/lit/ - Literature

>>22084777
>I dislike Nietzsche because he likes the contemplation of pain, because he erects conceit into a duty, because the men whom he most admires are conquerors, whose glory is cleverness in causing men to die. But I think the ultimate argument against his philosophy, as against any unpleasant but internally self-consistent ethic, lies not in an appeal to facts, but in an appeal to emotions. Nietzsche despises universal love; I feel it the motive power to all that I desire as regards the world. His followers have had their innings, but we may hope that it is coming rapidly to an end.
>t. picrel
Why can't secular humanists ever keep their fuckin narrative straight?

From 'The nature of sense-data' (1913):

"I regard sense-data as existing quite as truly as anything, indeed I regard their existence as the ultimate certainty on which all knowledge of what exists must be based. But it seems that their existence and nature are to some extent dependent upon the subject, not in the sense that they are illusory, or that they are “in” the mind (whatever that means), but in the sense that there is no good reason to suppose that they exist when they are not sensated, or that a particular sense-datum is ever sensated by more than one subject. If there are physical objects, and the scientific account of them is roughly true, it would seem that a sense-datum has a complicated relation to a certain physical object, compounded of the kind of connexion which would commonly be called causal, together with similarity of position in two structures (that of sense-data and that of physical objects) which, have certain logical affinities. The object to which a given sense-datum has this relation is called the object “corresponding” to the sense-datum; the sense-datum which has this relation to a given object is called an “appearance” of this object. I desire all further associations of the word "appearance" to be disregarded wherever the word occurs in The Problems of Philosophy. Thus appearances are what are certain and primitive; the physical objects inferred are hypothetical and by no means certain."

Pages 79-80.
https://sci-hub.se/10.1093/mind/XXII.1.76