/lit/ - Literature

>I warned you. Didn't I fucking warn you?

Why can't forms be self-predicated again? Seems like an obvious solution.

How do you solve the problem?

What exactly is going on in Plato's Republic, 523-524, when Socrates is talking about the "three fingers"? There is an emphasis on things that are "big and small", and the supposed contradiction between the two. Also immediately after, when Socrates references when something is perceived as hard and soft, or light and heavy. All these examples have something in common, and it's supposed to be motivation for the forms, but it never gets off the ground for me.

The examples are confusing to me because I don't think we ever perceive *some-thing* as BOTH hard and soft, light and heavy, big and small, etc., at exactly the same time. And if we do perceive contrarities at the same time, it's usually in a way that's equivocating and not exact. For example, leather can be perceived as "soft and hard" in a way due to the delicate texture of its finish and the firmness of the hide, but it would be an equivocation to say that it is both soft and hard, as we would be referring to two different aspects of the leather's quality.

So, where's the contradiction here? What what Plato trying to get across? I have a feeling this is a key link toward understanding Plato's "The One and the Indeterminate/Indefinite Dyad/Aoristas Duas/etc." doctrines. I've also heard this is a setup for Aristotle's understanding of substance, in which only through substance can contrarities exist. But even then, Aristotle says that contrarities happen through changes in space and time (e.g. a cup of tea gets hot, and then later it cools down), so they are never simultaneously existing as is claimed in Socrates's thought experiment.

So, I'm tracking at least four major iterations of the forms:
>early-middle era Plato (e.g. Republic, Phaedrus, Meno, etc.)
Here, forms seem to be the "bread and butter" of metaphysics, knowledge, etc. They're "hyperuranion" (divine in some sense), but they can also be "collected." Yet, for some reason, dianoia (discursive reasoning) and noesis (intuitive reasoning) are not the same. But we somehow "knew" them in a past life, which is what makes thinking possible at all.
>late era Plato (e.g. Sophist, Philebus, etc.)
The forms now seem to be derivative of higher principles (e.g. the One and the Indefinite, the Limit and the Unlimited, etc.) The forms seem to be both stable and definitive *and* flexible and in flux for this reason. There also is a prelude to Aristotle's "Categories" here, e.g. Sameness, Difference, Rest, Motion, etc.
>Aristotle (e.g. hylomorphism)
Form is explicitly defined as the pattern, arrangement, etc., of something, and is again directly linked to substance. However, it is (usually) inseparable from matter (except when it is not, e.g. the active intellect and the unmoved mover (and somehow does not fail the "Third Man" self-predication argument). It is directly apprehended by the intellect, which becomes the form. Finally, you have what appears to be two kinds of forms, genera (e.g. Aristotle's taxonomy of beings) and qualities (e.g. red, soft, etc.), and they both function like universals but the former is contingent and the latter is necessary (but somehow must always be instantiated in matter, and also we don't have to worry about self-predication for some reason).
>Neoplatonism
Forms are described in "sensual" metaphors and emerge from the sensibles, almost as if there is a spectrum of intelligibles from the sensible to the formal, the latter obviously being superior to the former.

Now, are forms akin to concepts, abstractions, etc., at least that the latter tries to map onto the former, with mixed results? Is an object's "form" the totality of all its patterns? When the mind apprehends a form, but only partially, is this an abstraction (e.g. our mind only "becomes" part of the intelligible, sensible and formal, and thus we only take away part of it)? When we only intentionally focus on one element of an object, are we only focusing on a single or a handful of its forms (and thus is an abstraction in that sense)? Is it a mistake to assume that "noetic thinking" is thinking at all?

Sorry if this is all over the place and if I butcher some of the narrative details. I'm mostly trying to get a sense of the "architecture" here.

So... it's like... we've got numbers, right? And the first one is, well, One. But then this One isn't one, it's actually a pair, since it is itself and it exists. Yes, it has being. So with One automatically comes the pair One and Being. So with One, it's actually two. And with all of this, you have difference. Now we have a triplet: One, Being, and Difference. So from One, you get One, Two, and Three. And I guess they're all prime n shit, and you can use them to make any other number. And there we have it, the generation of numbers.

...

...

Please tell me that this isn't the most retarded shit I've ever seen.

What is the generation of numbers, again? Is it an attempt to explain why there are different quantities of number? What exactly is the metaphysical process behind it? Does it imply that numbers are real?

What the FUCK is khôra/chora/χώρα? I've seen it described as the "place for Being", as the medium of space, as the "receptacle of reality", as a type of separation between matter and things, etc. I've also heard it become a battleground for claiming that the Greeks had a different conception of space, place, etc., than we did post-Descartes.

Well? What the fuck is going on here? How can a place or receptable of Being not be a being itself?

How are Plato’s forms different from universals?

Are Plato's forms a sort of substance onto themselves, with independent “realness” irrespective of any concrete objects? Is that the key difference from mere universals? Is that what is meant by self-predication?

I sometimes see forms described as the basis of analogy, metaphor, etc., which works well with the form-collecting chariot of Phaedrus. They're also strongly tied to the medium of vision (eidos originally meaning appearance). Realizing the truth behind the forms also appears like a mystical experience:
>I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way of putting it in words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself or a close companionship, when suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining.
Compare Plato's description in the 7th Letter with his discussion in The Republic about the practice of dialectic up until the first form.

How are Plato’s forms different from universals?

Are Plato's forms a sort of substance onto themselves, with independent “realness” irrespective of any concrete objects? Is that the key difference from mere universals? Is that what is meant by self-predication?

site: https://mathcs.holycross.edu/~little/WinterMathTalk.pdf
>“For the art of mechanics, now so celebrated and admired, was first originated by Eudoxus and Archytas, who embellished geometry with subtleties, and gave to problems incapable of proof by word and diagram, a support derived from mechanical illustrations that were patent to the senses. For instance in solving the problem of finding two mean proportional lines, a necessary requisite for many geometrical figures, both mathematicians had recourse to mechanical arrangements adapting to their purposes certain intermediate portions of curved lines and sections.3 But Plato was incensed at this, and inveighed against them as corrupters and destroyers of the pure excellence of geometry, which thus turned her back upon the incorporeal things of abstract thought and descended to the things of sense, making use, moreover, of objects which required much mean and manual labor. For this reason, mechanics was made entirely distinct from geometry, and ... came to be regarded as one of the military arts.”
So, Plato was described as a purist according to Plutarch. But, in the Republic, Socrates says:
>“[The language of geometers] is most ludicrous, though they cannot help it, for they speak as if they were doing something and as if all their words were directed towards action. For all their talk is of squaring and applying and adding and the like, whereas in fact the real object of the entire study is pure knowledge.”
And Glaucon acknowledges that geometry is great for use in war as well. Socrates does not push back against this, either.

I wonder if what's going on is more of a Cartesian-like mechanical philosophy (Eudoxus, Archimedes, etc.) versus a more "Newtonian" philosophy that Plato may have preferred, one that doesn't make unnecessary ontological assumptions about a world that is necessarily split between the unlimited and the limited.

What *exactly* is the difference between logos, episteme, nous, and sophia, as Plato would have understood it? From the Republic to the Seventh Letter, I've seen all kinds of translations, but all seem suspect:
>episteme=account... but then what makes that different from logos?
>episteme=science... but obviously the Greeks didn't think in the same empirical terms as Science™ does today
>nous="first principles", so would that be the unit and the indeterminate dyad, the limited, the unlimited, the mixed, and the cause?
>sophia=combines episteme and nous, though I am unsure what that would look like. Seems like a placeholder word.
>"The Fifth": a "gnosis-like" type of knowledge from the Seventh Letter that reminds me of the revelatory flash of the Form of the Good in The Republic. Has a "seeing is believing", almost irrational, quality to it.

I would love to list all the distinct forms of knowledge (image, name, logos, episteme, "fifth"), align them with the appropriate metaphysical category (unlimited, limited, mixed, cause, ...?), section of the Divided Line (eikasia, pistis, dianoia, noesis, Form of the Good), etc. But I am not sure if that is possible.

Don't get me started on Aristotle, who brings in concepts like:
>theoria
>phronesis
While having severe metaphysical clashes with Plato like denying the existence, or at least the relevance, of the Form of the Good and attacking the unit and the indeterminate dyad (which he may not have fully understood due to lacking the mathematical know-how). How the hell does Aristotle's arrangement of the intellectual virtues compare with what was delineated by his former teacher?

>>20919314
>Plato claims you can know it (Form of the Good), but it's a revelatory experience after basically a lifetime of strenuous physical, mathematical, and dialectical work
>every other pseud that comes after him claims that it is impossible, yet still expect to be understood
hmmm...

There was a fruitful discussion that broke out in a bait thread about Evola and Heidegger that, unfortunately, was interrupted by a janny deleting the thread.So I am going to rebirth it here by discussing the relationship between philosophy and poetry, philosophy and mathematics, and the tension between the two as seen in Plato's works and was rediscovered in Heidegger's works. This will be an effortpost with explicit references to works, so it will not suffer the same fate as the other thread.

Briefly, in works like Plato's Republic and Plato's Ion, there's an ambiguity in Plato's seeming hostility towards poetry, where he acknowledges it as divine, confirms that it is important, and even engages in it himself (through literary device), but condemns its irrationality. Plato can't live with or without poetry. Meanwhile, after initially dismissing Plato with a dated, superficial reading (that was standard from the German idealism days), the later Heidegger returns to Plato with fresh eyes to finally refine his critique of the history of philosophy and its concealment of Being. Namely, poetry is ultimately connected to nature, whose whims were satisfied by mathematics as a means to an end. But with Plato and beyond, mathematics becomes THE self-grounding mode of Being, the pathway to glimpse at the realm of the forms, laying the grounds for foundations for Western civilization to be engrossed in the world of technique. Cthonic poetry is stifled in the quest for technocratic efficiency.

Here's an interesting, but taxing to read essay: https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.153.1031&rep=rep1&type=pdf

In his own defense, Socrates makes the infamous argument that, if he had done evil, it could have only been done out of ignorance. According to him, the good is so choice-worthy that only the ignorant would prefer anything less, let alone evil. Therefore, Socrates ought not to be punished. At a surface glance, this argument seems laughable. Despite the fact that we have a conscience, vices still often seem choice-worthy too, and thus we occasionally lapse in self-control. Besides, many kinds of knowledge seem like they have nothing to do with virtue, e.g. charting the positions of stars. Some kinds of knowledge, especially technology, might even erode virtue by making us soft, distractible, or even suggestible, e.g. the internet. Knowledge about the future may even cause us to abandon all hope and simply indulge at whim, without a care to virtue, hoping to enjoy our last moments without judgment.

But on closer introspection, I think Socrates's argument makes sense, especially if we are to consider a deeper, more ingrained definition of knowledge. I'm aware that the Greeks, especially Aristotle, distinguished between multiple kinds of knowledge. From hereon, we ought to consider knowledge in matters of the good, like ethics and aesthetics. We may be aware of the difference between good and bad, but have we truly internalized it? Do we always learn from our poor experiences with vice? Have we fully contemplated the fleeting, momentary nature of vice versus the eternal strength of virtue? After Socrates, Stoics like Chrysippus had the insight of comparing emotions to persistent, inertial syllogisms held about one's self and the world. In other words, emotions have a logic of their own. Perhaps overcoming vice and virtue could be likened to slowly conditioning oneself to the true, eternal nature of the world, i.e. learning... acquiring knowledge.

I think it's worth considering that, at the end of the day, virtue ethics might reduce itself to time preference on a celestial scale. But there lies the problem. How can mortal beings attain eternal knowledge? Such knowledge may not be possible, leaving room for faith. And even if such matters could be fully prospected? Suppose there is no final revelation, no necessary understanding that one makes after supposedly running the gamut. What if something more than knowledge is necessary for us? One can imagine the Underground Man who knowingly chooses to be unpredictably malicious just because he could. Finally, what does this say about free will? Perhaps the most intimidating aspect of Socrates's perfect virtue for the modern man is the threat of losing one's liberty. What kind of kind of rational person wants to be limited by virtue?

Plato loved to focus on the Form of the Good, order, and rationality in his works. But even if philosopher-kings came to power and were able to implement the city-in-speech… well, wouldn’t it be boring? I’m reminded of the Pythagorean tendencies to favor “perfection” to the point where they’d lack the ability to create tension, release, texture, and other satisfying elements of music. Does Plato ever buck these trends in his philosophy, or is he always pushing for some kind of perfectly crystallized world?

I'm ambivalent about this nigga like you wouldn't even believe

Would Plato consider a robust understanding of history to be "knowledge", episteme? Or would he consider that to be merely "true opinion", doxa? What's the difference? I reckon it would be the latter because history doesn't concern itself with eternal subject matter.

Also, how can knowledge be useful if it has to be eternal? Can the application of knowledge (figuring out the fastest path to Larissa, etc.) be itself knowledge? Those means may change over time, depending on the technology available, so it can’t be knowledge.

Finally, how do we talk about moral knowledge meaningful with Plato? Sure, I ought to participate in "the Form of the Good" as an ethical principle. But wouldn't that manifest much differently in 2022 AD compared to 400 BC? If what qualifies as virtuous changes, then it isn't eternal.

>it's about the chaotic sensible vs. the eternal intelligible world, e.g. the concrete vs. the abstract, the phenomenal vs. the noumenal, being vs. becoming
>ackshually it's about concrete particulars vs. abstract universals
>ackshually all you get are abstract particulars, abstract universals don't exist, or they're infinitely many
>ackshually what's most important is that there is ultimately a hierarchy of abstractions, culminating in the form of the good
I'm having an unfathomably difficult time trying to understand what exactly Plato was trying to communicate about the Forms in a sea of commentary and how to situate it within an all-encompassing system of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. I get the impression that Plato wanted to illustrate that essences of things exist, that the Form of the Good is what enables them to exist, and through participation in the Form of the Good, things can reach their essential perfection in the world of becoming. And that all of this carries mystical, or at least idealist, baggage. But I can't make heads or tails over how to situate that understanding of sublime forms against the universals vs. particulars debate.

Besides, if we believe in cosmological accounts with rational commitments, like Christianity, scientism, etc., anything with an ordering principle that resembles "logos", then is the world of becoming, the world in which we live in, as chaotic as it seems? Understanding the underlying principles makes the world intelligible, and knowledge no longer needs to depend on what eternally "is" as long as you know where you are and where things will be to some extent in the future.

>>19341739
Yes and they're based

>>18274607
>he doesn't understand that the ideal city is a model with which to understand the soul and Justice itself

>>18166086
Euthyphro and Meno

>>17905025
I READ 5000 PAGES TODAY NO CAP

>>17621080
>Learning the true nature of the forms and of the Ultimate Form of the Good is impractical