/lit/ - Literature

>>19419596
>Buddhists' arguments for anatta come as a response to Samkhya's ontology … the source of Vedanta's metaphysics.
Samkhya isn’t the source of Vedanta metaphysics, the source of both Samkhya and Vedanta are the Upanishads, all the shared terminology used by both also occurs in the Upanishads and predates Samkhya. Advaita criticizes Samkhya heavily and Shankara takes it as the main opponent in his works to be refuted.
>Most criticisms that apply to Samkhya also apply to Vedanta.
No, not really

>>19419941
>1. If the self were the aggregates, It would have arising and ceasing (as properties).
The Self isn’t any of the aggregates, it’s not the Buddhist aggregate of consciousness since Buddha describes this as consisting of eye-conciousness, ear-consciousness, mental consciousness, the Self isn’t any of these but Its the luminous presence which reveals those things for what they are, which allows us to have knowledge of them. And it cannot be shown that the Self as that luminous presence arises or ceases, because arising requires a prior absence and the absence of awareness is impossible to confirm (as you cannot confirm something without being aware of it, hence awareness would still be present and not absent, not arising).
>If it were different from the aggregates, It would not have the characteristics of the aggregates.
Which isn’t a problem since the aggregates as described by Buddhists has little to do with how Advaitins conceive of the Self. Your quote failed to refute anything or point out any issue for Advaita
>The Atman of Advaitins falls under the same problem, it cannot at the same time be both aware of Maya and different from the aggregates that allow for the perception of Maya, that is wihout falling into contradictions.
There is no contradiction as the Atman is only conditionally the witness of maya, but this is a false imputation/understanding by the mind, the Atman is absolute reality isn’t aware of maya. The Atman present in each moment really just knows itself and the mind construes it as a witness:

> Śaṅkara analyzes consciousness (cit or caitanyam) through both perspectives of his two orders of reality. From the provisional empirical order, consciousness is a witnessing presence (sākṣin) by which all mental cognition is revealed as known. The absolute perspective strips consciousness of all relational properties, including intentionality and its status as a witness, leaving only the intrinsic self-illuminating nature of consciousness remaining. He identifies this pure non-intentional consciousness as numerically identical with nondual existence, which is brahman.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/shankara/#WitnCons

>”Now, for instance, the Self, while remaining immutable, is, by reason of His not being distinguished from intellectual states, imagined, through ignorance, to be the percipient of objects, such as sound, (which is really) perceived by the intellect.
- Shankara, Gita-bhasya 2.21

>>18485712
I have actually come to enjoy these threads. Guenonfag is quite persistent, arguing against all claims. The hater's on the other side... not doing quite well in the department of stating their case.
All in all, guenonfag wins.