form of their expression, are not very relevant here). *The proposition A = A is immediately certain and self-evident.* At the same time it is the original standard for the truth of all other propositions. If any proposition ever contradicted it—that is, if at any time a specific judgment contained a predicate that made a statement about a subject which contradicted the concept of that subject—we would regard it as false; and on refection, the proposition A = A would finally emerge as the maxim of our judgment. It is the principle of true and false, and whoever, as happens so often, regards it as a tautology, which says nothing and which does not advance our thinking, is entirely right, but has misunderstood the nature of the proposition. This applies to Hegel and almost all *empiricists* who came later—nor is it the only point of contact between these apparently irreconcilable opposites. A = A, the *principle of all* truth, cannot itself be a *specific* truth. Whoever finds the principle of identity, or the principle of contradiction, devoid of meaning has himself to blame. He expected to find specific ideas in them, and he hoped to add to his fund of positive knowledge. But those principles in themselves are no insights, no specific acts of thought, but the *standard applied to all acts of thought. This cannot itself be an act of thought which could be compared in any way to the others. The norm of thought cannot be situated in thought itself.* The principle of identity adds nothing to our knowledge. Rather than increasing a fortune, it provides the complete foundation for that fortune in the first place. *The principle of identity is either nothing, or it is everything.*

Is he correct? Is the principle of identity (A=A) *everything*? Why or why not?