/lit/ - Literature

>>12401637
here is another thing, because i would love to talk about metaphysical bloatware in this thread. one thing that Buddhism and Taoism both have in common is a *skepticism about rules.* postmodernity doesn't even get near to the depth of nondual panpsychism, which is precisely why it is so fucking dope in the year 2019. Buddhism has twenty million suggests about what the mind is *not,* and the fundamental rule of the Tao is that the Tao that can be named is not the true Tao.

what is it that Hegel does, in the PoS? he gives an exhaustive catalogue of how an idea bootstraps itself all the way from sense-certainty to Absolute Knowing. there are contingent rules for its existence at every step of the way, but the encounter with Absolute Knowing at the end is synonymous with the knowing of itself, and why every step along the way was necessary. you get a similar idea with Spinoza: It's All God Motherfuckers. all of it. what Lacan did, and why he mattered so much, was to recognize in the hysteric the neurotic fixation upon rules and language, the ways in which we construct reality around identity, rule-following, representation, and much else. that was one of the true jailbreak-redemptions of thought in the 20C. there are times when Deleuze seems far less interesting than Lacan, although this is perhaps my own personal demons and neuroses, but the discourse of the hysteric/Sphinx is one of the most pants-on-head retardedly brilliant contribution to thought by anyone. he gets a lot of this from Heidegger (the metaphysics of production, Being and Time, much else) and from Hegel also, and from Nietzsche, and from Kojeve (in a word, the crucial role played by recognition).

but go down way down deep into the self and you find *emptiness* there, prior to any named Thing-in-itself. for Schopenhauer, who actually *did* take Kant seriously, that Thing was the Will. and it is the Will that the Buddhists and the Taoists are expressly interested in freeing you up from. the will, we might say, is nothing until it is negated, blocked, or canceled (and at which point it becomes Desire). Whitehead is miles and miles beyond all of this, by the way. he proceeds directly to the Cosmos, do not pass go, do not collect $200. i say, Capital today is like a Sphinx. it's not even the actual thing that Capital can be, it is more like a monument to the sad passions. Land said something like this, in FN:

>How would it feel to be smuggled back out of the future in order to subvert its antecedent conditions? To be a cyberguerrilla, hidden in human camouflage so advanced that even one's software was part of the disguise? Exactly like this?

it's as 90s a line as one could ask for, and unlike Uncle Nick, i'm less interested in subverting anything. i want to *get along* with the future. and if the Future is anything, it is a kind of continual reminder of how it feels to be a fucking primitive computer running next-level software. ever have this feel?

>It is necessary to think of a more perfect system than automation. Automation here means a closed system with overdetermination, and for Simondon, such is only a low level of perfection of technical objects. From the discussions of chapter 1 to the account of interobjective relations and technical system in this chapter, we have unfolded a technical reality that we are living and the technical tendency that already lies ahead of us. Now, if we understand that both Heidegger and Simondon point to a higher degree of convergence, in comparison with the one that is brought about by network technologies, then how can we imagine this higher degree of convergence in an already converged technical system? To reconsider convergence, we can no longer take the notion of network for granted as signifying convergence in its totality. Instead, Simondon and Heidegger point to types of logic that are more profound than efficient connections and reticulations: on one hand, a logic of convergence that points to an intuitive thinking beyond objectification, namely, whose role is to think about the “thingness” of the thing; on the other hand, a logic of convergence that needs to be reinvented inside the technical systems against the alienation effected by them.

>Hence, for Simondon, instead of aesthetic thought, philosophical thought is the penetrating force that will be able to produce a convergence effect in the later stage of technological development. That is to say, it is not the perception of objects that matters but rather the modification of the interobjective and intersubjective system. Philosophical thought is able to produce a force in favor of transduction, given that this thought is fundamentally relational. This also constitutes the task of the previous parts of this book, that is, to constitute a theory of relations. Transduction in my reading also implies convergence, which concerns the interoperability and compatibility (as well as incompatibility) between humans and machines, seeing them as a structure that is at the same time individual and collective. Transduction is not a pure becoming but rather a rupture that reconfigures the structure of both the being and its milieu. We can say that the shift from analog to digital produces transductions in different domains of society. This also corresponds to our previous discussion of the difference between milieu and context, because a change in context is a change in information, while the change in milieu is a change in structure. A change in information can trigger a change in structure, but it is not entirely correspondent to transduction in the milieu; hence in this chapter we explore this change in context as informational change, which in turn provides the motivation for a transduction.

-- YH/OEDO

>It is necessary to think of a more perfect system than automation. Automation here means a closed system with overdetermination, and for Simondon, such is only a low level of perfection of technical objects. From the discussions of chapter 1 to the account of interobjective relations and technical system in this chapter, we have unfolded a technical reality that we are living and the technical tendency that already lies ahead of us. Now, if we understand that both Heidegger and Simondon point to a higher degree of convergence, in comparison with the one that is brought about by network technologies, then how can we imagine this higher degree of convergence in an already converged technical system? To reconsider convergence, we can no longer take the notion of network for granted as signifying convergence in its totality. Instead, Simondon and Heidegger point to types of logic that are more profound than efficient connections and reticulations: on one hand, a logic of convergence that points to an intuitive thinking beyond objectification, namely, whose role is to think about the “thingness” of the thing; on the other hand, a logic of convergence that needs to be reinvented inside the technical systems against the alienation effected by them.

>Hence, for Simondon, instead of aesthetic thought, philosophical thought is the penetrating force that will be able to produce a convergence effect
in the later stage of technological development. That is to say, it is not the perception of objects that matters but rather the modification of the interobjective and intersubjective system. Philosophical thought is able to produce a force in favor of transduction, given that this thought is fundamentally relational. This also constitutes the task of the previous parts of this book, that is, to constitute a theory of relations. Transduction in my
reading also implies convergence, which concerns the interoperability and compatibility (as well as incompatibility) between humans and machines,
seeing them as a structure that is at the same time individual and collective. Transduction is not a pure becoming but rather a rupture that reconfigures the structure of both the being and its milieu. We can say that the shift from analog to digital produces transductions in different domains of society. This also corresponds to our previous discussion of the difference between milieu and context, because a change in context is a change in
information, while the change in milieu is a change in structure. A change in information can trigger a change in structure, but it is not entirely correspondent to transduction in the milieu; hence in this chapter we explore this change in context as informational change, which in turn provides the motivation for a transduction.

-- YH/OEDO