/lit/ - Literature

>>16201375
I don't think it does. Tell me what you think, I'd like to discuss it with someone.

Kant's argument can be easily derived from the trascendental deduction, and it is imho pretty straightforward: since the intellect is a synthetic faculty, it is not sufficient for the production of an experience. To put it more bluntly: intellect cannot "kickstart" an experience by creating a first representation, which can then be reassembled by reproductive imagination, leading to the richness of contents we can find in our experience.
Since the intellect deals with every phenomena I can represent (because our trascendental schemes requires pure concepts), I can extend this causal insufficiency to phenomena too. So I end up with a judgement that might sound like "phenomena are not causally sufficient for the presence of my experience", then add a second premise "I have an experience" and reach the conclusion "phenomena are not the totality of what exists/are not the totality of causes" (which is, as I've said in my previous post, a determinate judgement on phenomena, and we are entitled to those). But what is both existent and not a phenomenon, is a noumenon (in the negative sense): which means that the judgement "noumena exist" is analitically identical to the previously mentioned conclusion. Also notice that, as he says in the logic section, negations do not determinate any concept. For example, "not-dog" does not represent any determinate object that is not a dog. This means that even given this conclusion, we have not assigned any determinate quality to noumena.

Kant would have incurred in a contradiction had he made this assessment through the use of determinate judgements concerning noumena, but he didn't: rather he obtained it through a negative judgement of the causal power of phenomena, and that is perfectly compatibile with his trascendental philosophy.

I'm sure this argument could be phrased more elegantly than I did, hopefully you'll still be able to get the gist of it.

To go against the grain, I would say that it is not OK.
In the introduction Plato clearly states that this dialogue is meant to be a continuation of Republic. Narratively, Socrates repeats the arguments/system contained in the Republic to Timaeus, Critias and Hermocrates, and they then have to depict said system through mythos (or tales) of their own. If you'll start immediatly with Timaeus you won't know what Timaeus is trying to depict and imitate with his tale. Furthermore, the premises of Timaeus' mythos will sound completely arbitrary to you without proper knowledge of the arguments in Republic. Timaeus immediatly starts by saying that this chosmos is beautiful and that its creator is good: why would that be the case?
The answer to this question becomes trivial if you know what Socrates says in Republic.

Unfortunately this is one of the few dialogues in which Plato takes for granted that his readers will be familiar with other previous texts of his.

>>16110139
Prime Martha Argerich is my ultimate waifu. I genuinely cannot look at a picture of her without falling in love. She's also one of my favourite pianists ever, so that only adds to it