/lit/ - Literature

Let us define the world as a set of all that is conceivable; let us define an "object" as any constituent part of the world.

I. Suppose we define God as that being that has consciousness of all objects in the universe, simultaneously.

II. If God has infinite consciousness, then we must distribute this consciousness amongst all of the objects in the universe.

III. If we take the limit as God's consciousness approaches an infinite number of objects in the world, then the limit approaches 0. To explain: The limit as n (the number of objects in the world) approaches infinity means that any 1 object is a fraction of n, so they function is 1/n. Thus, 1/infinity becomes infinitesimally small, and 0.

IV. If God ascribes a quantity of 0 consciousness to each constituent object in the world, then God is not conscious of anything.

IV. That which is conscious of everything is not conscious of anything.

V. God exists, but he is nothing.

QED

anything is neither itself nor not itself. It is neither its conjunction nor its disjunction. It is neither neither nor both, but the negation of every possibility and its negation, culminating in an infinite regress of nothingness, which proves to be more nothing than the preceding term. this process in itself must then be something, and it becomes anything.

>>3395064
That's not what I'm saying. We are no longer talking about "knowledge," as it were. And please don't confuse subjective incomprehensibility with objective incomprehensibility. see:>>3395059

>>3395029
If you read the remainder of it, I agree with that assessment. 1 = 1 is true in classical first-order logic, but not in deviant non-classical logics. It's essentially in agreement with your statements at that point.

Suppose though, that when the definition and meanings of all terms are defined we are all in agreement to a certain extent, is this not true?
And if we're all in agreement when these definitions are presented, then that means they are meaningful to us. And if they are meaningful to us, this means that we understand how they function together. This means of functioning when a given set of data is presented is the mechanism I am describing. This mechanism still exists, regardless of the definitions of the given data.

>>3394951

1 = 1 in classical first-order logic, sure; in certain non-classical deviant logics, 1 = 1 is not true; this is a result of how we define "=". the fact that we are able to derive things from these definitions, however, is not a mechanism with a formal notation. the process through which symbols interact must exist for symbols to interact, but it cannot be expressed in language, because it underlies language -- it exists a priori. for there to be any meaning behind p --> q, we must have an unseen, fundamental intuition about how things interact. otherwise, for anything to be meaningful, we could never communicate on the basis that i may arbitrarily draw a conclusion on the basis of a subjective mechanism i decide to create. to clarify: the fact that i can draw the same conclusions from a given set of data when the criterion and all external factors are defined means that there an underlying objective process through which i know.

>>3394870
>>3394870

No, i'm not. i'm arguing that we cannot be 100% certain -- my argument was purely epistemological. i'm not inferring that languages "heralds the possibility of being objective", i'm arguing that indeed the quantification of language is dubious, but that the way symbols interact with one another is not.

p --> q
p
thus, q

certainly the symbols in the example are subject to our whims -- completely subjective. but modus ponens, the metalogical process and what it means to be a conditional is not subjective. this process underlies thoughts, actions and words. we couldn't think without it. certainly, how we define terms in logic are subject to fallacy and erroneous assumptions due to their empirical roots. but on a fundamental basis, this causal mechanism cannot be subjective because it precedes all thought.

>>3394749

the definitions we attribute to logical notation, without a doubt, can certainly be viewed as subjective; but the metalogical mechanism by which sufficient and necessary conditions exist and interact cannot be subject to one's whim.

>>3394723

this also relies on the assumption that we are certain of the accuracy of argumentation and the logical structures of arguments; for they aren't self-proving.

>>3394656

our ability to measure in this case is irrelevant; the whole notion of certainty relies on what we know for ourselves, not the other. for one to make the claim "cogito ergo sum" would require that only they knew the answer to this question; the ability to measure this factor is irrelevant, for it cannot be measured.

>>3394636

but the object that is asleep is incapable of detecting is the point of contention.

>>3394627

this was necessary so as to present a skepticism towards the very nature of the senses. "perceptions" seems to be implicitly sensory-based. this need not be the case, however; we can easily be disembodied spirits

>>3394623

You keep using 'I' so as to present a circular argument. You assume there is an 'I' while asleep. The fact that during that point in time there are no thoughts in that object's head and that object is not able to be self-aware means that it was once "you" while awake but is no longer in the capable of fully being "you" while asleep.

>>3394598

>The fact that I can perceive things means something must exist

this comment is irrelevant; "perception" of things that aren't oneself are irrelevant to knowledge of one's existence.

>You could change the individual to being just something exists

if there is a lapse in your own continuity, the purported knowledge of oneself can be questioned

>>3394575
>>3394565

the answer to this is simple:
this type of "knowing" is a predicate on a metalinguistic frame with its own independent truth-values.

>>3394568
>>3394561

pronouns are going to lead to some trouble.

If thinking and consciousness are necessary for one's existence does that mean that during sleep we no longer exist? There is absolutely no stream of consciousness during REM
cycles, does that mean there is a lapse in the continuity of one's identity?

Descartes himself notes the trouble with sleep for his "cogito". Do you go into and out of existence before and after sleep, respectively? This would be a successful reductio for his "cogito"

>>3394387

this picture doesn't accurately present the issue at hand:

suppose it was "what americans know about being" and "being".

the epistemic and metaphysical necessities are disconnected, for they encompass two separate spheres of being.

<λx.[]Θ(x)>(c) <=> []<λx.Θ(x)>(c). if we mean: what it means to be vs what americans know of what it means to be, then this presents an infinite regress; for what it means to be has being and must then encompass a larger set of being within being which we must assess whether americans have knowledge of. it's an extension of zeno's argument from space.

QED

A point of consideration: Is it unwarranted for one to believe in the non-existence of God or the existence of God?
Provided there's no intellectual basis for either of these stances, a choice is going to have to be made regardless. When presented with a question, one has the option of saying "yes" or "no", or refusing to respond. But when there's no evidence in favor of any one response, don't all of these responses weigh just as equally? We must choose by virtue of being presented with the question. Answering the question "Does God exist?" thus appears to answer more questions about oneself and one's decision-making process than it does about the accuracy of one's claims. If you want to believe in God, it is a justified belief; if you don't, it is also justified. Until evidence arises, this issue is a non-issue.

Everyone or her?
I can't love
touch you forever
just melt away
fleets away now

lines of this poem read vertically and horizontally.

>>3199677

Any defense of a specific mode of knowing would be interesting. You could defend foundationalism - and say "for one to possess knowledge, their beliefs must derive from some axiomatic given statement" - from a cartesian standpoint - or platonic, or humean. If you stick with Hume, you could argue for perception being the method of belief-formation by which beliefs arise, and beliefs are axiomatic on an empirical basis.

an interesting epistemological discussion in recent literature is that of epistemic contextualism, where the truth-value of a given proposition is dependent on the context - or situation in which it is presented. so if i say "A is a cat", even if A is not a cat I am right in saying A is cat - supposing im not lying to myself - by virtue of being presented with a context in which i had no other choice but to come to such a conclusion. if it is the case that A is not a cat, and evidence is presented, then i was still right in my original statement based on the context.

>>3199129
The notion of knowledge began with plato's incorporation of the forms to distinguish between that which can be known and that which is sensibly or apparently so. This distinction represents that of true opinion (belief of the senses) and knowledge (justified true belief). Justified true belief is knowledge for plato - something that is only representative of awareness of the forms; true belief is awareness of the world of the senses, the empirical world. This, however, is not the case in modern epistemology: there are a number of caveats that have been idenitifed by Gettier - a 20th century american philosopher. But this isnt something that's typically discussed on an undergraduate level, so we'll stick with JTB. Really, all JTB is is a belief one holds with reason that is true - if this wasn't obvious before. The next question becomes: does the belief i have rely on an unwarranted belief? Does knowing require an infinite regress of beliefs justifying prior beliefs, a circularity of beliefs, or a foundational belief that precedes beliefs. Does the mechanism by which I believe change things? Is it not knowledge to claim a = a or "this appears blue"?

Suppose I say "A appears blue", is this dependent on another belief or the mechanism by which I perceive? If it is based on the mechanism in itself, then foundational beliefs exist by which I can claim knowledge.

the subject is EXTREMELY vast, any particular questions would help.

same guy as >>3193442

>>3193442

Be specific about what kinds of papers you want to read. Do you want a focus or a general education in formal logic? Does this include the philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language or linguistics?

>>3131690
brilliant

Where should one START?

The place to *start* would be Russell's "A History of Western Philosophy." While filled with a number of errors, Russell's style is clear and concise - a perfect introduction for the layman. Moreover, it provides one with the social and political context of the growth of each constituent school at any given time.

Once you've read this, it'd be best to consider things chronologically: start with the pre-socratics and purchase Copleston's set on the history of philosophy as a companion.
Copleston's work is extraordinarily helpful and provides great detail to many of the philosophical issues at hand.

Upon completion of the pre-socratics, you ought to read the following in, preferably, the following order:
Plato's Euthyphro
Plato's Apology
Plato's Crito
Plato's Phaedo
Plato's Meno
Which are, arguably, the most important platonic dialogues. The Republic should be included subsequently.
As for Aristotle, his metaphysics is quite necessary.

Another important introductory aspect:
A basic notion of propositional or predicate logic - as well as fallacies - will be quite helpful:
Use Hurley's "An Concise introduction to logic"

studying mathematics, philosophy and linguistics.

fortunately, i only read philosophy on my spare time - so it's a non-zero-sum game