/lit/ - Literature

having sex with men dressed up like women is still faggotry desu
all of hedonic sex can be reduced to a comprehensibility towards masturbation, that's all there is to it, really, cum is cum, ya know? just ditch the phantasmal forms of coke sniffing naturalists appearing in the shape of motoric fuckmeat in your head and you'll be all set

>Prove the existence of an outer world? Ok: I have one hand, here. I have another, here. My hands exist, therefore, the outer world exists. QED!
so... this is the power... of analytic philosophy

>>11133675
>t.

I was reading G. E. Moore's lecture titled "Proof of an External World" earlier today and came across this:
>Now Kant, as we saw, asserts that the phrases "outside of us" or "external" are in fact used in two very different senses; and with regard to one of these two senses, that which he calls the "transcendental" sense, and which he tries to explain by saying that it is a sense in which "external" means "existing as a thing in itself distinct from us," it is notorious that he himself held that things which are to be met with in space are not "external" in this sense. There is, therefore, according to him, a sense in which the word has commonly been used by philosophers - such that, if external be used in that sense, then from the proposition "two dogs exist" it will not follow that there are some external things. What this supposed sense is I do not think that Kant himself ever succeeded in explaining clearly...
etc., etc.

This strikes me as misconstruing Kant's philosophy to fit within an arbitrarily defined propositional framework for the purposes of Moore's lecture and proof. That is, if things in themselves were to exist, then it wouldn't be possible to say that the proposition "there are external things" does not follow from the proposition "two dogs exist [as things in themselves]." But it seems an undercraft to treat the transcendental signification of the term "external" as if it would deny that such and such a particular thing exists as a thing in itself given that things in themselves do in fact exist (which they don't). The problem isn't getting to the assertion "external things exist" from another assertion that a particular thing exists, the problem is whether or not external things can be said to exist at all as things in themselves. In this case, we could not prove the existence of things in themselves from any particular thing ("two dogs exist") because the existence of external things in themselves in general is the entire point of dispute. "Two dogs exist" already takes "external things exist" as its enthymeme. So am I the brainlet here or is Moore?

"My atheism angers God"

>>8181568
>someone who won't take common sense for an answer
Reminder.