/lit/ - Literature

The true free will extends "backward", irrespective of extending "forward", and does not mix with the world, irrespective of being able to do so. Free will being given to Man so that he might affect the world in the vulgar Catholic sense would be tremendously insulting to both God and Man in that Man being given "free will" after the fact, after being created in this way and not in that and, indeed, after being created at all is an absurd abomination: implicitly burdening the "free will" with that which it did not will, both in content and in form, mere predestination is both more just and more dignifying. Similarly, freedom of will and freedom of action being one and the same, as Catholics maintain they are in the "ideal" state of their world, would make the freedom of such a will Epistemologically indistinguishable from a will totally subordinate to an autonomous Phenomenal, mere predestination is both more just and more dignifying. Moreover, I maintain that "mere" predestination is actually THE true will itself: a will so free that it has implicitly chosen and concluded everything, implicitly unburdened and unburdening itself even of what itself wanted to choose, before one is even "created", let alone born, so that one is then not ironically free but truly free, even from choice, to passively observe the technicality of one's Phenomenal life excreting itself away.

Previously, in a strictly Protestant sense:

>>>/lit/thread/S17731637#p17735398
>The idea that free will precedes one's birth, that one precedes one's birth, is at least implicit if not explicit in most of Christianity, excluding Catholicism, which is not Christian at all. The Protestant obsession with determinism goes far enough to Dialectically reach absolute free will, i.e. life is so determined that even one's (ostensible) experience of determinism could be Epistemologically indistinguishable from one's false experience of free will relative to God's true determinism, that God actually determined this when one thinks he determined that, his determinism ever imploding lest the determined defiles it by knowing, its Epistemological retreat indistinguishable from an Ontological one, lest he defiles it by being.

>>18286214

The true free will extends "backward", irrespective of extending "forward", and does not mix with the world, irrespective of being able to do so. Free will being given to Man so that he might affect the world in the vulgar Catholic sense would be tremendously insulting to both God and Man in that Man being given "free will" after the fact, after being created in this way and not in that and, indeed, after being created at all is an absurd abomination: implicitly burdening the "free will" with that which it did not will, both in content and in form, mere predestination is both more just and more dignifying. Similarly, freedom of will and freedom of action being one and the same, as Catholics maintain they are in the "ideal" state of their world, would make the freedom of such a will Epistemologically indistinguishable from a will totally subordinate to an autonomous Phenomenal, mere predestination is both more just and more dignifying. Moreover, I maintain that "mere" predestination is actually THE true will itself: a will so free that it has implicitly chosen and concluded everything, implicitly unburdened and unburdening itself even of what itself wanted to choose, before one is even "created", let alone born, so that one is then not ironically free but truly free, even from choice, to passively observe the technicality of one's Phenomenal life excreting itself away.

Previously, in a strictly Protestant sense:

>>>/lit/?task=search&ghost=yes&search_text=%22lest+he+defiles+it%22
>The idea that free will precedes one's birth, that one precedes one's birth, is at least implicit if not explicit in most of Christianity, excluding Catholicism, which is not Christian at all. The Protestant obsession with determinism goes far enough to Dialectically reach absolute free will, i.e. life is so determined that even one's (ostensible) experience of determinism could be Epistemologically indistinguishable from one's false experience of free will relative to God's true determinism, that God actually determined this when one thinks he determined that, his determinism ever imploding lest the determined defiles it by knowing, its Epistemological retreat indistinguishable from an Ontological one, lest he defiles it by being.

Previously on predestination:

>>>/lit/thread/S17066449#p17066706
>The idea that free will precedes one's birth, that one precedes one's birth, is at least implicit if not explicit in most of Christianity, excluding Catholicism, which is not Christian at all. The Protestant obsession with determinism goes far enough to Dialectically reach absolute free will, i.e. life is so determined that even one's (ostensible) experience of determinism could be Epistemologically indistinguishable from one's false experience of free will relative to God's true determinism, that God actually determined this when one thinks he determined that, his determinism ever imploding lest the determined defiles it by knowing, its Epistemological retreat indistinguishable from an Ontological one, lest he defiles it by being.

>>17066449
>But it's really not. Cancer is not a consequence of Free Will

The idea that free will precedes one's birth, that one precedes one's birth, is at least implicit if not explicit in most of Christianity, excluding Catholicism, which is not Christian at all. The Protestant obsession with determinism goes far enough to Dialectically reach absolute free will, i.e. life is so determined that even one's (ostensible) experience of determinism could be Epistemologically indistinguishable from one's false experience of free will relative to God's true determinism, that God actually determined this when one thinks he determined that, his determinism ever imploding lest the determined defiles it by knowing, its Epistemologically retreat indistinguishable from an Ontological one, lest he defiles it by being.