/lit/ - Literature

>>22450968
>What's wrong with infinite semiosis?
I am a realist and it bothers my realist sensibilities
>The later Peirce distanced himself from other American Pragmatists because they were unconcerned with establishing a "realist" framework for their theory of truth.
Are you saying Peirce was realist compared to them? Interesting. Infinite semiosis combined with his rejection of intuition/acquaintance (the given) just feels deeply anti-realist/nonrealist to me. It's ok though I find much to learn from nonrealists too. I like James, don't know Dewey well though.
>At some point, I may compile a list of good secondary sources.
Thanks a ton for those posts, I'll write them up in a document for later consulting. Much appreciated.

>>22442044
1. Frege has a very special theory of metaphysical types. The referents of predicates are not objects for him, but gappy unsaturated things (he calls them "concepts" but that's misleading because they are more like worldly properties). So he wouldn't make universals (analogous to concepts) be standard objects. But then he shows that in language we often speak of numbers as subjects not predicates, i.e. "three is greater than four," and so he has to treat them as individuals. And there's a whole business that has to do with Hume's principle that he uses to derive their status as entities. It's not clear that Fregean numbers are really sets of sets frankly, I think it gets complicated and that's because in Frege's time words got used differently (like "extension") compared to today. Anyway I think he's wrong, but I don't see what's the point of acting like he's begging the question. Just study him and see where you fall. His arguments are stronger than you're giving credit, and I don't even agree with him.
2. Russell is the one who points out there is a difference between the "is" of existence and "is" of predication so I'm not sure what your point is. Besides that, it's problem of intentional inexistence that he inherits from Brentano via Meinong. Russell was actually a Meinongian earlier on, before designing the theory of descriptions to get out of the problem. He's right there's bad syntax with saying "A does not exist" because he's focusing on trying to give a representation which has a picture-like relation to reality. And if you say "A does not exist" that suggests a picture where you have some object A, with the property of non-existence. But that intuitively is the wrong picture. That's why his later conclusion is that we need further analysis via paraphrase. "A does not exist" does not match reality's structure with its own structure like a picture, and we need a descriptive paraphrase which matches better. On that paraphrase, "A" disappears altogether replaced by a bound variable, etc.
3. I don't know what you mean because this is the same Russell who teaches the existence of numbers and sets and propositions and universals and so forth, which are typically said to be non-spatiotemporal abstract entities. So are you sure this is right?
>>22442344
4. Russell does NOT disbelieve in universals. I assume you mean Frege as before. Russell was a platonist (lowercase p) about universals. He believed in repeating properties like redness that exist in reality, and they're not sets for him.
5. Symbolic logic is just a formal apparatus to cast the content you mention into. It does help clarify confusions, and frankly every philosopher who introduces new notions is giving the analogy of a formal language, by introducing new predicates, etc. They might not be writing it with little symbols as usual but the point is Plato was doing it, Aristotle was doing it, every philosopher does it, like Heidegger, etc. No issue there.

>>21502002
It says his name in the file, you 0 IQ zoomer

>>20217800
The works of Bertrand Russell fall in two categories. The first category consists in his logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind/perception, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mathematics. This is where he is at his brightest. His contributions in these fields are solid and have repercussions to this day. However, /lit/ hates analytic philosophy as a rule so they don't really like this material much. For what it's worth, Russell was a platonist about universals, and at various times a substance dualist, a phenomenalist, and a property dualist about mind and matter, two views that I think many people on /lit/ would not associate with scientism at all, that's just to prove Russell isn't a materialist, contrary to what >>20217881
said. The second category consists in Russell's history of philosophy, ethics, philosophy of religion, political philosophy, and cultural critique. This is Russell's popular philosophy, and what /lit/ and everybody generally knows him best for. But everybody, even the people who like the other side of Russell, finds this second side of Russell more or less worthless and too polemical. Unfortunately /lit/ doesn't realize Russell had the first side, or doesn't take it seriously. The second category is not Russell at his brightest, just Russell at his most vocal. Nobody in philosophy reads that stuff or cares about it.

>>18723095
It's not a hard or long book. I wish people already gravitated toward Frege and Russell ahead of ever having sudden impulses to read the funny Austrian language man just because "he seems cool," but since they're pseuds who always go for iceberg tier 1 philosophers, we always have to have these threads, and someone always has to come and remind new people to read Frege and Russell before the Tractatus. That's all, don't worry about much else unless you want to.

>>18260295
>>18260300
>analytic
Ok hard mode must exclude Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. In which case: Carnap, Goodman, Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty, as far as pre-1980 philosophers go.
>last 30-40 years
Kripke, Lewis, Armstrong, Fine, Schaffer, Sider, without a doubt.

>>14134776
Please come back anon. Stay. Talk to me about Kripke and Naming and Necessity. At this point I've read the book like four times. This place becomes hell when all the good anons leave.