/lit/ - Literature

>>23466759
>you probably actually think that the arguments in the analytic of principles are apodictic
yes

> As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to be established upon a priori grounds that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary; much more is this the case with an attempt to determine all pure a priori cognition, and to furnish the standard—and consequently an example-of all apodeictic (philosophical) certitude.
If they are wrong prove it to me.

>>23373489
I can tell you what they are, but that wouldn't be deducing them, which shows their synthetic a priori nature.

But to satisfy your curiosity, here is one:

>The synthetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all cognition, which I do not merely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must necessarily be subject, in order to become an object for me; because in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold in intuition could not be united in one consciousness.

>>23334863
>Things in themselves either exist or don't exist
you are not understanding. I literally adressed this in OP. The quoted statement is just that, a statement, an expression of thought. The moment you begin to think you have already begun to use the categories. In fact, the moment you become self-conscious you are using the categories. The Ding an sich, as that which is not phenomena, and thus never an object, can NEITHER be said to be or not to be, since Reality (IS) and Negation (IS NOT) are categories NOR can it be attributed the category of substance (as standing behind the phenomena) NOR the category of causality (as the transcendent cause of sensation) NOR any other category. When can Kant speaks of the Ding an sich he speaks of it purely as noumena in the negative sense, as an object of THOUGHT, namely the thought of that which is not phenomena, and as a THOUGHT we necessarily use the categories when THINKING it but thinking is not knowing, which demands an object of sense corresponding to the concept which, by definition, the Ding an sich can never be.

>If I take away from an empirial intuition all thought (by means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the existence of such or such an affection of sensibility in me, it does not follow that this affection or representation has any relation to an object without me.

>>23286427
>t. doesn't know

>Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, if there existed a possibility of proving a priori, that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess the inseparable attribute of personality, and are conscious of their existence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have penetrated into the sphere of noumena; and in this case the right could not be denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing ourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves possessions in it.

>>22791459
That's a lot of questions buddy and people literally get paid to answer them- I ain't so I'll answer one and then tell you to fuck off and read the book or read >>22790312 or >>22790376

>What about pure mathematics? He states that it's based on a priori Anschaungen, so shouldn't it be knowledge?
Math is based on a priori intuition AND the construction of concepts from those a priori intuitions.

>mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the construction of conceptions. The construction of a conception is the presentation a priori of the intuition which corresponds to the conception.

Kant gives examples of what he means:
>I construct a triangle, by the presentation of the object which corresponds to this conception, either by mere imagination—in pure intuition, or upon paper—in empirical intuition, in both cases completely a priori, without borrowing the type of that figure from any experience. The individual figure drawn upon paper is empirical; but it serves, notwithstanding, to indicate the conception, even in its universality, because in this empirical intuition we keep our eye merely on the act of the construction of the conception, and pay no attention to the various modes of determining it, for example, its size, the length of its sides, the size of its angles, these not in the least affecting the essential character of the conception.

>The reason why mathematical cognition can relate only to quantity is to be found in its form alone. For it is the conception of quantities only that is capable of being constructed, that is, presented a priori in intuition

>We can form an intuition, by means of the mere conception of it, of a cone, without the aid of experience; but the colour of the cone we cannot know except from experience.

>In this intuition it regards the conception in concreto, not empirically, but in an a priori intuition, which it has constructed; and in which, all the results which follow from the general conditions of the construction of the conception are in all cases valid for the object of the constructed conception.

>>22730756
>Has anyone ever seen a bilingual (English / German) edition?
unfortunately I don't believe there is one.

I should also add that for some unbeknownst perhaps incomprehensible reason Dover left out the second edition preface in their Dover Philosophical Classics edition, but fortunately the version on wikisource has both prefaces.

As far as the German version, wikisources German site has the first edition:

https://de.m.wikisource.org/wiki/Index:Critik_der_reinen_Vernunft_(1781)

but unfortnately they do not have the second edition so you will have to look elsewhere.

>>22499948
>not every one is bound to study Metaphysics, that many minds will succeed very well, in the exact and even in deep sciences, more closely allied to intuition [what can be sensed], while they cannot succeed in investigations dealing exclusively with abstract concepts. In such cases men should apply their talents to other subjects.
nothing personal kid

>>22476211
>Now, these representations had to be given through experience
The Great Mystery

>the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined.

HEGEL WAS A KANTIAN

Kant:
>as objectively considered there can only be one human Reason, so there cannot be many Philosophies; in other words, there is ONLY ONE TRUE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY founded upon principles, however variously and however contradictorily men may have philosophized over one and the same proposition.

>>22395259
IQ meme aside, yes, many of you will get filtered, many of you may even be constitutionally incapable of understanding Kant

>should any reader find this plan, which I publish as the Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics, still obscure, let him consider that not every one is bound to study Metaphysics, that many minds will succeed very well, in the exact and even in deep sciences, more closely allied to intuition [what can be sensed], while they cannot succeed in investigations dealing exclusively with abstract concepts. In such cases men should apply their talents to other subjects.

But in the end success depends more on determation to achieve the goal and persistence in attaining than in innate ability. If you actually want to understand, you will.

Did he have a fetish for long, convoluted sentences or was he just retarded?