/biz/ - Business & Finance

>>57148792

>To put things in perspective, despite the sheer volume of transactions involved an attacker would somehow have to maintain consistent and exclusive control over 65% of ALL outputs to compromise just 1% of arbitrary rings per day. Raising the ringsize from 11 to 20 would up that percentage to 80%.

And ring sigs are getting ditched soon anyway.

>>54262433
>I didn't read it but the abstract says it reduces the anonymity set by 8-9, so it'd be applicable to size 11 rings, not just in the past like that other study

Theoretically, under ideal lab conditions where there are no other flooders. That is the fatal flaw with flood attacks: they require exclusivity and control over a super-majority of outputs, as soon as somebody else gets the same idea the two attacks cancel each other out.

>>51410193
>own 95% of the outputs

Good God, you're hilarious!

Protect your freedoms!
Join team #Monero today!

>>51029780
>Said the developers who are clearly in on it.

Clearly.

>Point is its an exploit and it doesnt require it to be in the code.

Its not an exploit, its a theoretical and well-understood theoretical attack vector that has never actually been successfully mounted due to the requirement of *exclusive* and *sustained* control over a *super-majority* of outputs.

TL;DR: flood attacks are very easily neutralized by counter-spamming.

>>50911592

At ring size 128 you'd need exclusive and sustained control over something like 99% of ALL outputs to glean insight on just 0.1% of rings, Seraphis basically = GAME OVER for adversaries, not that they currently have a reasonable chance of cracking ring sigs either.

So its smooth sailing until we jump ship to SNARKs/STARKs/whatever.

Sorry, Z-cucks, there will be no flipping of XMR after all.