/biz/ - Business & Finance

Yes

>>54060846
No obviously
the goyim fear the jewish goblin

God that is a degusting goblin jew.

No, because I want this whole system to fail
Yes, because I am a working white male that has a large retirement fund and a lot of savings

>>54060846
no.

they must all be liquidated

>>54060846
No damnit.

>>54060846
No kike bailouts

>>54060846
i dont really give a fuck. it wont make a difference at this point.

>>54060993
I don't really care what you think

>>54060846
No.

>>54060846
>add 6 gazillion in debt receipt of govt
>tranny executives gets bailed out
>cattle pay the debt back
Privatised profit banks should have privatised loss. Bailout means loss gets distributed among citizen. So no bailout

>>54060846
no

its time for the crash

>>54060846
The Jews have perfected the grift: The privatization of success and the socialism of failure.

>>54060846
No. Accelerate.

>>54060846
Yes. Then the government should nationalize the banks that have been bailed out.

>>54060846

No.

Nationalize the entire banking sector like in China.

>>54060846
Yes

>>54060846
They should get less than nothing.
FDIC 250k and a bill for admin of 5k

Yes. People think bailouts means that there's no money and the Fed would have to give $200B or whatever away to cover all of the deposits.

In reality, it's a liquidity issue. SVB will eventually recover $200B, they just can't do it right now because they didn't expect everyone to demand to withdraw their money at once and had locked it all up in longer term assets. The current way this will work is the FDIC slowly selling their shit off and trickling the money back to uninsured depositors over several months to a few years. By the end of it, they should get almost all of their money back. But most of them can't afford to wait that long, and many businesses will go bust while waiting.

Instead, you could have a "bailout" where the Feds come in, immediately recapitalize the bank in exchange for all of its equity, run it like a normal bank for a few months to a year, and then sell it back off to private investors once everything's stabilized. They are almost guaranteed to generate a nominal profit from doing so, it greatly lessens the economic damage associated with the bank's failure, and it's not that different than what the FDIC is going to do anyways.

I support Peter Thiel funding the bailout for the bankrun that he caused, yes.

>>54061504
You sound like a Wallstreet executive fag

>>54061522
How did the gay kike caused it?

>>54061551
He told some VC people to begin to take their money out of the bank, it was reported in the press.

>>54060846
no.

>>54061551
Thiel got spooked when the bank said that they were looking to offload some of their bonds at a loss. Normally this would be fine, what caused the bankrun was when Thiel pulled billions out and told all of his VC friends to do the same. 25% of the bank's deposits were withdrawn in 2 days, very few banks would be able to survive with those kinds of outflows.

>>54060846
Is distinguishing between the hosed equity holders, people holding deposits, regular employees, and the upper management relevant in a "bailout?"

>>54060846
>goy ceo
Yikes….get a Jew and I’ll think about it

>>54061586
>very few banks would be able to survive with those kinds of outflows.
Most banks have a variety of customers and loan products, SVB just stashed VC billions into long dated bonds and sat on them.

>>54060846
No, even though they followed the /biz/ mantra of buy high, sell low

Which is a great business when interest rates are 0%, and people are shoveling money into Venture Capital Startups like they have no common fucking sense.
It's a 3-way catastrophe when interest rates surge.

>>54061628
It sucks when there are hedge fund managers basically making veiled threats over this bank if uninsured deposits aren't made whole.

>>54061628
That's not to say that there isn't some blame for the executives, they should have been offloading those bad bonds months ago. But from what's publicly available at this point, it's hard to not place some of the blame with the early VCs. Pulling your money out is fine, yelling "fire" and causing a panic is not.

>>54060846
no.
bailouts only reinforces the "too large to fail" meme.
plus bailouts act as an award for failures while taking money from successful and hard working citizens

>>54061683
That's the problem with all your customers being a concentrated clique of Venture Capitalists who all hang out with one another.

>>54061676
Why does it suck? They can bitch and moan all they want, it's their clients who take the losses, not us.

Now they know how everyone else has felt over the last three years while their buddies in Washington ruined everyone's lives

No. Being "THE bank for startups" was always an incredibly risky and stupid move because the people who run most startups are followers and morons. They all want to replicate an existing "success", like Uber, and most don't have an original idea or a worthwhile bit of tech. OF COURSE they all panicked because Twitter said so, and OF COURSE they're dumb enough to start a bank run and shoot themselves in the dick.

All these companies were born from, and sustained by, low interest rates and investors throwing cash around hoping something would go to the moon.

Let them die.

1/13
SVB
The lesson might be that there are some industries that are bad to bank. Imagine that it was 2021, and someone was like “do you want to start the Bank of Crypto? What about the Bank of Venture-Backed Tech Startups?” You’d be tempted, right? Those industries had so much money! They seemed cool. If you were their bank — if you were the specialized bank that exclusively focused on those industries — influencers on Twitter would tweet nice things about you, and you’d get invited to fancy parties. Also, as their bank, you’d probably find a way to get a cut of growing industries with lots of potential. Provide banking services to tech startups, get warrants in those startups, get rich when they go public. Provide banking services to crypto exchanges, start some sort of blockchain-based payment network, get rich through the magic of saying “blockchain” a lot.

But the structure of being the Bank of Crypto or Startups was a bit rickety. Traditionally, the way a bank works is that it takes deposits from people who have money, and makes loans to people who need money. The weird problem with focusing exclusively on crypto or startups in 2021 is that they had too much money. If you were the Bank of Startups, the main service that you provided to startups is that equity investors would give them a truck full of cash and they’d deposit it at your bank. Here is how SVB Financial Group, the holding company of Silicon Valley Bank, describes the vibe of 2021 and 2022 in its Form 10-K two weeks ago:

>Much of the recent deposit growth was driven by our clients across all segments obtaining liquidity through liquidity events, such as IPOs, secondary offerings, SPAC fundraising, venture capital investments, acquisitions and other fundraising activities—which during 2021 and early 2022 were at notably high levels.

People kept flinging money at SVB’s customers, and they kept depositing it at SVB. Perfectly reasonable banking service.

>>54061799
But the customers didn’t need loans, in part because equity investors kept giving them trucks full of cash and in part because young tech startups tend not to have the fixed assets or recurring cash flows that make for good corporate borrowers. [1] Oh, there is some tech-industry-adjacent lending you can do. [2] Tech founders want to buy houses, and you can give them mortgages. Venture capital and private equity funds want to manage liquidity and/or juice their reported return rates by paying for investments with borrowed money rather than drawing from their limited partners, so you can get into the capital-call-line-of-credit business. There are vineyards near Silicon Valley and you can develop an expertise in vineyard financing. And, sure, some of your tech-company customers do need to borrow money, and are creditworthy, and you lend them money and that works out. But there is a basic imbalance. Customer money keeps coming in, as deposits, but it doesn’t go out, as loans.

So you have all this customer cash, and you need to do something with it. Keeping it in, like, Fed reserves, or Treasury bills, in 2021, was not a great choice; that stuff paid basically no interest, and you want to make money. So you’d buy longer-dated, but also very safe, securities, things like Treasury bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities. We talked yesterday about how this worked out at Silvergate Capital Corp., the actual Bank of Crypto. And as of the end of 2022, Silicon Valley Bank, the actual Bank of Startups, had about $74 billion of loans and about $120 billion of investment securities.

No the system must be purged and the Hog must be Lean.

>>54061807
3/13
Crudely stereotyping, in traditional banking, you take deposits and make loans. In the Bank of Startups, in 2021, you take deposits and mostly buy bonds. Again crudely stereotyping, corporate loans often have floating interest rates and shorter terms, while bonds have fixed interest rates and longer terms. None of this is completely true — there are fixed-rate corporate loans and floating-rate bonds, traditional banking tends to involve making lots of loans (like mortgages) with long-term fixed rates, you can do swaps, etc. — but it is a useful crude stereotype. [3]

Or, to put it in different crude terms, in traditional banking, you make your money in part by taking credit risk: You get to know your customers, you try to get good at knowing which of them will be able to pay back loans, and then you make loans to those good customers. In the Bank of Startups, in 2021, you couldn’t really make money by taking credit risk: Your customers just didn’t need enough credit to give you the credit risk that you needed to make money on all those deposits. So you had to make your money by taking interest-rate risk: Instead of making loans to risky corporate borrowers, you bought long-term bonds backed by the US government.

>>54061819
4/14
The result of this is that, as the Bank of Startups, you were unusually exposed to interest-rate risk. Most banks, when interest rates go up, have to pay more interest on deposits, but get paid more interest on their loans, and end up profiting from rising interest rates. But you, as the Bank of Startups, own a lot of long-duration bonds, and their market value goes down as rates go up. Every bank has some mix of this — every bank borrows short to lend long; that’s what banking is — but many banks end up a bit more balanced than the Bank of Startups. At the Financial Times, Robert Armstrong writes:

>Few other banks have as much of their assets locked up in fixed-rate securities as SVB, rather than in floating-rate loans. Securities are 56 per cent of SVB’s assets. At Fifth Third, the figure is 25 per cent; at Bank of America, it is 28 per cent.

>For most banks higher rates, in and of themselves, are good news. They help the asset side of the balance sheet more than they hurt the liability side. … SVB is the opposite: higher rates hurt it on the liability side more than they help it on the asset side. As Oppenheimer bank analyst Chris Kotowski sums up, SVB is “a liability-sensitive outlier in a generally asset-sensitive world”.

>>54061834
5/13
But there is another, subtler, more dangerous exposure to interest rates: You are the Bank of Startups, and startups are a low-interest-rate phenomenon. When interest rates are low everywhere, a dollar in 20 years is about as good as a dollar today, so a startup whose business model is “we will lose money for a decade building artificial intelligence, and then rake in lots of money in the far future” sounds pretty good. When interest rates are higher, a dollar today is better than a dollar tomorrow, so investors want cash flows. When interest rates were low for a long time, and suddenly become high, all the money that was rushing to your customers is suddenly cut off. Your clients who were “obtaining liquidity through liquidity events, such as IPOs, secondary offerings, SPAC fundraising, venture capital investments, acquisitions and other fundraising activities” stop doing that. Your customers keep taking money out of the bank to pay rent and salaries, but they stop depositing new money.

This is all even more true of crypto — I mean, the Fed raised rates once and the entire crypto industry vanished? [4] — but it is not not true of startups. But if some charismatic tech founder had come to you in 2021 and said “I am going to revolutionize the world via [artificial intelligence][robot taxis][flying taxis][space taxis][blockchain],” it might have felt unnatural to reply “nah but what if the Fed raises rates by 0.25%?” This was an industry with a radical vision for the future of humanity, not a bet on interest rates. Turns out it was a bet on interest rates though.

>>54061853
6/13
Here’s Bloomberg’s Katie Greifeld:

Silvergate and SVB “in fact are victims of the same phenomenon as Fed tightening extinguishes froth from those parts of the economy with the most excess — and it’s hard to find more excess than in crypto and tech startups,” said Adam Crisafulli of Vital Knowledge.

And my Bloomberg Opinion colleague Paul Davies:

Both crypto and venture capital booms were children of the ultra-low rates of the past decade and a half. Now, rising rates and the shrinking of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet have burst those industry bubbles and increased the competition among banks for funding.

And so if you were the Bank of Startups, just like if you were the Bank of Crypto, it turned out that you had made a huge concentrated bet on interest rates. Your customers were flush with cash, so they gave you all that cash, but they didn’t need loans so you invested all that cash in longer-dated fixed-income securities, which lost value when rates went up. But also, when rates went up, your customers all got smoked, because it turned out that they were creatures of low interest rates, and in a higher-interest-rate environment they didn’t have money anymore. So they withdrew their deposits, so you had to sell those securities at a loss to pay them back. Now you have lost money and look financially shaky, so customers get spooked and withdraw more money, so you sell more securities, so you book more losses, oops oops oops. [5]

>>54061869
7/13
As Armstrong puts it, SVB had “a double sensitivity to higher interest rates. On the asset side of the balance sheet, higher rates decrease the value of those long-term debt securities. On the liability side, higher rates mean less money shoved at tech, and as such, a lower supply of cheap deposit funding.”

Also, I am sorry to be rude, but there is another reason that it is maybe not great to be the Bank of Startups, which is that nobody on Earth is more of a herd animal than Silicon Valley venture capitalists. What you want, as a bank, is a certain amount of diversity among your depositors. If some depositors get spooked and take their money out, and other depositors evaluate your balance sheet and decide things are fine and keep their money in, and lots more depositors keep their money in because they simply don’t pay attention to banking news, then you have a shot at muddling through your problems.

>>54060846
No. It’s either brutal free market capitalism for all or bail out socialism for all. There can be no middle ground

>>54061887
8/13
But if all of your depositors are startups with the same handful of venture capitalists on their boards, and all those venture capitalists are competing with each other to Add Value and Be Influencers and Do The Current Thing by calling all their portfolio companies to say “hey, did you hear, everyone’s taking money out of Silicon Valley Bank, you should too,” then all of your depositors will take their money out at the same time. In fact, Bloomberg reported yesterday:

>Unease is spreading across the financial world as concerns about the stability of Silicon Valley Bank prompt prominent venture capitalists including Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund to advise startups to withdraw their money. …

>Founders Fund asked its portfolio companies to move their money out of SVB, according to a person familiar with the matter who asked not to be identified discussing private information. Coatue Management, Union Square Ventures and Founder Collective also advised startups to pull cash, people with knowledge of the matter said. Canaan, another major VC firm, told firms it invested in to remove funds on an as-needed basis, according to another person.

>SVB Financial Group Chief Executive Officer Greg Becker held a conference call on Thursday advising clients of SVB-owned Silicon Valley Bank to “stay calm” amid concern about the bank’s financial position, according to a person familiar with the matter.

>Becker held the roughly 10-minute call with investors at about 11:30 a.m. San Francisco time. He asked the bank’s clients, including venture capital investors, to support the bank the way it has supported its customers over the past 40 years, the person said.

>>54061504
Hedge funds have already offered 75% of deposits. Let the free market decide. They want their privatized profits, so they can enjoy their privatized losses just like us peasants

>>54061907
9/13
Nah, man, you don’t get to be a successful venture capitalist by taking a long view or investing in relationships or being contrarian. I’m sorry, I’m sorry, this is unfair. Of course they were right — Silicon Valley Bank did collapse, and if you got your money out early that was good for you — but that is largely self-fulfilling; if all the VCs hadn’t decided all at once to pull their money, SVB probably would not have collapsed. [6]

But it did:

>Silicon Valley Bank collapsed into Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. receivership on Friday, after its long-established customer base of tech startups grew worried and yanked deposits.

>The California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation in a statement Friday said it has taken possession of Silicon Valley Bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver, citing inadequate liquidity and insolvency.

>The FDIC said that insured depositors would have access to their funds by no later than Monday morning. Uninsured depositors will get a receivership certificate for the remaining amount of their uninsured funds, the regulator said, adding that it doesn’t yet know the amount.

>Receivership typically means a bank’s deposits will be assumed by another, healthy bank or the FDIC will pay depositors up to the insured limit.

>>54061676
I have no estimation of their political connections or power, that's what sucks.

>>54060846
Fuck no. No bailouts ever for any bank or business or anyone. "Privatized profits and socialized losses" is NOT what I believe to be fair. Banks can take care of themselves or they can fucking die.

>>54061936
10/13
SVB’s capital stack looked roughly like this, as of Dec. 31:

-A tiny sliver of insured deposits (that is, deposits under the $250,000 FDIC limit), something like $8 billion worth out of $173 billion of total deposits. [7]
-Roughly $165 billion of uninsured deposits.
-Roughly $13 billion of “short-term borrowings,” meaning mostly Federal Home Loan Bank advances.
-Roughly $2 billion of long-term FHLB advances.
-Roughly $3 billion of long-term bonds.
-Maybe $4 billion of other liabilities, for a total of $195 billion of liabilities.
-About $3.6 billion of preferred stock.
-Common stock with a book value of about $12.4 billion and a market value, on Dec. 31, of about $13.6 billion.

It had assets of about $212 billion on that Dec. 31 balance sheet, though since then it has had to sell some assets and mark others down, and it’s not clear what they’re worth today. The California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation cited “inadequate liquidity and insolvency” when it put SVB into FDIC receivership, suggesting that the assets are worth less than the liabilities. The FDIC’s job, in receivership, is “efficiently recovering the maximum amount possible from the disposition of assets” to distribute to creditors.

>>54061683
They stop hedging about six months before they collapsed in favor of taking out more bonds. They also didn’t fund raise to lower their risk profile because that would have been bad for the stock and caused executive compensation to be lower. It is 100% of the fault of management for the failure

>>54061964
11/13
One obvious question is: If you are “another, healthy bank” working through this weekend to buy SVB and assume its deposits, how much would you pay for the assets, which were worth $212 billion in December? [8] I am pretty sure the answer is higher than $8 billion, the amount of insured deposits: The FDIC will not be on the hook for the insured deposits. The $15 billion of FHLB advances are also quite senior and will presumably be no problem to pay back.

I would also guess — not investing or banking advice! — that the answer will also turn out to be higher than $188 billion, which is the total amount of deposits plus FHLB advances. I say this not because I have done a detailed analysis of SVB’s assets but because it seems bad for the FDIC to wind up a big high-profile bank in a way that causes significant losses for depositors, including uninsured depositors. There was a run on SVB in part because there hasn’t been a big bank run in a while, and people — venture capitalists, startups — were naturally worried that they might lose their deposits if their bank failed. Then the bank failed.

>>54061737
I have no estimation of their political connections or power, that's what sucks.

>>54060846
fuck no. I want the whole troon infested shithole to burn.

>>54060846
Yes. Print more money.

>>54061985
12/13
If it turns out to be true that they lose their deposits, there could be more bank runs: Lots of businesses keep uninsured deposits at lots of banks, and if the moral of SVB is “your uninsured transaction-banking deposits can vanish overnight” then those businesses will do a lot more credit analysis, move their money out of weaker banks, and put it at, like, JPMorgan. This could be self-fulfillingly bad for a lot of weaker banks. My assumption is that the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the banks who are looking at buying SVB all really don’t want that. If you are a bank looking at buying SVB, and you do a detailed analysis of its assets and conclude that they are worth $180 billion, and you come to the FDIC and say “I will take over this bank and pay the uninsured depositors 95 cents on the dollar,” the FDIC is going to look at you and say “don’t you mean 100 cents on the dollar,” and you are going to say “oh right yes of course, silly me, 100 cents on the dollar.” [9]

Maybe I’m wrong about that, but if I am it’ll be bad!

>>54060846
No. Its customer base is entirely Silicon Valley. Why should anyone care?

>>54060846
No

>>54062010
13/13
Above that, though, I have no idea. The stock closed at $106.04 per share yesterday (a $6.2 billion market cap, roughly 50% of book value), and was halted today. The preferred was trading at about 60 cents on the dollar yesterday, also closed today. Byrne Hobart wrote the bull case yesterday:

>The simple way to look at SVB from an investing perspective is to separate the ongoing business from the balance sheet for a moment, and ask: what premium does SVB's business deserve to book value, in a hypothetical world where they didn't make a massive rates bet? Over the last twenty years, they've traded at an average of 2.3x tangible book value, and generally at a premium to their banking peers. So a simple way to value the business is to say that the fair value of the business is generally ~100 cents on the dollar in liquidating value and another ~130 cents on the dollar in franchise value. If that liquidating value has been vaporized by a rates bet, the surviving business is still worth a premium to book.

But that was yesterday, and the franchise value melts pretty quickly when you go into FDIC receivership. The bear case is … well, back in November, when crypto exchange FTX was still looking for a rescue (it never found one), I wrote that the traditional price for that sort of rescue is “we will buy your exchange, make sure that all your customers are made whole, and give you a Snickers bar in exchange for 100% of the equity.” That may be where this is heading.

>>54062029
Matt's Newsletter can be read free on Newsletterhunt.com. It's great stuff from an ex-Goldman insider who isn't trying to sell anything or offer investing (or legal) advice.
Notes:
[1] Similarly in crypto, on 2021, crypto exchanges had tons of cash that they needed to park at a bank, but were not really in the business of taking loans from banks. There was a lot of lending in the crypto world, but it was all loans secured by Bitcoins and stuff and that is mostly too spicy for a bank; it was mostly done by crypto shadow banks (including exchanges themselves). Though Silvergate did some of it.

[2] Here I am sort of summarizing SVB's discussion of its loan portfolio on pages 70-71 of the 10-K.

[3] Oh it’s way too crude. Here is “Banking on Deposits: Maturity Transformation without Interest Rate Risk,” by Itamar Drechsler, Alexi Savov and Philipp Schnabl, in the Journal of Finance in 2021, making the case “that maturity transformation does not expose banks to interest rate risk — it hedges it,” even in a model where banks lend long at fixed rates, because depositors are not very sensitive to interest rates.

[4] Oh I am exaggerating for effect, please do not email me to be like “by summer 2022 there had been a string of actual and projected Fed rate increases” or “actually there is still crypto,” I know.

LOL I loaned out money to someone who doesn't make money. Then it turned out they wanted it in hand!

>>54062101
[5] This oversimplifies the mechanics of how you lose money, and I recommend Marc Rubinstein's explanation today. Basically SVB ended up with a large portfolio of held-to-maturity bonds with an average duration of 6.2 years at the end of 2022, “and unrealised losses snowballed, from nothing in June 2021, to $16 billion by September 2022.” These losses “completely subsumed the $11.8 billion of tangible common equity that supported the bank’s balance sheet,” meaning that SVB was technically insolvent. But mark-to-market losses on held-to-maturity bonds don't count for bank accounting purposes; the theory is that you will just hold the bonds until maturity, they will pay back par, and you won't have any losses. So SVB was still solvent and fine. “Sell even a single bond out of an HTM portfolio, however, and the entire portfolio would need to be re-marked accordingly”: If you have bonds in your held-to-maturity portfolio, you have to be really confident you can hold them to maturity. SVB’s bonds kept maturing, providing cash to pay out depositors who wanted their money back. But: “What neither the CEO nor the CFO anticipated, however, was that deposits might run off faster” than the bonds. They did, SVB sold its available-for-sale bonds, it wasn’t enough, and here we are.

[6] Other things might have prevented its failure. Daniel Davies points out that Silicon Valley Bank, though it is big, is not quite big enough to be subject to the Federal Reserve’s post-2008 liquidity regulations, which would have made it more, you know, liquid.

>>54062115
[7] The FDIC’s statement says “At the time of closing, the amount of deposits in excess of the insurance limits was undetermined,” and presumably the mix has shifted since Dec. 31.

[8] They were not: Again, that was the book value, and the unrealized losses on the held-to-maturity bonds would reduce that. On the other hand, maybe they've gone up since then? Byrne Hobart tweeted: "One irony of all this is that a flight to safety is disproportionately good for exactly the long-duration low/no-credit risk stuff that caused this problem in the first place."

[9] When IndyMac Bancorp failed in 2008, uninsured depositors got back 50 cents on the dollar, though they were relatively small. Since then, it seems to be an FDIC goal to get the uninsured depositors paid.

The customers should be made whole. The bankers should be dragged out in the street and beaten with sticks.

Its almost entirely a bank for atartups so no. They could have picked a proper bank with normal loans but they picked this risky meme bank.

>>54062160
The bankers did nothing wrong: they invested deposits to generate operating money and profits.
If they made a mistake it was investing that money in something susceptible to interest rates and not having enough liquidity.

The customers caused all this by sheep stampeding in a panic to withdraw all monies.

>>54062199
But it was FASHIONABLE to bank at Bank Le Startup.
The crypto guys had no choice with Silvergate because basically no legit banks would touch them.

>>54060846
No

>>54060846
I still have to say no:
The bank had a poor investment model and was far too specialized in customer base
The customers were all panicky sheep who ensured their own losses.
Fuck both of them.

>>54060846
no
collapse everything no survivors
i dont even care if im caught in it

>>54061504
>In reality, it's a liquidity issue. SVB will eventually recover $200B,

no they will not.

>>54062334
>>54061504
They won't because their customers are forcing the to sell long dated bonds early into a shitty bond market.

>>54062160
Why? The venture capitalists invested so much specifically with this bank because they got special financing deals. They think they’re hot shit with a net worth of 200 million to a couple billion, but none of the big players would give them preferential treatment because they are small fish

>>54062404
Basically both sides fucked up, as neither had a plan for a world of high interest rates, even as they kept going up and the Fed kept saying "they will keep going up and up".

>>54062429
The failure of the bank is on management not hedging or fund raising. The loss of deposits is on the venture capitalists because they knowingly parked money in a high risk bank in exchange for ultra cheap loans. I don’t feel bad for either party because the failure was out of greed and stupidity from both parties

>>54062205
the bankers knew there was weakness when they reported 3Q22 back in November but instead of raising capital and addressing it they kicked the can down the road hoping things would just fix themselves

utterly incompetent morons, just like the VC-backed clients they serve. This truly is nature healing

>>54062199
>They could have picked a proper bank with normal loans but they picked this risky meme bank.

They actually couldn't, most banks would not accept them.

>>54062476
>>54062485
Everyone thinks they are playing a fine game until it suddenly goes sideways. Crypto will be exactly the same, for the same reasons, Fiscal tightening. (plus it's saturated with crooks and no regulation).

>>54061504
It’s not a liquidity issue if the HTM bonds on the asset side of the balance sheet got utterly nuked when rates went from 0% to 5%. At current market values there may not be enough assets to make depositors whole no matter how much time is given for recovery, unless you make essentially a bet that rates will fall in the short to medium term and boost your asset values to the point you become solvent again

>>54062573
If financing for your startup idea only gets approved by a meme bank, maybe your idea is trash.

>>54062693
SVB wasn't financing startups, it was holding the money in their accounts.
They aren't Softbank.

>>54062587
Crypto will be just fine because there is never an expectation of a bailout when shit goes sideways. Crypto is far more of a free market than most others because institutions fail all the time and people just eat the loss. Look at all the blowups we had in 2022-23 - no one came to the rescue and rightfully so. Bitcoin crashed, found a clearing price, and life will go on as it always has

If anything this entire debacle is a giant redpilling event for normies on how banking actually works, and how fucking retarded the people pulling the strings truly are. Makes crypto seem like the better alternative by a mile. I'll take the volatility risk any day over the solvency risk of human-run institutions

>>54062587
Crypto is full of just as much fraud as the banks and the stock market is. The real risk comes from all the shady exchanges and stablecoins that never get audited. Circles audit services are not the same as a full audit under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, so they are in the same category of being totally opaque

>>54062750
>Crypto will be just fine because there is never an expectation of a bailout when shit goes sideways.
Crypto needs a means of banking.
Crypto needs connection to larger commerce and industry.
That was always the end-case for Crypto, without it it's just beanie babies.
Now their bank connections are dying, and legit businesses see it as a fanciful risk not worth taking in a tight money environment. So it has no compelling use case besides criminal activity, and the SEC is hot to take that on now.

But hey you still have your beanie babies!

>>54060846
bail them out with the bonuses paid to the managers

>>54061201
Poltards think trannies are bank executives. Touch grass incel

>>54062859
oh no, he's retarded

my apologies for seriously engaging

>>54062917
Spoken like a man with a shelf full of rare beanie babies.

>>54060846
Absolutely not. If the bank needs it's money back then they should take it back from all the yuppies they made bad loans to. Start seizing their assets.

>>54062617
They would have lost some money but been able to cover it with loans and recapitalization over the long term like they were already doing. The problem was the massive increase in withdrawal requests during the run.

>>54060846
Fuck no.

>>54062955
They didn't make any bad loans. It's a run on the banks caused by a panic, and the bank is having to sell long term investments at a quick loss.
SVB was barely in the business of making loans, see >>54061964

>>54060846
NO LET THEM BURN

>>54060846
Yes all bank should be bail out as needed. Should be as simple as PPP loan

>>54062930
At this point there are still legitimate on/off ramps and legitimate ways to make money like with AAVE or you can play the opaque stablecoin game. You are correct that they are rapidly drying up, but they aren’t beanie babies at this point

>>54060846
No way
liquidate 'em all baby

>>54063028
No, not yet, but the entire future of the enterprise is falling apart. These cryptos were supposed to be a widely adopted technology that "changed financial systems" and "revolutionized industry on every level". Now it's becoming apparent that it's all pretty much an NFT ponzi.
Thus it will inevitably dwindle to nothing, accelerated by the Federal Government getting tired of it and feeling motivated to clamp down on it.

>>54062859
Crypto wont disappear. >>54062750
and yourself are forecasting them same thing in the short term (liquidity of usd drying up leading to a dump) while >>54062750 alludes to longer term potential while you attempt to ignore it by pointing towards contemporary lack of connections to larger commerce.

>SILVERGATE HAD A CRYPTO BANK RUN

The basic function of crypto is that you can buy cryptocurrencies with dollars and sell cryptocurrencies for dollars. I suppose there are other functions? But the main thing is that if you think Bitcoin will go up, you spend some dollars to buy some Bitcoin, and then if it goes up (or doesn’t), you sell it for dollars.

If you like crypto a lot — or if you are an institutional-ish crypto trader — you will do this a lot, and you may find yourself frustrated with the dollar side of things. Crypto trades globally, 24 hours a day, seven days a week; you can use smart contracts to send crypto automatically, and sending crypto is generally a permissionless lightly-regulated activity. But if you want to buy crypto with dollars, you need to use the US dollar financial system, which can feel clunky to you, a crypto native. You will probably have to send a bank transfer, but the banks are not open 24/7, and some of them might raise annoying questions if you try to transfer money from your bank account to buy crypto.

There are solutions. One solution is that you take your dollars, you deposit them at a big trustworthy crypto exchange, and then you use the dollars in your exchange account to buy and sell crypto. The exchange holds a bunch of dollars and a bunch of crypto for its customers, and when you buy crypto the exchange deducts some dollars from your account and adds some crypto to your account, and vice versa when you sell. There are problems with this solution. The biggest is of course that sometimes the big trustworthy crypto exchanges aren’t, and they lose or steal your dollars. But another issue is that, when you deposit your dollars at the exchange, it needs to deposit them somewhere. It needs to keep customer dollars at some crypto-friendly bank that will give them back on demand.

>>54063113
Another solution is stablecoins: Instead of keeping your dollars at a bank, you turn them into crypto dollars by buying stablecoins that are meant to always be worth a dollar, and then instead of buying and selling crypto with dollars you buy and sell crypto with dollar-denominated stablecoins. But here too you have to trust the stablecoin issuer, which is not always a great idea. (Other stablecoins are algorithmic and that’s also risky.) And the stablecoin issuer needs to put the money somewhere, so again there is a need for a crypto-friendly bank.

Another solution is bank fraud, but don’t do that.

So you need a crypto-friendly bank. For big US crypto exchanges and traders, that bank is often Silvergate Capital Corp., a bank that is so crypto-friendly that it not only accepts deposits from crypto exchanges and traders, it also built its own payments network for crypto settlement. By “payments network” I mean that, if I have an account at Silvergate and you have an account at Silvergate and I want to buy some Bitcoin from you for dollars, we can do the dollars side of the transaction by telling Silvergate to deduct the dollars from my account and add them to your account. Here’s how Silvergate describes its Silvergate Exchange Network:

>We designed the SEN as a network of digital currency exchanges and digital currency investors that enables the efficient movement of U.S. dollars between SEN participants 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. In this respect, the SEN is a first-of-its-kind digital currency infrastructure solution.

>>54063129
>The core function of the SEN is to allow participants to make transfers of U.S. dollars from their SEN account at the Bank to the Bank account of another SEN participant with which a counterparty relationship has been established, and to view funds transfers received from their SEN counterparties. Counterparty relationships between parties effecting digital currency transactions are established on the SEN to facilitate U.S. dollar transfers associated with those transactions.

>SEN transfers occur on a virtually instantaneous basis as compared to electronic funds transfers being sent outside of the Bank, such as wire transfers and ACH transactions, which can take from several hours to several days to complete. Our proprietary, cloud-based API combined with our online banking tools, allows customers to efficiently control their fiat currency, transact through the SEN and automate their interactions with our technology platform.

It’s a way to send dollars, at a bank, that feels welcoming to crypto investors: It’s 24/7, it has a cloud-based API, crypto exchanges are on it, etc.

>>54061371
Yes, we should give central banks more power to cause crises like this.

Ethically I am against bank bailouts, but I want the USA to suffer higher inflation because it's good for my gold portfolio so I hope they happen.

>>54063144
And so Silvergate attracted a lot of crypto deposits. If you are a crypto exchange or a crypto trading firm, you will find it attractive to keep your money at Silvergate, because (1) they are nice to you and like crypto, which is not so true of a lot of other banks, (2) they let you send money to your crypto-trading buddies at 2 a.m. on a Saturday, which is also not true of a lot of other banks, and (3) they are a real live bank, regulated by US banking regulators, with public audited financial statements and capital regulation to try to keep them from losing your money, which is definitely not true of a lot of crypto exchanges and stablecoin issuers.

This suggests a very simple “narrow banking” business model for Silvergate:

1. Take lots of deposits from crypto exchanges and investors, who really need a friendly bank, and pay them no interest.

2. Invest the deposits in very safe assets, US Treasuries and reserves at the Fed, because you have cheap deposit funding and don’t need to take a lot of risk to earn a nice return.

>>54063179
In practice … oh, I mean, everyone takes a bit more risk than that. The obvious risk for Silvergate to take, on the asset side of its balance sheet, would be to succumb to the temptation of lending against crypto: Its customers (crypto traders and exchanges) have a lot of Bitcoin, they might want to borrow dollars, they’ll pay high interest rates, Silvergate has a lot of dollars (from its customers), it is just a natural fit. [1] Does Silvergate do this? Oh sure:

>Our SEN Leverage product enables our digital currency customers to borrow U.S. dollars directly from the Bank to provide liquidity to support bitcoin trading activity using bitcoin as the collateral for these loans, which we refer to as SEN Leverage direct lending. In the SEN Leverage direct lending structure, a digital currency service provider, acting as custodian, holds the borrower’s bitcoin and the Bank uses the SEN to fund the loan directly to the borrower’s account at the exchange. In addition, the Bank also provides loans collateralized by bitcoin to digital currency industry companies for corporate treasury and other business purposes, which we refer to as SEN Leverage indirect lending. In the indirect lending structure, the lender uses bitcoin to collateralize its loan with the Bank and the funding of the loan and liquidation of the collateral may or may not occur via the SEN.

At the end of 2022, “total SEN Leverage commitments were $1.1 billion,” of which about $300 million seems to have been drawn. “All of our SEN Leverage loans continued to perform as expected, with no losses or forced liquidations,” Silvergate said in January.

Kek! Oh Fuck no.

Can you imagine the reaction to this if it happened?

RW and MAGA are already telling Ackerman, Sacks and all his Buttbuddies to go pound sand. I love how they cozied up to them and now are having sads that they are telling them to Fuck off. You sure as Shit ain't getting support from the AOC/Bernie crowd. Who exactly are they expecting to support this?

For someone that claims to be a smart guy, David Sacks sure has a fundamental misunderstanding of product market fit. The product in this case is an SVB failout, and the market is us and elected representatives. David there is zero demand for your SVB bailout product.
>"David, this meeting is too technical for you."
I love folks that are responding to his Twitter with that. Fucking Kek!

No
>b-but muhh jerbs
I’m a decent welder and know woodworking as well, plus a CDL holder with hazmat and tanker endorsement, I can find a job almost anywhere.
>muhh way of life
Fuck everything
>muhh famine
Should’ve prepped niggers. I’ll sell you naproxen, ibuprofen, or tylenol for a 5000% markup or a bic lighter for its weight in gold
>what about the feral niggers?
The average baboon will fall with a shot of 00buck, the armored variant can be taken care of with a slug.

>>54063192
A more boring risk for Silvergate to take would be just regular old interest-rate risk. Instead of taking customer money and parking it at the Fed, or in one-month Treasury bills, Silvergate could buy other pretty safe stuff — Treasury notes, US agency securities, mortgage-backed securities, municipal bonds — to try to get a bit more yield. And that seems to be the main risk that Silvergate took. Its balance sheet as of Sept. 30, 2022, shows about $11.4 billion of “securities,” meaning bonds: muni bonds, mortgage-backed securities, agency and Treasury securities. Meanwhile there was about $1.4 billion of “loans,” meaning the $300 million of Bitcoin loans plus some real-estate lending.

Then some bad stuff happened in the fourth quarter of 2022. Bloomberg’s Max Reyes reports:

>For months, US authorities have been racing to sever ties between banks and risky crypto ventures, worried the financial system could someday suffer serious losses. They may have been too late.

>In the starkest warning yet by a US bank catering to the sector, Silvergate Capital Corp. said Wednesday it needs more time to assess the extent of damage to its finances stemming from last year’s crypto rout — including whether it can remain viable. The shares plunged about 30% in premarket trading on Thursday.

>The firm, which already reported a $1 billion loss for the fourth quarter, said that figure could climb higher. The company is still tallying the cost of rapidly selling assets to repay advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank System. It may also need to mark down the value of some remaining holdings.

>That could result in “being less than well-capitalized,” La Jolla, California-based Silvergate wrote in a regulatory filing. “The company is evaluating the impact that these subsequent events have on its ability to continue as a going concern.”

>>54063215
Here is the filing. The problem is:

1. Silvergate had tons of crypto deposits: $13.2 billion of deposits at the end of September, most of them not paying interest.
2. Then crypto melted down and crypto investors took their money back from exchanges, which in turn took it back from Silvergate. By the end of December, noninterest bearing deposits were down from $12 billion to just $3.9 billion.
3. Silvergate needed to come up with about $8 billion of cash to pay out these withdrawals.
It got some of the cash by borrowing $4.3 billion from the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, a government-chartered institution that is basically in the business of giving short-term secured loans to banks that have a sudden need for cash. [2] In late 2022 and early 2023, that described crypto-y banks, and it became controversial that they were borrowing from the FHLBs.

It got the rest of the money by selling a bunch of its bond portfolio: At the end of September it had $11.4 billion of bonds, $8.3 billion of them “available-for-sale” (an accounting term meaning that Silvergate had to mark them on its books at their fair value) and others “held-to-maturity” (meaning that Silvergate could mark them at cost and not worry about changes in market value). At the end of December, it had just $5.7 billion of bonds, all of them available-for-sale. It had sold the rest.

>>54063240
This caused problems, though, because the bonds were worth less than Silvergate paid for them, basically because interest rates went up a lot in 2022. One thing this means is that Silvergate realized losses on the sales:

>In order to accommodate sustained lower deposit levels and to maintain a highly liquid balance sheet, Silvergate sold $5.2 billion of debt securities for cash proceeds during the fourth quarter of 2022. The sale resulted in a loss on the sale of securities of $751.4 million during the fourth quarter of 2022.

Another thing it means is that Silvergate had to recognize losses on the bonds that it kept, because it had been accounting for some of them as hold-to-maturity (no need to recognize losses), and now it has to account for them as available-for-sale: “In addition, the Company recorded a $134.5 million impairment charge related to an estimated $1.7 billion of securities it expects to sell in the first quarter of 2023 to reduce borrowings.”

The Bitcoin loans held up fine but that’s not the point. The result is that Silvergate had a net loss of $1.05 billion in the fourth quarter.

>>54063251
A core feature of bank regulation is capital requirements. If you are a bank, and you take $100 of deposits and make $100 of loans, and one of the loans defaults and you only get back $98, then you don’t have enough money to pay back all of your depositors, and that’s very bad. What regulators do is require that a bank that makes $100 of loans has to fund those loans with at most, say, $92 of deposits; the other $8 has to come from the bank’s shareholders. Then if some loans default and the bank only gets back $98, it can pay back all $92 of deposits, and only the shareholders lose money.

Capital requirements are mostly “risk-based”: You have to have about $8 of capital for every $100 of “risk-weighted assets,” and different assets have different risk weights. A bank that makes a lot of sensible mortgage and business loans might have to have $8 of capital for every $100 of loans, while a bank that, uh, holds lots of Bitcoin might have to have $100 of capital for every $100 of assets. Very safe assets — US Treasury bonds, for instance — have a risk weighting of zero: They are so safe that regulators don’t worry about you losing money on Treasuries.

There is a backstop to this rule, though, called the “leverage ratio.” Basically, a bank needs to have at least $5 of capital for every $100 of assets to be “well capitalized,” regardless of the risk weights of those assets. [3] If you are a pretty narrow bank with just $95 of deposits that you park in Treasuries, you still need to put $5 of your own money in as well.

>>54063266
Silvergate’s assets are very safe, despite those Bitcoin loans: They consist mostly of highly-rated bonds that are likely to be paid back in full. As of September, Silvergate had:

- $15.5 billion of assets;
- $14.1 billion of liabilities;
- $1.3 billion of shareholders’ equity (about 8.6% of assets);
- a regulatory leverage ratio of 10.7%; [4]
- a total risk-based capital ratio of 45.5%, because a lot of its assets had zero risk weights.

That capital ratio of 45.5% looks very safe. The leverage ratio of 10.7% looks fine. But then Silvergate lost a ton of deposits, had to sell assets, and had a billion-dollar net loss. That left it with [5] :

- $11.4 billion of assets;
- $10.8 billion of liabilities;
- $571.8 million of shareholders' equity (about 5.0% of assets);
- a regulatory leverage ratio of about 5.1%;
- a total risk-based capital ratio of 57%.

That capital ratio of 57% looks very safe. The leverage ratio of 5.1% looks a whisper higher than the 5% regulatory requirement to be “well capitalized.” If Silvergate had just an extra $19 million of losses, it would be below 5%.

>>54063314
From Silvergate’s filing yesterday:

>Subsequent to December 31, 2022, a number of circumstances have occurred which will negatively impact the timing and the unaudited results previously reported in the Earnings Release, including the sale of additional investment securities beyond what was previously anticipated and disclosed in the Earnings Release primarily to repay in full the Company’s outstanding advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco. The Company sold additional debt securities in January and February 2023 and expects to record further losses related to the other-than-temporary impairment on the securities portfolio. These additional losses will negatively impact the regulatory capital ratios of the Company and the Company's wholly owned subsidiary, Silvergate Bank (the "Bank"), and could result in the Company and the Bank being less than well-capitalized. In addition, the Company is evaluating the impact that these subsequent events have on its ability to continue as a going concern for the twelve months following the issuance of its financial statements. The Company is currently in the process of reevaluating its businesses and strategies in light of the business and regulatory challenges it currently faces.

Silvergate had to sell more bonds to repay the Federal Home Loan Bank loan, so it booked more losses, so … it is a close question, but it seems possible that it now has a leverage ratio below 5% and so is not “well capitalized.” That is not technically the end of the world — if the number is above 4%, Silvergate would still be “adequately capitalized” — but it’s not great, and it’s pointing in the wrong direction.

>>54063327
If you are a bank you do not want to be pointing in the wrong direction, because that becomes self-fulfilling. Bloomberg reports today:

>Investors and business partners headed for the exits, with the stock down as much as 55%, while Coinbase Global Inc., Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd., Paxos Trust Co. and other crypto firms decided to stop accepting or initiating payments through Silvergate. The exodus may threaten the bank’s key source of deposits and a platform for crypto participants to transfer money among each other.

>“In light of recent developments & out of an abundance of caution, Coinbase is no longer accepting or initiating payments to or from Silvergate,” Coinbase said on Twitter. “Coinbase will be facilitating institutional client cash transactions with our other banking partners.”

We have talked a lot over the last year about crypto shadow banks imploding. Often, when a crypto shadow bank implodes, its leader will say that there was a “run on the bank”: It had valuable assets, but customers asked for their money back all at once, so it had to dump the assets, so they lost value, so it didn’t have enough money to pay back all the customers. I have been skeptical of these claims, because in general the valuable assets were, like, magic beans that the crypto shadow bank had invented itself. The crypto shadow bank’s assets — in the case of Terra, of FTX, of Celsius, so many others — were mostly confidence in the shadow bank itself, and when that evaporated so did the assets.

>>54060846
Of course not

>>54063340
Meanwhile in actual regulated US banking, the idea of a “run on the bank” is somewhat quaint. [6] A run on the bank happens in, like, It’s a Wonderful Life, but in the real world of big US banks, that particular dynamic — you hear some bad rumors about your bank, you rush to withdraw money, the bank has to dump assets to get the money, it becomes insolvent — would be strange. In modern US banking, there is deposit insurance to reassure small depositors. There are programs — the Federal Home Loan Banks, the Federal Reserve’s discount window — designed to make sure that a solvent bank can get cash to pay out depositors. And there are capital and prudential regulations designed to make sure that the banks are solvent.

But Silvergate is having a real run on the bank! It has lost money, not by making dumb Bitcoin loans — the Bitcoin loans are fine — but by doing the normal business of banking, borrowing short (taking deposits from crypto firms) to lend long (buying Treasuries and munis). Silvergate’s assets are real boring normal stuff, and if its depositors had kept their money at Silvergate, its bonds would have matured with plenty of money to pay them back. Instead, the depositors demanded their money back all at once, and Silvergate had to dump its long-term assets at big losses to repay them.

The story today is that Silvergate’s customers are withdrawing their money because they are worried about Silvergate, “in light of recent developments & out of an abundance of caution,” classic bank-run stuff. But that's not why they were withdrawing their money in late 2022, when the trouble started. Then, they were withdrawing their money because crypto had collapsed: Silvergate’s crypto-exchange customers faced withdrawals from their customers, so they took their money out of Silvergate. The customers — crypto exchanges — were the problem, not Silvergate.

>>54063358
It’s just last week that US regulators warned banks about this:

>The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (collectively, the agencies) are issuing this statement on the liquidity risks presented by certain sources of funding from crypto-asset-related entities, and some effective practices to manage such risks. …

>Deposits placed by a crypto-asset-related entity that are for the benefit of the crypto-asset-related entity’s customers (end customers). The stability of such deposits may be driven by the behavior of the end customer or crypto-asset sector dynamics, and not solely by the crypto-asset-related entity itself, which is the banking organization’s direct counterparty. The stability of the deposits may be influenced by, for example, periods of stress, market volatility, and related vulnerabilities in the crypto-asset sector, which may or may not be specific to the crypto-asset-related entity. Such deposits can be susceptible to large and rapid inflows as well as outflows, when end customers react to crypto-asset-sector-related market events, media reports, and uncertainty. This uncertainty and resulting deposit volatility can be exacerbated by end customer confusion related to inaccurate or misleading representations of deposit insurance by a crypto-asset-related entity.

It’s almost like they knew this was coming. The regulators did not quite say “therefore, don’t bank crypto exchanges”; in fact, they said the opposite: “Banking organizations are neither prohibited nor discouraged from providing banking services to customers of any specific class or type, as permitted by law or regulation.” But you got the idea.

>>54063386
I suppose this counts as contagion from the crypto crash to the real financial system: A regulated US bank is worried about “its ability to continue as a going concern,” and it is dumping Treasuries and munis and mortgage-backed securities to pay back its debts. It is a narrow sort of contagion: That bank is pretty much the Bank of Crypto, and I don’t think that, like, your mortgage rate will be materially higher because Silvergate had to sell off a few billion dollars of bonds. But it is certainly the sort of contagion that regulators will want to discourage, and now they have clear evidence that it’s real.

>>54062205
>The bankers did nothing wrong
>>54062304
>The bank had a poor investment model

>>54063425
The bankers did not lie or cheat or steal; they DID build a business model on economic conditions that stopped being true; and they were certainly too slow in attempting to adapt to them. But there wasn't malfeasance or criminality is my point.

>>54060846
No. If it spreads to additional regional banks they should be bailed out.
you can make the case that SVB was a unique case because of CA retardation, but theres a very real risk that the structure of post-08 regulation makes a flight to safety out of regional banks into SIBs likely in a crisis.

>>54060846
fuck off back to twatter chud

>>54063497
>the structure of post-08 regulation makes a flight to safety out of regional banks into SIBs likely in a crisis.
It does not, and I challenge you to explain how it does.

>>54060846
No. I’d kind of like to see what what an overleveraged long doing to to 4chan happens on an international scale

>>54061586
Based Thiel.

>>54063497
>SVB was a unique case because of CA retardation
SVB was unique because only 5% of its deposits were insured. Most regional banks are safer than SIBs.

>Paypal Mafia tells all their VCs and startups to pull money from SB, creates bank run and takes it down
>Paypal Mafia begs for a bailout for SVB customers
Do I have this right?

>>54063731
It's not even 5% LOL it's actually like 2.7%.

Maybe these Smug Valley guys should have considered that pissing off people on the left and right wouldn't work out that in the end.

>>54063754
Pretty close to it.

>>54060846
Yes. If niggers get their student loans forgiven and kikes get billions for their war in Ukraine, tech bros should get their bailout.

>>54063754
Yep, these 'staunch free-market capitalists' created the very problem they are now begging the taxpayers to solve for them.

>>54060846
Doesn't matter at this point, the time for financial solutions is long passed into history.
Bailout and get hyper-inflation and financial collapse.
Don't bail out and get contagion that spreads to other banks and collapses the entire financial industry.
Incredibly bullish for Chainlink.

>>54064014
>Don't bail out and get contagion that spreads to other banks
That's not how this works...
>Incredibly bullish for Chainlink.
dammit I'm responding to retards again.

>>54061504
If they can give 500b to Ukraine why not give the missing 400B to depositors of SVB?

>>54064054
Of course that's how this works, all of these banks are cross invested into one another, how do you think 2008 happened?

>>54064112
They should never have given any of it because it's your money, were you asked? Would you agree to giving a portion of your paycheck to bail out someone's bad investments?

>>54060846
Do I support my tax dollars bailing out a bunch of troons and dumb women who gambled their money on a bunch of equally worthless troon tech startups? Absolutely fucking not. They can rot in hell.

>>54063883
>tech bros

There aren't any "bros" in tech, its a bunch of troons and h1b visa workers.

Lmao imagine the government bails out the banks (again) and then turns around and strikes down the student loan bailout. Just imagine the shit storm lmao

>>54060846
no
let the shit hit the floor

>>54060846
No. Play stupid games win stupid prizes.
It also seems like people who I don’t like are disproportionately affected by this as well. And of course, I just want to see it all burn we can start anew

No bailouts ever. Die zombie economy die.

>>54064830
You mean tsoy males rolling over and going back to playing Nintendo? Yeah what a shit storm lmfao

>>54060846
To put it in perspective, the bailout would be less than half of what Biden has sent Ukraine

>>54060846
Yes for small but over the 250k limit businesses, maybe up to 10M or so. Absolutely not for bank owners and creditors. Big companies like Roku should take a haircut because they are big enough to know better and employ people who keep an eye on shit like this.

>>54064954
>implying
How mant people in the US have student loans? Its not a small number dumbass.

>>54060846
no. and we shouldn't have bailed anything out in 2008 either.

>>54065075
You are a little delusional my friend.

>>54065017
Lets be honest though, the geopolitical gain in destroying one of the top 3 world super powers, that is a rival to yourself, is worth more to the US govt. than some bank failing or not.

No

>>54065181
Yeah im the delusional one. Not the person who thinks the number of college graduates who would benefit from some form of student loan forgiveness is small and also comprised solely of nintendo babies.

>>54065017
Regardless the economy is in a mess, i strongly believe the market turns bearish tomorrow.

>>54065252
I know its fun to fantasize that one day you will actually do shit, but no, they will in fact roll over and go back to playing the new Zelda game after making some angry social media posts.
Don't deny the effect of soma.

>>54060846
nope
let the fraudulent system fail
fuck depositors

>>54065308
I dont have student loans, so i dont have to do anything. But im not so delusional to think that there wont be massive outrage if they bailout a bank for its dumb fucking financial decisions and then choose to not bailout regular citizens. Im not saying they are going to storm the capital or some shit, but the outrage will absolutely be there. The effects will most likely be felt in elections.

>>54060846
Absolutely not. The people in charge of the bank obviously don't deserve jack shit, but neither do the types of people who banked with them. It's not normal every day people banking with these cunts, and anyone with under $250k in them is already going to get a guaranteed full refund from FDIC. This is the perfect opportunity to teach people a lesson about paying attention to what their financial institutions are doing with their money so banks in general stop pulling this bullshit in order to have to compete with each other for the most tidy finances so people will actually want to put their money in them.

>>54065452
Yes, I'm sure the amount of Twitter posts will be astounding. Probably a good handful of Reddit buzzing and gold being awarded by kind strangers.

>>54060846
No
Heт

>>54065267
I reckon it's time to sit in USDT till the market tells me what it has to offer, might take it a step further by keeping it in a Spool smart vault to earn yields.

I guess such a wide consensus from biz on the no option means they are about to get full bailout + tip

>>54060846
>a SVB bailout?
NO.
TRUE CAPITALISM MEANS HAVING TO DIE FROM YOUR WOUNDS LIKE ANY COMMON NIGGER SO NEW IDEAS CAN RISE FROM THE SUSTENANCE PROVIDED BY YOUR ROTTING FLESH.
>
DEATH IS GOOD.

>>54066140
No.
We run the group that owns the group that runs the Fed.

>>54062617
>At current market values there may not be enough assets to make depositors whole no matter how much time is given for recovery
>no matter how much time
mein Neger, the amount of time necessary is the term of their long-dated bonds; unless they bought them on the secondary market at a premium to the principle they will get the money back if they hold to maturity. Ok maybe that's 30 years if they hold a lot of really long bonds but it still counts as getting the money back

>>54060846
No, obviously

fuck money and anyone who makes it

This Fucking idea about SVB and the "little guys". No little guys had accounts or lines of credit with SVB. You had to have 10 million before they would even talk to you. Why do you think only 2.7% of the money is FDIC insured? There were ZERO little guys banking with SVB.

No bailout because it's funny to watch successful people get fucked over. Especially my enemies.

>>54066827
That's how America works. Everything is constantly rephrased so that anyone with less than a billlion bucks is "the little guy" that needs to be coddled and protected at all costs.
Anyone else gets food stamps if they need it, otherwise fuck you. Middle class who?

No bail out

They privatise the gains and socialise their losses onto the tax payer.
Its time to end these bull shit artists and all their shit talking let them burn.

no bail out whatsoever
everybody needs to get fucked in the ass

>>54060846
no, fuck hem kids

>>54060846
nah
equity goes to 0 -> just about enough cash to cover deposits. no way gubmint should throw tax dollarydoos to help out fucking bank owners that can't be bothered to diversify their investments

No
Not a solution to the problem
They would spin another cycle again knowing no consequences will follow

Absolutely fucking not

Anyone in favor of it also probably wants student loan forgiveness and is just a fucking leech

>>54060846
No, there should not be a bailout, but there is probably going to be one anyway.

No, and neither does Yellen. Eyes on the prize, focus on the bigger picture. Stop getting your dick rock solid for a bailout that is already confirmed to not happen. There will be a happening one day, but this ain't it.

>>54060846
yes

>>54060846
Yes because we don't have a choice in the matter.

It's whatever narrative provides the least resistance. They don't want a revolt, they want disappointment. What's more disappointing than a bailout?

And for the faggots that say it's not the case this time and they'll start a riot. Try it. I guarantee you'll be the first tear gassed into submission while they just rubber bullet everyone away for the safety of the bankers.

>>54060846
NO

you know rich jews will get bailed out. odds are like -10,000

>>54060846
america is the great satan. killing it off at this point would be doing the world a favor. but i'm dependent on it so bail out the woke shitters and kick the can boomer style

>>54063883
>>54063908
vatnik alert

>>54060846
NO. We poor are not going to bail you rich losers out again. We are going to shoot you, and take over to stop you from ruining everything again.

>>54070174
Go back to /k/ then leave there and go back to plebbit

>>54070174
Z.
Fuck off back to NAFO Twitter and remember to dilate