/lit/ - Literature

>>17482477
I didn't know that, I only read his two Inquiries.
>But even without a subject, Hume was still establishing causality, substance, and brought about through necessary and universal operations within our mind, and not things out in the noumenal reality. How's that any different from Kant?
Causality and substance are only established pragmatically, insofar as they help up navigate the world. Their truth is instead negated: we are wrong when we think these concepts actually refer to something (even the phenomena we experience), regardless of how useful it is for us to do so.
Kant is instead interested in affirming exactly this truth (as in, that we are epistemically justified to apply this concepts to objects). His response is problematic for the Humean because Kant grounds his system on premises that Hume would have accepted. So, to mention it again, to establish his trascendental deduction (which ends up proving that we are correct when we, for example, attribute causality to phenomena we observe) needs only two premises: that the I think must accompany all our representations, and that we do not have an intellectual intuition of the I think. Both premises follow directly from (respectively) Hume's bundle theory and his critique of personal identity. Kant's 360noscope move is to point out that these theories already entail a series of presuppositions which necessarily lead to the trascendental deduction (and the rest of his system with it).

I wonder how Kant would have responded to contemporary analytic skeptics. Like, could have Kant 360noscoped Dennett, and start his trascendental philosophy from a standpoint which rejects that we have representations at all, and that we are in fact not conscious? In comparison, Hume's position is almost metaphysical.