/lit/ - Literature

>>16812838
>>16812854
This is what I am referring to:
>Schopenhauer gives an explanation of the active nature of agency, but not in terms of the causal efficacy of agents. Instead, the key to accounting for human agency lies in the distinction between one’s intelligible and empirical character. Our intelligible character is our character outside of space and time, and is the original force of the will. We cannot have access to our intelligible character, as it exists outside our forms of knowing. Like all forces in nature, it is original, inalterable and inexplicable. Our empirical character is our character insofar as it manifests itself in individual acts of will: it is, in short, the phenomenon of the intelligible character. The empirical character is an object of experience and thus tied to the forms of experience, namely space, time and causality.
My friend who also read all of World as Will and Representation argues Schopenhauer had a lot of complex views on the Platonic nature of the "intelligible character". Why does not one ever talk about his distinction between intelligible and empirical character?
I just found that Schopenhauer did believe in palingenesis!