/lit/ - Literature

>>20201405
>>20201486
it does make sense and i don't take any issue with what it's saying, my question is why is this incredible? it seems kind of obvious, like what >>20201525 says its basic platonism and the type of thought any earnest, not-retarded philosopher would have.
so op, what is so incredible about this? is it the seemingly (although not that much) contradictory language illustrating a lucid thought that impresses you? if so, try this passage from Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy, which seems far more contradictory and confusing but communicates something far more profound. likely near impossible to understand without reading the book but might inspire you to read it (you should)
>From afar we can hardly see this summit. The eternal return is the being of becoming. But becoming is double: becoming-active and becoming-reactive, becoming-active of reactive forces and becoming reactive of active forces. But only becoming-active has being; it would be contradictory for the being of becoming to be affirmed of a becoming-reactive, of a becoming that is itself nihilistic. The eternal return would become contradictory if it were the return of reactive forces. The eternal return teaches us that becoming-reactive has no being. Indeed, it also teaches us of the existence of a becoming-active. It necessarily produces becoming-active by reproducing becoming. This is why affirmation is twofold: the being of becoming cannot be fully affirmed without also affirming the existence of becomingactive. The eternal return thus has a double aspect: it is the universal being of becoming, but the universal being of becoming ought to belong to a single becoming. Only becoming-active has a being which is the being of the whole of becoming. Returning is everything but everything is affirmed in a single moment. Insofar as the eternal return is affirmed as the universal being of becoming, insofar as becoming-active is also affirmed as the symptom and product of the universal eternal return, affirmation changes nuance and becomes more and more profound. Eternal return, as a physical doctrine, affirms the being of becoming. But, as selective ontology, it affirms this being of becoming as the "self-affirming" of becoming-active.

>>15350167
You are actually right on the money, society is a body with organs. The body without organs is a totally deterritorialized socius. BwO is just a socius where all the organs (the territories) on the body are removed. It is a social plane with total potential, as it isn't yet defined by territories/organs/machines/social formations/ ect. Much like the Greeks too, you can apply it to the body as well, make yourself a body without organs, as well as the universe itself, as a plane of potential territoriality by actualities like the mountains of the earth and the heat from the sun.

>>15052331
two drops of water as abstract entities are generalities. two drops of water dripping in succession from the ceiling of a cave is repetition. a million water water droplets /in general/ do nothing, a million water droplets /in repetition/ can build a stalagmite. repetition implies a temporal element of intensive change that generalities do not.

“The Couple Overfloweth

We sometimes go on as though people can’t express themselves. In fact they’re always expressing themselves. The sorriest couples are those where the woman can’t be preoccupied or tired without the man saying “What’s wrong? Say something…,” or the man, without the woman saying … and so on. Radio and television have spread this spirit everywhere, and we’re riddled with pointless talk, insane quantities of words and images. Stupidity’s never blind or mute. So it’s not a problem of getting people to express themselves but of providing little gaps of solitude and silence in which they might eventually find something to say. Repressive forces don’t stop people expressing themselves but rather force them to express themselves; What a relief to have nothing to say, the right to say nothing, because only then is there a chance of framing the rare, and ever rarer, thing that might be worth saying. What we’re plagued by these days isn’t any blocking of communication, but pointless statements. But what we call the meaning of a statement is its point. That’s the only definition of meaning, and it comes to the same thing as a statement’s novelty. You can listen to people for hours, but what’s the point? . . . That’s why arguments are such a strain, why there’s never any point arguing. You can’t just tell someone what they’re saying is pointless. So you tell them it’s wrong. But what someone says is never wrong, the problem isn’t that some things are wrong, but that they’re stupid or irrelevant. That they’ve already been said a thousand times. The notions of relevance, necessity, the point of something, are a thousand times more significant than the notion of truth. Not as substitutes for truth, but as the measure of the truth of what I’m saying. It’s the same in mathematics: Poincaré used to say that many mathematical theories are completely irrelevant, pointless; He didn’t say they were wrong – that wouldn’t have been so bad.

Deleuze is a materialist, this is basically his attempt to materialize psychoanalysis. He isn't interested in lack like Freud or Lacan, he is interested in the positive remainder, production. It's all there in the first few lines:
>Hence we are all handymen: each with his little machines. For every organ-machine, an energy-machine: all the time, flows and interruptions. Judge Schreber* has sunbeams in his ass. A solar anus. And rest assured that it works: Judge Schreber feels something, produces something, and is capable of explaining the process theoretically. Something is produced: the effects of a machine, not mere metaphors.
The Judge's schizophrenia isn't a mere matter of symbolism, it was a productive machine which Schreber's desire flowed through. It produced his book, A Memoir of My Nervous Illness, which was one of Freud's major influences, in turn producing psychoanalysis itself. Schizophrenitization isn't a matter of lack, it is the production of the new, the overcoming of limits, the deterritorialization of a previously territorialized socius, an egg, ect. The production he is concerned with is the material production of the new, new which overcomes the old entirely over a plane of total potential, a plane of pre-territorialized immanence (a body without organs).

How much did Deleuze rip off from Whitehead?

>transcendental empiricsm
what did he mean by this?

Who are some writers that have traversed the BwO?

Was Deleuze a Taoist sage?

Was Deleuze a Taoist sage?

Was Deleuze a Taoist sage?

>tfw cured from the cancer and stupidity that is platonism
feels good

>the final boss of philosophy

>>12541214
Hegel wrote an Encyclopedia repeating his work in a simpler fashion to help his students (still confusing), Kant did something similar with his Prolegomena (still confusing), Heidegger wrote Being and Time about 4 or 5 times before giving up on it (still confusing). Wittgenstien was deeply upset that no one could understand TLP, so if it was a positive method he certainly regretted it. The hard pill to swallow is that Deleuze is as radical of a break of philosophy as any of these other thinkers; that's why he's so hard to read. He's the real deal.

Let's go into 2019 by talking about /lit/'s favorite philosopher delooze!

no, he is.

give me a rundown on deleuze

idk why people hate deleuze here he is cool and fun

Now that the dust has settled, what do we think abiut Deleuze?