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>> No.11591046 [View]
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11591046

>>11589931

The watcher is the critiquer.

>> No.6476841 [View]
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6476841

>>6476281

24, as I was gradually coming to understand the general argument of the transcendental deduction.

I wouldn't say I "realized" any fact about the self, because I didn't take the argument as definitive and become a Kantian; I only realized a different way of thinking about the self - a way which is bizarre and deep and fun.

I also can't say for sure how closely Kant resembles Buddhism here, since I haven't really studied any of the many traditions within the latter, but in discussions like these I tend to find posts that in whole or in part describe many of Kant's key points: >>6476460
>>6476671

>> No.6406986 [View]
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6406986

>>6405680
>>6405695
>>6406866

Pic related has a good deal in common with these posts; but Kant would say that the self isn't an illusion as long as we are dealing with the proper concept of "self." He'd say that we can't have insight into what our fundamental self is, but since we have knowledge of the consequences of our fundamental self (consequences like experience of the external world and our internal mental life), we can know what our fundamental self is not. The self that properly persists through all our ever-changing perceptions is not a substance like Descartes believed, it is not a single thing that supports our perceptions in the way that a single substance bears its properties; it's not even within space and time, but rather space and time are generated by it. Our fundamental self must be thought as the consistent way in which experience is ordered - the unity that grounds the formal structure of our consciousness, rather than the sensory content. The content of consciousness is like the wooden planks of the ship of Theseus, constantly passing away and being replaced, while the form of consciousness is like the function and shape of the ship of Theseus, consistent and unified as it sails across waters or stands on display.

Not that I necessarily subscribe to Kant's philosophy, but it's pretty fucking cool to think about.

>> No.6242052 [View]
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6242052

>>6240565

Unknowable in earthly life.

- K

>> No.6187712 [View]
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6187712

>>6184312

>> No.5916715 [View]
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5916715

>>5915066

Don't go so far beyond appearances, amigo.

- I.K.

>> No.5850093 [View]
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5850093

If y'all mothafuckas would just read my transcendental deduction, you'd see that the "I" is ultimately formal, not material.

- I.K.

>> No.5805700 [View]
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5805700

>>5805517

This anon >>5805569 summarizes pretty well the point from Hume referenced by this anon >>5805547 (though I believe it's from Book 1 of the Treatise).

Then Kant comes along with one of his awe-inducing assaults of mindfuckery, saying that a person undeniably does have consciousness of a unity of self, but he agree with Hume that this is not the consciousness of any persisting sense-impression of "me," since there is no sense-impression that is constant across all experience. Therefore, since my self-identity is not a result of the sense-data of experience, my self-identity must be the result of the way all of these sense-impressions are organized and related to one another; that is, my self-identity is not material, it's formal. If Kant were to use the ship of Theseus as an analogy, he'd say it's not the regularity of the materials out of which the ship is made that accounts for the ship's unity over time, but rather the regularity of the ship's function.

And, by the way, since each of us can only be consciousness of what results from the orderly unification of sense-impressions (this result being the regular, predictable series of perceptions called "experience" and the consciousness of self that is inseparably bound up with it) but cannot be conscious of what it is that performs this unification, each of us can only know how we appear to ourselves, not what kind of thing we really are.

So regarding

>What books should I read on this matter?

Critique of Pure Reason is worth your time. Pic related.

>> No.5429643 [View]
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5429643

>>5427039

Maybe consider Kant.

>> No.5287450 [View]
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5287450

>>5287347

Somewhat relevant

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