/biz/ - Business & Finance

>>14446896
>what exactly does it protect and in what scenario would it fail
it protects from malware on your computer (ideally the truth is once you plug it in theoretically it's not 100% safe anymore)
it's most important vulnerability is physical access by an attacker. also writing down the seed as recommended standard practice is just retarded.

>>14447200
there is also one more thing that can happen, let's assume an attacker takes control of your computer but can't take control of your hw device. you create a transaction on the pc client and send the tx to the device for signing the device displays the address you spend to, but you have no idea if the change address is something you actually control or not (not that it's displayed). so you spend $1.50 from your $100k and then your $100k is gone even tho the hw worked up to spec.

>>14447200

You don't know what you're talking about....

>>14447288
i know exactly what i'm talking about. just because you don't get it...

It protects against anything but Evil Maid attacks while things like MEW are better against Evil Maid but much worse if you get malware.
You should run a VM to access your crypto wallets.

>>14446896
>using a glorified usb stick with french backdoors
not going to make it

Reminder to lock your coins at the top to prevent any losses.
We all are gonna make it, frens.

>>14447284
This.I would have expected this to be discussed more heavily in here. The Ledger can be fooled into sending away ALL funds from ALL your accounts, with NO warning from the device... This is how it can be exploited:

a. The user initiates a payment on malicious software
b. ALL coins get used as inputs
c. The Ledger gets fooled into accepting a malicious change address (this fault behavior is caused by simply leaving the derivation path empty) ...
d. The user confirms the normal looking transaction on the Ledger
e. ALL coins (minus the payment) get sent to the malicious change address

More information:https://sergeylappo.github.io/ledger-hack/

>>14446896
> paranoid
> buys ledger
Retard. Ledger has backdoors.

>>14447425
you started out good but the vm part is not actual good practice and does not add significantly to security. no vm is secure form the host. and even breakouts from the vm to host have been documented.

the truth is you have to have control over the computer or device you transact from. if it has malware you could be fucked.

cryptographic security means a galactic empire can go bankrupt trying to get your $100k. snakeoil security like soft pins and tamper proof chips means someone with a few grand investment can crack unlimited number of these wallets. jamal will pass it to the fence the fence will know the guy and you are fucked.

combining the two with multisig, is probably the best practice today for a hot wallet.

for cold storage just use encrypted paper wallets generated on a mint offline os, or store the seed using shamirs or grouping at multiple locations! losing your hot/spend wallet should be more than survivable.

>>14447200
>>14447284
Thanks for the advice.
I assume you only need the seed when you wipe the device by using the wrong pin. I thought of memorizing the last 2 or 3 seed phrases and then encrypting the rest on 2 or 3 usb drives on a fresh and clean offline OS using TrueCrypt. This would require that I don't need the seed that often.
>theoretically it's not 100% safe anymore
I read about an attack that targets the desktop app, how often has such an attack succeeded so far ?
>so you spend $1.50 from your $100k and then your $100k is gone
I don't really get that, so you are saying that an attacker could change the properties of a transaction I make, potentially changing the destination address or the amount ?

Why even look at ledger scam when there's completely open source Trezor.

>>14446896
>But I am becoming paranoid, what if there is a key logger on my system and my key files are stolen ?

that'd suck

>>14447496
it's funny that even a cheap usb drive and a bit of tech savvy is better than using a ledger

>>14447519
How do you encrypt an eth wallet

>>14447490
with deterministic hierarchic pubkey generation this can be prevented tho, i just want to see the source code with my own eyes i want to be able to verify the protection is there and it's solid. and i want a 1000 other devs to come to the same conclusion. until that i will stay away.

>>14447490
Ok thanks for clarifying.

>>14447496
>>14447438
So hardware wallets are still quite controversial

>>14447542
dunno i only really bother with bitcoin. but you could put it in a keepass2 db, that uses argon key derivation...

>>14447520
>I assume you only need the seed when you wipe the device by using the wrong pin. I thought of memorizing the last 2 or 3 seed phrases and then encrypting the rest on 2 or 3 usb drives on a fresh and clean offline OS using TrueCrypt.
yeah keeping part of it memorized and breaking it up is the minimum security, you can also group it on paper no tools required store at 3 separate secure locations!

>>14447563
> hardware wallets are still quite controversial
Only ledger is controversial. The fact that they didn't fully open the code means that they've implemented backdoors.
Trezor is open source, u can even build your own Trezor using their code. So it's safe.

>>14447590
shamirs key sharing would be better tho... you still need a secure computer for that unless you are willing to do it on paper by hand.

>>14447520
>TrueCrypt
You misspelled Veracrypt

>>14447606
same shit m8 veracrypt is the live for of truecrypt

Buying new brand pc, get from github MEW and generate offline wallet, write down seed, format pc. Am i only subject to supply-chain attacks this way right? How to avoid supply-chain attacks tho? Become paranoid here too

>>14447676
getting MEW from another pc, this new one before the formatting will not touch internet

>>14447676
>Buying new brand pc, get from github MEW and generate offline wallet, write down seed, format pc.
just boot a live os they will mount your hdd as read only, no formatting needed. the pc doesn't have to be new wither just reboot before and after.

i can't believe people unironically actually buy new pc for this shit a brand new pc out of china can be full of malware anyhow it just won't have anywhere to write significant amount of data the rules of computer science and physics are on your side in this.

>>14447490

Well your link says this bug is long fixed.

>>14447737
it may or may not be (i know there is a theoretical fix) i never seen the source code... and hence the problem with ledger.

Do you tinfoil retards really think the people at nano will pull an “exit scam” by executing the backdoor that they have “built in” and steal every crypto stored on ledger around the world.

>>14447787
in crypto there is no place for trust
i will not use any tool that requires me to trust in the benevolence of a third party.
it's more principles than paranoia. you are free to have trustful custodial relationships in this world that's not revolutionary.

>>14447814
What a fucking retard

>>14447719
Well for the less tech savvy individuals this seems like the way to go, but even then wouldn't just airgapping the new laptop ( removing wifi card, uninstsllinhg drivers etc) make this secure? Also can you give me a quick rundown on Shamir? I can't find any simple guide anywhere am brainlet

>>14447832
you have a boomer soul

>>14447843
don't think you have to remove the wifi card (you can turn these off too)... if you check you have no internet connectivity it's fine. you also don't have to remove the hardrive but you can do both if you are paranoid. still no reason to buy anew computer.

https://github.com/iancoleman/shamir
just download open the html and try it out all instructions are on the page.

>>14447894
Thanks dude you are pretty based fren

>>14447894
also check out shamir-39
which has been explicitly made to split seeds securely it uses seed words in the parts also

>>14447847
why do you trust the computer or any electronic that you use retard.

an other reason why i'm not willing to buy one of these trinkets is that every smartphone will have the same functionality built in in 2 years. and when you get a new phone you get a hw for free. and this means support for the standalones will diminish or disappear. it's a nieche market with a time to live in months.

>>14447972
that's the point you don't.
you verify before sending a cent to the addresses you generated and you don't trust your shit not to have malware on it.

>>14447843
>Well for the less tech savvy individuals this seems like the way to go,
Lots of anons have the Dunning-Kruger Effect over their wallet, seen a few paper wallet/usb drive/'airgapped' fags lose everything.

Just get a HW

>>14448001
Paper and “muh airgapped laptop” faggots are the worst. Just KYS.

>>14448002
yeah your post is dunning-kruger exhibit a

>>14448030
at least i know exactly what it takes to attack my wallets over 900 quintillion years with the entire hashing power of nicehash. longer than how long the universe existed with an unimaginably powerful quantum computer the size of a small moon.

>>14447986
>trusting chink manufacturers with your crypto

>>14448064
like i said spend wallets are not that big of a deal for me and the secure chips will not be manufactured in china or i don't buy it. shit has to be opensource too but we will get there.

Let me try this way, old laptop from 2008, install win7 from a formatted usb, with same usb copy into it MEW and GChrome, generate paper wallet, write down seed. Burn laptop with fire. Am i safe 100% safe aside losing seed?

>>14448128
>Burn laptop with fire.
that's a bit overdoing it... why not just boot a live os and just turn the damn thing off until you want to use it again? if you are this paranoid just disconnect the harddrive and the wlan.

also once you write down your seed it's the main point of vulnerability. you actually made things worse.

okay guys here is how i do it...
start a mint live linux on your computer prepare all your tools on the stick also (verify hash of everything obviously you can also review code changes and source if you are a coder).

once you generated your password encrypted wallets (print to virtual pdf printer) gather the bip38 private keys in a text file also.

print out the paper wallets in multiple copies secure them at multiple locations. after this boot the live os again do decryption/verify test for all of them, also you can back your password up using shamirs key sharing (in case you forget, die, inheritance etc...)

after this you prepare the documents to the key holders, do the dry test on the live os again once it's all ready to be distributed.

you also upload the text file to multiple cloud providers or say your gmail account store the pdf in multiple electronic copies etc... (always have secure redundancy!!)

then you start distributing the coins to your wallets... you can even make a practice run first with a little amount with importing and spending just don't reuse that wallet!

>>14448479
>using a printer
Already compromised

>>14448511
read again! password encrypted wallets
nobody can do shit with them, you want to keep it private only because your public keys are also on them. so maybe don't print them out at copy general...

>>14448524
well not the pubkeys just the addresses technically.