/lit/ - Literature

Did Heidegger treat Spinoza unfairly concerning his substance?

It is very clear that Heidegger is against any form of self-sufficient substance as constituting the fundamental ontology, since this would mean an ontical, instead of an ontological ground. For any human being/Dasein, every other being/entity appears within an equipmental totality, a sort of Indra's net, where everything refers/reflects everything else and nothing stands on its own. For this reason, Heidegger speaks negatively about Spinoza (this in his lectures on Schelling).

This, at first sight, seems logical, given that Spinoza posits a very clear form of substance monism (which, from the point of view of a human being, is a dual-aspect monism). However, the way in which Spinoza further develops his point makes it clear that his idea of a Substance comes close to a Neoplatonic One, and does not include any separate entities/beings, just forms of activity of the one substance. In that sense, the word 'substance' as used by Spinoza might have confused Heidegger into thinking that it points at the same type of substance as talked about by Aristotle (which is a type of substance which indeed comes way closer to Heideggers ontic beings/entities, and which Heidegger rightfully critiques).

Am I misinterpreting Heidegger and/or Spinoza, or is Heidegger misinterpreting Spinoza?

In a similar vein, I also have the feeling that Heidegger misinterpreted Bergson when he stated that Bergson still treats time (or rather, duration) in a spatial manner (i.e., as subsequent durations on a timeline). However, this point has already been discussed in multiple papers, while the above point concerning Spinoza has not.

Any thoughts?

>Atheism is just 1 less god believed from being religious
>Death is just 1 less thing consciousness has intentional focus of.

Woah

Why?

and what is the being of beings
and what is the being of the being of the beings
and what is the being of the being of the being of the...

>*causes the Iranian Revolution 1979*

So I'm moderately well-read in philosophy: some of the greek and roman authors (Aristotle, Plato, Seneca, Aurelius, all in translation), and random odds and ends from most recent ones (Kant, Voltaire, Rousseau, Nietzsche, Arendt); but I cannot for the life of me understand Heidegger or anybody's explanation of Heidegger.
I always wanted to read him because I liked both Nietzsche (who was allegedly a big influence on him), and Arendt (who was his student), but whenever I pick up one of his texts it just sounds like gibberish.
I read the full text of "What is metaphysics", which is short and I was told is an easy entry, but the most I could tell you is he wants to demonstrate we don't know what "nothing" is. I neither understand how exactly he claims to prove this or why the fuck I should care (though he claims to be doing both in the text). Yes, I also watched some youtubers claiming to "explain" what he's about. Makes no sense. Not looking to shit on him, I really want to get what he's about, but I just don't. Can you help me out?

this seems to me what he was getting at in his later works. reductive physicalists effectively preclude the possibility of wonder by making everything be describable under one descriptive closure (elementary particles). this form of reduction, seems to be what is meant by calculative thought. i have actually unwittingly made the same criticism (though i took the main point from schelling, not heidegger) and applied it to quine's metaontology

>Non-Being Beings Being's Being Into Non-Being's Being Beings It Into Being
/lit/ will defend this shit

Does his support of Nazism weaken his thought?

>>17190661
All languages aren't equal. Read Heidegger.

What if I am "authentically" a bad/selfish/unhappy person?

Did he know Finnish? Finnish is a much more superior language than German for philosophy by Heidegger's own standards. Stupid kraut.

>>15859917
>You’re right.

Did he succeed in providing a plausible account of a way out of the subject-object dichotomy?

This thread is dedicated to the philosophy of the german philosopher Martin Heidegger.

Posts about both stages of Heidegger's thought are encouraged.

Everything I write sounds the flat, repetitive, and boring.
How do I improve my writing to sound as articulate as this genius?

>you can't stop science anyway, so just don't look at a tree as a piece of wood and just enjoy it

How come Heidegger survives and the German/Austrian right is so "practical" when science proves this stuff much less effective?

Also, is Sellner right about Gramschi being one of the few smart Marxists for the right? (German)
https://youtu.be/KnLuf-nSHGQ

Thoughts on Heidegger?

Can Heidegger help a young start-up entrepreneur to change his view of the world and life?

List of literature (books or authors) inspiring/ inspired by National socialism? Also things related to national socialism such as eugenics, race etc.

Will start with what I know.

Nietzche
Heidegger
Karl Jung
Alfred Rosenberg
Adolf Hitler

Why should Dasein be transparent to itself? I never understood this in Heidegger. In Being and Time, he criticizes Kant and Hegel for attempting to do ontology with ontical understandings of supposedly primordial aspects of the subject or res cogitans, for example Hegel's dialectic or Kant's transcendental schema of the imagination "hidden in the depths of the soul."

That point is obviously well taken, but why SHOULDN'T Kant be right in a deeper sense, namely that there simply are things hidden in the depths of our soul, things which Dasein could never unearth because they are conditions of thought and not objects of thought?

For instance I don't quite understand Heidegger's dismissal of Kant's deduction of the transcendental aesthetic of the forms of space and time. I understand his dismissal of Kant deriving the specific theoretical forms "space" and "time" from our every-day experience of "enworlded" spatiality/temporality, and then putting the cart before the horse by presuming that the systematically/theoretically exposited forms are the real conditions of the every-day experience. But I feel Kant would simply grant this, and say, "Sure, but something is still conveying sense data from our retinas and 'giving it to us', 'as' that supposedly primordial enworlded spatiality. It may very well be that I erred in describing that initial spatiality in rationalistic, discursive terms, but the point stands: what is really primordial is that there is a form of spatiality whatsoever, and that is given by some fact 'hidden in the depths of the soul' and not by some immanent and/or transparent necessity of Dasein."

How would Heidegger respond to attempts to naturalize and biologize him? To read him through a cognitive scientist's version of Kant, let's say? tldr: Are there "depths of the soul" that are both inaccessible to Dasein's/the transcendental subject's self-knowledge, and determinative of that knowledge nevertheless? (These could be construed materialistically/biologically for example.)

Why did anyone take this kraut seriously? Especially post-war Euro leftists.
Everything he writes seems like dime a dozen poetic musings of an old man trying to cope.

>>11850423
>is there anything actually unnatural about technology
>tfw