/lit/ - Literature

>>20107895
Start with the Sceptics:

>On this question, the pronouncements of highly learned men are so varied and so much at odds with each other that inevitably they strongly suggest that the explanation is human ignorance, and that the Academics have been wise to withhold assent on matters of such uncertainty; for what can be more degrading than rash judgement, and what can be so rash and unworthy of the serious and sustained attention of a philosopher, as either to hold a false opinion or to defend without hesitation propositions inadequately examined and grasped?
—Cicero, De natura deorum

>On this question, the pronouncements of highly learned men are so varied and so much at odds with each other that inevitably they strongly suggest that the explanation is human ignorance, and that the Academics have been wise to withhold assent on matters of such uncertainty; for what can be more degrading than rash judgement, and what can be so rash and unworthy of the serious and sustained attention of a philosopher, as either to hold a false opinion or to defend without hesitation propositions inadequately examined and grasped?
—Cicero, De natura deorum

>On this question, the pronouncements of highly learned men are so varied and so much at odds with each other that inevitably they strongly suggest that the explanation is human ignorance, and that the Academics have been wise to withhold assent on matters of such uncertainty; for what can be more degrading than rash judgement, and what can be so rash and unworthy of the serious and sustained attention of a philosopher, as either to hold a false opinion or to defend without hesitation propositions inadequately examined and grasped?
—Cicero, De natura deorum

>The only difference between us and philosophers who think that they have knowledge is that they have no doubt that the views they defend are true, whereas we hold many views to be persuasive, i.e., ones that we can readily follow but scarcely affirm. But we are freer and less constrained because our power of judgment is intact and we aren't compelled by any obligation to defend a set of views prescribed and practically imposed on us by someone else. Other philosophers, after all, labour under two constraints. First, they are chained to one spot by bonds formed before they were able to judge what was best. Second, they make their judgments about subjects they don't know at the weakest point in their lives under pressure from a friend or captivated by a single speech from someone they heard for the first time; and they hang on to the philosophical system they happened to adopt as their salvation from the storm that drove them into it. They claim, of course, to be entrusting themselves entirely to someone they judge to have been wise. This is a procedure I would approve if untaught novices had the capacity to make such judgments—though deciding who is wise seems to be a particular function of people who are already wise. Still, assuming they did have this capacity, they could only judge after they had heard all the issues and knew the views of the other philosophers as well. But they have made their judgments at a single hearing and submitted themselves to one person's authority. I don't know how it is that most people would rather go wrong by defending to the hilt a view they have grown to love than work out without intransigence which view is most consistent.
—Cicero, Academica

We got way too cocky dogmatist bros...

>>19932405
Cicero’s De natura deorum (‘On the Nature of the Gods’

>On this question, the pronouncements of highly learned men are so varied and so much at odds with each other that inevitably they strongly suggest that the explanation is human ignorance, and that the Academics have been wise to withhold assent on matters of such uncertainty; for what can be more degrading than rash judgement, and what can be so rash and unworthy of the serious and sustained attention of a philosopher, as either to hold a false opinion or to defend without hesitation propositions inadequately examined and grasped?
—Cicero, De natura deorum 1.1

>>19924829
> If philosophy is worthy of any praise, shouldn't it farther approximate the real Truth that philosophers always talk about as time progresses?
Read the ancient sceptics.

>The only difference between us and philosophers who think that they have knowledge is that they have no doubt that the views they defend are true, whereas we hold many views to be persuasive, i.e., ones that we can readily follow but scarcely affirm. But we are freer and less constrained because our power of judgment is intact and we aren't compelled by any obligation to defend a set of views prescribed and practically imposed on us by someone else. Other philosophers, after all, labour under two constraints. First, they are chained to one spot by bonds formed before they were able to judge what was best. Second, they make their judgments about subjects they don't know at the weakest point in their lives under pressure from a friend or captivated by a single speech from someone they heard for the first time; and they hang on to the philosophical system they happened to adopt as their salvation from the storm that drove them into it. They claim, of course, to be entrusting themselves entirely to someone they judge to have been wise. This is a procedure I would approve if untaught novices had the capacity to make such judgments—though deciding who is wise seems to be a particular function of people who are already wise. Still, assuming they did have this capacity, they could only judge after they had heard all the issues and knew the views of the other philosophers as well. But they have made their judgments at a single hearing and submitted themselves to one person's authority. I don't know how it is that most people would rather go wrong by defending to the hilt a view they have grown to love than work out without intransigence which view is most consistent.
—Cicero, Academica