/lit/ - Literature

>>20572105
Partially, but it's not quite that simple.
Stirner devotes a lot of space to the notion of 'getting behind things', beyond them, and how this is a process that transforms the self and gives it new content, content which then becomes something new to be overcome in itself. The 'unique' is the void that drives this process of negation. The resisting world and the particular 'I' that emerge in the face of the void are what's unique, eigen-tümlich, personal, and also mine, something proper to me, something of which I have ownership. Stirner thinks Hegelian dialectics in a radically individualistic sense (not in the bad way of being particular, but as localized universality that can not be translated into a 'scientific standpoint' because it is the very thing that escapes objectivization, hence why his philosophy made Marx seethe like you wouldn't believe), and intersubjectivity from that radical personal perspectivity (the way true individuals can interact with each other freely and remain individuals, deepen both their individuality and their universality). Stirners subject is still a historical and localized creature, and though it is always escaping from circumstance into itself, into negation, it is also at every point of this process real and meaningful, not a finger pointing at the noumenal moon, but the very determinate void itself in its full reality.
>The true human being doesn't lie in the future, an object of longing, but rather it lies in the present, existing and actual. However and whoever I may be, joyful and sorrowful, a child or an old man, in confidence or doubt, asleep or awake, I am it. I am the true human being.
All this is already implicit in Hegel's philosophy imo, but Stirner really brings it into focus.