MEV attack risk

[Anonymous No.49339498]

At what price point will the link network security be at risk?

Since the token is needed, there is a real risk that the MEV mafia will target the point where the network becomes vulnerable.

[Anonymous No.49339511]

>>49339498
did you hear about the guy who stole a calendar?
he got 12 months

[Anonymous No.49339517]

>>49339498
staking is DON specific

[Anonymous No.49339519]

>>49339511
checked..

[Anonymous No.49339533]

What security exactly would miners have to exploit? They just de-prioritize link calls? It would push back the threshold of profitability of DONs a little bit but I don’t think they could realistically do it without sacrificing more money in the short term than they’d gain in a very long time frame.

[Anonymous No.49339539]

>>49339517
Not talking about staking specifically here, plus it'll only be an option

>>49339511
I don't get it

[Anonymous No.49339541]

>>49339498
to do mev you need to run a node
new LINK nodes will be judged by the current honest LINK nodes

once Ari manages to launch his MEv killer (Aeternity, I think?), honest old Link nodes will be able to alert MEv attempts and slash the LINK stake of mev maffia attempting to run mev on Link nodes

due to superlinear staking it will be more profitable to turn in mev nodes than to be bribed or participate

[Anonymous No.49339551]

>>49339539
calendars have 12 months

[Anonymous No.49339552]

>>49339539
>plus it'll only be an option
that's my point, collateralization is the security guarantee. why else are you concerned about token price if you aren't talking about staking

[Anonymous No.49339573]

>>49339533
Not necessarily by doing mev at eth level but at link node level they could act as bad actors on the network by either running a node or bribing one theoretically there could be a price point where it could be seen profitable to do so

[Anonymous No.49339584]

>>49339552
This >>49339573. Implicit staking relies on the token having value, think pos L1 for instance

[Anonymous No.49339595]

>>49339541
Ok now that's interesting, what's this aeternity thing I don't know about that. Still based on trust though but yeah I get it bootstrap and all

[Anonymous No.49339614]

>>49339584
it's application specific, if a user undercollateralizes their transaction that's on them. it would take a lot to undercollateralize given a single honest actor can take the stake of every bad actor

[Anonymous No.49339638]

>>49339595
watchdog mechanism is only based on higher tier layer trust if you choose so, it is a flexible mechanism (because it pauses the DON) and can be judged in any way you please (see whitepaper v2)

Aeternity: start watching this halfway through https://youtu.be/wGBilgN-KHo

[Anonymous No.49339655]

>>49339614
Once again not referring to staking necessarily here. Slashing is staking specific. But yeah to go your way if jobs were collaterised and the token lost 80%value like it did here what happens, I guess you'll say they'll have to stake more link but in reality these things can take time or some nodes could simply go broke see Aave users get liquidated on their loans for instance. During this short period of time could the network be at risk? Is there a mechanism in place to protect it?

[Anonymous No.49339671]

>>49339638
Always two steps ahead. I wonder what mechanisms they've already thought up for a future that doesn't even exist yet.

[Anonymous No.49339703]

>>49339638
Aequitas it's called, my bad
>>49339671
yes they were working on this at least 2 years back already from what I recall.

[Anonymous No.49339717]

>>49339638
Thanks, will look into this. Also do you have any idea how this >>49339655 is handled? Can you just pause your node while you get more link? Does it mean we could see the link network pause during high volatility periods?

[Anonymous No.49339766]

>>49339717
staking doesn't recompense users of the contract in V2, it is supposed to prevent an exploit altogether by offering high incentive to the other nodes to report rather than participate

common misconception since in v1 it was supposed to pay out contract users

RE the pausing, I'm not sure how they will handle that. Possibly each hybrid smart contract itself will be able to be written with a conditional pause function based on a watchdog signal from link nodes.
Such watchdog pause would of course be highly exceptional event because attacker loses a lot of money and reputation, and the contract would be safe if paused itself.

[Anonymous No.49339845]

>>49339766
Thanks but what I'm saying is since the incentive for high tier node to police other nodes is that they'll get their links, this incentive decreases when the collateral amount decreases. So in times of high vol to the downside their could be a point where it is more attractive for them to act as bad actors because nodes will be under collaterize. Of course we can think reputation and all but we'll this is crypto so we all know that game theory can only go so far before greed gets the best of it

[Anonymous No.49339899]

>>49339845
game theory is based on greed and only fails if the theory is just incorrect

even if small nodes in a certain DON are undercollateralized it only takes one honest actor thinking of long-term reputation instead to ring the alarm. In order to pull off a successful attack one needs to coordinate and bribe all the nodes, and the event you describe is unpredictable by nature so hard to coordinate

additionally I don't think the tier 1 nodes would vote wrong once the alarm is rung, they have a lot more at stake in implicit staking and future reputation than whatever is going on in an undercollateralized DON

but of course you are right and the real proof will be to see staking in action. I'm excited to see it.

[Anonymous No.49339948]

>>49339899
Yes sure. That is precisely why I asked in the OP what's the price point this could happen, what's the price point that would make the network vulnerable. There could be a point where nodes would throw away their reputation thinking there's a lot of money to be made and link is going to zero anyway. Seeing these two years of price manipulation and suppression I wonder if this could be something a concerted attack could target: dump Link price to make it vulnerable and bribe nodes at the same time. Anyway that's highly hypothetical but these past years have made me a bit paranoid about the length they're able to go to kill link

[Anonymous No.49340109]

>>49339948
fee value doesn't change IIRC, it gets updated with LINK price
similarly, you could update required stake with LINK price, all you need is an oracle, it's what ChainLink does

I'll add that you can manipulate all you want but when real demand and use arrives, good luck.