/lit/ - Literature

>>18385691
This guy is actually right: explaining objective morality on theism is as difficult, if not more so, than on atheism. First of all, if you buy divine command theory you have to contend with the Euthyphro dilemma. Eventually you find yourself making a ton of implausible claims about the Good’s relation to God. Finally, even if divine command theory is true, theists would have a difficult time explaining what it is exactly that makes a descriptive claim, that God commands x, for example, morally obligatory. Is it because God is more powerful than us? That God is the creator of all things? Both of these statements are descriptive, and moral obligations would still not arise from them. Perhaps if one adds the proposition that one should obey the commands of powerful creators of all things, the inference would be justified, but what basis do we have for that proposition? Plenty of atheists have offered plausible accounts of objective morality; Philippa Foot in particular comes to mind.