/lit/ - Literature

>>21416696
Man is activated into action by the feelings of pleasure and pain. Kant acknowledges this. Man is not a disembodied spirit existing apart from the needs and wants of the body. Ok conceded. But reason also has causality on man, independent of material wants or needs. By following the command of reason in opposition to the demands of material causality, or the inclinations and attractions of sense, man proves his free wiil, in concreto, in practice, in experiential fact. This isn't an abstraction. This is something you can demonstrate to yourself, now, this instant. It is this material existence that allows us to exercise our free will and through it to recognize the moral law, in the same way the pure concepts of the understanding do not enter into consciousness until after they have been abstacted from experience through critique even though that same critique shows them to be the formal cause of experience itself.

There is no man magically devoid of all desires. But this desire you are talking about is a causality of nature. You seem to believe this is the only kind of causality, but if youd read the critique you'd know reason itself exerts influence on human will, and this is the categorical imperative, the moral law. You are stuck in a materialist standpoint, and that's why you keep failing to see a higher causality, which would demand a raising of consciousness through actually reading the critique, since kantian morality presupposes transcendental idealism, or the kantian metaphysical foundations.

>>21372120
>I don't see what you can get out of studying Kant honestly.
Basic bitch take. Honestly, Kant will raise your consciousness. This can be good or bad depending on if your up to the task of refuting him. If you stop at Kant you'll probably want to kys. But studying the writings of those who overcame his limitations, or attempting to overcome them yourself will also make you want to kys. Basically, what I'm saying is it takes a special kind of person to read Kant and not end up wanting to kys. But blessed are they who can.

Gott mit uns

And the existence of God:

the moral law led to a practical problem which is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any sensible motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the first and principle element of the summum bonum, viz., morality; and, as this can be perfectly solved only in eternity, to the postulate of immortality. The same law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element of the summum bonum, viz., happiness proportioned to that morality, and this on grounds as disinterested as before, and solely from impartial reason; that is, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect; in other words, it must postulate the existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral legislation of pure reason).

Gott mit uns.
Heil Herr Kant.

>>21329114
He recognized the necessity of God and the immortality of the soul to acheive this, otherwise unachievable by the emprically cognized human, end/goal/purpose which Reason itself commands.

The immortality of the soul:

>Now, the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. Since, nevertheless, it is required as practically necessary, it can only be found in a progress in infinitum towards that perfect accordance, and on the principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will.

>Now, this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an endless duration of the existence and personality of the same rational being (which is called the immortality of the soul). The summum bonum, then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul

And the existence of God:

the moral law led to a practical problem which is prescribed by pure reason alone, without the aid of any sensible motives, namely, that of the necessary completeness of the first and principle element of the summum bonum, viz., morality; and, as this can be perfectly solved only in eternity, to the postulate of immortality. The same law must also lead us to affirm the possibility of the second element of the summum bonum, viz., happiness proportioned to that morality, and this on grounds as disinterested as before, and solely from impartial reason; that is, it must lead to the supposition of the existence of a cause adequate to this effect; in other words, it must postulate the existence of God, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the summum bonum (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral legislation of pure reason).

Gott mit uns.
Heil Herr Kant.

>>21319922
>Pure reason always has its dialectic, whether it is considered in its speculative or its practical employment; for it requires the absolute totality of the 'conditions of what is given conditioned, and this can only be found in things in themselves. But as all conceptions of things in themselves must be referred to intuitions, and with us men these can never be other than sensible and hence can never enable us to know objects as things in themselves but only as appearances, and since the unconditioned can never be found in this chain of appearances which consists only of conditioned and conditions; thus from applying this rational idea of the totality of the conditions (in other words of the unconditioned) to appearances, there arises an inevitable illusion, as if these latter were things in themselves (for in the absence of a warning critique they are always regarded as such). This illusion would never be noticed as delusive if it did not betray itself by a conflict of reason with itself, when it applies to appearances its fundamental principle of presupposing the unconditioned to everything conditioned. By this, however, reason is compelled to trace this illusion to its source, and search how it can be removed, and this can only be done by a complete critical examination of the whole pure faculty of reason; so that the antinomy of the pure reason which is manifest in its dialectic is in fact the most beneficial error into which human reason could ever have fallen, since it at last drives us to search for the key to escape from this labyrinth; and when this key is found, it further discovers that which we did not seek but yet had need of, namely, a view into a higher and an immutable order of things, in which we even now are, and in which we are thereby enabled by definite precepts to continue to live according to the highest dictates of reason.

>Freedom, however, is the only one of all the ideas of the speculative reason of which we know the possibility a priori

An Idea? Known? How could this be? Are not all Ideas concepts without objects and therefore unknowable? No. There is one Idea, at least, which obtains an object and through this means obtains objective validity: Freedom. But what is freedom if not the exercise of WILLPOWER.

>there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory proof of the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For whereas it insisted that the objects of experience as such, including our own subject, have only the value of phenomena, while at the same time things in themselves must be supposed as their basis, so that not everything supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction and its concept as empty; so now practical reason itself, without any concert with the speculative, assures reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, viz., freedom, although (as becomes a practical concept) only for practical use; and this establishes on the evidence of a fact that which in the former case could only be conceived.

>assures reality to a supersensible object

And what is the supersensible if not the intelligible?

And thus this intellegible object which corresponds to our Idea, or concept of pure reason as opposed to the understanding, gives that Idea the objective validity which makes that Idea knowable. But since concepts without intuitions are empty, it is therefore an intuition which has supplied the material with which to synthesize a manifold into a concept and present an object giving that concept objective validity.

Ideas are not empirical however, and transcend anything empirical. And yet the Ideal object is intuited. How? Another kind of intuition, a kind of intuition which, before it becomes actual, is merely intelligible, an intuition which prior to a consciousness of its existence is only an apparition of the Mind- a ghost, perhaps a spirit, if you will.

We thus realize that this (from a lower standpoint) merely intelligible, or intellectual, intuition is actually (from a higher standpoint) spiritual intuition.

Somesay Kant never reached Swedenborg. Perhaps it was Swedenborg who reached Kant

>there now appears an unexpected and very satisfactory proof of the consistency of the speculative critical philosophy. For whereas it insisted that the objects of experience as such, including our own subject, have only the value of phenomena, while at the same time things in themselves must be supposed as their basis, so that not everything supersensible was to be regarded as a fiction and its concept as empty; so now practical reason itself, without any concert with the speculative, assures reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, viz., freedom, although (as becomes a practical concept) only for practical use; and this establishes on the evidence of a fact that which in the former case could only be conceived.

>assures reality to a supersensible object

And what is the supersensible if not the intelligible?

And thus this intellegible object which corresponds to our Idea, or concept of pure reason as opposed to the understanding, gives that Idea the objective validity which makes that Idea knowable. But since concepts without intuitions are empty, it is therefore an intuition which has supplied the material with which to synthesize a manifold into a concept and present an object giving that concept objective validity.

Ideas are not empirical however, and transcend anything empirical. And yet the Ideal object is intuited. How? Another kind of intuition, a kind of intuition which, before it becomes actual, is merely intelligible, an intuition which prior to a consciousness of its existence is only an apparition of the Mind- a ghost, perhaps a spirit, if you will.

We thus realize that this (from a lower standpoint) merely intelligible, or intellectual, intuition is actually (from a higher standpoint) spiritual intuition.

Somesay Kant never reached Swedenborg. Perhaps it was Swedenborg who reached Kant

>>21233921
What irony that the greatest thinker who ever lived denied the faculty of intellectual intuition to human beings! The Critique of Pure Reason is overflowing with intellectual intuition expressed in precise, disciplined Prussian German.

The Critique is written from the standpoint of someone who lacks intellectual intuition, or in other words, someone who fails to recognize his own thinking as intuition, i.e, direct cognition of his thoughts. Yet, the Critique itself, as a product of thinking, is a product of intellectual intuition, in fact, presupposes it. Kant, with his impeccable intelligence, could not have failed to recognize this. Thus what makes the Critique so great is its profound irony, without doubt intended deliberately by the great Architect.

The truth is Kant himself possessed intellectual intuition, but chose to write from the standpoint of one without this faculty, so that his intended audience, empiricist and rationalist philosophers could bridge the gap between themselves through the recognition that belief or not in the faculty of intellectual intuition is what lied at the boundary between them. And further those who did not believe in this faculty would come to recognize their own intellectual intuition by means of the great contradiction of the Critique, its great irony: its grandiose display of intellectual intuition to deny that selfsame intuition. A contradiction that can only be resolved, an irony that can only be understood, when the reader finally recognizes their own thinking as this mysterious intellectual intuition.

This predicate which Kant admits only to the concept of a divine understanding, shows itself to be found in the understanding of man- and thus man's understanding reveals itself to be divine understanding; the Mind of God is Mind of Man.

>I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition- if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience—that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds.

> For that the concept precedes the perception signifies the concept's mere possibility; the perception which supplies the content to the concept is the sole mark of actuality. We can also, however, know the existence of the thing prior to its perception and, consequently, comparatively speaking, in an a priori manner, if only it be bound up with certain perceptions, in accordance with the principles of their empirical connection (the analogies). For the existence of the thing being thus bound up with our perceptions in a possible experience,
we are able in the series of possible perceptions and under the guidance of the analogies to make the transition from our actual perception to the thing in question. Thus from the perception of the attracted iron filings we know of the existence of a magnetic matter pervading all bodies, although the constitution of our organs cuts us off from all immediate perception of this medium. For in accordance with the laws of sensibility and the context of our perceptions, we should, were our senses more refined, come also in an experience upon the immediate empirical intuition of it. The grossness of our senses does not in any way decide the form of possible experience in general. Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches, then, only so far as perception and its advance according to empirical laws can extend.

>>21210239
Correct. The law of contradiction is the necessary condition of logical possbility but not real possibility, which is cornforming to the pure intuition and concepts that underlie experience and make its unity possible. BUT these concepts themselves are objects in the mental plane of experience. And thus they underlie themselves and in thinking them the understanding provides its own material unto which to apply its concepts, namely thoses concepts themselves as intellectual intuitions. Therefore on the mental plane all concepts that are understood, and therefore conform to the categories, demonstrate their possibility by means of their actuality as clear and distinct concepts and are there own corresponding object, as unity of concept as matter and concept as form.

>>21206610
What irony that the greatest thinker who ever lived denied the faculty of intellectual intuition to human beings! The Critique of Pure Reason is overflowing with intellectual intuition expressed in precise, disciplined Prussian German.

The Critique is written from the standpoint of someone who lacks intellectual intuition, or in other words, someone who fails to recognize his own thinking as intuition, i.e, direct cognition of his thoughts. Yet, the Critique itself, as a product of thinking, is a product of intellectual intuition, in fact, presupposes it. Kant, with his impeccable intelligence, could not have failed to recognize this. Thus what makes the Critique so great is its profound irony, without doubt intended deliberately by the great Architect.

The truth is Kant himself possessed intellectual intuition, but chose to write from the standpoint of one without this faculty, so that his intended audience, empiricist and rationalist philosophers could bridge the gap between themselves through the recognition that belief or not in the faculty of intellectual intuition is what lied at the boundary between them. And further those who did not believe in this faculty would come to recognize their own intellectual intuition by means of the great contradiction of the Critique, its great irony: its grandiose display of intellectual intuition to deny that selfsame intuition. A contradiction that can only be resolved, an irony that can only be understood, when the reader finally recognizes their own thinking as this mysterious intellectual intuition.

This predicate which Kant admits only to the concept of a divine understanding, shows itself to be found in the understanding of man- and thus man's understanding reveals itself to be divine understanding; the Mind of God is Mind of Man.