/lit/ - Literature

What other pseuds should I avoid reading?

Let's talk about Derrida. Almost everything I read or watch on him goes in a uniformly different direction than each other thing. You might say it is difficult to determine what he means. Take a take, leave a take. Does he say that there is no meaning, or only that there is no FIXED meaning? To assume there is fixed meaning, would that be Platonism (eg the Platonism he attacks)?

So language is decentralized

Why do I get the feeling that his writings are just him going to war against reality? He literally tries to go to war against the logos.

>You don't just say, "Could you elaborate?"

>>16308775
Are you going to have a tantrum now?

>>15967713
I don't think so honestly. I think he's just doing what he feels like, maybe they told him to cross his arms and this is what he thought that meant lol.

Derrida is the most comical example of actual philosopher posturing. Guy makes a literal Zoolander face

Is the Black Lives Matter and Transgender psyop just a manifestation of capital manipulating performative sign?

>evil incarnate
pic related

genius or talentless hack ????

Where are all the Derrida lovers out there? He's a bit of a cuck for Eastern stuff and has refreshing takes on Hegel and Heidegger. People say hes hard but most of his work can easily be said to be easier than some Foucault books and WAY easier than Deleuze and some P&R chapters.

He has all the characteristic of the individual, independent niche philosophies /lit/ obsesses over like Whitehead, Guenon, Deleuze&G, Land, Stirner etc etc but gets no love

Did all the Derrida readers on /lit/ die out?

>>14155373

>Derrida furiously replied, "As long as it is a question of God and the existence of God, then of course God exists! Otherwise everything is predestined so, it is the question of the existence of God!" He then challenged his readers to accept him as a "theory" and insisted that what he had established, in his very first article in La Bruxelles, was a "fact" that "does not contradict or contradict the existence of God". (This is exactly what the "evangelicals" believe – which they are not allowed to admit to.) On the other hand, a more recent study indicates that most (or perhaps all) of the world's people are, in fact, atheists, and that this is not a recent phenomenon.
Honestly Derrida is retarded. The Bible teaches that we will become like God, that we will have a place in Paradise, and that we will have a place on this planet in the hereafter. But this is a mistake. What do I mean, by 'a place in Paradise'? Well, consider the following: we have a lot of problems on Earth. We do not live together in peaceful coexistence as in the Bible. One hundred percent of humanity is in hunger and war. Our bodies are in constant need of medical treatments, so the idea of a Paradise and a place in it is totally absurd. I do not think that God does not know the situation of the Earth as well as we do. I do not think that he wants to live among us and make us His friends. I do not think that He wants to send us to the earth on a ship filled with hungry dogs and with sick horses and with animals that have to be beaten.

>The structure of "the self" and "the self as other" will have to be developed a little beyond that. But even if this structure doesn't have any definitive definition it's important to try and understand how it fits into the wider structures and structures of experience for the self. Here, once you have an understanding for the structural structure of the self, you may develop a theory of how it functions in the context of other objects.
>Let's say the Self is a structure or schema for how people come to know what they experience. This is one possible example. Now what if this schema is not only a theoretical structure – how will we know what is "really" there, what is "there for us," what are the "sociologies" that guide us and shape how we experience? How will we know about people without knowing what this person is actually like? This is precisely what a theory of the Self would look like and how we would learn about "people" if we had one. To be specific, we would need a theoretical structure with a function for the self, excuse me, T [a] [r], and such that the function for the self is invertible (i.e. has the right adjoints) in the domain of all R-set, then we can have the following set of terms from the self function. This is one way to see that this is, in fact, a function. Note, though, what that tells us about their structure. They must be the ones whose domains are the subdomain subsets of the domain of [a] .
>Hence, (1) is true for any R-set R that contains [r] and R where [r] ≠ 0, and (2) is true for any R with length zero. For the case of n = 10 or greater, and the choice of set L = [0,1,2,3,4], where R is any finite group, the two formulas are independent and each holds for the set of finitely long sets; and for the case of R (1,2,3,4) , [0,1] is true for every finite length. But the proof that (1) is true for any R is independent on the choice of set L. In particular, (1) is true for a finite length set [0,1] and (2) for [0,1,2,3], so it is possible to prove the self exists as a set of non-undeterminded structural "selfs." I believe the proof I provide is sufficient to prove the existence of a self to the end that, in fact, the self is the only meaningful, non-deterministic element of the set.
No seriously what the FUCK did Derrida mean by this?

>Derrida famously claimed that the only way to make sense of 'the world' is to abandon Cartesian rationalism. One might think, then, that this statement is meaningless or irrelevant, if it says nothing about what a 'world' is. The question however, is whether the world has any meaning in and of itself. While it is true that in a world that can be conceived in terms of concepts, and which is not 'contagious', such concepts can serve as 'concepts of reference' – to say that everything is in a world that is an instance of that concept – that does not follow. It would be more accurate to claim that there is an 'epistemological 'world' of concepts, but that this 'world' cannot be the world that is in a concept.
>The epistemology of things in the world (in particular, its being epistemically contingent) is not an epistemological world, but a concept of a metaphysically contingent world (in terms of that concept); a concept that exists outside any kind of empirical world. Thus, since the concept of the transcendental is non-objective, it is also non-experimental, yet is not a description of the empirically contingent, but of the transcendental. Now, the world-phenomenon of the world-concept can be described as "the world-phenomenon" or "the phenomenon which can be investigated by means of the concepts of the transcendental," but "the world" in the ordinary sense does not refer to the transcendental world in the naturalistic sense. On the contrary, it refers to the conceptual world of the transcendental and, therefore, to the concept of the world on which it is supposed to depend. It can therefore be understood as both "phenomenal" and "experimental."
>Thus, the "phenomenal" world, which is the world retarded by the transcendental principle, is the phenomenal world of the real-external world (the transcendental world), and the phenomenal world of the real-external world—in other words the world that has the "phenomenal quality"—is the phenomenal world of the world that transcends the transcendental world. The phenomenal world, to its greatest extent, is the actual world of the phenomenal world, which is why it is necessary to speak of "phenomenality," or "phenomenalness," or "phenomenal nature." That is, the phenomenal world, which is the real-external world, is the reality that transcends the phenomenal world. The phenomenal world, by contrast, is the world retarded by the transcendental principle that is the only real world that can be experienced by the human mind. The world of the phenomenal world, as a phenomenal world, is the reality of the transcendental world, and that, in turn, is the phenomenal world.
Can someone paraphrase this for a lay person? Or at least tell me what it means?

>Derrida once said, "when I was a young theologian, I was very aware of these [problems] in metaphysics. As a result, what I became convinced of is that at the very end of the metaphysical realm there exists no more than one truth, no more than one truth, that is the fundamental truth of all that is and has to be and is to come. For at the end of the metaphysical realm there are no longer two or more different things, but at the very least there are things with one and the same truth. At the end there is only one truth." So it is at the very end of the universe that we exist, and then we are aware in that realization that this is the end of all the philosophical questions, and I believe in the end we will be more aware of that. So this seems to me the main issue. Then, in a way, that is the very beginning of philosophy, just as it is the beginning of physics, and is very important insofar as it opens up what is the way of understanding the world.
Can someone who's read Derrida explain this to me?

Was there a more low-IQ and deliberately cryptic-to-come-accoss-as-profound philosopher?

Invent postmodernist words thread.
I'll start:
>Restructivistic

If the postmodernists are the modern day sophists, who is the modern day Plato?

Is he one of the wisest and most well-read people from the past 100 years?

Your work is shit if you don't feel like this while trying to write it

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoKnzsiR6Ss

>>11355052
Attractiveness/style.

*deconstructs your path*